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MENTAL PHILOSOPHY;

EMBRACING THE THREE DEPARTMENTS OF THE

INTELLECT, SENSIBILITIES, AND WILL.

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CONTENTS.

DIVISION SECOND.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

SENTIENT OR SENTIMENTIVE STATES OF THE MIND.—SENTIMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAP. I.—RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE SENSIBILITIES.

Section — Page

1. Reference to the general division of the whole mind..... 23
2. Difference between intellections or states of the intellect, and sentiments or states of the sensibility..... 24
3. Action of the sensibilities implies that of the intellect..... 25
4. Importance of the study of the sensibilities..... 26
5. Difficulties attending the prosecution of this study..... 27

CHAP. II.—CLASSIFICATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

6. Natural or pathematic sensibilities and moral..... 29
7. Relation of the natural to the moral sensibilities in time..... 30
8. The moral and natural sensibilities have different objects..... 32
9. The moral sensibilities higher in rank than the natural..... 33
10. The moral sensibilities wanting in brutes..... 34
11. Classification of the natural sensibilities..... 35
12. Classification of the moral sensibilities..... 36

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS FIRST.

EMOTIONS OR EMOTIVE STATES OF THE MIND.

EMOTIONALITY, EMOTIVENESS, EMOTIVITY.

CHAP. I.—NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.

13. We have a knowledge of emotions by consciousness..... 39
14. The place of emotions, considered in reference to other mental acts..... 40
15. The character of emotions changes so as to conform to that of perceptions..... 41
16. Emotions characterized by rapidity and variety..... 43

CHAP. II.—ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS.—EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.

17. Characteristics of emotions of beauty..... 44
18. Of what is meant by beautiful objects..... 46
19. Of the distinction between beautiful and other objects..... 46
20. Grounds or occasions of emotions of beauty various..... 48

Section Page
21. Illustrations of the foregoing statement 49
22. Of the objects in general which excite emotions of beauty... 50
23. All objects not equally fitted to cause these emotions 52
24. A susceptibility of emotions of beauty an ultimate principle of our mental constitution 53
25. Remarks on the beauty of forms.—The circle 54
26. Original or intrinsic beauty.—The circle 56
27. Of the beauty of straight and angular forms 57
28. Of square, pyramidal, and triangular forms 59
29. The variety of the sources of that beauty which is founded on forms illustrated from the different styles of architecture.. 60
30. Of the original or intrinsic beauty of colours 61
31. Further illustrations of the original beauty of colours 64
32. Of sounds considered as a source of beauty 65
33. Illustrations of the original beauty of sounds 66
34. Further instances of the original beauty of sounds 69
35. The permanency of musical power dependent on its being intrinsic 71
36. Of motion as an element of beauty 72
37. Explanations of the beauty of motion from Kames 73
38. Of intellectual and moral objects as a source of the beautiful. 74

CHAP. III.—ASSOCIATED BEAUTY.

39. Associated beauty implies an antecedent or intrinsic beauty.. 75
40. Objects may become beautiful by association merely 76
41. Further illustrations of associated feelings 77
42. Instances of national associations 79
43. The sources of associated beauty coincident with those of human happiness 80
44. Of fitness considered as an element of associated beauty 81
45. Of utility as an element of associated beauty 82
46. Of proportion as an element of associated beauty 83
47. Relation of emotions of beauty to the fine arts 85
48. Differences of original susceptibility of this emotion 86
49. Objection to the doctrine of original beauty 86
50. Summary of views in regard to the beautiful 88
51. Of picturesque beauty 89

CHAP. IV.—ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS.—EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.

52. Connexion between beauty and sublimity 90
53. The occasions of the emotions of sublimity various 91
54. Great extent or expansion an occasion of sublimity 92
55. Great height an element or occasion of sublimity 93
56. Of depth in connexion with the sublime 93
57. Of colours in connexion with the sublime 94
58. Of sounds as furnishing an occasion of sublime emotions 95
59. Of motion in connexion with the sublime 96
60. Indications of power accompanied by emotions of the sublime 97
61. Of moral worth in connexion with sublimity 98
62. Sublime objects have some elements of beauty 99
63. Emotions of grandeur 100
64. Of the original or primary sublimity of objects 100
65. Considerations in proof of the original sublimity of objects.. 101
66. Influence of association on emotions of sublimity 102
67. Further illustrations of sublimity from association 103

CHAP. V.—NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL TASTE.

68. Definition of taste, and some of its characteristics 104
69. Distinguishable from mere quickness of feeling or sensibility. 105

Section Page
70. Of the process involved in the formation of taste..... 106
71. Instantaneousness of the decisions of taste..... 108
72. Of the permanency of beauty..... 109

CHAP. VI.—EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS.

73. General nature of emotions of the ludicrous..... 110
74. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous..... 111
75. Of Hobbes' account of the ludicrous..... 112
76. Of what is to be understood by wit..... 113
77. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects..... 113
78. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects..... 114
79. Of other methods of exciting emotions of the ludicrous..... 115
80. Of the character and occasions of humour..... 116
81. Of humorous descriptions as modified by disposition..... 117
82. Of the practical utility of feelings of the ludicrous..... 118

CHAP. VII.—INSTANCES OF OTHER SIMPLE EMOTIONS.

83. Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, and gladness..... 119
84. Emotions of melancholy, sorrow, and grief..... 120
85. Emotions of surprise, astonishment, and wonder..... 120
86. Emotions of dissatisfaction, displeasure, and disgust..... 122
87. Emotions of diffidence, modesty, and shame..... 122
88. Emotions of regard, reverence, and adoration..... 123

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

THE DESIRES.

THE DESIRING NATURE OR DESIREMENT.

CHAP. I.—NATURE OF DESIRES.

89. Of the prevalence of desire in this department of the mind.. 127
90. The nature of desires known from consciousness..... 127
91. Of the place of desires in relation to other mental states.... 128
92. Of an exception to the foregoing statement..... 130
93. The desires characterized by comparative fixedness and permanency..... 131
94. Desires always imply an object desired..... 132
95. The fulfilment of desires attended with enjoyment..... 132
96. Of variations or degrees in the strength of the desires..... 133
97. Tendency to excite movement an attribute of desire..... 133
98. Classification of this part of the sensibilities..... 134
99. The principles, based upon desire, susceptible of a twofold operation..... 135

CHAP. II.—INSTINCTS.

100. Of the instincts of man as compared with those of the inferior animals..... 136
101. Of the nature of the instincts of brute animals..... 137
102. Instincts susceptible of slight modifications..... 139
103. Instances of instincts in the human mind..... 140
104. Further instances of instincts in men..... 142
105. Of the final cause or use of instincts..... 143

CHAP. III.—APPETITES.

Section Page
106. Of the general nature and characteristics of the appetites... 144
107. The appetites necessary to our preservation, and not originally of a selfish character..... 145
108. Of the prevalence and origin of appetites for intoxicating drugs..... 146
109. Of occasional desires for action and repose..... 146
110. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the appetites.. 147

CHAP. IV.—PROPENSITIES.

111. General remarks on the nature of the propensities..... 148
112. Principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence..... 149
113. Of the twofold action of the principle of self-preservation... 150
114. Of curiosity, or the desire of knowledge..... 151
115. Further illustrations of the principle of curiosity..... 152
116. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the principle of curiosity..... 154
117. Imitativeness, or the propensity to imitation..... 155
118. Practical results of the principle of imitation..... 156
119. Of emulation considered as a propensive principle..... 158
120. Of approbativeness or the desire of esteem..... 158
121. Of approbativeness or the desire of esteem as a rule of conduct..... 160
122. Of acquisitiveness, or the desire of possession..... 161
123. Of the moral character of the possessory principle..... 162
124. Of perversions of the possessory desire..... 164
125. Of the desire of power..... 164
126. Facts in proof of the natural desire of power..... 165
127. Of the moral character of the desire of power..... 167
128. Veracity, or the propensity to utter the truth..... 167
129. Of the twofold action of the propensity to truth..... 168
130. Propensity of self-love, or the desire of happiness..... 169
131. Of selfishness as distinguished from self-love..... 171
132. Modifications of selfishness; pride, vanity, and arrogance... 171
133. Reference to the opinions of philosophical writers..... 173

CHAP. V.—PROPENSITIES CONTINUED.—SOCIALITY, OR THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY.

134. The principle of sociality original in the human mind..... 174
135. The principle of sociality not selfish..... 175
136. Reference to the doctrine of Hobbes on this subject..... 176
137. Remarks on the statements of the preceding section..... 176
138. The doctrine of an original principle of sociality supported by the view that it is necessary to man in his actual situation 177
139. Of the principle as it exists in the lower animals..... 178
140. The existence of the principle shown from the conduct of children and youth..... 179
141. The same shown from the facts of later life..... 180
142. The social principle exists in the enemies of society..... 181
143. Proofs of the natural desire of society from the confessions and conduct of those who have been deprived of it..... 182
144. Further proofs and illustrations of the natural origin of the principle of sociality..... 184
145. Other illustrations of a similar kind..... 185
146. Other instances in illustration of the same subject..... 187
147. The subject illustrated from experiments in prison discipline 188
148. Relation of the social principle to civil society..... 190
149. Of the form of desire denominated hope..... 191

Chap. VI.—the malevolent affections.

Section — Page

150. Of the comparative rank of the affections..... 192
151. Of the complex nature of the affections..... 193
152. Of resentment or anger..... 194
153. Illustrations of instinctive resentment..... 195
154. Uses and moral character of instinctive resentment..... 196
155. Of voluntary in distinction from instinctive resentment..... 196
156. Tendency of anger to excess, and the natural checks to it... 197
157. Other reasons for checking and subduing the angry passions 199
158. Modifications of resentment. Peevishness..... 202
159. Modifications of resentment. Envy..... 203
160. Modifications of resentment. Jealousy..... 203
161. Modifications of resentment. Revenge..... 205
162. Illustrations of the malevolent passions..... 205
163. Nature of the passion of fear..... 207

Chap. VII.—the benevolent affections.

164. Of the nature of love, or benevolence in general..... 208
165. Love, in its various forms, characterized by a twofold action..... 209
166. Of the parental affection..... 210
167. Illustrations of the strength of the parental affection..... 211
168. Of the filial affection..... 212
169. The filial affection original or implanted..... 213
170. Illustrations of the filial affection..... 215
171. Of the nature of the fraternal affection..... 217
172. Of the utility of the domestic affections..... 218
173. Of the moral character of the domestic affections, and of the benevolent affections generally..... 219
174. Of the moral character of the voluntary exercise of the benevolent affections..... 221
175. Of the connexion between benevolence and rectitude..... 222
176. Of humanity, or the love of the human race..... 223
177. Further proofs in support of the doctrine of an innate humanity, or love of the human race..... 225
178. Proofs of a humane or philanthropic principle from the existence of benevolent institutions..... 227
179. Other remarks in proof of the same doctrine..... 229
180. Objection from the contests and wars among mankind..... 231
181. The objection, drawn from wars, further considered..... 233
182. Illustration of the statements of the foregoing section..... 234
183. Of patriotism, or love of country..... 236
184. Of the affection of friendship..... 237
185. Of the affection of pity, or sympathy..... 239
186. Of the moral character of pity..... 240
187. Of the affection of gratitude..... 241

Chap. VIII.—the benevolent affections.—love to the supreme being.

188. Man created originally with the principle of love to God.... 243
189. That man was originally created with a principle of love to God, further shown from the Scriptures..... 244
190. Further proofs that man was thus created..... 246
191. On the twofold action of the principle of divine love..... 247
192. Relation of the principle of supreme love of God to the other principles of the pathematic sensibilities..... 249
193. Illustration of the results of the principle of love to God from the character and life of the Saviour..... 250

Section Page
194. The absence of this principle attended with an excessive and sinful action of other principles 251
195. Further illustrations of the results of the absence of this principle 253

CHAP. IX.—HABITS OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

196. General remarks on the nature of habit 256
197. Of habits in connexion with the appetites 257
198. Of habits in connexion with the propensities 258
199. Of habits in connexion with the affections 259
200. Of the origin of secondary active principles 261
201. Objection to these views in respect to habit 263
202. Explanation of the above-mentioned cases 264
203. Further illustrations of the foregoing instances 265
204. The objection to the extent of the law of habit further considered 266
205. The objection noticed in connexion with the malevolent affections 268

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES OR CONSCIENCE.

MORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS SENTIMENTS.

CLASS FIRST.

EMOTIONS OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

CHAP. I.—PROOFS OF A MORAL NATURE.

206. Reference to the general division 271
207. Proof of a moral nature from consciousness 272
208. Evidence of a moral nature discoverable in what we notice in children 273
209. Proofs of a moral nature from the manner of our intercourse with our fellow-men 274
210. Proofs of a moral nature from the terms used in different languages 275
211. Proofs from the operation of the passions of anger and gratitude 276
212. Proofs of a moral nature from feelings of remorse 277
213. Evidence of a moral nature from the ideas of merit and demerit, reward and punishment 278
214. The existence of a moral nature involved in systems of moral philosophy, and in other writings and treatises of a moral nature 279
215. Proofs from the uniformity of law 280
216. Evidences of a moral nature even among Savage nations 283
217. Further remarks on the morality of Savage tribes 284
218. The existence of civil or political society implies a moral nature 285
219. A moral nature implied in the motives of human conduct which are recognised in historical works 286
220. Evidence of a moral nature from Scripture 288
221. Concluding remarks on the general fact of a moral nature ... 289

CHAP. II.—EMOTIONS OF MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

222. Classification of the moral sensibilities 290
223. Nature of the moral emotions of approval and disapproval .. 291
224. Of the place or position, mentally considered, of the emotions of approval or disapproval 293

Section Page
225. Changes in the moral emotions take place in accordance with changes in the antecedent perceptions 293
226. Of objects of moral approval and disapproval 294
227. Of the original ground or basis of moral approbation and disapprobation 296
228. Emotions of moral approval are called forth in connexion with the existence of right or rectitude in the things approved of 298

CHAP. III.—RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORAL NATURE.

229. Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience .. 299
230. Of the close connexion between conscience and reasoning .. 300
231. Illustration of the preceding section 301
232. Further illustrations of the same subject 302
233. Remarks upon the case stated in the foregoing section 303
234. Of the training or education of the conscience 304
235. Of guilt when a person acts conscientiously 305
236. Illustrations of the statements of the preceding section from the case of the Apostle Paul 306

CHAP. IV.—NATURE OF MORAL BEAUTY.

237. Of the origin of emotions of moral beauty 307
238. Of the origin and import of the phrase moral deformity 309
239. Of the correspondence between the degrees of moral beauty, and the quickness or liveliness of the moral sensibilities .. 309
240. Of the perception of moral beauty considered as a source of happiness 311
241. Of the moral beauty of the character of the Supreme Being. 312

CHAP. V.—NATURE OF MORAL SUBLIMITY.

242. Remarks in explanation of the moral sublime 314
243. Instances and illustrations of the moral sublime 315
244. The moral sublime involves the morally beautiful 316
245. A degree of moral sublime in acts of strict and undeviating integrity or justice 317
246. Other instances of the sublimity of justice 318
247. Instances of friendship and the parental affection illustrative of the subject 319
248. Of the moral sublimity of great benevolent undertakings 320
249. The spirit of forgiveness in some cases sublime 322

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES OR CONSCIENCE.

MORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

CHAP. I.—EXISTENCE OF OBLIGATORY FEELINGS.

250. Feelings of moral obligation distinct from feelings of moral approval and disapproval 327
251. Proof of the existence of obligatory feelings from consciousness 327
252. Further proof from the conduct of men 328
253. Further proof from language and literature 329
254. Further proof from the necessity of these feelings 331

CHAP. II.—NATURE OF OBLIGATORY FEELINGS.

Section Page
255. Feelings of obligation simple, and not susceptible of definition. 332
256. They are susceptible of different degrees. 333
257. Of their authoritative and enforcing nature. 333
258. Feelings of obligation differ from those of mere approval and disapproval. 334
259. Feelings of obligation have particular reference to the future 335
260. Feelings of obligation subsequent in time to the moral emotions of approval and disapproval. 336
261. Feelings of obligation differ from desires. 337
262. Further considerations on this subject. 338

CHAP. III.—UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

263. Of uniformity in the decisions of the moral nature, and the principle on which it is regulated. 339
264. The nature of conscience, considered as a uniform principle of action, requires that it should vary in its decisions with circumstances. 340
265. Differences in the decisions of conscience dependant in part on differences of intellectual power. 341
266. Diversities in moral decisions dependant on differences in the amount of knowledge. 342
267. Of diversities in moral judgment in connexion with differences in civil and political institutions. 344
268. Additional illustration of the same view of the subject. 345
269. This view of the subject further illustrated from cases of assassination. 346
270. Reference to a cruel law of the Athenians. 348
271. Of diversities and obliquities of moral judgment in connexion with speculative opinions. 348
272. Further illustrations of the influence of wrong speculative opinions. 349
273. Of the effect of wrong speculative opinions among heathen tribes. 350
274. Influence of early associations on moral judgments. 351
275. Illustration of the principle of the preceding section. 352
276. Of diversities of moral judgment in connexion with an excited state of the passions. 354
277. Of the action of the conscience in connexion with strong temptation. 355
278. Of the existence of a moral nature in connexion with public robbers and outlaws from society. 357
279. Illustration of the fact that there are the remains of conscientious feeling even in the most depraved of men. 358
280. Of errors in the statements of travellers. 360
281. Instances in proof of the preceding view. 361

CHAP. IV.—IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

282. Remarks on the reality of right and wrong, and on the standard of rectitude which is involved in their existence. 363
283. Of the origin of the ideas or abstract conceptions of right and wrong. 364
284. The immutability of moral distinctions supported by the views which men take of things in their nature or essence 365
285. Illustrations of the views of the preceding section. 366
286. Application of the foregoing views to the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions. 369

Section Page
287. The immutability of moral distinctions shown, secondly, from the terms and the structure of languages..... 370
288. The immutability of moral distinctions shown, thirdly, from the operation of the passions of gratitude and anger..... 373
289. Shown, in the fourth place, by the character of the emotions which arise in view of actual instances of right and wrong 375
290. Shown, in the fifth place, from the deportment and conduct of individuals, and from the character of codes of law and civil institutions..... 377
291. The doctrine further shown from the opinions which mankind entertain of the character and government of God... 380
292. Further remarks on the subject of the last section..... 382
293. Further proof from a consideration of the relation which the doctrine bears to the original and permanent character of the Supreme Being..... 383
294. Of the proofs of this doctrine from the appeals which are made in various parts of the Scriptures..... 385
295. Remarks in conclusion of what has been said on this subject 387

CHAP. V.—MORAL EDUCATION.

296. Suggestions on the importance of moral education..... 388
297. The mind must be occupied at an early period either with good or bad principles..... 390
298. Of the time when moral instruction and discipline ought to commence..... 391
299. Of the discouragements attending a process of moral instruction..... 392
300. Of the importance, in a moral point of view, of adopting correct speculative opinions..... 393
301. Further remarks on the same subject..... 394
302. Of the knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of the study of religious truth generally..... 395
303. Of the application of the principle of habit in morals..... 396
304. Further views on the influence of moral habits..... 398
305. Of the importance of correct morals in connexion with our civil and political situation..... 400

THE SENSIBILITIES, OR SENTIMENTIVE NATURE.

SENTIMENTIVE STATES OF THE MIND OR SENTIMENTS.

PART THIRD.

IMPERFECT OR DISORDERED SENTIMENTIVE ACTION.

CHAP. I.—DISORDERED AND ALIENATED ACTION OF THE APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES.

306. Introductory remarks on disordered sentimentive action.... 403
307. Of what is meant by a disordered and alienated state of the sensibilities..... 403
308. Of the disordered and alienated action of the appetites..... 404
309. Disordered action of the principle of self-preservation..... 406
310. Disordered and alienated action of the possessory principle. 407
311. Instances of the second kind or form of disordered action of the possessory principle..... 409
312. Disordered action of imitativeness, or the principle of imitation..... 411
313. Disordered action of the principle of sociality..... 411
314. Further remarks on the disordered action of the social propensity..... 412

Section Page
315. Of the disordered action of the desire of esteem..... 413
316. Disordered action of the desire of power..... 415
317. Disordered action of the principle of veracity..... 416

CHAP. II.—SYMPATHETIC IMITATION.

318. Of sympathetic imitation, and what is involved in it..... 418
319. Familiar instances of sympathetic imitation..... 419
320. Of sympathetic imitation in large multitudes..... 420
321. Of the animal magnetism of M. Mesmer in connexion with this subject..... 421
322. Instances of sympathetic imitation at the poorhouse at Haerlem..... 423
323. Other instances of this species of imitation..... 424
324. Application of these views to the witchcraft delusion in New England..... 425
325. Practical results connected with the foregoing views..... 426
326. Application of these views to legislative and other assemblies 427

CHAP. III.—DISORDERED ACTION OF THE AFFECTIONS.

327. Of the states of mind denominated presentiments..... 428
328. Of sudden and strong impulses of mind..... 430
329. Insanity of the affections or passions..... 432
330. Of the mental disease termed hypochondriasis..... 433
331. Of intermissions of hypochondriasis, and of its remedies.... 435
332. Disordered action of the passion of fear..... 437
333. Perversions of the benevolent affections..... 438

CHAP. IV.—DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

334. Nature of voluntary moral derangement..... 440
335. Of accountability in connexion with this form of disordered conscience..... 441
336. Of natural or congenital moral derangement..... 442
337. Of moral accountability in cases of natural or congenital moral derangement..... 444

CHAP. V.—CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES.

338. Frequency of casual associations, and some instances of them 445
339. Of association in connexion with the appetites..... 446
340. Of casual associations in connexion with the propensities... 447
341. Other instances of casual association in connexion with the propensities..... 448
342. Inordinate fear from casual associations..... 449
343. Casual associations in respect to persons..... 450
344. Casual association in connexion with objects and places.... 451
345. Of casual association in connexion with particular days..... 453
346. Antipathies to animals..... 454

CONTENTS OF THE WILL.

DIVISION THIRD.

THE WILL.

VOLITIONAL STATES OF THE MIND OR VOLITIONS.

PART FIRST.

GENERAL NATURE AND RELATIONS OF THE WILL.

CHAP. I.—RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE WILL.

Section — Page

1. General relation of the will to the other departments of the mind 459
2. All the great mental departments connected together 459
3. The intellectual part the foundation or basis of the action of the other parts of the mind 460
4. The connexion of the intellect with the will 461
5. The connexion of the understanding with the will shown from its connexion with action 462
6. Further proof from an observation of the conduct of men 463
7. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section 464
8. Nature of the connexion between the intellect and will 465
9. Opinions of Locke and Mackintosh on this point 467
10. Power of will and intellect not perfectly correspondent to each other 468
11. An energetic will sometimes found in connexion with limited powers of intellect 470

CHAP. II.—RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES TO THE WILL.

12. Introductory statement 471
13. Of the division or classification of the sensibilities 472
14. Acts of the intellect in immediate proximity with emotions 474
15. Emotions not in proximity with volitions 475
16. Emotions followed by desires and obligations 476
17. Desires in proximity with the will 477
18. Obligatory feelings also in proximity with the will 478
19. Further remarks and illustrations on this subject 479
20. Of the strength of the desires 480
21. Illustrations of the strength of desires 480
22. Of the strength of feelings of obligation 482

CHAP. III.—VOLITIONS, OR VOLUNTARY STATES OF MIND.

23. Necessity of the controlling power existing in the will 483
24. Remarks on the nature of the will 485
25. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions 486
26. Volition never exists without some object 487
27. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be in our power 487

Section Page
28. Volition relates to our own action and to whatever else may be dependent upon us ... 489
29. Volitions involve a prospective element ... 490
30. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength ... 491
31. Causes of the variation of strength in volitions ... 492
32. Further illustrations of the same subject ... 493

CHAP. IV.—DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS.

33. Of an objection sometimes made to the general arrangement. 494
34. Probable cause of confounding desires and volitions ... 495
35. Desires and volitions discriminated in our consciousness ... 496
36. Desires differ from volitions in permanency ... 497
37. Further proof of this distinction from language ... 499
38. Sentiments of esteem and honour often imply this distinction ... 499
39. Strictures on the foregoing remarks of Reid ... 500
40. Volition may exist in respect to those complex acts which the mind can embrace as one ... 502
41. If the distinction in question do not exist, the foundation of morals becomes unsettled ... 504
42. Instances in illustration of the distinction in question ... 505
43. Illustration from Roman history ... 506
44. Proofs from some facts in the mental constitution ... 507
45. Of the chastisements of God inflicted on those he loves ... 508
46. The scriptural teachings to be understood in their obvious import ... 510

PART SECOND.

LAWS OF THE WILL.

CHAP. I.—LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF LAW.

47. The preceding chapters preparatory to what follows ... 513
48. Of the importance of the topics now entered upon ... 514
49. The inquiry, whether the will has its laws preliminary to that of its freedom ... 515
50. Analogical argument from the fact that everything throughout nature has its laws ... 516
51. Remarks of Cicero on the universality of law ... 517
52. Remarks of Hooker on the same subject ... 518
53. The universality of law, including laws of the will, necessarily implied in the idea of God ... 519
54. An argument thus furnished in favour of laws of the will ... 520

CHAP. II.—LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT.

55. Of the existence of a moral government ... 521
56. Laws of the will deducible from the first principles of moral government ... 522
57. Laws of the will inferred from that supremacy or paramount authority which is implied in a moral government ... 522
58. Inferred also from the fact that the subjects of a moral government must be endued with adequate powers of obedience ... 523
59. Laws of the will inferred from that rationality which is essential to the subjects of a moral government ... 524
60. Laws of the will inferred from the fact that in the administration of a moral government motives are employed ... 525
61. Inferred also from the application of rewards and punishments ... 526

Section Page
62. The same inferred from the fact that the moral government of the present life is in its nature disciplinary..... 527
63. That the will has laws implied in the existence of virtue and vice..... 528

CHAP. III.—LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF THE DEITY.

64. The notion which men naturally form of the Deity implies foreknowledge..... 530
65. The prescience of God implied in his omniscience..... 531
66. The prescience of God taught in the Scriptures..... 533
67. Foreknowledge of events implies foreknowledge of volitions. 534
68. Application of these views to the will..... 535
69. The views of this chapter in harmony with the great doctrine of divine spiritual influences..... 536

CHAP. IV.—LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN.

70. Man as well as Deity susceptible of foresight..... 537
71. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation and conduct..... 538
72. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others..... 539
73. Other familiar instances of this foresight..... 540
74. The fact of laws of the will shown from the regularity of voluntary contributions and of deposites..... 541
75. Of sagacity in the estimate of individual character..... 543
76. Foresight of the conduct of masses of men and nations..... 544
77. Proof from the regularity observable in the commission of crime..... 546

CHAP. V.—LAWS OF THE WILL INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE.

78. The doctrine of the laws of the will confirmed by consciousness..... 547
79. The same confirmed by the fact of the will's not being a subject, but an attribute..... 548
80. The same confirmed by the fact that every exercise of the will implies an object..... 549
81. Confirmed also by the fact that every exercise of the will implies a motive..... 550
82. Confirmed also by the fact that every exercise of the will implies belief..... 551
83. Statement of other laws that are involved in the constitution or nature of the will itself..... 552
84. Proof on the subject before us from instances of predominant emotion and passion..... 553
85. Of the sense in which the proposition under consideration is to be understood..... 554

CHAP. VI.—NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES.

86. Division of motives into Internal and External..... 556
87. External motives derive their efficacy from the mind..... 557
88. The character of motives depends in part on the constitutional traits of the individual..... 559
89. Further division of motives into Natural or Personal, and Moral..... 560
90. Their relation to and influence on the will..... 561

PART THIRD.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

CHAP. I.—NATURE OF MENTAL FREEDOM.

Section Page
91. Of bodily in distinction from mental freedom..... 565
92. Of unsuccessful attempts to explain the nature of freedom.. 566
93. Freedom, considered as an element of thought rather than as a thing in actual realization, is the name of a simple abstract idea..... 567
94. Occasions of origin of the abstract idea of liberty..... 568
95. Of the undefinableness of the term freedom..... 569
96. Supposed definitions of freedom are either mere synonyms, or embrace some element requiring explanations..... 569
97. Distinction between the idea and reality of liberty..... 571
98. Of the source of our knowledge of liberty itself in distinction from the abstract idea of liberty..... 572
99. Of the precise import of the phrase moral liberty..... 572

CHAP. II.—MENTAL HARMONY THE BASIS OR OCCASION OF MENTAL FREEDOM.

100. Statement of the inquiry in this chapter..... 574
101. Occasions on which liberty exists..... 575
102. Of the circumstances under which this mental harmony may be expected to exist..... 576
103. Objected that perfect harmony of the mind is not realized in the present life..... 577
104. Perfection of mental harmony and consequent mental liberty illustrated from the character of the Saviour..... 578
105. Objected that the foregoing views are necessarily, and in their very terms, inconsistent with liberty..... 580

CHAP. III.—FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

106. Remarks on the nature of the freedom of the will..... 582
107. Of the relation of the freedom of the will to the fact of its subjection to law..... 583
108. Circumstances or occasions under which freedom of the will exists..... 585
109. Evidence of the freedom of the will from consciousness..... 586
110. Of an objection to the argument from consciousness..... 587
111. Illustration of the will's freedom, drawn from the nature of motives..... 588
112. Objected that the will is necessarily governed by the strongest motive..... 589

CHAP. IV.—FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE.

113. Remarks on the nature or mode of the argument..... 590
114. Of the elements of man's moral nature..... 591
115. Evidence of freedom of the will from feelings of approval and disapproval..... 592
116. Proof of freedom from feelings of remorse..... 593
117. Without the possession of liberty of will man could never have framed the abstract notions of right and wrong..... 594
118. Proof from feelings of moral obligation..... 595
119. Evidence from men's views of crimes and punishments..... 596
120. Prevalent opinions of mankind on this subject..... 597

CHAP. V.—OTHER PROOFS OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

Section Page
121. Evidence of the freedom of the will from languages..... 599
122. Evidence from the occasional suspension of the will's acts.. 599
123. Evidence of the freedom of the will from the control which every man has over his own motives of action..... 600
124. The freedom of the will further shown from the attempts of men to influence the conduct of their fellow-men..... 602
125. Further evidence from the observation of men's conduct... 602
126. Argued further from the view taken in the Scriptures..... 603
127. Practical importance of the doctrine of liberty..... 604

CHAP. VI.—CONSISTENCY OF LAW AND FREEDOM.

128. Objected that the views maintained are contradictory..... 607
129. Answered that they result necessarily from the evidence.... 607
130. Denial of the alleged contradiction..... 609
131. Admission of inexplicableness or mystery..... 610
132. Of the limited powers of the human mind..... 612
133. We find things which cannot be explained everywhere..... 613
134. Illustrated from the influence of men over each other..... 614
135. Opposite supposition attended with equal difficulty..... 615
136. Both views are to be fully received..... 615
137. The doctrine of the will's freedom equally important with that of its subjection to law..... 616

CHAP. VII.—ENTHRALMENT OR SLAVERY OF THE WILL.

138. Of the occasions of mental enthralment..... 617
139. Inability to define enthralment or slavery..... 618
140. The nature of mental enthralment illustrated by a reference to extorted promises..... 619
141. Illustration of the same subject from cases of torture..... 621
142. Historical illustrations of the subject..... 622
143. The will enthralled by the indulgence of the appetites..... 624
144. Enthralment of the will occasioned by predominant and over-ruling propensities..... 625
145. The will enthralled by inordinate ambition..... 626
146. The will enslaved by the indulgence of the passions..... 627
147. Inordinate intensity of the domestic affections..... 628
148. Of the slavery of the will in connexion with moral accountability..... 630

PART FOURTH.

POWER OF THE WILL.

CHAP. I.—NATURE OF MENTAL POWER.

149. Of the distinction between liberty and power..... 635
150. Proof of the distinction between liberty and power..... 636
151. Distinction of power and liberty involved in the fact of our being able to form abstract ideas of power and liberty.... 637
152. Distinction of power and liberty shown from language..... 637
153. Further shown from the possession of a moral nature..... 638
154. Origin of the idea of power in intuition or suggestion..... 639
155. The idea of power involves the reality of power..... 640
156. Things exist which are not made known by the senses..... 640
157. Of power as an attribute of the human mind..... 641
158. Further shown by a reference to the divine mind..... 642

CHAP. II.—POWER OF THE WILL.

Section Page

159. Proof of power in the will from the analogy of the mind.... 644
160. Proof of power in the will from internal experience..... 645
161. Proved from the ability which we have to direct our attention to particular subjects..... 646
162. Proof of power in the will from observation..... 646
163. Of power of the will as exhibited in patience under suffering 648
164. Illustration of the subject from the command of temper.... 649
165. Further illustration of this subject..... 650
166. Proved from the concealment of the passions on sudden and trying occasions..... 651
167. Further instances of concealment of the passions..... 652
168. Illustrated from the prosecution of some general plan..... 652
169. Subject illustrated from the first settlers of New-England... 655
170. Illustrated by the fortitude exhibited by Savages..... 656
171. On the self-determining power of the will..... 656

CHAP. III.—DIFFERENCES OF VOLITIONAL POWER.

172. Differences in volitional power seldom noticed..... 657
173. Remarks on constitutional weakness of the will..... 658
174. Of comparative or relative weakness of the will..... 659
175. Instances of want of energy of the will..... 660
176. Remarks on great strength of the will..... 662
177. Energy of the will under bodily suffering..... 662
178. Energy of the will as shown in imminent danger..... 663
179. Energy of the will as shown in martyrdoms..... 665
180. Subject illustrated from two classes of public speakers..... 666
181. Power of the will requisite in the military and other arts.... 668
182. Energy of the will requisite in the men of revolutions..... 669
183. Practical application of these views..... 670

CHAP. IV.—CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER.

184. Connexion of the will with consistency of character..... 671
185. Illustrations of the inconsistent character..... 673
186. Illustrations of the consistent character..... 673
187. Of individuals remarkable for consistency of character..... 674
188. Of the value of consistency in the religious character..... 676
189. Of the foundation or basis of consistency or inconsistency of character..... 677
190. Of inconsistency of belief in connexion with inconsistency of conduct and character..... 679
191. Self-possession an element of consistency of character..... 680
192. Perseverance under changes of circumstances a second element..... 681
193. Consistency implies a control over the passions..... 682

CHAP. V.—DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL.

194. Importance of a due discipline of the Will..... 684
195. A due balance of all the powers the most favourable state of things to the just exercise of the will..... 685
196. Of the culture of the appetites, propensities, and passions, as auxiliary to the discipline of the will..... 687
197. Some instances and proofs of the foregoing statements..... 689
198. Importance of repressing the outward signs of the passions. 691
199. Of enlightening the intellect in connexion with the discipline of the will..... 693
200. Further remarks on the same subject..... 696

Section Page
201. Of aiding the will by a reference to the regard of others..... 697
202. Of aiding the will by a reference to the conscience..... 698
203. Of the aids furnished by the principle of imitation..... 699
204. Of aiding the will by placing ourselves in circumstances which do not admit of a retreat..... 701
205. Of the effects of habit in giving strength to the will..... 702
206. Of strengthening the will by religious considerations..... 703

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

DIVISION SECOND.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

SENTIENT OR SENTIMENTIVE STATES OF THE MIND.

SENTIMENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 1. Reference to the general division of the whole mind.

It will be recollected that we proposed, as the basis of our inquiries, the general division of the mind into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. These great departments of the mind are not only generically distinct, but the difference between them is so clear and marked, it is surprising they should have been so often confounded together. They are not only different in their nature, a fact which is clearly ascertained by Consciousness, in its cognizance of their respective acts, but are separated from each other, as all observation shows, by the relations which they respectively sustain. The Intellect or Understanding comes first in order, and furnishes the basis of action to the other great departments of the mind. It is this portion of the mind which we have endeavoured to examine, and which we are now about to leave for the purpose of advancing into departments of our mental nature, which, considered in reference to the Intellect, may be regarded as more remote and interior.

In examining the Intellect, we were aided by adopting the classification, founded in nature, into intellectual states of External origin, and intellectual states of Internal origin; a classification which seems sufficiently to authorize the expressions External Intellect and Internal Intellect; expressions founded on the fact that the intellectual action sometimes takes place in direct connection with outward objects, and sometimes independently of such connexion. A mode of expression, which may be regarded

as synonymous in import, and which it may sometimes be found convenient to employ, is that of the Sensuous and Super-sensuous Intellect. This distinction in the intellective activities is important in enabling us to get a true idea of the intellect itself, and in suggesting the best methods of cultivating and applying our perceptive or intellective powers; but, considered in relation to the Sensibilities, is perhaps of less consequence. In both of its great departments alike, as also in its more subordinate modes of action, the Intellect furnishes the broad and deep foundation for that vast variety of mental states which are commonly included under the denomination of the emotions, desires, and passions.

§ 2. Difference between intellections or states of the intellect, and sentiments or states of the sensibility.

In advancing into what we assert to be a different part of our spiritual being, we are aware that some may be disposed to inquire whether the assertion of such difference, notwithstanding the general remarks of the last section, is well founded; whether, in other words, there is such a marked line of distinction between the intellectual and sentimentive nature as to authorize our speaking of them as distinct and different mental departments. We do not propose, however, nor does it appear necessary, to go into this topic here any further than to refer briefly to what has already been said upon it on a former occasion. In the chapter in the Introduction to the first volume, the object of which was to ascertain the outlines of a General Classification, we attempted to show the difference between the intellect and the sensibilities, between intellections and sentiments or sentimentive states of the mind, by a reference to consciousness, to the terms found in different languages, to the incidental remarks frequently found in English writers, besides the more direct and specific testimony of those who have written professedly on the mind. That this distinction is involved, wholly or almost without an

exception, in the structure of languages, is a well-known fact; and that it is made by leading writers on the philosophy of the mind, though often with an imperfect recognition of its fundamental nature and results, is no less undeniable. Not only this, it finds its way incidentally into the remarks of writers (and, such is the nature of their convictions, it cannot well be otherwise) who were writing upon other subjects, and who, at the time, were far from being aware that they were enunciating, either directly or indirectly, any doctrines of mental philosophy. The following passage of Southey, in addition to those already quoted, will illustrate what we mean; involving, like the others, not only a distinction between the Understanding and the Heart, but separating both from the Will. "Believing in them [the Prophets and the Evangelists] with a calm and settled faith, with that consent of the WILL, and HEART, and UNDERSTANDING which constitutes religious belief, I find in them the clear annunciation of the kingdom of God upon earth."*

But on a question of this kind we must rest ultimately, and it is presumed we can do it in this case with entire confidence, on the testimony of Consciousness. In a multitude of cases we are obliged to rely upon knowledge from this source; and certainly, on no subject whatever, is its testimony more clear than in respect to the acts of the intellect and the acts of the heart. When we have perceptions, when we think, we know the existence of such perceptions or thought to be one thing; when we have emotions and desires, we know the existence of such emotions and desires to be another thing; and we have an internal conviction, strong as any conviction can well be, that there is no possibility in ordinary cases of confounding them together.

§ 3. Action of the sensibilities implies that of the intellect.

As a general thing, there is and can be no move-

* Southey's Progress of Society, Colloquy ii.

ment of the sensibilities, no such thing as an emotion, desire, or feeling of moral obligation, without an antecedent action of the intellect. If we are pleased or displeased, there is necessarily before the mind some object of pleasure or displeasure; if we exercise the feeling of desire, there must necessarily be some object desired, which is made known to us by an action of the intellect. So that if there were no intellect, or if the intellectual powers were entirely dormant and inactive, there would be no action of the emotive part of our nature and of the passions.—And we may not only say in general terms that the action of the sensibilities implies the antecedent action of the intellect, but may even assert more specifically (making allowance for those constitutional differences which pervade every part of the mental structure), that the activity of the sensibilities will be nearly in *proportion* to that of the intellect. In other words, on all subjects which are calculated to excite any interest at all, those who have the broadest and most satisfactory views will be likely to feel more intensely than others; the sensibilities expanding and exerting themselves in conformity with the expanded and energetic action of the perceptive and cognitive powers.

§ 4. Importance of the study of the sensibilities.

The department of the mind on which we now propose to enter is not only distinct from the other great divisions, having a nature and characteristics of its own, but possesses, we may venture to assert, equal importance and interest. If man had been formed of intellect only, of cold and unimpassioned perceptivity; if he could merely have perceived, compared, associated, and reasoned, without a solitary emotion or desire, without any of the various affections of our nature, without sorrow for suffering or sympathy in joy; in a word, if he had been all head and no heart, the human soul would have shown not only a different, but a depressed and inferior aspect, compared with what it does at present. But, happily and wise-

ly, it is far otherwise. We find him constituted with a sentimentive as well as an intellectual nature; with powers of feeling as well as of thought. It is the sentimentive part of human nature (including in the term the moral as well as the natural affections) which Socrates, if we may rely on the doctrines and conversations that are handed down to us, particularly turned his attention to, and on account of which he was pronounced by the Oracle the wisest of all men living. It is here that we are let into the secrets of men's actions. It is in this department of the mind we find the causes which render them restless and inquisitive, which prompt to efforts both good and evil, and make the wide world a theatre, where vice and virtue, hope and fear, and joy and suffering, mingle in perpetual conflict.

Much is said, and with a good deal of truth, of the value of a knowledge of human nature; a species of knowledge which is useful to all persons, and in many situations is clearly indispensable; but this knowledge, to any available extent, can never be supposed to exist separate from an acquaintance with that portion of our nature which we now propose to investigate. A knowledge of human nature, in the common apprehension of the phrase, does not so much imply a knowledge of the powers of perception and reasoning as a knowledge of the springs of action, back of the intellect, which, in the shape of the emotions and passions, give an impulse and a character to the conduct both of individuals and communities. In other words, a knowledge of human nature is essentially a knowledge of the HEART; a term by which men commonly distinguish the sentient from the intellectual nature; and, consequently, all the value, and it is by no means inconsiderable, which pertains to the study of human nature, attaches equally to the interesting inquiries now before us.

§ 5. Difficulties attending the prosecution of this study.

But while we may properly and very justly main-

tain that no series of topics in the whole range of mental philosophy is either more fitted or more worthy to secure and interest the attention than those now before us, it cannot be denied that the discussion of them is attended with some difficulties, which do not perplex, certainly not in an equal degree, the examination of other parts of the mind. The perplexity to which we now refer will be better understood if we reflect a moment on the distinctive nature of the sensibilities. It is well known that the sensibilities, in their more decided action, are characterized by a sort of excitement, a stirring and breaking up of the inward depths, an agitation of the otherwise calm surface of the soul. It is this trait, so familiar to our consciousness, though difficult to be imbodied in language, to which we refer, and which undoubtedly characterizes the action of some portion of the sensibilities more than of others. The term PASSIONS is frequently employed to express that portion in particular.

Now it is the business of philosophy to give an accurate view of the passions, to dissect them, and to show precisely what they are. But that excitement which has been mentioned is the appropriate element of the passions; the very breath of their existence, in some stages of their developement, is inseparable from tumult and agitation. Such a state of things seems to be, and is in fact, inconsistent, to no inconsiderable extent, with that calm and critical examination which is desirable. We are obliged to wait till the excitement which exists has greatly subsided. In the interval of this delay, which cannot well be avoided, the true and important moment of examination has departed; and we are accordingly under the necessity of relying upon memory rather than upon direct consciousness for those intimations which are involved in a full knowledge of the subject of inquiry. It is different with the intellectual powers; their progress is calm and unruffled; we can mark them distinctly and accurately at every step, and in the very moment of their movement. But if it be otherwise in the Sen-

sibilities, particularly in that portion of them known as the AFFECTIONS or PASSIONS, the only remedy is to use the greater caution, and to compare and combine our own internal experience, so far as we can ascertain what it is, with what we can gather from the outward observation of others. The difficulty is, indeed, considerable; but not so great as to discourage efforts to examine a portion of the mind, which has been less accurately surveyed than the intellect, but which promises, as the result of its examination, an equally ample reward.

CHAPTER II.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 6. Natural or pathematic sensibilities and moral.

As we pass onward from the percipient and cognitive nature to the distinct and more remote region of the emotions and passions, it seems proper, before we enter more minutely into the various inquiries which may be expected to present themselves, to consider whether the department of the Sensibilities itself is not susceptible of being resolved into some subordinate yet important divisions. In accordance with this suggestion, our first remark is, that the Sensibilities, when subjected to a careful examination, will clearly be found to separate themselves into the great divisions of the Natural or Pathematic, and the Moral. These leading departments will be found to run, if we may be allowed the expression, in two separate channels, which, although they are for the most part parallel with each other, are nevertheless essentially and sufficiently distinct; each being characterized by its own attributes and by its appropriate results. Our examination of the Sensibilities will accordingly proceed upon the basis of this division.

In reference to the use of the term Pathematic, as applicable to the states of mind embraced in one of

these great divisions, it is proper to observe, that it appears to have been formed from its Greek original, and first used by Sir James Mackintosh. He repeatedly speaks of that part of our nature which includes the emotions and passions as *unnamed;* and in the progress of his discussions, appears at times to be embarrassed for the want of suitable English words to express it. And under these circumstances he proposes the term in question, which, in its etymological import, appears to involve a reference to the emotions and desires (the feelings that are particularly characteristic of the natural sensibilities), and adds the remark, which we are not aware is in the process of being realized, "until some more convenient and agreeable name shall be hit on by some luckier or more skilful adventurer in such new terms as seem to be *absolutely necessary.*"* The term, in the present state of our philosophic language, is certainly convenient; and such is the great weight deservedly attached to the name of its proposer, that we shall at least be pardoned for using it.

§ 7. Relation of the natural to the moral sensibilities in time.

When we use the term HEART as expressive of a part of our mental nature, we commonly have reference to the natural or pathematic sensibilities; when we use the term CONSCIENCE, we have reference to our moral sensibilities; so that the distinction now in question is obviously involved in the common usage of language. In truth, all the considerations, consciousness, the ordinary structure of language, and the incidental as well as the more formal and considered remarks of writers, which were formerly brought forward to show the distinction between the intellect and the sensibilities, in the more extended sense of the latter term, may also be adduced to show a well-founded distinction between the Natural and the Moral sensibilities. But abundant proof on a subject of this nature naturally flows out, if the fact in question actu-

* Progress of Ethical Philosophy. Remarks on Hartley.

ally exists, from a careful and philosophical examination of the departments of the mind, of which it is predicated. Without, therefore, delaying our inquiries by attempting to draw proof of its existence from other sources, we may proceed to notice some of those circumstances which may be enumerated as involved in and as incidental to the distinction which has been asserted.

And, in the first place, it appears to be the fact, as a general thing, that the exercise of the natural or pathematic sensibilities is the first in the order of time. Nor, if we reflect upon the subject, can we well suppose it to be otherwise. If there were no such thing as the Natural Sensibilities (in other words, if man were constituted without possessing the capability of emotion, desire, and passion), it is obvious that there would be no adequate basis in his mind for the operation of the Moral sensibilities. The pathematic sensibilities or the heart is the great, we do not say the exclusive, but still the great seat of the motives of men's actions, and consequently furnishes a principal field of operations for the conscience to act upon. We do not mean to assert, however, that there is not and cannot be any action of the moral, until there has been an entire, a *complete* developement of the pathematic nature, embracing, as it does, the whole circle of natural emotions and passions. It is true, when we descend to particular cases and specific acts, we find from observation that the natural sensibilities are first in the order of time, as they obviously are in the order of nature. And we say that they are first in the order of nature for the reason just hinted at, viz., that they include a large portion of the subjects which it is the business of our moral constitution to act upon, scrutinize, and judge. It is, nevertheless, equally true, that these two great departments of the emotive or sentimentive man, taken in their general history and as a *whole*, develope themselves nearly at the same time, and, as it were, side by side and parallel to each other.

In respect to the matter under consideration, they seem to bear much the same relation to each other which the External intellect bears to the Internal. When we look at specific acts of the External intellect, we shall find that some of them, absolutely and necessarily so, are first in the order of time; but when we look at the two departments as a *whole*, we find the developement, to a considerable extent, going on simultaneously. And so in regard to the Natural and Moral Sensibilities, considered in relation to each other, in reference to the time when they are respectively brought into action.

§ 8. The moral and natural sensibilities have different objects.

Another, and perhaps a still more decisive mark of distinction may be found in the views which these two great departments respectively take of the objects in respect to which they are called into exercise. The one considers objects chiefly as they have a relation to ourselves; the other, as they relate to all possible existences. The one looks at things in the aspect of their desirableness; the other fixes its eye on the sublime feature of their rectitude. The one asks what is GOOD, the other what is RIGHT.

Obliterate from man's constitution his Conscience (what may be called, if we may be allowed the expression, the *moralities* of his nature), and you at once strike from the mind one half of its motives to action; for, in respect to everything which is considered by us desirable to be done, the question always recurs, is it *right* to be done? At one time, on the supposition of an entire erasure of the moral sensibilities, all his movements are dictated by the suggestions and cravings of the appetites. At other times he covets knowledge, or seeks society, or indulges in the refinements of the arts; but it will be found in these instances, as well as when he is under the influence of the appetites, that pleasure is still his leading object, and that he is disappointed in not securing it. In his higher moods of action, when raised in some degree

above the influence of the subordinate propensities, his movements will be based on calculations of interest; and although the various suggestions which influence his conduct may have an extensive range, they will never fail to revolve within the limits of a circle, the centre of which is HIMSELF. On the supposition which has been made, viz., the extinction of the moral nature, even his Benevolence, so far as it is not purely *instinctive*, will necessarily assume the character of the prudential or self-interested. It is his moral nature, and that alone, which places him beyond the limits of this circle, and enables him, on suitable occasions, to act with exclusive reference to God, his fellow-men, and the universe.

§ 9. The moral sensibilities higher in rank than the natural.

And such being the objects of these two great departments of our nature, it is not surprising that they do not hold the same place in our estimation. There is obviously a sort of graduation in the feelings of regard and honour which we attach to different parts of the mind. We at once, and, as it were, instinctively, regard some as higher than others. We may not be able always to tell why it is so; but such is the fact. We never hesitate, for instance, to assign a lower place to the instincts than to the appetites; and, on the other hand, we always allot to the appetites, in the graduation of our regard, a place below that of the affections. And entirely in accordance with this general fact, we find it to be the case, that the moral sensibilities excite within us higher sentiments of regard; in other words, hold, in our estimation of them, a higher rank than the appetites, propensities, and passions, which constitute the leading divisions of our pathematic nature.

In this respect, also, viz., in the comparative rank of the two departments under consideration, there seems to be some analogy between the great divisions of the sensibilities and those of the intellect. There can be no question that men commonly locate, in the

scale of the mind's regard and honour, the internal intellect above the external. The latter simply perceives; the former not only perceives, but exercises the additional and higher function of comparing, estimating, and combining. And so in respect to the topic now before us. The moral sensibility appears to hold, in respect to the other great division of our sentient nature, the position of a consultative and judicial power; it stands above it and over it, in the exercise of a higher authority; it keenly scrutinizes the motives of action; it compares emotion with emotion, desire with desire; it sits a sort of arbitress, holding the scales of justice, and dispensing such decisions as are requisite for the due regulation of the empire of the passions.

§ 10. The moral sensibilities wanting in brutes.

It will perhaps throw light upon the distinction we are endeavouring to illustrate, if we call to recollection here that the natural or pathematic sensibilities exist in brute animals essentially the same as in man. They are susceptible of various emotions; they have their instincts, appetites, propensities, and affections, the same as human beings have, and perhaps even in a higher degree. They rush with eagerness in the pursuit of whatever is calculated to gratify their appetites, and are deeply interested in everything that is addressed to the natural affections. They are pleased and displeased, they have their prepossessions and aversions, they love and hate, with as much vehemence, at least, as commonly characterizes human passion.—But if we look for the other and more elevated portion of the sensibilities, it is not there. And here, we apprehend, is the great ground of distinction between men and the brutes. The latter, as well as human beings, appear to know what is good, considered as addressed simply to the natural affections; but man has the higher knowledge of moral as well as of natural good. The brute, as well as man, knows what is desirable, considered in the light of the natural appe-

tites and passions; but man enjoys the infinitely higher prerogative of knowing what is worthy of pursuit, considered in the light of moral and conscientious perceptions.

§ 11. Classification of the natural sensibilities.

Beginning, in the examination of the wide and interesting subject before us, with the natural or pathematic sensibilities, we shall find this portion of our sentient nature resolving itself into the subordinate divisions of the Emotions and Desires. These two classes of mental states follow each other in the order in which they have been named; the Emotions first, which are exceedingly numerous and various; and then the Desires, embracing under the latter term the Appetites, Propensities, and Affections. This is not only the order in succession or time, but it is also the order in nature.—In other words, and stated more particularly, such is the constitution of the human mind, that, when we pass from the region of the intellect to that of the sensibilities, we first find ourselves (and there is no other possible position which, in the first instance, we can occupy) in the domain of the EMOTIONS. We are at first pleased or displeased, or have some other emotion in view of the thing, whatever it is, which has come under the cognizance of the intellect. And emotions, in the ordinary process of mental action, are followed by Desires. As we cannot be pleased or displeased without some antecedent perception or knowledge of the thing which we are pleased or displeased with, so we cannot desire to possess or avoid anything without having laid the foundation of such desire in the existence of some antecedent emotion. And this is not only the matter of fact, which, as the mind is actually constituted, is presented to our notice; but we cannot well conceive how it could be otherwise. To desire a thing which utterly fails to excite within us the least emotion of pleasure seems to be a sort of solecism or absurdity in nature; in other words, it seems to be impossible,

from the nature of things, under any conceivable circumstances. At any rate, it is not possible as the mind is actually constituted, whatever might have been the fact if the mind had been constituted differently.

§ 12. Classification of the moral sensibilities.

If we look at the conscientious or Moral sensibilities, we find that they divide themselves in a manner entirely analogous to the division which is found to exist in the Natural. The first class of mental states which presents itself to our notice under this general head is that of moral Emotions, corresponding in the place which they occupy in relation to the Intellect, as well as in some other respects, to the natural emotions. The moral emotions are followed by another class of moral feelings, which may be designated as Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation, which hold the same relation to the moral emotions which the Desires do to the natural emotions. If we had not moral emotions (that is to say, feelings of moral approval or disapproval), it would not be possible for us to feel under moral obligation in any case whatever, the latter state of the mind being obviously dependent on the former.—It will be noticed, that in this place we scarcely do more than simply state the fact of this subordinate classification, without entering into minute explanations. The precise relation which the two departments of our moral nature sustain to each other will be more fully stated and clearly understood when, in their proper place, they come particularly under examination.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS FIRST.

EMOTIONS OR EMOTIVE STATES OF THE MIND.

EMOTIONALITY, EMOTIVENESS, EMOTIVITY.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF THE EMOTIONS.

§ 13. We have a knowledge of emotions by consciousness.

In prosecuting the examination of the Sensibilities, in accordance with the plan which has been marked out in the Introduction, we begin with the Emotions. It is, of course, implied in the arrangement we have made, which assigns them a distinct place, that this class of mental states has a nature and characteristics of its own, in virtue of which they are distinguished from all others. And if this be true, it follows from the mere fact of their existence, and from the recognised and necessary relationship of effects and causes, that they have their appropriate causative principle. And, accordingly, when we have occasion to speak of the specific and subordinate department of the Sensibilities, which, considered as sustaining the causative relation, gives rise to emotions in distinction from other mental states, it may with propriety be denominated the Emotive department or Emotive susceptibility, or, if a separate term be preferred, the Emotivity, Emotiveness, or Emotionality. In its action, on the occasions which appropriately call it forth, the Emotive department of the Sensibilities gives us, as its results, Emotions, and nothing else.

But turning from Emotionality, considered as a distinct susceptibility sustaining a causative relation, to a consideration of its results, the question may be asked, What more are we to understand by emotions; or, in other words, what definition shall we give of them? and it cannot be denied that it is extremely difficult to explain by words what their precise nature is. We do not suppose, indeed, that any one is ignorant of what is meant when we have occasion to speak of an emotion, whether it be an emotion of melancholy, of

cheerfulness, of surprise, of grandeur, or of some other kind. But, whatever may be the fact as to our knowledge, it is unquestionable that we are unable to give a verbal explanation of them, *in themselves considered.* In this respect they are like all other states of the mind which are truly simple. The fact of their entire simplicity necessarily renders them undefinable, because a definition implies a separation of the thing defined into parts; so that we are dependent for a knowledge of the interior and essential nature of emotions, not upon verbal explanations and definitions, which are inadequate to the communication of such knowledge, but upon consciousness. It is a species of knowledge which the soul reveals to itself by its own act, directly and immediately. While, therefore, we do not profess to define emotions in any proper and legitimate sense of defining, we may commend them without impropriety to each one's internal examination. And certainly we may rely upon the intimations which consciousness, when properly interrogated, can hardly fail to disclose, in this case as well as in others.

§ 14. The place of emotions, considered in reference to other mental acts.

Although, in attempting to give some idea of Emotions, we are obliged, for a knowledge of them, in themselves considered, to refer each one to his own consciousness, we may nevertheless mention some circumstances which throw an indirect light on them, and, at any rate, render more clear to our perception the relation which they sustain to other mental states. The first circumstance which we propose to indicate has reference to the position which they occupy (of course it will be understood that we mean their position, not in the material sense of the term, but in time or succession). It will be found on examination to be the fact, as we have already had occasion to suggest, that Emotions always occupy a place between intellections or acts of the intellect and the desires, if they

are natural emotions; and between intellections and feelings of moral obligation, if they are moral emotions. That they are subsequent to intellections, we believe must be abundantly clear. It is as obvious as any axiom of geometry, that we cannot have any feeling, any emotion, in respect to that, whatever it is, which we have no knowledge of.

In regard to the Desires, it is true, that, like the emotions, they are subsequent to the perceptive and cognitive acts; but it is well understood that they are not in *immediate* proximity with them. It is perfectly obvious, that no act of perception, or of cognition in any shape, can lay the foundation for a desire, unless the object of perception is pleasant to us; in other words, unless it excites within us pleasant emotions. For, whenever we speak of a thing as pleasant to us, we certainly involve the fact that we have pleasant emotions in view of it.—Nor, furthermore, can any perceptive or intellectual act lay the foundation for Obligatory feelings (that is to say, feelings of moral obligation) without the intervention and aid of moral emotions. It may be regarded as self-evident, that we never could feel under moral obligation to do or not to do a thing, unless the thing to be done or not to be done had first excited within us an emotion of approval or disapproval. So that the desires, and those feelings in the moral sensibilities which correspond to them, are based upon emotions, as really as the emotions are based upon intellections. In the order of nature, therefore, emotions are found in the place which has now been allotted them, and they are found nowhere else, being always and necessarily posterior to a knowledge of the things to which they relate; and, on the other hand, antecedent, by an equally strict natural necessity, to the other states of the mind which have been mentioned.

§ 15. The character of emotions changes so as to conform to that of perceptions.

It is important to impress upon the recollection that

the order of succession, in fact and in nature, is precisely that which has been stated, viz., intellections, emotions, and desires in the case of the natural sensibilities, and obligatory feelings in the case of the moral sensibilities; the two last mentioned being followed immediately, as their natural results, by acts of the will, which terminate and complete the entire process of mental action. But as we must take them and examine them in their order, we say further, in regard to the Emotions, which is the topic before us at present, that the fact of their subsequence to intellections and of their being based upon them is confirmed by the circumstance of their always changing or varying in precise accordance with the perceptive or intellective acts. If it were otherwise (that is to say, if they had any other foundation than intellective acts), how does it happen that these changes so uniformly take place? We are looking, for instance, on some extended landscape, but are so situated that the view of certain objects is interrupted, and, of course, the relations of the whole are disturbed. At such a time, the emotions we have are far from being pleasant; perhaps they are decidedly unpleasant. But, as soon as our imperfect perceptions are corrected, as soon as we are able to embrace the portions which were previously thrust out of view, and thus restore the interrupted proportions and harmony of the whole scenery, our emotions change at once, and we experience the highest pleasure.—Again, if we look at a painting which has come from the hand of some master of his art, we are distinctly conscious at first sight of a pleasing emotion; but we examine it further, and make ourselves acquainted with a number of things, less prominent than others, but still decidedly showing the skill of the painter, which escaped our first view, and we are conscious of a distinct change in that emotion. It becomes more decided, more full, in precise conformity with the increased knowledge which we have obtained of the merit which the picture actually possesses. And it is so, if no unusual

disturbing influence is interposed, in every other case, showing not only the intimate but proximate connexion between the emotions and the intellective acts, and the dependence of the former on the latter.

§ 16. Emotions characterized by rapidity and variety.

When we assert that the position of the emotions is between intellections on the one hand, and desires and obligations on the other, we imply, of course, that there is a real and marked distinction between them and the latter mental states. And this distinction exists. If consciousness gives us a knowledge of emotions, the same consciousness can hardly fail to give us a knowledge of the mental states that are subsequent to them; and the difference of knowledge resulting from these different acts of consciousness involves necessarily a difference in the things known. Among other things, if we consult our consciousness for the purpose of ascertaining the comparative nature of the mental states in question, we shall undoubtedly be led to notice that the emotions, as compared with the others, are generally more prompt and rapid in their origin, as well as more evanescent. They arise and depart on the surface of the mind, swelling and sinking almost instantaneously, like the small waves and ripples that play upon the scarcely agitated surface of a summer's lake, and which have no sooner arrested the eye of the beholder than they are gone. The desires and feelings of obligation not only arise subsequently and more slowly, but obviously possess a greater tenacity and inflexibility of nature. When a strong desire or a decided sentiment of duty has once intrenched itself in the soul, it is well known that it is comparatively difficult to dislodge it.

There is another circumstance involved in the distinction between them. The emotions have less unity in kind; in other words, are more various. Desires and obligations, although liable, like other mental states, to be modified by peculiar circumstances, are, in themselves considered, always one and the

same. But of emotions we find many varieties, such as the emotions of cheerfulness and joy, of melancholy and sorrow, of shame, of surprise, astonishment, and wonder. We have furthermore the emotions, differing from all others, of the ludicrous, the emotions of beauty and sublimity, also the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and some others. —If the reader will bear these statements in mind, taken in connexion with some things to be said hereafter, he will feel less objection than he might otherwise have felt to the general and subordinate classifications which we have thought ourselves authorized to make. These divisions we hold to be fundamental. They are necessarily involved, as we apprehend, in a thorough and consistent knowledge of the mind. Important points, for instance, in the doctrine of the Will, will be found to depend upon distinctions which are asserted to exist in the sensibilities. It is desirable, therefore, that the grounds of such distinctions should be understood, so that they may not only be above rejection, but above doubt.

CHAPTER II.

ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS.—EMOTIONS OF BEAUTY.

§ 17. Characteristics of emotions of beauty.

We do not profess to enter into an examination of every possible emotion. They are so various and multiplied it would be difficult to do it; nor would any important object be answered. Proceeding on the principle of selecting those which, either in themselves or by reason of their relation to the arts and to human conduct, appear to be most interesting and important, we shall begin with emotions of Taste or Æsthetic emotions.

The doctrine of the Æsthetic emotions has a close connexion with the fine arts, as well as with the effects which certain objects in nature have upon us. If there were not in men an Emotivity or Emotive

nature, a susceptibility of *feeling* added to that of perceiving, there would be no possibility of explaining the power which the fine or liberal arts exercise over the human mind. The epithet *æsthetic*, if we were governed in our use of it by its etymology alone, might be regarded as applicable to and embracing all the emotive states; but the recognized and popular application of the term, which is not always guided by etymological intimations, restricts it to what are sometimes called "emotions of taste," particularly those of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity.

We begin with emotions of beauty. We have already had occasion to remark that all emotions are undefinable, and of course the æsthetic emotions do not form an exception. Of the emotions of beauty it will be as difficult to give a definition, so as to make them clearer to any one's comprehension than they really are, as to define the simple sensations of color, sound, or taste. We find in them, however, these two characteristics.

(1.) The emotion of beauty, in the first place, is always a pleasing one. We never give the name to one which is painful, or to any feeling of disgust. Whenever, therefore, we speak of an emotion of beauty, we imply, in the use of the terms, some degree of satisfaction or pleasure. All persons, the illiterate as well as the scientific, use the phrase with this import.—(2.) We never speak of emotions of beauty, to whatever degree may be our experience of inward satisfaction, without referring such emotions to something external. The same emotion, which is called satisfaction, or delight of mind, when it is wholly internal, we find to be termed an emotion of beauty, if we can refer it to something without, and can spread its charms around any external object. We do not, however, mean by this that the objects must necessarily be material; but that, whether material or immaterial, they must be external or outside, considered in relation to our own emotive susceptibility. But this will appear more clearly hereafter.

§ 18. Of what is meant by beautiful objects.

There are many objects which excite the emotion of beauty; that is, when the objects are presented, this emotion, in a greater or less degree, immediately exists. These objects we call beautiful.—There are other objects which, so far from exciting pleasant emotions within us, are either indifferent, or cause feelings of a decidedly opposite character, so that we speak of them as deformed or disgusting. If there were no emotions, pleasant or unpleasant, excited by either of these classes, or if the emotions which they cause were of the same kind, we should apply to them the same epithets. So that the ground of distinction, which, in speaking of these different objects, we never fail to make, appears to exist in our own feelings. In other words, we call an object BEAUTIFUL because it excites within us pleasant emotions, which, in the circumstances of the case, we cannot well ascribe to any other cause. And when we prefer to say, in other terms, that an object has beauty, we obviously mean the same thing, viz., that the object has a trait or quality (perhaps we may find it difficult to explain precisely what it is) which causes these emotions.

§ 19. Of the distinction between beautiful and other objects.

In view of what has been said, we may venture to make two remarks.—(I.) Every beautiful object has something in itself which truly discriminates it from all other objects. This something, this peculiar trait, whatever it is, lays the foundation for those results in the human mind, which, on being experienced, authorize us to speak of the object as beautiful. This is clear, not only from what, on a careful examination, we shall frequently find in the objects themselves, but also from the fact that the operations of the mind always have their appropriate causes. If the mind experiences a pleasant emotion in view of a certain object, it is because there is something in the object which has a determinate and permanent relation to that particular mental state which distinguish-

es it from other objects. If it were not for that distinctive trait in the object, the human mind is so constituted that it could not have experienced the corresponding emotion.

(II.) Beautiful objects are distinguished from all others, not only by something in themselves, certain original and inherent traits characteristic of them, but also, and perhaps still more, by a superadded trait, a species of borrowed effulgence, derived and reflected back from the mind itself. When we contemplate a beautiful object, we are pleased; we are more or less happy. We naturally connect this emotion of pleasure with the object which is its cause; and we have been in the habit of doing this, no doubt in most instances unconsciously to ourselves, from early life. The consequence is, the association between the inward delight and the outward cause becomes so strong that we are unable to separate them; and the objects, additional to their own proper qualities, appear to be surrounded and to beam out with an effulgence which comes from the mind.

These remarks will be found to have an application to certain speculations which have sometimes been promulgated on the subject of beauty. In accordance with what has just been said, we do not feel at liberty to deny absolutely and without qualification, as the philosophy of some writers seems to authorize them to do, that there is actually beauty in the objects which are generally considered as possessing it; in the rising or setting sun, in the moon walking in her majesty, and in the multitude of stars that rejoice in her presence. On the contrary, we have already intimated that there is something in all these cases, as there is in blossoms, and flowers, and waving trees, and falling cascades, which distinguishes them from other objects that are not beautiful. God has made them glorious in themselves. But, at the same time, we have no doubt that they are invested, in the eye of the beholder, with a new and additional radiance, which flows out from his own bosom. The mind

seems to act on the principle of *compensation;* it receives from the lustre of the outward object a happiness, which it repays by throwing around it the appropriate tribute of superadded splendour.

§ 20. Grounds or occasions of emotions of beauty various.

The next remark which we have to make on the subject of Beauty is, that the objects by which it is occasioned are not always the same, but are very various; differing from each other not only in their general nature, but also in their subordinate incidents. This may occasion a degree of surprise and difficulty in the minds of some, who cannot readily perceive how the results can be identical, while there is such a want of unity and accordance in their antecedents. It has frequently been the case, that writers, under the bias of mind originating from this difficulty, have endeavoured to resolve the various grounds or causes of beauty into one. In other words, they are disposed to maintain, that in every object which men agree in denominating beautiful, there is one common quality, one predominant element, however different the objects may be in other respects, which is the ground of the internal emotion. Accordingly, some announce the general and somewhat indefinite doctrine, that beauty consists in the perception of relations; others, more precise and definite in their views, maintain that it consists in a fixed and determinate proportion (that is to say, a proportion which is known and measurable) of the parts of the object; others, again, assert that the emotion of beauty is based upon the perception of utility; in other words, in the perception of the fitness of the beautiful object for some profitable purpose.

It is not our object to endeavour in this place, as we shall have occasion to refer to the subject again, to show the futility of these and other kindred attempts, which aim, and in some instances with no small show of plausibility, to resolve the basis of all beauty into a single principle. We simply state here,

in general terms, the fact, as we understand it to be, that the grounds or causes of beauty, while the result or internal emotion is always identical in its nature, are multiplied and various. In other words, we assert that beauty in the mind is one, while outward beauty, or, rather, the causes of beauty in outward objects, is many; accompanying the statement with the additional and explanatory remark, that this state of things, anomalous as it may appear at first, is supported by the analogy of the mind in some other instances.

§ 21. Illustrations of the foregoing statement.

Take, as an illustration, the state of mind denominated Belief. The grounds or occasions of belief, it is well known, are very various; so much so as scarcely to exhibit any likeness or to admit of any comparison; but belief itself, although it admits of various degrees, is always the same in nature. It is occasioned alike (and this is obviously a fundamental principle of the mind) by the senses, or, rather, by the powers operating through them, by the internal power of suggestion, by consciousness, by memory, by relative suggestion or judgment, by reasoning, and testimony; and the operation of all these various causes results in an identity of feeling.—We have another instance of the same thing in Association. The associating principle or power is found, as we have already seen, to operate with a diversity of laws or methods, but with a unity of results. The issue is not discordant with itself, but is one, viz., a regular consecution of the mental states. But, although the result is identical, the antecedents or causes are various, viz., resemblance, contrast, contiguity in time and place, and cause and effect, which are greatly modified also by other causes.

And so in regard to emotions of beauty. There is a want of identity in the grounds of their existence, but not in the result which follows. The causes, like different roads conducting to the same termination,

are various; but the issue is one.—It ought to be added, however, although the emotion of beauty is the same in nature under every variety of circumstances, it exists in different and various *degrees*. We speak with entire propriety of the beauty of an object being greater or less, the same as we speak of any event which is alleged to have taken place, as being, in our opinion, more or less probable; expressions indicative of differences in the degree of belief which the mind under the particular circumstances of the case entertains.

§ 22. Of the objects in general which excite emotions of beauty.

It can always be said, therefore, of emotions of beauty, that they possess the characteristic of being pleasant, and that they are always the same in their essential or subjective nature; and at the same time they are often found to differ from each other in the occasions of their origin, and also in the degree or intensity in which they exist.

(I.) Proceeding now to the occasions on which they arise, we remark, in the first place, that emotions of beauty are felt, and frequently in a very high degree, in the contemplation of material objects that are addressed to the sense of sight, such as woods, waters, cultivated fields, and the visible firmament. We look abroad upon nature, in the infinite variety of her works, as she is exhibited in the depths below and in the heights above; in her shells and minerals; in her plants, and flowers, and trees; in her waters, and her stars and suns; and we find the mind kindling at the sight; fountains of pleasure are suddenly opened within us; and we should do violence to our mental structure if we did not pronounce them beautiful.

(II.) Again, emotions of beauty are felt, and cannot fail to be felt, in view of all artistic forms and combinations of forms which are truly representative of material things that are beautiful. The emotions will be greater or less, corresponding to the greater or less degree of exactness in the artistic representation. The

landscape, which demands and secures the homage of æsthetic admiration, as it comes fresh and perfect from the hands of God, is invested by the same law of being with a kindred crown of beauty, though in a less degree, when it is reproduced on the canvass of the painter.

(III.) And further, emotions of beauty are felt in the contemplation of intellectual and moral objects. In other words, mind, as well as matter, furnishes the occasion on which they arise. The means or instruments by which mind, which is not a direct object of sight or of any of the senses, is revealed to us, are various, such as the natural signs of the countenance, the tones of the voice, conventional language, and the actions of men in trying situations. Whenever, and in whatever way, we discover intelligence, wisdom, truth, honour, magnanimity, benevolence, justice, or other traits of a mind acting as it was created and designed to act, we have a foundation laid (varying, it is true, with the degree in which they exist, with the combinations they form with each other, and with the circumstances in which they are put forth), for the emotions of beauty. The human countenance, considered merely as a material object, and as presenting nothing more than outline and colour, is undoubtedly beautiful, but becomes more so when it distinctly indicates to us intelligence and amiability. This is particularly true when moral traits are made known to us. The approbation which we yield when the poor are relieved, the weak are defended, and the vicious are reclaimed, and when, in general, any other striking deeds of a virtuous kind are performed, is always attended with a delightful movement of the heart, which, as it is reflected back upon it, gives to the action a decided character of beauty.

(IV.) But emotions of beauty are not exclusively limited to these occasions. Feelings, which not only bear the same name, but are truly analogous in kind, exist also on the contemplation of many other things. —The sentiment or feeling of beauty exists, for in-

stance, when we are following out a happy train of reasoning; and hence the mathematician, who certainly has a delightful feeling, analogous to what we experience in contemplating many works of nature, speaks of a *beautiful* theorem.—The connoisseur in music applies the term *beautiful* to a favourite air; the lover of poetry speaks of a beautiful song; and the painter discovers beauty in the design and in the colouring of his pictures. We also apply the term beauty to experiments in the different departments of physics, especially when the experiment is simple, and results in deciding a point which has occasioned doubt and dispute. We speak of it, and, as we suppose, with a degree of propriety, as a beautiful experiment.

So that all nature, taking the word in a wide sense, is the province of beauty; the intellectual and the sentimentive, as well as the material world. We do not, however, mean by this to descend into particulars, and to say that everything which exists within the range of these departments is beautiful, but merely that from none of the great departments of nature are the elements of beauty excluded.

§ 23. All objects not equally fitted to cause these emotions.

From what has been said, it must be evident that there is a correspondence between the mind and the outward objects which are addressed to it. This has already been clearly seen in respect to the sensations and external perceptions, and it is not less evident in respect to that part of our nature which we are now attending to. The mind, and the external world, and the external circumstances of our situation, are reciprocally suited to each other, not only in the matter of perception but also in the matter of feeling. Hence, when we ascribe the quality of beauty to any object, we have reference to this mutual adaptation. An object is ordinarily called beautiful when it has agreeable or pleasing qualities; in other words, when it is the cause or antecedent of pleasing emotions, which, under the circumstances of the case, are properly call-

ed emotions of beauty. However it might appear to other beings, it would not have the character of beauty to us if there were not a sort of correspondence, an adaptedness to each other, between our mental constitution and such outward object.

But no one can be ignorant that not all objects cause the emotions in question; and of those which possess this power, some have it in a greater and some in a less degree. This brings us to a very important inquiry. It is no unreasonable curiosity which wishes to know why the effect is so limited, and why all objects are not embraced in it. Why different objects cause the same emotion in different degrees. And why the same objects produce a diversity of emotions in different individuals, and even in the same individual at different times.

§ 24. A susceptibility of emotions of beauty an ultimate principle of our mental constitution.

In answering these questions, something must be taken for granted; there must be some starting-point; otherwise all that can be said will be involved in inextricable confusion. That is, we must take for granted that the mind has an original susceptibility of such emotions. Nor can we suppose, after what has already been said, that there can be any objection to a concession which is warranted by the most general experience. We all know that we are created with this susceptibility, because we are all conscious of having had those emotions which are attributed to it. And if we are asked how, or why it is, that the susceptibility at the bottom of these feelings exists, we can only say, that such was the will of the Being who created the mind; and that this is one of the original or ultimate elements of our nature.

Although the mind, therefore, is originally susceptible of emotions of beauty, still it is no less evident, from the general arrangements we behold, both in physical and intellectual nature, that these emotions have their fixed causes or antecedents. We have seen

that these causes are not limited to one class or kind of objects, but are to be found under various circumstances; in the exercises of reasoning, in the fanciful creations of poetry, in musical airs, in the experiments of physics, in the forms of material existence, in works of art, and in the exhibition of mental attributes. Perhaps we may assert as a general statement (that is to say, in a great number or majority of cases), these objects cannot be presented to the mind, and the mind be unmoved by it; it contemplates them, and it necessarily has a feeling of delight, of a greater or less degree of strength, which authorizes us in characterizing them as beautiful.

In asserting that this is correct as a *general statement*, it is implied that some objects do not originally cause these emotions. And hence we are led to enter into more particular inquiries, having reference to this difference in what may conveniently be called the ÆSTHETIC power of objects. Accordingly, our purpose in the remarks which are to follow is to point out some of those objects, and forms and qualities of objects, which seem from their very nature, and in distinction from other objects which do not have this power, fitted to create within us the feelings under consideration.

§ 25. Remarks on the beauty of forms.—The circle.

In making that selection of those objects and qualities of objects which we suppose to be fitted, in the original constitution of things, to cause within us pleasing emotions of themselves, independently of any extraneous aid, we cannot profess to speak with certainty. The appeal is to the general experience of men; and all we can do is to give, so far as it seems to have been ascertained, the results of that experience. Beginning, therefore, with material objects, we are justified by general experience in saying that certain dispositions or forms of matter are beautiful; for instance, the CIRCLE.

We rarely look upon a winding or serpentine form

without experiencing a feeling of pleasure, and on seeing a circle this pleasure is heightened. Hence Hogarth, who, both by his turn of mind and by his habits of life, has claims to be regarded as a judge, expressly laid it down in his Analysis of Beauty, that those lines which have most variety in themselves, contribute most towards the production of beauty; and that the most beautiful line by which a surface can be bounded is the waving or serpentine, or that which constantly, but imperceptibly, deviates from the straight line. This, which we frequently find in shells, flowers, and other pleasing natural productions, he calls the line of beauty.

Without entering into the question whether the circular form has absolutely, all other things being equal, more beauty than any other form, it can certainly be said, without hesitation, that it possesses the power of exciting this emotion, at least in a considerable degree. We might safely refer it to almost any man's experience, whatever his mental character or situation in life, and let him say, when he contemplates the waving features of numberless flowers, when he gathers on the sea-shore wreathed and variegated shells, or beholds through distant meadows the winding stream, or pauses in the pathless wood to gaze on the constantly-changing position of its branches, whether he does not at once feel within him a spontaneous movement of delight. Is not the object, which is directly before him, in itself a source of this feeling? Although he may have a superadded pleasure from some other source, as we shall have occasion to see; still, considering the subject particularly in reference to the object before him, may not the true philosophy be summed up in the single assertion that he sees and he feels; he beholds and he admires; the intellect, through the instrumentality of the eye, has a knowledge of the object, and the awakened heart expands with the homage of its voluntary joy.

§ 26. Original or intrinsic beauty.—The circle.

It is necessary, in examining the subject of beauty, to look at it in two points of view, viz., as Intrinsic and as Associated. In the remarks which we may have occasion to make in this chapter, we have reference exclusively to what may be denominated Original or Intrinsic beauty; by which we mean that which is founded in the nature of the object, independently of accidental or merely accessory circumstances.—Accordingly, in view of the remark at the close of the last section, it seems to result from the common experience of mankind, that objects which are circular, or approach that form, exhibiting a constantly varying outline, have in themselves, and on account of this configuration, a degree, and not unfrequently a *high* degree, of beauty. The bending stem of the tulip, the curve of the weeping willow, the windings of the ivy, the vine wreathing itself around the elm, the serpentine river, are highly pleasing. The vast circular expanse of the visible sky, when seen in a cloudless night, is a beautiful object, independently of the splendour that is spread over it by its brilliant troops of stars. The arch of the rainbow, expanding its immense curve over our heads, could hardly fail to be regarded as an object of great beauty, even if nothing but the form and outline were presented to our vision, without the unrivalled lustre of its colours. And the same of other instances, scattered in profusion through the works of nature, but too numerous to be mentioned here.

On this question, as in many others of mental philosophy, we appeal to the common feelings of mankind. And it is on this account that what we now say on the subject of the intrinsic beauty of some objects and combinations of objects, we take to be no "fable of man's device," no tinkering of an earthly philosophy; but the response of a higher oracle, the voice of nature, the announcement of the universal heart of humanity. We are aware that some may object to such an appeal; they perhaps regard it as be-

low the dignity of science; but no one is ignorant that philosophers, who were not wanting in sagacity, have frequently made it. Their great inquiry on subjects of this nature is, what men generally have thought and felt. "I never remember," says Mr. Burke, "that anything beautiful, whether a man, a beast, a bird, or a plant, was ever shown, though it were to a hundred people, that they did not all immediately agree that it was beautiful, though some might have thought it fell short of their expectation, or that other things were still finer. I believe no man thinks a goose to be more beautiful than a swan, or imagines that what they call a Friesland hen excels a peacock."

§ 27. Of the beauty of straight and angular forms.

Although the circular or constantly varying outline is thought, more than any other, to excite the delightful emotions under consideration, we are not to suppose that the power of beauty is excluded from other forms. In examining the works of nature, it is hardly necessary to say that we find numerous instances of straight and angular forms, as well as of the serpentine and winding, although perhaps less frequently. It can hardly be doubted that these forms, as they are operated upon and moulded in nature's hands, possess more or less beauty. It is almost a matter of supererogation to attempt to illustrate this statement to those who have a heart and eye open to the great variety of her works, which on every side are presented to our notice. Her forms, either original or in their combinations, are without number; and if it be true that beauty does not claim a relationship with all, it is equally so that it is not restricted to one, or even a small portion of them. The intertwining shrubbery which spreads itself abroad upon the ground, emits, if we may be allowed the expression, its sparkles and gleams of beauty around our feet. The elm, which rises upward towards the heavens, and forms its broad and green

arch over our heads, is radiant with beauty also, although it is exceedingly diverse in its appearance. We readily admit, for we cannot well do otherwise without violence to the suggestions of our nature, that the curve of the weeping willow possesses beauty. But, at the same time, we are not prepared to assert that the solitary palm-tree is absolutely destitute of it, although it displays, as it arises on the bosom of the desert, nothing but a tall, straight, branchless trunk, surmounted at the top, like a Corinthian column, by a single tuft of foliage.

"There are an infinite number of the feebler vegetables," says Mr. Alison, "and many of the common grasses, the forms of which are altogether distinguished by angles and straight lines, and where there is not a single curvature through the whole, yet all of which are beautiful." He ascribes, in another place, a high degree of beauty to the knotted and angular stem of the balsam. And remarks also, in regard to the myrtle, that it is "generally reckoned a beautiful form, yet the growth of its stem is perpendicular, the junctions of its branches form regular and similar angles, and their direction is in straight or angular lines."

Although it seems to be unnecessary to delay at much length on this topic, we take the liberty to refer to a single instance more, because it has probably escaped the notice of many persons, and has never, so far as we know, been adduced in illustration of the subject under review. One would hardly look for symmetrical and beautiful configurations in the falling flakes of SNOW. It appears, however, that the snow, at different times, and under the different circumstances in which it falls, assumes about a hundred different forms; not merely accidental, but determinate and permanent forms. Exact delineations of these forms have been executed; particularly of those which were observed by Mr. Scoresby in the Polar Seas; and although the circular or waving outline is almost entirely excluded from them, they are, in general, highly beautiful.

§ 28. Of square, pyramidal, and triangular forms.

The remarks of the last section, going to show that beauty is not limited to circular forms, is confirmed by what we observe in the works of art as well as of nature. The square, for instance, although we do not suppose it presents very high claims, comes in for a share of notice. On account of its practical convenience, and also for the reason of its being more entirely within the reach of human skill than some other forms, it is frequently introduced into architecture; generally with a pleasing effect, and sometimes with a high degree of beauty.

In the Gothic architecture, the pyramidal, a form still further removed from any relationship with the circle, has a conspicuous place, and, when properly combined with other forms, gives a decided pleasure. Hogarth, in illustration of his remark that variety has a great share in producing beauty, explicitly observes that the pyramid, which gradually diminishes from its basis to its points, is a beautiful form. And it is in consequence of being so regarded that we find it so frequently employed, not only as a characteristic feature in the order of architecture just referred to, but in steeples, sepulchral monuments, and other works of art.

Triangular forms also are not without beauty. Mr. Alison states that the forms of Grecian and Roman furniture, in their periods of cultivated taste, were almost universally distinguished by straight or angular lines. What is there, he inquires, more beautiful than the form of the ancient tripod? "The feet gradually lessening to the end, and converging as they approach it; the plane of the table placed, with little ornament, nearly at right angles to the feet; and the whole appearing to form an imperfect triangle, whose base is above. There is scarcely, in such a subject, a possibility of contriving a more angular form, yet there can be none more completely beautiful."

In connexion with these statements, it is proper to add a single explanatory remark. We have much

reason to believe that the emotion will be stronger in all cases in proportion as the beautiful object is distinctly and immediately embraced by the mind. It may be asserted, with undoubted good reason, that the square form has a degree of beauty as well as the circle, although it is generally conceded that it has less. But it is a matter of inquiry whether the difference in this respect is owing so much to the original power of the forms themselves as to the circumstance just alluded to. In other words, whether it be not owing to the fact that the circle, being more simple, makes a more direct, entire, and decided impression; whereas the attention is divided among the sides and angles of the square and other similar figures.

§ 29. The variety of the sources of that beauty which is founded on forms illustrated from the different styles of architecture.

The doctrine that all beauty is limited to a particular form, or a small number of forms, does not appear to be sustained, but rather to be discountenanced and rebuked, by what we notice in the different orders of architecture: as it is, in fact, by all the arts that are based on the feelings now under review. An interesting field of inquiry is here opened, which we are not at liberty to enter, but must merely glance at and leave.

The simple facts which it is important for us to notice are, FIRST, that all the acknowledged styles of architecture are more or less beautiful; and, SECOND, that they all differ from each other, being respectively distinguished by their own characteristics.—We cannot be expected to go into particulars. We read, however, of the architecture of Egypt; and the monuments of its existence, surprising for their number and extent, still remain. No one, if we are at liberty to receive the statements of travellers, can walk amid the desolate cities on the banks of the Nile, and amid the splendid ruins of its sacred islands, without profound emotions of delight and admiration, as he contemplates the remains of sculptured grottoes, obelisks,

columns, sphinxes, colossal statues, and pyramids. But his delight and admiration would not be less if he could the next moment be set down amid the hills of Greece, crowned with the multitude of her temples and the groups of her statuary; although he would find the principles which predominate in her great works of art, the Doric severity and strength, the Ionic lightness and grace, the Corinthian ornament, and other characteristic features, exceedingly different, in many respects, from what he had witnessed just before. And even the Gothic architecture, the product of a later and comparatively barbarous age, but inspired by a new insight into nature, and adventuring upon new combinations, has opened in its light and clustered pillars, its pinnacles, capitals, and pointed arches, rich and before unexplored sources of beauty.

It is to this fact simply that we wish to direct attention, viz., that all the acknowledged styles of architecture are more or less beautiful; but are all, in many particulars, different from each other. The authors of them seem to have wandered forth into the great universe of beauty, and to have gathered up, from the exemplars which nature so richly furnishes, such forms as pleased them best; being guided, of course, in some measure, by the circumstances of their time and country. But this could not have been; they could not have gathered so richly and so variously as is testified by the splendid but diversified monuments they have left, if nature had been so restricted, as some have supposed, in her liberality, and if the forms of beauty had not been many, but one.

§ 30. Of the original or intrinsic beauty of colours.

We proceed to remark, as we advance in the further consideration of this interesting subject, that we experience emotions of beauty in beholding the colours, as well as in contemplating the outlines or forms of bodies. The doctrine which we hold is, that some colours of themselves, independently of the addition-

al interest which may subsequently be attached to them in consequence of certain associations, are fitted to excite within us those feelings of pleasure, which authorize us in this, as well as in other analogous cases, to speak of the cause of them as beautiful. In other words, there are some colours which possess, as we suppose, an original or intrinsic beauty.—In support of this opinion, we are merely able to allude to some of the various considerations which naturally present themselves, without entering into that minute exposition of them which would be admissible in a treatise professedly and exclusively devoted to the subject before us.

(1.) The pleasure which results from the mere beholding of colours may be observed in very early life. It is in consequence of this pleasing emotion that the infant so early directs its eyes towards the light that breaks in from the window, or which reaches the sense of vision from any other source. It is pleasing to see with what evident ecstasy the child rushes from flower to flower, and compares their brilliancy. Casting his eyes abroad in the pursuit of objects that are richly variegated, he pauses to gaze with admiration on every tree that is most profusely loaded with blossoms, or that is burdened with fruit of the deepest red and yellow. It is because he is attracted with the brightness of its wings that he pursues the butterfly with a labour so unwearied, or suspends his sport to watch the wayward movements of the humming-bird.

(2.) The same results are found also, very strikingly and generally, among all savage tribes. The sons of the forest are not so wholly untutored, so wholly devoid of natural sensibility, that they will not sometimes forget the ardour of the chase in the contemplation of the flowers which bloom in the neighbourhood of their path. Seeing how beautiful the fish of their lakes and rivers, the bird of their forests, and the forest tree itself are rendered by colours, they commit the mistake of attempting to render their own

bodies more beautiful by artificial hues. They value whatever dress they may have in proportion to the gaudiness of its colours; they weave rich and variegated plumes into their hair; and as they conjectured, from his scarlet dress, that Columbus was the captain of the Spaniards, so they are wont to intimate and express their own rank and dignity by the splendour of their equipments.

(3.) And the same trait, which had been so often noticed in Savages, may be observed also, though in a less degree, among the uneducated classes in civilized communities. In persons of refinement, the original tendency to receive pleasing emotions from the contemplation of colours seems to have, in a measure, lost its power, in consequence of the developement of tendencies to receive pleasure from other causes. In those, on the contrary, who have possessed less advantages of mental culture, and whose sources of pleasure may in consequence be supposed to lay nearer to the surface of the mind, this tendency remains undiminished. Coloured objects generally affect them with a high degree of pleasure; so much so that the absence of colour is not, in their estimation, easily compensated by the presence of any other qualities. We cannot well suppose that there is any intermediate influence between the beautiful object and the mind, of which this pleasure is the product, but must rather conclude, in the circumstances of the case, that the presence of the object, and that only, is the ground of its existence. It is this view of the subject which seems to be taken in a passage of Akenside, that is interesting for its poetical merit as well as its philosophical truth:

> "Ask the swain,
> Who journeys homeward from a summer day's
> Long labour, why, forgetful of his toils
> And due repose, he loiters to behold
> The sunshine gleaming, as through amber clouds,
> O'er all the western sky; full soon, I ween,
> His rude expression and untutored airs,
> Beyond the power of language, will unfold
> The form of Beauty smiling at the heart."

§ 31. Further illustrations of the original beauty of colours.

We may derive additional proof of the fact that colours are of themselves fitted to cause emotions of beauty, from what we learn in the case of those persons who have been blind from birth, but in after life have suddenly been restored by couching, or in some other way.—"I have couched," says Dr. Wardrop,* speaking of James Mitchell, "one of his eyes successfully, and he is much amused with the visible world, though he mistrusts information gained by that avenue. One day I got him a new and *gaudy* suit of clothes, which delighted him beyond description. It was the most interesting scene of sensual gratification I ever beheld."

But this person, it appears, had some faint notions of light and colours previous to the operation by which his powers of vision were more fully restored. And the facts, stated in connexion with his exercise of this imperfect vision, are equally decisive in favour of the doctrine under consideration. The statements to which we refer are as follows.—"At the time of life when this boy began to walk, he seemed to be attracted by bright and dazzling colours; and though everything connected with his history appears to prove that he derived little information from the organ, yet he received from it much sensual gratification. He used to hold between his eye and luminous objects such bodies as he found to increase by their interposition the quantity of light; and it was one of his chief amusements to concentrate the sun's rays by means of pieces of glass, transparent pebbles, or similar substances, which he held between his eye and the light, and turned about in various directions. These, too, he would often break with his teeth, and give them that form which seemed to please him most. There were other modes by which he was in the habit of gratifying this fondness for light. He would retire to any outhouse or to any room within his reach, shut the windows and doors, and remain there

* As quoted by Mr. Stewart in his account of Mitchell.

for a considerable time, with his eyes fixed on some small hole or chink which admitted the sun's rays, eagerly watching them. He would also, during the winter nights, often retire to a dark corner of the room and kindle a light for his amusement. On these occasions, as well as in the gratification of his other senses, his countenance and gestures displayed a most interesting avidity and curiosity."

The conclusion which we deduce from these sources of proof is, that colours are fitted, from our very constitution, to produce within us emotions of beauty.

§ 32. Of sounds considered as a source of beauty.

We next propose to inquire into the application of these principles in respect to sounds. And here also we have reason to believe that they hold good to a certain extent; in other words, that certain sounds are pleasing of themselves; and are hence, agreeably to views already expressed, termed BEAUTIFUL.—In proceeding, however, to the consideration of beauty as it exists in connexion with sounds, it may be proper to recur to the remark which was made near the commencement of the chapter, that the sources or grounds of beauty, although the emotions they excite within us are all of essentially the same kind, are very various. In view of what was there said, we do not feel at liberty to doubt, as some may be disposed to do, whether there is beauty in sounds, merely because sounds are obviously altogether different from some other objects which constitute sources of beauty, such as colours or forms. It is not the intention of nature that the empire of the beautiful shall be limited in this manner. On the contrary, if certain sounds have something within them, which, from its very nature, is calculated to excite pleasing emotions, they are obviously distinguished by this circumstance from other sounds, and furnish a sufficient reason for our regarding them and speaking of them as BEAUTIFUL.

(I.) In asserting, however, that there is an original beauty in sounds, we do not wish to be understood as

saying that all sounds, of whatever kind, possess this character. There are some sounds which, in themselves considered, are justly regarded as indifferent, and others are positively disagreeable. No one would hesitate in pronouncing the discordant creaking of a wheel, the filing of a saw, the braying of the ass, the scream of a peacock, or the hissing of a serpent, to be disagreeable. There are other sounds, such as the bleating of the lamb, the lowing of the cow, the call of the goat, and other notes and cries of animals, which appear to be, in themselves, entirely indifferent. We are aware that they are sometimes spoken of as beautiful, nor is it necessary to deny that they are sometimes heard with a high degree of pleasure. But we regard the beauty in this case as rather associated than intrinsic; the result rather of accessory circumstances than of the thing itself. The happy remarks of Mr. Alison, going to show the nature of the beauty which is ordinarily felt at such times, will be read with interest.

"The bleating of a lamb is beautiful in a fine day in spring; in the depth of winter it is very far from being so. The lowing of a cow at a distance, amid the scenery of a pastoral landscape in summer, is extremely beautiful; in a farm-yard it is absolutely disagreeable. The hum of the beetle is beautiful in a fine summer evening, as appearing to suit the stillness and repose of that pleasing season; in the noon of day it is perfectly indifferent. The twitter of the swallow is beautiful in the morning, and seems to be expressive of the cheerfulness of that time; at any other hour it is quite insignificant. Even the song of the nightingale, so wonderfully charming in the twilight or at night, is altogether disregarded during the day; in so much so, that it has given rise to the common mistake that this bird does not sing but at night."

§ 33. Illustrations of the original beauty of sounds.

(II.) Other sounds, those which are properly termed

musical, have a beauty which is original or intrinsic, and not merely accessory. It is true that different nations have different casts or styles of music, modified by the situation and habits of the people; but everything that can properly be called music, whatever occasional or accidental modification it may assume, is in its nature more or less beautiful. Musical sounds, independently of their combinations and expressions, are characterized in a way which distinguishes them from all others; viz., by the circumstance of their possessing certain mathematical proportions in their times of vibration. Such sounds please us originally; in other words, whenever, in all ordinary circumstances, they are heard, they please naturally and necessarily.—We are aware that attempts have sometimes been made to explain the pleasure which is received from musical sounds, as well as from those of a different character, on the doctrine of association, and on that alone. But there are various difficulties in this explanation, some of which will now be referred to.

(1.) In the first place, we are led to expect, from the analogy of things which we witness in other cases, that we shall find in the human heart also an original sensibility to the beautiful in the matter under consideration. We refer now to what we frequently notice in the lower animals; and although we do not claim that very much weight should be attached to this view of the subject, it certainly furnishes some matter for reflection. Why should brute animals be originally pleased with musical sounds, and man, whom we may well suppose to have as much need of this pleasure, be naturally destitute of the capability of receiving it? In regard to brute animals (we do not say all, but many of them), there is no possible question as to the fact involved in this inquiry. Through all the numberless varieties which they exhibit, from the mouse, of which Linnæus says with strict truth, "DELECTATUR MUSICA," to the elephant on the banks of the Niger, that responds with his unwieldy dance to the rude instrument of the untutor-

ed African, they yield their homage to the magic of sweet sounds. To attempt to explain the pleasure they receive on the ground of association would be difficult, perhaps ridiculous. The simple fact is, that they listen and are delighted. It is the sound, and nothing but the sound, which excites the joy they exhibit. In this case, as in some others, the fact and the philosophy are one. And if the doctrine which we oppose be true, then the sluggish hippopotamus, if we may credit the statements of Denham, the late distinguished traveller in the interior of Africa, has a power which man, elevated as he is, has not. "We had a full opportunity," he expressly remarks, "of convincing ourselves that these uncouth and stupendous animals are very sensibly attracted by musical sounds, even though they should not be of the softest kind. As we passed along the waters of the lake Muggaby at sunrise, they followed the drums of the different chiefs the whole length of the water, sometimes approaching so close to the shore, that the water they spouted from their mouths reached the persons who were passing along the banks."* So great is the acknowledged power of music over many brute animals, that the classical traditions which celebrate the achievements of the early poets and musicians scarcely transcend the bounds of truth.

> "For Orpheus' lute was strung with poets' sinews,
> Whose golden touch could soften steel and stones,
> Make tigers tame, and huge leviathans
> Forsake unsounded deeps to dance on sands."

(2.) In the second place, children at an early period of life, before they have had an opportunity of connecting associations with them to any great extent, are highly pleased with musical sounds. This is a fact which we cannot suppose has escaped the notice of any one. Let a wandering musician suddenly make his appearance in a country village with his fife, bagpipe, or hand-organ (instruments which are not supposed to possess the highest claims to musical power),

* Denham and Clapperton's Narrative, p. 121, 165.

and it is surprising to see with what an outburst of joy the sound is welcomed to the heart of childhood. Delighted countenances cluster at the windows; and merry groups, that just before made the streets ring with their noise, suddenly leave their sports, and rush with a new and delighted impulse to the presence of the strolling minstrel. This is universally the fact; and when we consider the early age at which it takes place, it seems to be inconsistent with any other view than that which ascribes to sounds of a certain character an original or intrinsic attraction.

(3.) We witness, furthermore, the same result in Savage tribes when they first become acquainted with the instruments of music, however simple or imperfect they may be, which have been fabricated by European skill. It is said of the native inhabitants of this country that they frequently purchased of the Spaniards, when they first came to America, small bells; and when they hung them on their persons, and heard their clear musical sounds responding to the movement of their dances, they were filled with the highest possible delight. At a later period in the history of the country, it is related by one of the Jesuit missionaries, "that once coming into the company of certain ignorant and fierce Indians, he met with a rude and menacing reception, which foreboded no very favourable termination. As it was not his design, however, to enter into any contention if it possibly could be avoided, he immediately commenced playing on a stringed instrument; their feelings were softened at once; and the evil spirit of jealousy and anger, which they exhibited on his first approach to them, fled from their minds."*—We cannot suppose it necessary to multiply instances to the same effect.

§ 34. Further instances of the original beauty of sounds.

(4.) In the fourth place, deaf persons, who have been suddenly restored to the sense of hearing, and also

* See Irving's Life and Voyages of Columbus, chap. ix., London Quarterly Review, vol. xxvi., p. 287.

persons who, in consequence of their peculiar situation, have never heard musical sounds till a certain period of their life, and have therefore been unable, in either case, to form associations with such sounds either pleasant or unpleasant, have been found, on hearing them for the first time, to experience a high degree of pleasure.—So far as we have been able to learn, we believe this to be the fact. At the same time, as instances of this kind seldom occur, and are still less frequently recorded, we do not profess to rely upon the statement as universally true, with an entire degree of confidence. The circumstances which are related of Caspar Hauser, on hearing musical sounds for the first time, are one of the few instances in point. The statement is as follows: "Not only his mind, but many of his senses, appeared at first to be in a state of stupor, and only gradually to open to the perception of external objects. It was not before the lapse of several days that he began to notice the striking of the steeple clock and the ringing of the bells. This threw him into the greatest astonishment, which at first was expressed only by his listening looks and by certain spasmodic motions of his countenance; but it was soon succeeded by a stare of benumbed meditation. Some weeks afterward, the nuptial procession of a peasant passed by the tower with a band of music close under his window. He suddenly stood listening, motionless as a statue; his countenance appeared to be transfigured, and his eyes, as it were, to radiate his ecstasy; his ears and eyes seemed continually to follow the movements of the sounds as they receded more and more; and they had long ceased to be audible, while he still continued immovably fixed in a listening posture, as if unwilling to lose the last vibrations of these, to him, celestial notes, or as if his soul had followed them, and left his body behind it in torpid insensibility."*

* Life of Caspar Hauser, chap. iii.

§ 35. The permanency of musical power dependant on its being intrinsic.

On the subject of the original or intrinsic beauty of certain sounds, one other remark remains to be made here.—It will be recollected that the doctrine which we are opposing is, that all the power which musical sounds have, considered as a source of beauty, is wholly resolvable into association. If this be true, then it seems to be the proper business of professed composers of music to study the nature and tendency of associations rather than of sounds. The common supposition in this matter undoubtedly is, that the musical composer exercises his invention and taste, in addition to the general conception or outline of his work, in forming perfect chords, varied modulation, and accurate rhythm. This is a principal, not the only one, but a principal field of his labours; the theatre on which his genius is especially displayed; and without these results of chord, modulation, and rhythm, it is certain that his efforts will fail to please. But if the doctrine which we are opposing be true, would it not be the fact that he could bring together the most harsh and discordant sounds, and compose, by means of them, the great works of his art, provided he took the means to cover their deformity by throwing over them some fascinating dress of association? But we presume it will not be pretended that mere association possesses this power as a general thing, even in the hands of genius.—Furthermore, we do not hesitate to say that, from the nature of the case, the musical genius which composes its works for immortality must deal chiefly with the elements and essentialities of things, and not with the mere incidents and accessories. Permanency in the works of art of course implies a corresponding permanency in their foundation. Associations are correctly understood to be, from their very nature, uncertain and changeable, while the beauty of some musical compositions (we speak but the common sentiment of mankind in saying it) is imperishable; a fact which seems to be in-

consistent with its being founded on an unfixed and evanescent basis.

§ 36. Of motion as an element of beauty.

Motion also, a new and distinct object of contemplation, has usually been reckoned a source of the beautiful, and very justly.—A forest or a field of grain gently waved by the wind, affects us pleasantly. The motion of a winding river pleases; and this, not only because the river is serpentine, but because it is never at rest. We are delighted with the motion of a ship as it cleaves the sea under full sail. We look on it as it moves like a thing of life, and are pleased without being able to control our feelings, or to tell why they exist. And the waves, too, around it, which are continually approaching and departing, and curling upward in huge masses, and then breaking asunder into fragments of every shape, present a much more pleasing appearance than they would if profoundly quiet and stagnant.

With what happy enthusiasm we behold the foaming cascade, as it breaks out from the summit of the mountain, and dashes downward to its base! With what pleasing satisfaction we gaze upon a column of smoke ascending from a cottage in a wood: a trait in outward scenery which landscape-painters, who must certainly be accounted good judges of what is beautiful in the aspects of external nature, are exceedingly fond of introducing. It may be said in this case, we are aware, that the pleasure arising from beholding the ascending smoke of the cottage is caused by the favourite suggestions which are connected with it, of rural seclusion, peace, and abundance. But there is much reason to believe that the feeling would be to some extent the same if it were known to ascend from the uncomfortable wigwam of the Savage, from an accidental conflagration, or from the fires of a wandering horde of gipsies.—And if motion, on the limited scale on which we are accustomed to view it, be beautiful, how great would be the ecstasy of our feel-

ings if we could be placed on some pinnacle of the universe, and could take in at one glance the regular and unbroken movements of the worlds and systems of infinite space.

§ 37. Explanations of the beauty of motion from Kames.

The author of the Elements of Criticism, who studied our emotions with great care, has the following explanations on this subject: "Motion is certainly agreeable in all its varieties of quickness and slowness; but motion long continued admits some exceptions. That degree of continued motion, which corresponds to the natural course of our perceptions, is the most agreeable. The quickest motion is for an instant delightful; but it soon appears to be too rapid: it becomes painful by forcibly accelerating the course of our perceptions. Slow continued motion becomes disagreeable for an opposite reason, that it retards the natural course of our perceptions.

"There are other varieties in motion, besides quickness and slowness, that make it more or less agreeable: regular motion is preferred before what is irregular; witness the motions of the planets in orbits nearly circular: the motion of the comets, in orbits less regular, is less agreeable.

"Motion uniformly accelerated, resembling an ascending series of numbers, is more agreeable than when uniformly retarded; motion upward is agreeable by the elevation of the moving body. What, then, shall we say of downward motion regularly accelerated by the force of gravity, compared with upward motion regularly retarded by the same force? Which of these is the most agreeable? This question is not easily solved.

"Motion in a straight line is no doubt agreeable; but we prefer undulating motion, as of waves, of a flame, of a ship under sail: such motion is more free, and also more natural. Hence the beauty of a serpentine river."

§ 38. Of intellectual and moral objects as a source of the beautiful.

But we are not to suppose that there is nothing but matter, and its accessories of form, motion, and sound, which are the foundations of the beautiful. The world of mind also, so far as it can be brought before our contemplation, calls forth similar emotions.—The human countenance, in itself considered, is a beautiful object. Nature has decidedly given that character to the curving outline of the lips and forehead, the varying tints of the cheek, and the gentle illuminations of the eye. But these interesting traits, additional to what they are in themselves, convey ideas of mind; they may be regarded as natural indications and signs of the soul, which is lodged behind them; and although the human countenance is pleasing of itself, it is beyond question that the thought, and feeling, and amiability of which it is significant, are pleasing also. We may illustrate what we mean by an instance of this kind. If we fix our attention upon two men, whose outward appearance is the same, but one of them is far more distinguished than the other for clearness of perception, extent of knowledge, and all the essentials of true wisdom, we certainly look upon him with a higher degree of complacency. And this complacency is greatly heightened if we can add to these intellectual qualities certain qualities of the heart or of the moral character, such as a strong love of truth, justice, and benevolence.

It is true, that in the present life intellectual and moral objects are brought before our contemplation only in a comparatively small degree, surrounded and almost encumbered, as we are, with material things; but they are, nevertheless, proper objects of knowledge, and are among the great sources of beauty. There is no object of contemplation more pleasing and even enrapturing than the Supreme Being; but, in contemplating the Deity, we do not contemplate an outward and accessible picture, or a statue of wood and stone, but merely a complex internal conception, which embraces certain intellectual and moral

qualities and powers, and excludes everything of a purely material kind. Now when we dwell upon the parts of this great and glorious conception, and follow them out into the length and breadth of infinite wisdom, of infinite benevolence, of unsearchable power and justice, and of other attributes, which are merged together and assimilated in this great sun of moral perfection, we find such a splendour and such a fitness in them that we cannot but be filled with delight. The object before us, unless we may more properly speak of it as sublime, is obviously one of transcendent natural and moral beauty.

CHAPTER III.

ASSOCIATED BEAUTY.

§ 39. Associated beauty implies an antecedent or intrinsic beauty.

THE views on the subject of beauty which we think it important to enforce, involve the positions, FIRST, that there is an original or intrinsic beauty; and, SECOND, that there is a beauty dependent on association. —In opposition to those persons who may be disposed to maintain that no object is beautiful of itself, but that all its beauty depends on association, we wish, in this connexion, to introduce what we regard as an important remark of Mr. Stewart. "The theory," he remarks, "which resolves the *whole* effects of beautiful objects into Association, must necessarily involve that species of paralogism to which logicians give the name of *reasoning in a circle.* It is the province of association to impart to one thing the agreeable or the disagreeable effect of another; but association can never account for the *origin* of a class of pleasures different in kind from all the others we know. If there was nothing originally and intrinsically pleasing or beautiful, the associating principle would have no materials on which it could operate."*

This remark, if it be true, appears to be decisive

* Essay on the Beautiful, chap. vi.

on the subject before us. And that it is true, we think must appear from the very nature of association. No writer, so far as we know, ascribes to Association an absolutely causative power; but only what may be called the power of *transferring*. If this be accepted as a correct view, namely, that Association does not of itself originate or create anything, but only acts in reference to what is already created or originated by bringing the objects before it into new and more intimate relations, then it follows as a necessity, that it cannot act without something being given for it to act upon. In other words, if as a principle of transfer and not of origination, it imparts beauty to one object, it must find it in another. And if the beauty exists in that other object in consequence of association, which is sometimes a supposable case, then it must have been drawn from some other source still more remote. In either case there must, of necessity, be somewhere an original or intrinsic beauty which is made the subject of such transfer.

§ 40. Objects may become beautiful by association merely.

In accordance with what has thus far been said on this whole subject, it will be kept in mind, that some of the forms of which matter is susceptible are pleasing of themselves and originally; also that we are unable to behold certain colours, and to listen to certain sounds, and to gaze upon particular expressions of the countenance, and to contemplate high intellectual and moral excellence, without emotions in a greater or less degree delightful. At the same time, it must be admitted, that, in the course of our experience, we find a variety of objects that seem, as they are presented to us, to be unattended with any emotion whatever; objects that are perfectly indifferent. And yet these objects, however wanting in beauty to the great mass of men, are found to be invested, in the minds of some, with a charm allowedly not their own. These objects, which previously excited no feelings of beau-

ty, may become beautiful to us in consequence of the associations which we attach to them. That is to say, when the objects are beheld, certain former pleasing feelings peculiar to ourselves are recalled.

The lustre of a spring morning, the radiance of a summer evening, may of themselves excite in us a pleasing emotion; but, as our busy imagination, taking advantage of the images of delight which are before us, is ever at work and constantly forming new images, there is, in combination with the original emotion of beauty, a superadded delight. And if, in these instances, only a part of the beauty is to be ascribed to association, there are some others where the whole is to be considered as derived from that source.

Numerous instances can be given of the power of association, not only in heightening the actual charms of objects, but in spreading a sort of delegated lustre around those that were entirely uninteresting before. Why does yon decaying house appear beautiful to me, which is indifferent to another? Why are the desolate fields around it clothed with delight, while others see in them nothing that is pleasant? It is because that house formerly detained me as one of its inmates at its fireside, and those fields were the scenes of many youthful sports. When I now behold them, after so long a time, the joyous emotions which the remembrances of my early days call up within me are, by the power of association, thrown around the objects which are the cause of the remembrances.

§ 41. Further illustrations of associated feelings.

He who travels through a well-cultivated country town cannot but be pleased with the various objects which he beholds; the neat and comfortable dwellings; the meadows that are peopled with flocks and with herds of cattle; the fields of grain, intermingled with reaches of thick and dark forest. The whole scene is a beautiful one; the emotion we suppose to be partly original; a person, on being restored to sight by couching for the cataract, and having had no op-

portunity to form associations with it, would witness it for the first time with delight. But a considerable part of the pleasure is owing to the associated feelings which arise on beholding such a scene; these dwellings are the abode of man; these fields are the place of his labours, and amply reward him for his toil; here are contentment, the interchange of heart-felt joys, and "ancient truth."

Those who have travelled over places that have been signalized by memorable events will not be likely to suspect us of attributing too great a share of our emotions to association. It is true that, in a country so new as America, we are unable to point so frequently as an European might do, to places that have witnessed achievements and sufferings of such a character as to become sacred in a nation's memory. But there are some such consecrated spots. With whatever emotion or want of emotion the traveller may pass by other places of our wild and stormy coast, he would do violence to the finest impulses of the heart if he did not stop at the Rock of Plymouth, the landing-place of the Pilgrim Fathers. Not because there is anything in the scenery either of the ocean or the land which presents claims upon him more imperative, or so much so, as that of some other places. But there is a moral power, the spirit of great achievements, hovering around the spot (explainable on the principles of association, and on them alone), which spreads itself over the hard features of the soil, and illuminates the bleakness of the sky, and harmonizes what would be otherwise rugged and forbidding into a scene of touching loveliness and beauty.

The powerful feeling which exists on visiting such a spot, whether we call it an emotion of beauty or sublimity, or give it a name expressive of some intermediate grade, is essentially the same with that which is caused in the bosom of the traveller when he looks for the first time upon the hills of the city of Rome. There are other cities of greater extent, and washed by nobler rivers, than the one which is before him;

but upon no others has he ever gazed with so much intensity of feeling. He beholds what was once the mistress of the world; he looks upon the ancient dwelling-place of Brutus, of Cicero, and of the Cæsars. The imagination is at once peopled with whatever was noble in the character and remarkable in the achievements of that extraordinary nation; and there is a strength, a fulness of emotion, which would never have been experienced without the accession of those great and exciting remembrances.—It is in connexion with the principles of this chapter, and in allusion to places of historical renown, that Rogers, in his Pleasures of Memory, has said, with equal philosophical truth and poetical skill,

> "And hence the charms historic scenes impart;
> Hence Tiber awes, and Avon melts the heart,
> Aerial forms, in Tempe's classic vale,
> Glance through the gloom, and whisper in the gale;
> In wild Vaucluse with love and Laura dwell,
> And watch and weep in Eloisa's cell."

§ 42. Instances of national associations.

The influence of association in rousing up, and in giving strength to particular classes of emotions, may be strikingly seen in some national instances.—Every country has its favourite tunes. These excite a much stronger feeling in the native inhabitants than in strangers. The effect on the Swiss soldiers of the Ranz des Vaches, their national air, whenever they happened to hear it in foreign lands, has often been mentioned. So great was this effect, that it was found necessary in France to forbid its being played in the Swiss corps in the employment of the French government. The powerful effect of this song cannot be supposed to be owing to any peculiar merits in the composition, but to the pleasing recollections which it ever vividly brings up in the minds of the Swiss, of mountain life, of freedom, and of domestic pleasures.

The English have a popular tune called Belleisle March. Its popularity is said to have been owing to

the circumstance that it was played when the English army marched into Belleisle, and to its consequent association with remembrances of war and conquest. And it will be found true of all national airs, that they have a charm for the natives of the country, in consequence of the recollections connected with them, which they do not possess for the inhabitants of other countries.

We have abundant illustrations of the same fact in respect to colours. The purple colour has acquired an expression or character of dignity, in consequence of having been the common colour of the dress of kings; among the Chinese, however, yellow is the most dignified colour, and evidently for no other reason than because yellow is that which is allotted to the royal family. In many countries black is expressive of gravity, and is used particularly in seasons of distress and mourning; and white is a cheerful colour. But among the Chinese white is gloomy, because it is the dress of mourners; and in Spain and among the Venetians black has a cheerful expression, in consequence of being worn by the great.

Many other illustrations to the same purpose might be brought forward. The effect of association is not unfrequently such as to suppress entirely and throw out the original character of an object, and substitute a new one in its stead. Who has not felt, both in man and woman, that a single crime, that even one unhappy deed of meanness or dishonour, is capable of throwing a darkness and distortion over the charms of the most perfect form? The glory seems to have departed; and no effort of reasoning or of imagination can fully restore it.

§ 43. The sources of associated beauty coincident with those of human happiness.

It would be a pleasing task to point out more particularly some of the sources of associated beauty, if it were consistent with the plan which we propose to follow. But it has been our object throughout to give

the sketch or outline of a system, rather than indulge in minuteness of specification. And as to the subject which we now allude to, it could hardly be expected that we should attempt to examine it extensively, much less exhaust it, when we consider that the sources of associated beauty are as wide and as numerous as the sources of man's happiness.

The fountains of human pleasure connected with the senses, the intellect, the morals, and the social and religious relations, are exceedingly multiplied. And whenever the happiness we experience, from whatever source it may proceed, is brought into intimacy with a beautiful object, we generally find that the beauty of the object is heightened by that circumstance. In other cases, the association is so strong, that a beauty is shed upon objects which are confessedly destitute of it in themselves.—We might, therefore, dismiss this topic with the simple remark, that the sources of associated beauty are necessarily as wide as the unexplored domain of human joy. There are, however, a few of its elements which seem to be worthy of a separate and specific notice.

§ 44. Of fitness considered as an element of associated beauty.

In conformity with what has just been said, we proceed to remark, that the degree of the emotion of beauty will be likely to vary in accordance with the suggestions of congruity or fitness which attend the beautiful object, considered in its relations with other objects.—In regard to the origin of the idea of congruity or fitness, it is proper to remark, that the state of the mind thus denominated, which is intellectual rather than sentimentive, naturally and necessarily arises on the contemplation of those objects where such fitness actually exists. It arises, therefore, in the first place, on the contemplation of natural objects. As creation comes from the hand of a God of order and not of confusion, everything has its appropriate character, its appropriate place and time. And as the human mind is obviously, in its very structure, adapt-

ed to this state of things, suggestions of congruity or fitness, when the works of nature constitute the object in view, are constantly arising.

They arise also in connexion with the works of human skill. It is in these works particularly that we find the application of the remark, that the degree of beauty will vary in accordance with the suggestions of congruity which attend the object, considered in relation to other objects. Whatever may be the beauty of an object in itself considered, if we distinctly perceive in it an incongruity with other objects, such as result, for instance, from an entire discordance of time and place, the displeasure or disgust which we feel in view of such want of fitness is so great as to diminish, and perhaps to annul entirely, the emotions of pleasure which would otherwise exist.

It is in accordance with these views that Hogarth has been led to remark, that twisted columns, which naturally convey an idea of weakness, always displease when they are employed to support anything which is bulky, or has a heavy appearance. "The bulks and proportions of objects," he immediately adds, "are governed by fitness and propriety. It is this that has established the size and proportion of chairs, tables, and all sorts of utensils and furniture. It is this that has fixed the dimensions of pillars, arches, &c., for the support of great weight, and so regulated all the orders in architecture, as well as the sizes of windows and doors, &c. Thus, though a building were ever so large, the steps of the stairs, the seats in the windows must be continued of their usual heights, or they would lose their beauty with their fitness: and in ship-building, the dimensions of every part are confined and regulated by fitness for sailing. When a vessel sails well, the sailors always call her a beauty; the two ideas have such a connexion!"

§ 45. Of utility as an element of associated beauty.

Another element of associated beauty is the perception of utility. Some writers, among others Mr. Hume,

have imagined that they were able to discover the origin or foundation of all emotions of beauty in this perception; understanding by the term utility a fitness or adaptation of the beautiful object to some beneficial purpose. And it is undoubtedly true, that we contemplate this quality, whenever we discern it, with a degree of complacency and approbation. Many objects, when their use or adaptation to some beneficial purpose has become known to us, have at once been clothed with an interest which they did not before possess. We do not hesitate, therefore, to admit, that a share of our emotions of associated beauty may be traced to this source. But when the perception of utility (that is to say, of the fitness of the object for some profitable ends) is proposed as the ground and origin of all emotions of beauty, including those that are original as well as those that are associated, the doctrine evidently cannot be sustained.

Mr. Burke, in his Treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful, has paid some attention to this doctrine. He rejects it altogether, considered as the universal basis of beauty. If it be admitted to be true, he considers it a fair inference from it that the wedgelike snout of the swine, with its tough cartilage at the end, and the general make of its head, so well adapted to digging and rooting, are extremely beautiful; and that hedgehogs and porcupines, which are so admirably secured against all assaults by their prickly hides, can justly be considered creatures of no small elegance.

On the theory, therefore, which proposes the perception of utility as the true ground of all emotions of beauty, both associated and original, it is enough for us to say that it goes too far. It does, indeed, in connexion with the laws of association, suggest a happy explanation of many such emotions coming under the class of associated, but by no means of all even of these.

§ 46. Of proportion as an element of associated beauty.

There are some who imagine they find the source

of beauty in a certain symmetry and determinate proportion of parts. This idea has been particularly advocated by artists, who seem to have supposed that the elements of beauty might not only be discovered, but even measured in the great models of architecture, statuary, and painting. They assign, perhaps, to the height of a column, the measurement of six or seven of its own diameters, and designate to an inch the length and breadth which constitute the beautiful in other cases. Mr. Burke has examined this opinion also; directing his inquiries to vegetables, the inferior animals, and man. He has shown that, in all cases, there are no certain measures on which the beautiful can justly be said to depend.

For instance, in the vegetable creation we find nothing more beautiful than flowers, but there is a very great variety in their shape, and in the disposition of the parts which pertain to them. In the rose, the stalk is slender, but the flower is large. The flower or blossom of the apple, on the other hand, is very small, but the tree large. Now if one of these be in proportion, the other wants it; and yet, by general consent, both the rose and the apple blossom possess beauty; and the bush of the one and the tree of the other allowedly present a very engaging appearance. —If, again, we inquire in respect to man and in respect to the inferior animal creation, we are brought to the same result, viz., that beauty does not depend upon a fixed relative size of the parts, that is, upon proportion.

It is proper to remark, however, that the word proportion is sometimes used, not to signify something which is definite, fixed, and invariable, but as synonymous with a fitness or propriety which is gathered up from the general relations and aspects of the object, and is represented by a state of mind itself. This subject we have already briefly considered. And we readily admit, wherever there is a distinct suggestion of such an idea of fitness, there is also an additional sentiment of the beautiful; and, wherever there

is a perception of unfitness or want of propriety, there is a diminution of it.

"The sense of propriety," says Kames, in some remarks on Gardening and Architecture, "dictates the following rule, That every building ought to have an expression corresponding to its destination. A palace ought to be sumptuous and grand; a private dwelling neat and modest; a playhouse gay and splendid; and a monument gloomy and melancholy." And it is entirely obvious, whenever this sense of propriety is violated, whether in these cases or in others like them, we fail to experience that pleasure, or to regard the object with that degree of complacency which we otherwise should.

§ 47. Relation of emotions of beauty to the fine arts.

The remarks of the last section lead us further to observe, that the study of this part of our constitution is exceedingly important in its applications to the fine arts. As a general statement, the true measurement of beauty in outward objects is the amount of pleasure or satisfaction which is caused within ourselves. The fine arts are outward representations, addressed in the first instance to the senses of sight and hearing in particular, and through them to that susceptibility of the beautiful which exists in the interior of the soul; and we can judge of their excellence only by their effects in relation to that susceptibility. How great ignorance, therefore, must we discover in all inquiries where the fine arts are concerned, if we are not thoroughly acquainted with this part of our sentient nature!

Perhaps these remarks should be accompanied with a precautionary suggestion. The observation we wish to make is this. We are not at liberty, as a general thing, to pass a positive judgment on works of art, founded on our own emotions merely, and wholly exclusive of any consideration of the feelings of others. Some accidental circumstance, or some casual association of a more permanent kind, may either unduly

increase or diminish the precise effects which would otherwise have been produced; and we shall not be likely to be sensible of this perversion of feeling if we rely on ourselves alone. Although, therefore, it is important that we should correct our own judgments by comparing them with the emotions and judgments of others, it will still remain true that the great grounds of decision, in all cases of beauty or deformity in the works of art, will be found in ourselves.

§ 48. Differences of original susceptibility of this emotion.

Supposing it to be true that we possess an original susceptibility of emotions of beauty, independently of what we derive from association, it seems, however, to be the fact, that this susceptibility is found existing in different degrees in different persons. Let the same beautiful object be presented to two persons, and one will be found to be not only affected, but ravished, as it were, with feelings of beauty; while the other will have the same kind of emotions, but in a very diminished degree.—A great degree of susceptibility of emotions of beauty, with a somewhat restricted import of the word, is usually termed SENSIBILITY.

The differences of men in this respect may justly be thought, where we cannot account for it by anything in their education or mental culture, to be constitutional. Nor is it more strange that men should be differently affected by the same beautiful objects, in consequence of some difference of constitution, than that they should constitutionally have different passions; that one should be choleric, another of a peaceable turn; that one should be mild and yielding, another inflexible.

§ 49. Objection to the doctrine of original beauty.

We stop here to notice one of the objections which may occur to the views which have been given on the subject of beauty. Supposing, as we do, that the mind has originally certain tendencies to emotions of beauty, we readily admit the power of various cir-

cumstances in modifying, and, in some cases, of overcoming such original tendencies. Nor, in point of fact, can it be denied that the character of our feelings of beauty sometimes changes; that is, what is regarded by us as beautiful at one time, is not at another; what is beautiful in the eyes of one age or of one nation, sometimes loses its lustre in the view of another.—The objection is, that such changes of feeling in regard to the beautiful are inconsistent with an original susceptibility of such emotions.

(1.) In answer to this difficulty, we would suggest, in the first place, that we experience analogous variations in other parts of the mind.—Take, for instance, the susceptibility of Belief; that power by which we are led to regard anything as true or false. It will surely be admitted that there is in the mind an original tendency to assent to certain propositions, rather than others of an opposite kind. It cannot be supposed that the characteristic of mind, which leads us to regard one thing as true and another as false, is something which is wholly superinduced; the result merely of accidental circumstances. But that which is felt by us to be true to-day, may be felt by us to be false to-morrow, because we have then new facts before the mind, and new sources of evidence are disclosed.

(2.) It is also well known, that our estimates of subjects in a moral point of view frequently alter. Those objects which appeared just and worthy in youth, have sometimes a different appearance in manhood, and again have a different aspect in old age. This is not because the mind, particularly the moral susceptibility, in its intrinsic nature, alters, but because objects are seen by us under different lights. Changes of opinion, similar to what may be noticed in individuals, may also be clearly noticed in the moral and religious history of different ages and nations.

(3.) Again, we find the same tendency to frequent fluctuations in the feelings of cheerfulness and melancholy, of mere pleasure and pain, of desire and aversion, as well as of beauty, and grandeur, and sub-

limity. The reason is, we take different views of objects. And this is much the same as to say that truly different objects are presented to the mind from what we had contemplated before, which is a cause amply sufficient for the changes we sometimes notice in these feelings.

It is the same in regard to the objects addressed to the susceptibility under consideration. To-day we regard some work of art as beautiful; and if we find that it appears different to us to-morrow, it is because we have discovered in it some new touches, some new relations, which escaped our notice before, and which justly have the effect to diminish our estimate of the merit of the whole work. These considerations go no little ways in explaining the changes that sometimes take place, so far as intrinsic or original beauty is concerned. But we are to recollect, furthermore, that a considerable portion of beauty is confessedly built upon association, and for this portion no one ever claimed an absolute permanency or uniformity.

§ 50. Summary of views in regard to the beautiful.

As the subject of emotions of beauty is one of no small difficulty, it may be of advantage to give here a brief summary of some of the prominent views in respect to it.

(1.) Of emotions of beauty it is difficult to give a definition, but we notice in them two marks or characteristics.—They imply, first, a degree of pleasure, and, secondly, are always referred by us to external objects as their cause.

(2.) Every beautiful object has something in itself which discriminates it from other objects that are not beautiful. On this ground we may with propriety speak of beauty in the object. At the same time, a superadded lustre is reflected back upon it from the mind; and this, too, whether the beauty be original or associated.

(3.) The feeling which we term an emotion of beauty is not limited to natural scenery, but may be

caused also by the works of art, by the creations of the imagination, and by the various forms of intellectual and moral nature, so far as they can be presented to the mind. All these various objects and others may excite within us feelings of pleasure; and the mind, in its turn, may reflect back upon the objects the lustre of its own emotions, and thus increase the degree of their beauty.

(4.) There is in the mind an original susceptibility of emotions in general, and of those of beauty in particular; and not only this, some objects are found, in the constitution of things, to be followed by these feelings of beauty, while others are not; and such objects are spoken of as being originally beautiful. That is, when the object is presented to the mind, it is of itself followed by emotions of beauty, without being aided by the influence of accessory and contingent circumstances.

(5.) Without pretending to certainty in fixing upon those objects, to which what is termed original or intrinsic beauty may be ascribed, there appears to be no small reason in attributing it to certain forms, to sounds of a particular character, to bright colours, to some varieties of motion, and to intellectual and moral excellence in general, whenever it can be made a distinct object of perception.

(6.) Many objects, which cannot be considered beautiful of themselves, become such by being associated with a variety of former pleasing and enlivening recollections; and such as possess beauty of themselves may augment the pleasing emotions from the same cause. Also, much of the difference of opinion which exists as to what objects are beautiful and what are not, is to be ascribed to differences of association.—These are some of the prominent views resulting from inquiries into this subject.

§ 51. Of picturesque beauty.

We apply the term PICTURESQUE to whatever objects cause in us emotions of beauty, in which the beauty

does not consist in a single circumstance by itself, but in a considerable number in a happy state of combination. The meaning of the term is analogous to the signification of some others of a like termination, which are derived to us from the Italian through the medium of the French. Mr. Stewart remarks of the word *arabesque*, that it expresses something in the style of the Arabians; *moresque*, something in the style of the Moors; and *grotesque*, something which bears a resemblance to certain whimsical delineations in a grotto or subterranean apartment at Rome. In like manner, *picturesque* originally implies what is done in the style and spirit of a painter, who ordinarily places before us an object made up of a number of circumstances, in such a state of combination as to give pleasure.

The epithet may be applied to natural scenery, and also to paintings and to poetical descriptions.—The following description from Thomson, which assembles together some of the circumstances attending the cold, frosty nights of winter, is highly picturesque.

> "Loud rings the frozen earth and hard reflects
> A double noise; while, at his evening watch,
> The village dog deters the nightly thief;
> The heifer lows; the distant waterfall
> Swells in the breeze; and, with the hasty tread
> Of traveller, the hollow-sounding plain
> Shakes from afar."

CHAPTER IV.

ÆSTHETIC EMOTIONS.—EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY.

§ 52. Connexion between beauty and sublimity.

Those emotions which, by way of distinction, we designate as SUBLIME, are a class of feelings which have much in common with emotions of beauty; they do not appear to differ so much in nature or kind as in degree. When we examine the feelings which are embraced under these two designations, we readily perceive that they have a progression; that there are

numerous degrees in point of intensity; but the emotion, although more vivid in one case than the other, and mingled with some foreign elements, is, for the most part, essentially the same. So that it is by no means impossible to trace, in a multitude of cases, a connexion even between the fainter feelings of beauty, and the most overwhelming emotions of the sublime.

This progression of our feelings from one that is gentle and pleasant to one that is powerful and even painful, has been illustrated in the case of a person who is supposed to behold a river at its first rise in the mountains, and to follow it as it winds and enlarges in the subjacent plains, and to behold it at last losing itself in the expanse of the ocean. For a time, the feelings which are excited within him, as he gazes on the prospect, are what are termed emotions of beauty. As the small stream, which had hitherto played in the uplands and amid foliage that almost hid it from his view, increases its waters, separates its banks to a great distance from each other, and becomes the majestic river, his feelings are of a more powerful kind. We often, by way of distinction, speak of the feelings existing under such circumstances as emotions of grandeur. At last it expands and disappears in the immensity of the ocean: the vast, illimitable world of billows flashes in his sight. Then the emotion, widening and strengthening with the magnitude and energy of the objects which accompany it, becomes sublime.

Emotions of sublimity, therefore, chiefly differ, at least in most instances, from those of beauty in their greater intensity and vividness. And yet the distinction between them is so marked, especially when we consider the subject in all its aspects, including the grounds or causes of the emotions as well as the emotions themselves, that they are entitled to a separate consideration and a distinct name.

§ 53. The occasions of the emotions of sublimity various.

As the emotions of sublimity are simple, they are

consequently undefinable. Nevertheless, as they are the direct subjects of our consciousness, we cannot be supposed to be ignorant of their nature. It may aid, however, in rendering our comprehension of them more distinct and clear in some respects if we mention some of the occasions on which they arise.—But, before proceeding to this, it is proper to recur a moment to a subject more fully insisted on in the chapter on Beauty, but which also properly has a place here. We have reference to the unquestionable fact, that the occasions of sublime emotions are not exclusively one; in other words, are not found in a single element merely, as some persons may be likely to suppose, but, like those of beauty, are multiplied and various. The measure of the sublimity of the object, that by which it is known as more or less sublime, or has any sublimity at all which is appreciable by ourselves, is found in the character of the emotion which it excites; and if the sublime emotion exists, as unquestionably it does on various occasions, this of itself is decisive as to the remark which has been made. Accordingly, the proper object before us, in the first instance, seems to be to indicate some of these occasions.

§ 54. Great extent or expansion an occasion of sublimity.

In endeavouring to point out some of the sources of sublimity, our first remark is, that the emotion of the sublime may arise in view of an object which is characterized by vast extent or expansion; in other words, by the attribute of mere horizontal amplitude. Accordingly, it is with entire propriety, that Mr. Stewart makes a remark to this effect, that a Scotchman, who had never witnessed anything of the kind before, would experience an emotion approaching to sublimity on beholding for the first time the vast plains of Salisbury and Yorkshire in England. Washington Irving also, in a passage of the Alhambra, has a remark to the same purport. "There is something," he observes, "in the sternly simple features of the Spanish landscape that impresses on the soul a feeling of

sublimity. The immense plains of the Castiles and La Mancha, extending as far as the eye can reach, derive an interest from their very nakedness and immensity, and have something of the solemn grandeur of the ocean." In regard to the ocean, one of the most sublime objects which the human mind can contemplate, it cannot be doubted that one element of its sublimity is the unlimited expanse which it presents.

§ 55. Great height an element or occasion of sublimity.

Mere height, independently of considerations of expansion or extent, appears also to constitute an occasion of the sublime. Every one has experienced this when standing at the base of a very steep and lofty cliff, hill, or mountain. When, in the silence of the night, we stand under the clear open sky, we can hardly fail, as we look upward, to experience a sublime emotion, occasioned partly by the immensity of the object, but also, in part, by its vast height. Travellers have often spoken of the sublime emotion occasioned by viewing the celebrated Natural Bridge in Virginia from the bottom of the deep ravine over which it is thrown. This bridge is a single solid rock, about sixty feet broad, ninety feet long, and forty thick. It is suspended over the head of the spectator, who views it at the bottom of the narrow glen, at the elevation of two hundred and thirty feet; an immense height for such an object. It is not in human nature to behold without strong feeling such a vast vault of solid limestone, springing lightly into the blue upper air, and remaining thus outstretched, as if it were the arm of the Almighty himself, silent, unchangeable, eternal.

§ 56. Of depth in connexion with the sublime.

It is a circumstance confirmatory of the view that it is impossible to resolve the grounds of sublimity into a single occasion or element, that we find the depth as well as the height of things, the downward as well as the upward, the antecedent and cause of this emotion. We are doubtful, however, whether

depth is so decisively, as it is certainly not so frequently a cause, as elevation or height; which last, on account of its frequent connexion with their existence, has given the name to this class of feelings. But others may think differently. Mr. Burke has the following passage on this point: "I am apt to imagine that height is less grand than depth, and that we are more struck at looking down from a precipice than looking up at an object of equal height; but of that I am not very positive."

But, however this may be, there is no doubt that sublime emotions may arise from this cause. When we are placed on the summit of any high object, and look downward into the vast opening below, it is impossible not to be strongly affected. The sailor on the wide ocean, when in the solitary watches of the night he casts his eye upward to the lofty illuminated sky, has a sublime emotion; and he feels the same strong sentiment stirring within him, when, a moment afterward, he thinks of the vast unfathomable abyss beneath him, over which he is suspended by the frail plank of his vessel. No one, we imagine, can read Shakspeare's description of Dover Cliffs without feeling that there is a sublimity in the depths beneath as well as in the heights above:

> "How fearful
> And dizzy 'tis, to cast one's eyes so low!
> The crows and choughs that wing the midway air,
> Show scarce so gross as beetles. Half way down
> Hangs one that gathers samphire, dreadful trade!
> Methinks he seems no bigger than his head.
> The fishermen, that walk upon the beach,
> Appear like mice; and yon tall anchoring bark
> Diminished to her boat; her boat a buoy,
> Almost too small for sight. The murmuring surge,
> That on the unnumbered idle pebbles chafes,
> Cannot be heard so high. I'll look no more,
> Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight
> Topple down headlong."

§ 57. Of colours in connexion with the sublime.

The colours, also, as well as the forms of bodies, may, to a limited extent, furnish the occasion of sub-

lime emotions. The lightning, when at a distance it is seen darting to the earth in one continuous chain of overpowering brightness; the red meteor shooting athwart the still, dark sky; the phenomenon known as the crimson Aurora Borealis, which occasionally diffuses the tints of the morning over the hemisphere of midnight, are sublime objects; and although there are other elements which unite in forming the basis of the sublime emotion, it is probably to be ascribed in part to the richness and vividness of colours. What object is more sublimely impressive than the contrasted hues of the mingling fires and smoke of a burning volcano! Darkness particularly is an element of the sublime. When the clouds are collecting together on some distinct and distant portion of the sky, how intently the eye fixes itself on those masses, which wear the visage of the deepest gloom! Forests, and frowning cliffs, and mountains, and the wide ocean itself, and whatever other objects are susceptible of sublimity, are rendered still more sublime by the shades and darkness that are sometimes made to pass over them. The poets of all countries have represented the Deity, the most sublime object of contemplation, as enthroned in the midst of darkness.—"He bowed the heavens also, and came down; and *darkness was under his feet.* He made *darkness* his secret place; his pavilion round about were *dark* waters, and *thick clouds* of the skies."

§ 58. Of sounds as furnishing an occasion of sublime emotions.

We find another element of the sublime in sounds of a certain description. There are some cries and voices of animals which are usually regarded as sublime. The roar of the lion, not only in the solitudes of his native deserts, but at all times, partakes of the character of sublimity. The human voice, in combination with a suitable number of other voices, is capable of uttering sublime sounds, and does in fact utter them, in performing many of the works of the great masters and composers of music. There is no

small degree of sublimity in the low, deep murmur of the organ, independently of the moral and religious associations connected with it. It is presumed no one will doubt that the trumpet, in the hands of a skilful performer, is capable of originating sublime sounds. Almost every one must have noticed a peculiarly impressive sound, sent forth by a large and compact forest of pines when waved by a heavy wind, which obviously has the same character. The heavy and interminable sound of the ocean, as it breaks upon the shore, is sublime; and hardly less so, the ceaseless voice of the congregated waters of some vast cataract. To these instances may be added the sound of a cannon, not only when it comes from the field of battle, but at any time; and still more, the mighty voice of thunder. The latter sound is often mentioned in the Scriptures, in connexion with the attributes of the Supreme Being, and apparently for the purpose of heightening the idea of his sublimity. "The Lord also thundered in the heavens, and the Highest gave his voice." —"The voice of the Lord is upon the waters; the God of glory thundereth."

We leave this part of the subject with introducing a remark from Coleridge, which goes to confirm the general doctrine of the sublimity of some sounds. He had been saying something of the scenery of the Lake of Ratzeburg, when he adds: "About a month ago, before the thaw came on, there was a storm of wind. During the whole night, such were the thunders and howlings of the breaking ice, that they left a conviction on my mind that there are sounds more sublime than any sight *can* be, more absolutely suspending the power of comparison, and more utterly absorbing the mind's self-consciousness in its total attention to the object working upon it."*

§ 59. Of motion in connexion with the sublime.

It will be noticed, from the train of thought which has been pursued, that there is a close analogy be-

* The Friend, Am. ed., p. 323.

tween beauty and sublimity, not only in the feelings which are originated, but also in the occasions of their origin. As the sentiments of beauty were found to be connected not only with the forms of objects, but also with colours and sounds, so also are those of sublimity. And, furthermore, as we found beauty connecting itself with certain kinds of motion, we find motion the basis likewise, in some of its modifications, of emotions of the sublime.

We often experience, for instance, emotions of sublimity in witnessing objects that move with great swiftness. This is one source of the feelings we have at beholding bodies of water rushing violently down a cataract. For the same reason, although there are undoubtedly other elements of the emotions we feel, the hurricane, that hastens onward with irresistible velocity, and lays waste whatever it meets, is sublime. And here also we find a cause of part of that sublime emotion which men have often felt on seeing at a distance the electric fluid darting from the cloud to the earth, and at witnessing the sudden flight of a meteor.

§ 60. Indications of power accompanied by emotions of the sublime.

The contemplation of mental objects as well as of material, may be attended with this species of emotion. Power, for instance, is an attribute of mind, and not of matter, and the exhibition of it is frequently sublime. It is hardly necessary to say, in making this remark, that power is not anything which is directly addressed to the outward senses, but is rather presented to the mind as an object of inward suggestion. Nevertheless, the causes of this suggestion may exist in outward objects; and, whenever this is the case, the feelings with which we contemplate such objects are generally increased. In other words, whatever sublimity may characterize an object, if, in addition to other sublime traits, it strongly suggests to us the idea of power, the sublime feeling is more or less heightened by this suggestion.

Nothing can be more sublime than a volcano throwing out from its bosom clouds, and burning stones, and immense rivers of lava. And it is unquestionable that the sublime emotion is attributable, in part, to the overwhelming indications of power which are thus given. An earthquake is sublime; not only in its mightier efforts of destruction, but hardly less so in those slighter tremblings and heavings of the earth which indicate the footsteps of power rather than of ruin. The ocean, greatly agitated with a storm, and tossing the largest navies as if in sport, possesses an increase of sublimity on account of the more striking indications of power which it at such a time gives. The shock of large armies, also, which concentrates the most terrible exhibition of human energy, is attended with an increased sublimity for the same reason. But in all these instances, as in most others, the sublime emotion cannot be ascribed solely to one cause; something is to be attributed to vast extent; something to the original effect of the brilliancy or darkness of colours; and something to feelings of dread and danger.

§ 61. Of moral worth in connexion with sublimity.

A consciousness of the feeling of the sublime is not limited to suggestions of POWER. There are other mental attributes which, under certain circumstances, are attended with the same effect. In general, all those feelings which are of a praiseworthy character, such as sympathy, benevolence, and the sentiment of justice, may become sublime when put forth under such circumstances as strongly to affect our hearts. The man who, in support of some great moral or religious principle, not only surrenders his property, but calmly and triumphantly sacrifices his life, is, in the highest sense, a sublime object of contemplation.—This is a topic of no small interest. But as, under the head of the Moral Sublime, it will be made the subject of a distinct chapter, it is unnecessary to delay upon it here.

§ 62. Sublime objects have some elements of beauty.

We have seen at the commencement of this chapter that a regular progression may in most instances be traced from the beautiful to the sublime. It seems, therefore, to follow, that instances of the sublime will, on the removal of some circumstances, possess more or less of the beautiful. And this, on examination, will be found to be generally the case. Take, as an example, the shock of powerful armies, which is confessedly a sublime scene. We have only to remove the circumstance of slaughter, and at once the regular order of the troops, their splendid dress and rapid movements, together with the floating of banners and the sound of music, are exceedingly picturesque and beautiful; nothing more so. And all this, in point of fact, is probably none the less beautiful when thousands are falling and dying in actual contest; although the painful emotion consequent on witnessing a scene of slaughter so much overpowers the sense of the beautiful, that it appears even not to have an existence. If the engagement between the armies should be without the accompaniments of military dress, and without order, and without strains of music, but a mere struggle between man and man, with such arms as came readiest into their power, the scene, however destructive and terrible, and however calculated to excite emotions of astonishment and dismay, would be anything rather than sublime.

A multitude of other instances, particularly such as are drawn from the works of nature, would seem to illustrate the same general fact. Diminish the force of the whirlwind to that of the gentle breeze, and, as it playfully sweeps by us, we feel that emotion of pleasure which is an element of the beautiful. And so, when the mighty cataract is dwindled down to the cascade, we shall discover that the tumultuous emotions of the sublime are converted into the gentler feelings of beauty.

However true it may be, as a general statement, that sublimity implies some elements of the beautiful,

it is not necessary to assert that this is *always* the case. Perhaps in some instances it is not. As an illustration, some will think it is not very evident that barren heaths and sandy plains of small extent have any portion of beauty; and still, when they are spread abroad before us to great extent, and especially when seen from the summit of some elevated object, they may have a considerable degree of the sublime. The statement given is meant as a general one, admitting certainly of but few exceptions.

§ 63. Emotions of grandeur.

For all the various emotions of which we are now speaking, as they rise from the lowest to the highest, we have the two general terms BEAUTY and SUBLIMITY. There is, however, another form of expression, which is, with some good reason, putting forth its claims to be received into use, viz., *emotions of grandeur*. We may happily apply this phraseology to various objects, which we hardly know whether to class with the beautiful or sublime; having too much of fulness and expansiveness for the former, and too little of power for the latter. The meandering river is beautiful; as it becomes deeper and wider, it assumes an appearance, not of mere beauty, but of grandeur; but the ocean only is more than either, is sublime.

§ 64. Of the original or primary sublimity of objects.

If there be a connexion between the beautiful and sublime; if beauty, grandeur, and sublimity are only names for various emotions, not so much differing in kind as in degree, essentially the same views which were advanced in respect to beauty will hold here. It will follow, if the contemplation of some objects is attended with emotions of beauty, independently of associated feelings; or, in other words, if they have a primary or original beauty, that there are objects also originally sublime. Hence we may conclude, that whatever has great height, or great depth, or vast extent, or other attributes of the sublime, will be able

to excite in us emotions of sublimity of themselves, independently of the subordinate or secondary aid arising from any connected feelings. We have much ground for regarding this as a correct supposition. We have good reason to believe that the Creative principle of the universe, who gave birth in the mind to the faculty or susceptibility of these emotions, has also established certain objects, and certain forms and conditions of objects as antecedent, by a fixed and original law of correspondence, to THE SUBLIME within us.

§ 65. Considerations in proof of the original sublimity of objects.

It may be inferred that there is such primary or original sublimity, not only in view of the connexion which has been stated to exist between the beautiful and sublime, but because it is no doubt agreeable to the common experience of men. But, in resting the proposition (where undoubtedly it ought to rest) on experience, we must inquire, as in former chapters, into the feelings of the young. And this for the obvious reason, that, when persons are somewhat advanced in age, it is difficult to separate the primary from the secondary or associated sublimity. They have then become inextricably mingled together.—Now take a child, and place him suddenly on the shores of the ocean, or in full sight of darkly-wooded mountains of great altitude, or before the clouds, and fires, and thunders of volcanoes, and in most cases he will be filled with sublime emotions; his mind will swell at the perception; it will heave to and fro, like the ocean itself in a tempest. His eye, his countenance, his gestures will indicate a power of internal feeling, which the limited language he can command is unable to express. This may well be stated as a fact, because it has been frequently noticed by those who are competent to observe.

Again, if a person can succeed in conveying to a child by means of words sublime ideas of whatever kind, similar emotions will be found to exist, although

generally in a less degree than when objects are directly presented to the senses. By way of confirming this, a statement of the younger Lord Lyttleton, who seems to have been naturally a person of much sensibility, may be appealed to. He relates that, when quite a boy, he was very forcibly struck with reading the following sublime passage of Milton:

> "He spake; and to confirm his words, out flew
> Millions of flaming swords, drawn from the thighs
> Of mighty Cherubim; the sudden blaze
> Far round illumined Hell."

An instance still more to the purpose, because the precise age is specified, is that of Sir William Jones. "In his *fifth* year, as he was one morning turning over the leaves of a Bible in his mother's closet, his attention was forcibly arrested by the sublime description of the angel in the tenth chapter of the Apocalypse; and the impression which his imagination received from it was never effaced. At a period of mature judgment, he considered the passage as equal in sublimity to any in the inspired writers, and far superior to any that could be produced from mere human compositions; and he was fond of retracing and mentioning the rapture which he felt when he first read it." The passage referred to is as follows: "And I saw another mighty angel come down from Heaven clothed with a cloud; and a rainbow was upon his head, and his face was as it were the sun, and his feet as pillars of fire."*

§ 66. Influence of association on emotions of sublimity.

Granting, therefore, that sublime emotions are in part original, still it is unquestionably true that a considerable share of them is to be attributed to association. As an illustration, we may refer to the effects of sounds. When a sound suggests ideas of danger, as the report of artillery and the howling of a storm; when it calls up recollections of mighty power, as the fall of a cataract and the rumbling of an earthquake,

* See Letters of Lord Lyttleton, xxv., and Teignmouth's Life of Sir William Jones, Am. edit., p. 14.

the emotion of sublimity which we feel is greatly increased by such suggestions. Few simple sounds are thought to have more of sublimity than the report of a cannon; but how different, how much greater the strength of feeling than on other occasions, whenever we hear it coming to us from the fields of actual conflict! Many sounds, which are in themselves inconsiderable, and are not much different from many others, to which we do not attach the character of sublimity, become highly sublime by association. There is frequently a low, feeble sound preceding the coming of a storm which has this character.

> "Along the woods, along the moorish fens,
> Sighs the sad genius of the coming storm,
> Resounding long in fancy's listening ear."
>
> THOMSON'S *Winter*.

It is sometimes the case, that people whose sensibilities are much alive to thunder mistake it for some common sounds, such as the noise of a carriage, or the rumbling of a cart. While they are under this mistake, they feel these sounds as sublime, because they associate with them all those ideas of danger and of mighty power which they customarily associate with thunder. The hoot of the owl at midnight is sublime chiefly by association; also the scream of the eagle, heard amid rocks and deserts. The latter is particularly expressive of fierce and lonely independence, and both are connected in our remembrance with some striking poetical passages.

§ 67. Further illustrations of sublimity from association.

The same results will be found to hold good in other cases. The sight of heavy and broken masses of dark clouds, driven about by the wind, is sublime. But how much more fruitful of emotion to those who, in the days of Fingal and Ossian, saw them, in their prolific imaginations, peopled with the ghosts of the dead; with the assemblies of those whose renown had continued to live long after their bodies had returned to the dust!—"Temora's woods shook with the blast

of the inconstant wind. A cloud gathered in the west. A red star looked from behind its edge. I stood in the wood alone; I saw a ghost in the darkened air; his stride extended from hill to hill. His shield was dim on his side. It was the son of Semo."*

I once stood at the base of the Egyptian pyramids, and can bear testimony that it is impossible to behold such vast efforts of human power and be unmoved. The emotion, in view of the object itself, is sublime. But the strength of the feelings which were experienced was greatly increased by means of the deeply impressive recollection, that those vast piles had stood unshaken, while successive generations flourished and perished at their feet; and by their being connected with many ideas of ancient magnificence, and with the suggestion of once renowned but now unknown kings and conquerors. I went from Egypt to Arabia Petræa, and ascended the heights of Mount Sinai. And in looking abroad from the summit of this vast rocky pile, the soul dilated and heaved like a tempest with the immensity of the objects beneath and around it. But not more, I think, in view of what was seen, than in consequence of the greatness of the past, and its wonderful experiences and histories, which were made present by associated recollection.

CHAPTER V.

NATURE OF INTELLECTUAL TASTE.

§ 68. Definition of taste, and some of its characteristics.

At this point in the examination of the Sensibilities, we turn aside for a moment to consider a subject which is closely and indissolubly connected with those emotions which have thus far received our attention; we refer to intellectual TASTE. It is sometimes the case, that a strong light is thrown upon a subject by the mere position which it occupies in reference to oth-

* Ossian, Epic Poem of Temora, bk. i.

er topics closely related to it. It is for this reason that the subject of taste, one both philosophically and practically of great importance, is introduced in this immediate connexion.

If we were required to give a definition, we should say that Taste, in the most general sense of the term, is the power of judging of the beauty or deformity of objects, founded on the experience of emotions, particularly those of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity.

In view of this definition there are two things to be noticed.—(1.) Taste is not a Sentient, but an Intellectual power; its decisions, although, in consequence of its close connexion with the feelings, it may often seem to be otherwise, are not acts of the Heart, but of the Understanding. So that, in the arrangement of the mental powers, notwithstanding its introduction here, it belongs strictly to the First rather than the Second great division of the mind.—(2.) Taste, as is obviously implied in the definition, is not an original power, distinct from every other, and having a nature of its own, but seems to be rather a modification or form of the Judgment. It differs from other exhibitions of the Judgment merely in the circumstance of its being exercised in a particular way, viz., in view of certain emotions and the causes of these emotions. In accordance with this view, an old English writer has correctly said, "What we call taste is a kind of *extempore* judgment; it is a settled habit of distinguishing, without staying to attend to rules or ratiocination, and arises from long use and experience."*

§ 69. Distinguishable from mere quickness of feeling or sensibility.

If taste be an intellectual power, originating in the understanding rather than the heart, then it seems to follow, and is unquestionably the fact, that it is not to be confounded with mere quickness of feeling, with mere sensibility. At the same time, it is to be recollected that there is no taste which is absolutely exclusive of sensibility; and that, though they are not iden-

* Hughes, as quoted by Stewart, Essay iii., chap. iii.

tical, they are closely connected together. Without any degree of sensibility, there would be no possibility of emotion; and, consequently, as it is the peculiarity of taste, the very thing which constitutes it what it is, to sit in judgment on emotions, the extinction of the sensibility involves the extinction of taste. And it is for this reason we are led to say that they are closely connected, although they are not identical.

And that they are not identical is not only obvious from the fact that the sentient and the intellectual, the understanding and the heart, are in their nature necessarily distinct from each other, but also from the fact that we sometimes find men of great sensibility, who are acknowledged by common consent to be deficient in the other attribute. Indeed, the excess of their sensibility seems in some cases to be an obstacle in the way of the perfection of their taste; the very cause of that deficiency of taste which they are perceived to manifest. When the excitement of feeling attendant on viewing an object is very great, it is a matter of course that the powers of perception and judgment, which are employed in the examination of its qualities considered as the cause of this internal excitement, will be perplexed and hindered. So that it is sometimes necessary to check for a time the tide of feeling, to contract and embank the fountains of sensibility, in order that the taste, which penetrates back of feeling into the causes and conditions of feeling, may suitably discharge its appropriate office.

§ 70. Of the process involved in the formation of taste.

Although every man of entire sanity of mind possesses the materials or elements which are prerequisite to taste, yet not every man is spoken of and regarded as possessing the thing itself. The materials must be moulded into a certain shape, the elements must be compacted into a specific form, before they will be considered as entitling their possessor to the honour of that valuable attribute. When we speak of a man of taste, we imply in the expressions that he

has a knowledge of, and is able to foretell, with a considerable degree of accuracy, what works will be found generally pleasing, or the opposite. This ability, as it exists in the man of taste, has sometimes been thought to be original or implanted; but it is not so. Generally speaking, it is the result of a long, and frequently a laborious process of induction. He who aspires to the possession of this power must condescend, as preparatory to obtaining it, to subject his judgment to a course of training and discipline. Accordingly, he contemplates the works of nature and art, first, in reference to himself; he examines the nature of the emotions which are excited in his own bosom, whether of beauty or of a different kind, and is thus enabled to decide, so far as he is himself concerned, whether the object is to be regarded as beautiful or not. He accordingly sets down some objects and qualities of objects as pleasing, others as displeasing; or, what is the same thing, he characterizes some as beautiful and others as deformed; and others, again, as possessing the marks of grandeur or of sublimity.

Not only this, he endeavours to ascertain the impressions which the same objects make upon the minds of others, and carefully compares the result of this inquiry with his own feelings, in order the more effectually to exclude from his decisions the possibility of mistake. In this way, sustained by the emotions of his own heart and the concurrent feelings of others, he is enabled to detect and to point out, in regard to a particular object, not merely the general fact of its beauty, but the elements of it; in other words, the specific things and relations in the object on which its beauty is based.—Having frequently repeated this process in respect to those objects which happen to come within his particular province or department, he becomes so familiar with the principles of beauty and sublimity within its limits, that he is, to that extent at least, regarded as a man of taste—a reputation which it is vain to suppose can be secured without some such process of repeated examination and comparison.

§ 71. Instantaneousness of the decisions of taste.

There is one distinctive peculiarity in the operations of taste, which may at first sight be thought to be inconsistent with that process of comparison and examination which has just been mentioned, viz., its rapidity of action, the instantaneousness of its decisions. It is this circumstance, probably, more than any other, which has originated and cherished the idea, too often prevalent, that taste is an original faculty, distinct from every other, and never possessed where it is not given by nature.—The instantaneousness of operation which has been mentioned is undoubtedly the result of Habit, and is easily explainable by a reference to the tendencies and effects of that great principle of the mind. By the term Habit, in its application to the mind, we express the well-known fact, that the mental action acquires facility and strength from repetition and practice. But so many instances in illustration of its nature and results have already been given, we cannot suppose it to be necessary to delay upon the subject here. And if the nature of habit is understood, and if it is applicable, as it unquestionably is, to the matter under consideration, then the mystery which may be thought to rest on the instantaneousness of the operations of taste at once vanishes.

The military engineer, by a single glance of the eye, detects the aptitudes and peculiarities of a military position; the experienced mechanician, in like manner, detects with a rapidity which to others has the appearance of intuition, the parts and the relations, the hinderances and the impulsions of a complicated machine. It is HABIT which is the secret of the power manifested in both of these cases, and in a multitude of others like them. And, for the same reason, the man of taste, availing himself of the immense power which habit has given to his critical judgment, discriminates in the works of genius, by an instantaneous perception, the elements of their beauty or sublimity.

§ 72. Of the permanency of beauty.

Before leaving this subject, there is one other topic which is deserving of a brief notice. We refer to the question whether we are to regard beauty as truly real and permanent, or as accidental and transitory. In other words, whether we are to look upon it as something essential to nature, so that, in its original and intrinsic elements, it will be found to affect all mankind nearly alike in all countries and ages, or as merely a pleasing illusion of the imagination, dependant wholly upon some interesting conjuncture of time and circumstances.—The doctrines which have been advanced help us in answering this interesting question. Various considerations point distinctly to the conclusion that beauty, so far as it may exist independently of association, has its foundation in nature, possesses its fixed causes and relations, and may justly be regarded, in respect to the human mind at least, as something permanent.

This view is sustained, in the first place, by the fact which has already appeared, that beauty in the first instance is original, and not associated. That beauty, in some proper and real sense of the term, exists, is a fact; that the human mind is readily accessible to its influence is a fact also; and, in the case of primary or intrinsic beauty, no other reason can be given either of its existence or of its influence, than that such is the constitution of nature. And this state of things seems clearly to involve its permanency.—If all beauty were associated, as some seem to have contended, it would be very different; we could nót, in that case, predicate of what is beautiful to-day that it would be so to-morrow; but it would be found constantly changing. But the fact that a large portion of it is intrinsic appears necessarily to furnish a basis of the permanency of that portion at least.

In the second place, the doctrine that beauty, in distinction from deformity, is permanent, and is in some way connected with the established nature of things, is confirmed by the fact that the standard of

beauty in one age has been essentially the standard of beauty in another, from the beginning of time down to the present hour. The great works of literature, which secured the suffrages of the universal mind in the age of Homer and the Hebrew prophets, retain their ascendency yet. The song of Virgil and the eloquence of Tully come over the heart of those who are able to appreciate them, with as much power as when they were first uttered. No later age or country has ever pronounced the great works of ancient architecture, the Temple of Theseus, the Parthenon, the Coliseum, and numberless others, to be destitute of those high attractions which the nations of antiquity concurred in ascribing to them. And in the sister art of sculpture, it is well known that the specimens of statuary which were the boast of the age of Phidias, have formed the study of the era of Canova. And it is the same in all the departments of the polite arts. Intrinsic Beauty, where it appears at all, stands forth imperishable in fact, which is certainly an evidence of an imperishable nature. Accordingly, under the conviction of its being of this character, Sir Joshua Reynolds says of the painter, if he aims at distinguished excellence, "he must disregard all local and temporary ornaments, and look only on those general habits which are everywhere and always the same; he addresses his works to the people of every country and every age; he calls upon posterity to be his spectators, and says with Zeuxis, IN ÆTERNITATEM PINGO."

CHAPTER VI.

EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICROUS.

§ 73. General nature of emotions of the ludicrous.

IN prosecuting the general subject of emotions, we are next to consider another well-known class, which are of a character somewhat peculiar, viz., *emotions of the ludicrous.*

It is difficult to give a precise definition of this feeling, although the same may be said of it as in respect to emotions of beauty, that it is a pleasant or delightful one. But the pleasure which we experience receives a peculiar modification, and one which cannot be fully conveyed in words, in consequence of our perception of some incongruity in the person or thing which is the cause of it.—In this case, as in many other inquiries in mental philosophy, we are obliged to rely chiefly on our own consciousness, and our knowledge of what takes place in ourselves.

§ 74. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous.

It may, however, assist us in the better understanding of them, if we say something of the occasions on which the emotions of the ludicrous are generally found to arise. And, among other things, it is exceedingly clear, that this feeling is never experienced except when we notice something, either in thoughts, or in outward objects and actions, which is unexpected and uncommon. That is to say, whenever this emotion is felt, there is always an unexpected discovery by us of some new relations.—But then it must be observed, that the feeling in question does not necessarily exist in consequence of the discovery of such new relations merely. Something more is necessary, as may be very readily seen.

Thus we are sometimes, in the physical sciences, presented with unexpected and novel combinations of the properties and qualities of bodies. But, whenever we discover in those sciences relations in objects which were not only unknown, but unsuspected, we find no emotion of ludicrousness, although we are very pleasantly surprised. Again, similes, metaphors, and other like figures of speech imply in general some new and unexpected relations of ideas. It is this trait in them which gives them their chief force. But, when employed in serious compositions, they are of a character far from being ludicrous.

Hence we infer that emotions of ludicrousness do

not exist on the discovery of new and unexpected relations, unless there is at the same time a perception, or supposed perception, of some incongruity or unsuitableness. Such perception of unsuitableness may be expected to give to the whole emotion a new and specific character, which every one is acquainted with from his own experience, but which, as before intimated, it is difficult to express in words.

§ 75. Of Hobbes' account of the ludicrous.

There has not been an entire uniformity on the subject of the emotions of the ludicrous.—It would seem that Hobbes (HUMAN NATURE, chap. ix.) considered feelings of this kind as depending on a modification of mere pride in a comparison of ourselves with others to our own advantage. He says of laughter, which, when considered in reference to the mind, and independently of the mere muscular action, is in many cases nothing more than a feeling of the ludicrous, that it is "a sudden glory, arising from a sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly."—To this notion of the origin of this class of our feelings there are some objections, viz.—(1.) In many instances we have the feeling in question when there is evidently no discovery of any infirmity, either in the witty person or in the subject of his wit, over which we can ourselves triumph with any good reason.—(2.) Further, if the doctrine which resolves the emotions of ludicrousness into a proud comparison of ourselves with others were correct, it would follow that the most proud and self-conceited men would be most inclined to mirth and sociability, which we do not find to be the fact.—According to Hobbes' notion of the origin of these feelings, we have only to go into the company of the most ignorant and stupid if we wish to be exceedingly merry. In such company we could not fail to be sensible of some eminency in ourselves, in comparison with the infirmities of others. We should here be in a situation corresponding to his

definition of laughter, but there can be no doubt that multitudes would be but very little inclined to indulge that feeling in the midst of such associates.

But while we cannot receive this writer's account of the feeling in question, we may undoubtedly be well agreed in respect to it, as far as this: That it implies a quick and playful delight of a peculiar kind, arising on the discovery of unexpected relations of ideas, and the perception or apparent perception of some incongruity.

§ 76. Of what is to be understood by wit.

The subject of emotions of the ludicrous is closely connected with what is termed Wit. This last-named subject, therefore, which it is of some importance to understand, naturally proposes itself for consideration in this place. In regard to WIT, as the term is generally understood at the present time, there is ground to apprehend that an emotion of the ludicrous is always, in a greater or less degree, experienced in every instance of it.

This being the case, we are led to give this definition, viz., WIT consists in suddenly presenting to the mind an assemblage of related ideas of such a kind as to occasion feelings of the ludicrous.—This is done in a variety of ways; and, among others, in the two following.

§ 77. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects.

The first method which wit employs in exciting the feeling of the ludicrous is by debasing those things which are grand and imposing; especially those which have an appearance of greater importance, and gravity, and splendour than they are entitled to. Descriptions of this sort are termed burlesque.

An attempt to lessen what is truly and confessedly serious and important has in general an unpleasant effect, very different from that which is caused by true wit. And yet it is the case, that objects and actions truly great and sublime may sometimes be so coupled

with other objects, or be represented in such new circumstances as to excite very different feelings from what they would otherwise. Among the various sayings of the Emperor Napoleon, none is more true than his very appropriate remark to the Abbé de Pradt, at the time of his secret flight on a sledge through Poland and Prussia, that there is but a single step from the sublime to the ridiculous.

In the practice of burlesque, as on all other occasions of wit, there is a sudden and uncommon assemblage of related ideas. Sometimes this assemblage is made by means of a formal comparison. Take, as an instance, the following comparison from Hudibras:

> "And now had Phœbus in the lap
> Of Thetis taken out his nap;
> And, like a lobster boiled, the morn
> From black to red began to turn."

We find illustrations of burlesque also in those instances where objects of real dignity and importance are coupled with things mean and contemptible, although there is no direct and formal comparison made, as in this instance from the above-mentioned book:

> "For when the restless Greeks sat down
> So many years before Troy-town,
> And were renowned, as Homer writes,
> For well-soled boots no less than fights."

In these instances we have related ideas. In the first there is undoubtedly an analogy between a lobster and the morning, in the particular of its turning from dark to red. But, however real it may be, it strikes every one as a singular and unexpected resemblance. In the other passage, it is not clear that Butler has done anything more than Homer in associating the renown of the Greeks with their boots as well as their valour. But to us of the present day the connexion of ideas is hardly less uncommon and singular, not to say incongruous, than in the former.

§ 78. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects.

The second method which wit employs in exciting emotions of the ludicrous is by aggrandizing objects

which are in themselves inconsiderable. This species of wit may be suitably termed *mock-majestic* or *mock-heroic.* While the former kind delights in low expressions, this is the reverse, and chooses learned words and sonorous combinations. In the following spirited passage of Pope, the writer compares dunces to gods, and Grub-street to heaven.

"As Berecynthia, while her offspring vie
In homage to the mother of the sky,
Surveys around her in the bless'd abode
A hundred sons, and every son a god;
Not with less glory mighty Dulness crowned,
Shall take through Grub-street her triumphant round;
And her Parnassus glancing o'er at once,
Behold a hundred sons, and each a dunce."

In this division of wit are to be included those instances where grave and weighty reflections are made upon mere trifles. In this case, as in others, the ideas are in some respects related, or have something in common; but the grouping of them is so singular and unexpected, that we cannot observe it without considerable emotion.

"My galligaskins, that have long withstood
The winter's fury and encroaching frosts,
By time subdued (*what will not time subdue!*),
A horrid chasm disclose."

It may be proper to make the remark in this place, which is applicable to wit in all its forms, that many sayings, which would otherwise have appeared to us witty, lose no small share of their intended effect whenever we are led to suspect that they were premeditated. Hence an observation or allusion, which would be well received in conversation, would often be insipid in print; and it is for the same reason that we receive more pleasure from a witty repartee than a witty attack. Our surprise at the sudden developement of intellectual acuteness is much greater at such times.

§ 79. Of other methods of exciting emotions of the ludicrous.

But it is not to be supposed that wit is limited to

the methods of assembling together incongruous ideas, which have just been referred to. A person of genuine wit excites emotions of the ludicrous in a thousand ways, and which will be so diverse from each other, that it will be found exceedingly difficult to subject them to any rules. It would be difficult, for instance, to bring within any established classification of the specific sources of wit many passages of the poet Butler. In the first Canto of his poem of Hudibras, we have a particular account of the hero's horse, in which the writer very singularly compares the animal to a Spaniard in majesty and deliberation of gait, and in some other respects to the celebrated horse of Cæsar, as follows:

"He was well stay'd, and in his gait
Preserved a grave, majestic state.
At spur or switch no more he skipp'd,
Or mended pace, than Spaniard whipp'd;
And yet so fiery he would bound,
As if he grieved to touch the ground.
That Cæsar's horse, who, as fame goes,
Had corns upon his feet and toes,
Was not by half so tender hoof'd,
Or trod upon the ground so soft;
And as that beast would kneel and stoop
(Some write) to take his rider up,
So Hudibras's ('tis well known)
Would do the same to set him down."

§ 80. Of the character and occasions of humour.

Closely connected with the general subject of ludicrous emotions and of wit is that of Humour. It is well known that we often apply the terms *humour* and *humorous* to descriptions of a particular character, whether written or given in conversation, and which may be explained as follows.

It so happens that we frequently find among men what seems to us a disproportion in their passions; for instance, when they are noisy and violent, but not durable. We find inconsistencies, contradictions, and disproportions in their actions. They have their foibles (hardly any one is without them), such as self-conceit, caprice, foolish partialities, and jealousies.—

Such incongruities in feeling and action cause an emotion of surprise like an unexpected combination of ideas in wit. Observing them, as we do, in connexion with the acknowledged high traits and responsibilities of human nature, we can no more refrain from an emotion of the ludicrous than we can on seeing a gentleman of fine clothes and high dignity making a false step and tumbling into a gutter. A person who can seize upon these specialties in temper and conduct, and set them forth in a lively and exact manner, is called a man of humour, and his descriptions are termed humorous descriptions.

Mr. Addison has given many examples of the humorous in the incidents and characters of the Tattler and Spectator. But excellence in this species of writing is not very frequently found, and is an attainment of considerable difficulty. In general it implies something peculiar in the character of the writer. There are some persons who seem to have a natural inclination for noticing those traits in the feelings and actions of men which cause ludicrous emotions. Whatever may be the cause of it, there can hardly be a question as to the fact that some possess this characteristic much more than others. This was particularly true of some of the writers who have been mentioned in this chapter, and of Swift, Fontaine, and others. Writers who have a natural turn of this sort will of course be more likely to excel in the humorous than others, although great excellence in it, in addition to this indispensable trait, will require great precision and power of language and cultivation of taste.

§ 81. Of humorous descriptions as modified by disposition.

Not unfrequently the character of humorous descriptions will be found to be modified by the traits that predominate in the writer's dispositions. If he be a person of kind and generous temper, so that he has a feeling of forgiveness and sympathy in view of the imperfections which he has the power of setting in a ludicrous or humorous light, like Shakspeare or

Sir Walter Scott, like Sterne, Dickens, and Irving, his gentle satires, if such they may be called, may provoke a smile, but will leave no sting, no wound behind them. But when this power is possessed by persons who naturally have an unfeeling heart, or whose tempers, which not unfrequently happens, have become unduly embittered by the infelicities of the times, as in the case of Swift and Voltaire, we feel uneasy in their presence, because we know they have in their hands a weapon, which smites and destroys with little or nothing to check its violence.

And this helps to illustrate what is often said in our study and estimate of human nature, that in judging men and forming an estimate of their character, we are to take into account not only particular powers and traits for which they may be distinguished, but the modification which these powers and traits may experience from their union with other leading traits of intellect or of disposition. Without understanding and appreciating this close and reciprocal relationship and modification of the powers of the mind, men's judgments of each other must necessarily be subject to great error.

§ 82. Of the practical utility of feelings of the ludicrous.

It is not impossible that the feelings which we have examined in this chapter may have the appearance to some minds of being practically useless. If this were the fact, it would be at variance with the economy of the mind in other respects, which gives evidence everywhere that its original tendencies are ingrafted upon it for some practical ends. But it is not so. The feeling of the ludicrous (or, as it is sometimes called, the sense of ridicule) is attended with results which, although they may not be perfectly obvious at first, will be found, on a little examination, to be of no small moment. It is entirely clear that it constitutes one of the important guides and aids which nature has appointed of human conduct. Scarcely any one is willing to undergo ridicule even in its milder and

more acceptable forms, much less to subject himself to the "world's dread laugh." And many persons would be less attentive to the decencies and proprieties of personal conduct and of the intercourse of life, than they are in fact, were it not for the fear of this species of retribution. It is true, it is not powerful enough, nor is it the appropriate instrument, to attack the more marked depravities incident to our nature, the strongholds of its sin; but it is unquestionably an effective and useful agent in its application to whatever is mean, incongruous, and unseemly.

Some valuable remarks may be found, in connexion with this subject, in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, bk. i., ch. iii., and in Beattie on Laughter and Ludicrous Compositions.

CHAPTER VII.

INSTANCES OF OTHER SIMPLE EMOTIONS.

§ 83. Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, and gladness.

Under the general head of Emotions there are many other simple feelings which merit some attention. Although they are, perhaps, not less essential to our nature, and not less important than those which have been already attended to, we do not find so many difficulties in their examination, and but a few remarks will be wanting to explain them.

We begin with the emotion of *cheerfulness*. Of the nature of this feeling none can be supposed to be ignorant. It exists, in a greater or less degree, throughout the whole course of our life. It is seen in the benignant looks, and is heard in the garrulity of old age; it sheds its consolations over the anxieties and toils of manhood, and reigns with a sort of perpetual spring in youth.

The words *joy* and *delight* express a high degree of cheerfulness; the feeling is the same; the difference is in its greater intensity. The word *gladness* is near-

ly synonymous with these last, but seems to be applied particularly when the joy is of a more sudden and less permanent character.

§ 84. Emotions of melancholy, sorrow, and grief.

While there are many things in life which are fitted to make us cheerful and happy, every one must know that for wise purposes a degree of bitterness is mingled in our cup, and that circumstances occur from time to time which are of an opposite tendency. And these prove to us occasions of melancholy, which is the name of another specific simple emotion.

There are different degrees of this emotion, as well as of that of cheerfulness. We sometimes express the very slightest degree of it by the words uneasiness or discontent. When the feeling of melancholy is from any circumstance greatly increased, we usually give it the name of *sorrow;* so that sorrow seems to hold nearly the same relation to melancholy that joy does to cheerfulness.

The word *grief* also has nearly the same relation to sorrow that gladness has to joy. As far as the mere feeling is concerned which they represent, the two words grief and sorrow may be regarded as synonymous with each other; with this exception, that the term grief is commonly employed when the sorrow exists suddenly and with great strength. Hence grief sometimes shows itself by external signs, and even in frantic transports; while sorrow, even when it is deeply rooted, is more tacit, enduring, and uncommunicative.

§ 85. Emotions of surprise, astonishment, and wonder.

Whenever anything novel and unexpected presents itself to our notice, whether in nature or in ordinary events, we experience a new simple emotion, distinct from any which has hitherto been mentioned, which we call a feeling of *surprise.* We are aware that this view is not adopted by Dr. Adam Smith. "Surprise," he remarks, in one of his Philosophical Essays,

" is not to be regarded as an original emotion, distinct from all others. The violent and sudden change produced upon the mind when an emotion of any kind is brought upon it, constitutes the whole nature of surprise." This remark, although coming from a person of acknowledged acuteness, seems to have been unadvisedly made. If there be no such feeling as that of surprise, it cannot easily be accounted for, that a term expressive of it is found in all languages. And, furthermore, the existence of such a feeling, of a specific nature and distinct from all others, seems to be as fully warranted by our own consciousness and the general testimony of men, as that of any feeling whatever. If Mr. Smith had said, a violent and sudden change of the mind (that is, some new, sudden, and unexpected perception) constitutes, not the emotion itself, but, in general, the *occasion* of the emotion of surprise, his language would have been less objectionable.

We sometimes use the word *astonishment*, which does not express a different emotion, but the same emotion in a different degree. When the feeling is exceedingly strong, it seems to suspend for a time the whole action of the mind, and we say of a person in such a situation, not merely that he is surprised, but is astonished or amazed.

When the facts or events which occasion the surprise are of such a singular and complicated character as to induce us to dwell upon them for a length of time, the feeling arising is then often called *wonder*. It is not, however, a different emotion from what we ordinarily call surprise, but the same emotion, modified by different circumstances.

It may be added here, that this emotion is highly important to our preservation, security, and improvement. It is in new circumstances, in untried and unexplored situations, that we are particularly required to be upon our guard, since we know not what effects may attend them, nor whether these effects may prove good or evil to us.

Happily for us, the emotion of surprise and astonishment which we experience at such times is very vivid, so much so as to arrest for a time both our perceptions and our conduct, and to compel us to pause and consider where we are, and what is to be done. Certainly this is a beneficent provision; for if nature had formed us unsusceptible of such vivid feelings, we should have gone on without being apprehensive of the consequences, and in that way often have plunged amid inexpressible evils.

§ 86. Emotions of dissatisfaction, displeasure, and disgust.

There is another emotion, which approaches very near to the feeling of melancholy, and still slightly differs from it, which we express by the term *dissatisfaction.* It is a painful feeling, though only in a small degree; but its nature, like that of all other simple emotions, cannot be fully understood, except by a reference to the testimony of our own inward experience.

When from any circumstance the emotion of dissatisfaction exists in an increased degree, we often express this difference, although the nature of the feeling remains the same, by another term, that of *displeasure.*

There appear to be other forms of the simple feeling of dissatisfaction. The feeling of *disgust* is the emotion of dissatisfaction, existing in an increased degree, but under such circumstances as to distinguish it, in the view of our consciousness, from the feeling of displeasure. The latter feeling approximates more closely to an emotion of hostility to the cause of it than the former. The terms are sometimes used together, and yet not as perfectly synonymous; as when we say that, on a certain occasion, we were both displeased and disgusted.

§ 87. Emotions of diffidence, modesty, and shame.

There is an emotion, often indicated outwardly by a half-averted look and a shyness and awkwardness of

manner, expressed by the term *diffidence.* An interesting modification of this feeling, as we suppose it to be, is *modesty;* differing from diffidence perhaps slightly in kind or nature, but probably only in degree. Although this feeling attracts but little notice in the genealogy of our mental operations, and occupies but a small space in its description, it is important in its results. It combines its influences, in connexion with the natural desire of regard or esteem, in keeping men in their place, and in thus sustaining that propriety of conduct and those gradations of honour and of duty which are so essential to the existence and the happiness of society.

A higher degree of this mental state is *shame.* When we find ourselves involved in any marked improprieties of conduct, this feeling exists, characterized outwardly by a downcast eye and a flushed countenance. It is not, however, exclusively attendant upon guilt, although guilt, among other consequences flowing from it, is in part punished in this way; but seems to be rather an appropriate punishment attendant on those minor violations of decency and order, which may exist without an infringement on morals.

§ 88. Emotions of regard, reverence, and adoration.

Different from all the feelings which have now been mentioned is the emotion of regard or respect, which, in its simplest form at least, we exercise towards the great mass of our fellow-beings. The mere fact that they are creatures of God, and are possessed of intellectual and moral powers like our own, is deemed sufficient to lay the foundation of the exercise of this feeling towards them.

When we observe in any individuals marked traits of mental excellence, as wisdom, truth, and justice, especially when these traits are expanded and exalted by great age, the feeling of respect, which we exercise in ordinary cases, is heightened into *reverence.* Every country can boast of a few such men, the just objects of the deepened regard of reverence; and the eyes of

successive generations have been turned with the same deep feeling towards those who are scattered along, in various places, in the long tract of history.

When the reverence or veneration is free from every inferior intermixture; in other words, when the object of it is regarded as without weakness and possessed of every possible perfection, it then becomes *adoration;* a homage of the soul so pure and exalted, that it properly belongs only to the Supreme Being. The wisdom of the wisest men is often perplexed with errors; the goodness of the best of men is marred by occasional infirmities; how much deeper, therefore, and purer, and more elevated will be our sentiments of veneration, when directed towards Him whose wisdom never fails, and who is not only just and kind in his administrations, but the original and inexhaustible source of beneficence and rectitude!

We conclude here the examination of the Emotions. We would not pretend that this part of our sentient nature has been fully explored in the views which have been taken, but would hope that so much has been said as to throw some satisfactory light upon it, and to leave us at liberty to turn to another class of subjects.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART FIRST.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES.

NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

THE DESIRES.

THE DESIRING NATURE OR DESIREMENT.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF DESIRES.

§ 89. Of the prevalence of desire in this department of the mind.

We now proceed to enter upon a separate portion of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, distinguished from that which has hitherto received our attention by the possession of its appropriate nature, and by sustaining its distinct and appropriate relations. The characteristic element of this region of the Natural Sensibilities, that which, in fact, constitutes the basis of its existence, is the state of mind, distinct from all others, which we denominate DESIRE. This state of mind not only stands at the threshold of the department which we now enter upon, but diffuses abroad its influence, and runs through, and gives a character to all the subordinate divisions into which this part of the Pathematic nature will be found to resolve itself. No appetite, no propensity, or affection exists in fact, nor can we suppose it possible for them to exist, exclusively of any intermixture of the ingredient of DESIRE.—It is for this reason that we denominate this portion of the sentimentive nature Desires, as we called the other Emotions; and as, in naming the susceptibility from which the emotions arise, we find it convenient to speak of the EMOTIVE sensibilities, or EMOTIONALITY, or EMOTIVITY, so, without violation of the usage and laws of the language, we may denominate the department which follows it the DESIRING or DESIRIVE nature, or DESIRIVENESS, or perhaps DESIREMENT.

§ 90. The nature of desires known from consciousness.

As DESIRES occupy so prominent a place in those principles of the mind which we now propose to give some account of, it is proper to delay here, in order

briefly to attempt some explanation of their nature. And in doing this, we are obliged, in the first place, to repeat the remark already often made, that we must turn the acts of the mind inward upon itself, and consult the intimations of our own consciousness. We do not suppose that any definition of desire, inasmuch as it is obviously a simple state of the mind, could possibly throw any such light upon it as to preclude the necessity of an internal reference. It is the light of the mind, if we will but turn our eyes to behold it, and that alone, which can truly indicate what may be called the essentiality of its nature.—At the same time, while we must obviously consult consciousness for a knowledge of its distinctive character, we may probably render our conceptions of it more distinct and perfect by considering some of the circumstances or incidents of its origin, and some of the relations it sustains.

§ 91. Of the place of desires in relation to other mental states.

It is important to possess a well-settled and definite idea of the place of Desires, considered in relation to other mental states, especially as a thorough understanding of this point throws light upon the important subject of the philosophy of the Will.—(1.) And the first remark to be made here is, that desires never follow, in direct and *immediate* sequence, to intellections or the cognitive acts of the mind. There is a distinct department or portion of the mind, *located*, if we may be permitted to use that expression, between the intellect and the mental states under consideration. It requires no further proof than the simple statement itself, when we say that we never desire a thing simply because we perceive it or have a knowledge of it. The mere perception of a thing is of itself no adequate reason why we should make the thing an object of pursuit. There must obviously be some intermediate state of the mind, existing as the proximate and causative occasion of desires, viz., an *emotion*. Accordingly, the prerequisite condition to desire is some

antecedent feeling, generally of a pleasurable nature, which intervenes between the desire, and the perception or knowledge of the desired object.

(2.) In illustration of what has been said, it is the fact, that, whenever we desire the presence or possession of an object, it is because we are in some way pleased with it. Whenever, on the other hand, we desire its removal from our presence, it is because we are in some way displeased with it. And these expressions, indicative of pleasure or displeasure, obviously involve the existence of that distinct state of the mind which we denominate an EMOTION; a state of feeling entirely different both from the perception of the object which goes before such emotion and the desire of the object which follows after it. Accordingly, we may feel at liberty to state, in general terms, that no man ever desired an object, or could by any possibility desire it, in regard to which he had experienced no emotion, but had always been in a state of perfect indifferency. Such, in the matter under consideration, is obviously the fixed law of the mind.

(3.) In this connexion, and in view of what has now been said, we may properly recur a moment to the mind's general structure. The general division of the Mind, it will be recollected, is into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. The External or Sensuous Intellect is first brought into action; followed, in greater or less proximity of time, by the developement of the Internal or Super-sensuous. The subsequent process of the mental action, when carried through in the direction of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, is from intellections to emotions, and from emotions to desires, and from desires to acts of the will. When carried through in the direction of the Moral sensibilities, it is from intellections to emotions (not natural, but moral emotions); and then, diverging into a different track, and avoiding the appropriate domain of the Desires, passes from emotions to feelings of moral obligation, and from the Obligatory feelings, like the corresponding portion of the

sensibilities, to the region of the Voluntary or Volitional nature.

§ 92. Of an exception to the foregoing statement.

The statements of the last section to this effect, that emotions are the prerequisite condition of desires, and that the latter never exist except in connexion with the fulfilment of this condition, is probably subject to an exception, which, although it may be of no great importance, it is proper to notice in this place. We have reference to those modifications and acts of desire which are *instinctive*. It is worthy of inquiry, whether some instincts, and some mental acts of an instinctive nature, are not capable of existing, and do not in fact exist, independently of antecedent emotions, considered as grounds of such existence. Such is the rapidity of their action, that they certainly have, in some cases, this appearance, although this circumstance may not of itself be decisive. They are also, in some cases, where this action is less rapid, directed and guided to their appropriate objects as *ultimate* ends, without any foresight of, or regard to the pleasure or pain which may be attendant, either antecedently or subsequently, on the acquisition of that object. The truth is, that some of the instincts (for it is probably not the fact, in an equal degree, in respect to all) receive their direction, not merely in the general sense of the term, but their *specific* direction, from a power out of the mind. They are moulded by a hand unseen to a particular object, and are impelled in its pursuit, without being at liberty to regard either the good or evil which may follow from it. And, under these circumstances, there is not that absolute necessity of the antecedence of intellections and emotions, which exists in the case of other desires.—With this slight exception, the general statement holds good. We speak of it as a slight exception, because, among other reasons, we are not obliged to suppose that it exists in respect to all even of the instincts. When, for instance, we make an instinctive effort to recover

the balance which we have lost, may we not suppose, although the effort is instantaneous, that we have a perception of the danger, and a sentiment or emotion of fear, antecedent to making the effort?

§ 93. The desires characterized by comparative fixedness and permanency.

There is one mark or trait attending the feelings under consideration which appears to be worthy of notice. We refer to the fact, that the desires, as compared with the emotions, appear to possess a greater degree of fixedness or permanency. It is well known that our emotions rapidly go and come, sinking and rising on the mind's surface like the unfixed waves of a troubled sea. But the desires, which are subsequent to them in the time of their origin, and may be regarded as produced in and as emerging from the troubled waters of emotion, evidently exhibit less facility and elasticity of movement. Having once entered their allotted position, although they are not absolutely immovable, they occupy it with so much pertinacity as to render it proper to regard this as one of their characteristics.

There certainly can be no great effort necessary in understanding the statement which has been made, and no great difficulty, as we suppose, in recognising and substantiating its truth. Take, for instance, the case of a man who is an exile in a foreign land, or of the unfortunate individual who is unjustly condemned to the occupancy of a prison, and they will assuredly tell you that the desires they have to see once more the light of heaven, their native land, and the countenances of their friends, sustains itself in their bosoms with a pertinacity which defies all change; and that they might as well rend away the fibres of the heart itself as to separate from it a feeling so deeply rooted.—We give this as an illustration; but it is more or less so in every case where the desires have decidedly fixed themselves upon any interesting object.

§ 94. Desires always imply an object desired.

An additional characteristic of Desires is, that they always have an object, generally a distinct and well-defined one, and cannot possibly exist without it. To speak of a desire, without involving the idea of an object desired, would be an anomaly in language. They differ in this respect from emotions, which, although they have their antecedent causes or occasions, do not possess, in their own nature, a prospective or anticipative bearing, but terminate in themselves. Desires, on the contrary, are always pointing onward to what is to be hereafter. And this is probably one reason of their greater degree of fixedness or permanency. The desires lean upon the object which they have in view as a sort of pillar of support; they may be said, with strict truth at the bottom of the expression, to cling around it, as the vine encircles and rests itself upon the elm; and, of course, are not left loose and fluttering, which is substantially the case with the states of mind which immediately precede them, at the mercy of every passing wind.

§ 95. The fulfilment of desires attended with enjoyment.

As a general thing, it may be said of the emotions that they are either pleasant or painful, although in some instances even of those feelings, it might not be easy to predicate distinctly and confidently either the one or the other. And this last statement is true particularly of the desires; which, although they exist distinctly and well defined in the view of the mind's consciousness, and constitute a powerful motive to action, can hardly be said, for the time being, to involve, in their own nature, either pleasure or its opposite. At any rate, we find it difficult, in ordinary cases, distinctly to detect either of these traits.

But, however this may be, there is still another characteristic circumstance which aids in distinguishing them from other mental states. It is this. Every desire, when the object towards which it is directed is attained, is attended with a degree of pleasure. It is

absolutely inseparable from the nature of desire, that the acquisition of the object of its pursuit, whether that object be good or evil, will be followed by the possession of some enjoyment. Sometimes the enjoyment is very great, at others less, varying generally with the intensity of the desire.

§ 96. Of variations or degrees in the strength of the desires.

There is this further statement to be made in reference to the Desires, applicable, however, to a multitude of other states of the mind, that they exist in *different degrees*. As a general thing, they will be found to exist in a greater or less degree, in accordance with the greater or less vividness and strength of the antecedent emotions. The original cause, however, of these variations, making allowance for some occasional constitutional differences, is to be sought for in the intellect or understanding. The more distinctly we perceive or understand a thing, the more distinct and vivid, we may reasonably expect, will be our emotions. And as the Desires are based upon the emotions as the antecedent occasion or ground of their existence, they may, in like manner, be expected to exhibit, as has already been intimated, a vividness and strength corresponding in a very considerable degree to that of the feelings which preceded them.—It will be noticed that we do not speak here of the permanency of desires, which is a very different thing, but simply of their intensity or strength for the time being.

§ 97. Tendency to excite movement an attribute of desire.

We shall conclude this notice of the nature of desire with remarking that there is one other characteristic attribute which particularly distinguishes it, and which undoubtedly must enter as an element into every perfect delineation of it. Such is the nature of desire, that it is of itself, in virtue of its own essence, a prompting, exciting, or, as Mr. Hobbes would term it, a *motive* state of the mind. In other words, its very existence involves the probability of action; it sets the

mind upon the alert; it arouses the faculties, both mental and bodily, and places them in the attitude of movement.—It is true that the desire does not, in point of fact, always result in action. Before action can be consummated, another power, still more remote in the interior structure of the mind, must be consulted, that of the Will. If the Will decidedly opposes the desire, its tendency is, of course, frustrated in the object aimed at; but the tendency itself, although disappointed of its object, still remains. It is there, and cannot be otherwise than there, while the desire exists.

This important tendency does not exist, as a general thing, in other departments of the mind. It does not exist, for instance, in the cognitive or intellective part of the mind, in itself considered. If the intellect were insulated from the nature which is back of it, man would be a being of speculation merely, not of action. Nor does it exist in the emotions. If man were formed with the emotive sensibilities only, without the accompaniment of those ulterior sensibilities which are built upon them, he would be as unmoved and inoperative as if he were constituted with the single attribute of perceptivity. He would be like a ship anchored in the centre of the ocean, agitated, and thrown up and down on the rising and falling billows, but wholly incapable of any movement in latitude or longitude. The tendency to excite movement, as an inherent or essential characteristic, exists in the desires, and nowhere else, except in the corresponding portion of the moral sensibilities, viz., the feelings of moral obligation.—The tendency in question belongs to these two mental states alike.—It is the office of the Will, as a separate and relatively a higher part of our nature, to act in reference to this tendency, either in checking or aiding, in annulling or consummating it.

§ 98. Classification of this part of the sensibilities.

If we were called upon to consider the Desires in their simplest form only, we might perhaps feel at liberty to dismiss the subject with what has already been

said. But the circumstance that they are subject to many modifications and combinations sets us upon a new field of inquiry of great extent and interest. The Desires are sometimes modified by being directed to particular ends. In other words, they are constituted with specific tendencies, from which they seldom vary. This is the case with the Instincts, properly so called; and probably not less so, in their original and unperverted action, with the Appetites. In regard to the Affections, a distinct class of the active or sentimentive principles which come under this general head, it seems, as far as we can judge, to be the fact, that DESIRES exist in a close and inseparable combination with certain emotions, and are thus made to assume an aspect which they would not otherwise possess. Accordingly, we have a basis, an ample and distinctly defined one, for a subordinate classification. And it is to the examination of the Desires, as they exist in this classification, that we now proceed, beginning with those which, in the gradations of regard we are naturally led to bestow upon them, are generally adjudged as lowest in point of rank, and proceeding upward to those which are higher. In accordance with this plan, they will present themselves to notice, and be made the subject of distinct consideration, in the order of the Instincts, the Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections.—We will only add, that a classification in any case ought not to be made without reasons. In the present instance, however, it would clearly be out of place to anticipate the reasons, any further than what has already in a general way been said, of that arrangement of the DESIRES which is now proposed. As we advance in our inquiries, we shall see that it is founded in nature and authenticated by the forms of language, as well as by the prevalent practice and sentiments of mankind.

§ 99. The principles, based upon desire, susceptible of a twofold operation.

There is one important remark, which is applicable

to all the principles, with the exception of the Instincts, which now present themselves for examination. It is, that, with the exception just mentioned, they all have a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. This statement, of course, will not apply to the pure Instincts; for the very idea of their being instincts, in the proper sense of the term, seems to imply an absolute exclusion of their being voluntary. But as we advance from the Instincts to the Appetites, and still upward to the Propensities and Affections, we find each and all of these important principles susceptible of being contemplated in this twofold aspect. Each, under circumstances of such a nature as to preclude inquiry and reflection, is susceptible of an instinctive action; and each, under other circumstances more favourable to the exercise of reasoning, is susceptible of a deliberate or voluntary action.—This remark is important in our estimate of these principles, considered in a moral point of view.

CHAPTER II.

INSTINCTS.

§ 100. Of the instincts of man as compared with those of the inferior animals.

IN proceeding to examine that part of our sentient constitution which is comprehended under the general name of Desires, we naturally begin with *instincts*, which are nothing more than desires existing under a particular and definite modification. Instincts, in their definition, are fixed or invariable tendencies to do certain things, without previous forethought and deliberation. The actions of men are not always governed by feelings founded on reasoning, but are sometimes prompted by quick and decisive impulses, which set themselves in array before reason has time to operate. It is from this circumstance that these mental tendencies or desires are termed instinctive; a word which implies, in its original meaning, a movement or ac-

tion, whether mental or bodily, without reflection and foresight.

Although such instinctive tendencies are undoubtedly found in men, it must be admitted that they are less frequent, and, in general, less effective, than in the lower animals. And, in truth, it could not be expected to be otherwise, when we remember that the brute creation are wholly destitute of the powers of abstraction and reasoning, or, at most, possess them only in a small degree. The provident oversight of the Supreme Being, without whose notice not a sparrow falleth to the ground, has met this deficiency by endowing them with instincts, the most various in kind, and strikingly adapted to the exigencies of their situation. We find the proofs of this remark in the nests of birds, in the ball of the silkworm, in the house of the beaver, in the return and flight of birds at their appointed seasons, and in a multitude of other instances.

§ 101. Of the nature of the instincts of brute animals.

So abundantly has the great Father of all things provided, by means of their instincts, for the preservation and enjoyment of the inferior animals, that they even, in some respects, seem to have the advantage over man, with all his high and excellent capacities. In the early periods of the human race, men looked abroad upon the great ocean with timidity; they launched their frail vessels, and directed their course by the heavenly bodies; but, with all their care and wisdom, they were often baffled, and obliged to put back again into the place of their departure, or run, perhaps, upon some unknown shore. But flocks of migratory birds are frequently seen navigating the boundless fields of air, passing wide tracts of unknown land and water, and returning again at the set time, and with scarcely making a mistake, or wandering a league from their course; and yet they are without any histories of former voyages, without chart or compass, and without the ability, so far as we are able to

determine, of reading the way of their flight in the bright letters of the stars.

This is only one of the facts or classes of facts which illustrate this subject; but it shows very clearly the unerring guidance, the fixed and definite adaptation to a particular end, which is the characteristic of instincts.

> "Who bade the stork Columbus-like explore
> Heavens not his own, and worlds unknown before?
> Who calls the council, states the certain day,
> Who forms the phalanx, and who points the way?"

The ways in which this unerring tendency, this divine guidance, shows itself, are almost innumerable. The philosopher Galen once took a kid from its dead mother by dissection, and, before it had tasted any food, brought it into a certain room having many vessels full, some of wine, some of oil, some of honey, some of milk, or some other liquor, and many others filled with the different sorts of grain and fruit, and there laid it. After a little time the embryon had acquired strength enough to get upon its feet; and it was with sentiments of strong admiration that the spectators saw it advance towards the liquors, fruit, and grain, which were placed round the room, and, having smelled all of them, at last sup the milk alone. About two months afterward, the tender sprouts of plants and shrubs were brought to it, and, after smelling all of them and tasting some, it began to eat of such as are the usual food of goats.

The cells constructed by the united efforts of a hive of bees have often been referred to as illustrating the nature of instincts.—"It is a curious mathematical problem," says Dr. Reid, "at what precise angle the three planes which compose the bottom of a cell in a honeycomb ought to meet in order to make the greatest saving, or the least expense of material and labour. This is one of those problems, belonging to the higher parts of mathematics, which are called problems of *maxima* and *minima*. It has been resolved by some mathematicians, particularly by the ingenious Mr.

Maclaurin, by a fluxionary calculation, which is to be found in the Transactions of the Royal Society of London. He has determined precisely the angle required; and he found, by the most exact mensuration the subject could admit, that it is the very angle in which the three planes in the bottom of the cell of a honeycomb do actually meet.

"Shall we ask here, who taught the bee the properties of solids, and to resolve problems of maxima and minima? We need not say that bees know none of these things. They work most geometrically, without any knowledge of geometry; somewhat like a child, who, by turning the handle of an organ, makes good music without any knowledge of music. The art is not in the child, but in him who made the organ. In like manner, when a bee makes its comb so geometrically, the geometry is not in the bee, but in that great Geometrician who made the bee, and made all things in number, weight, and measure."

§ 102. Instincts susceptible of slight modifications.

We usually speak of the instincts of animals as fixed and inflexible, and they undoubtedly are so in a considerable degree. Of this inflexibility, or fixed and particular direction which is appropriate to them, a multitude of facts might be brought as proof. Mr. Stewart, speaking of a blind old beaver, that had been taken and kept for a number of years in a pond by itself, asserts that the animal showed no inconsiderable degree of sagacity and mechanical contrivance in accomplishing particular ends; but these ends were in no respect subservient to its accommodation or comfort in its actual situation, although manifestly parts of those systematic instincts which belong to it in its social state. The animal seemed, he further observes, like a solitary wheel of a machine, which exhibits in its teeth marks of a reference to other wheels with which it was intended to co-operate.

It must be admitted, however, whatever may be the correctness of this general view, that instincts are not

always found in a pure and unmixed state, but are susceptible of being modified from observation and experience. The consequence is, that the naturally invariable tendency of the instinct is frequently checked and controlled; and it acquires, in that way, an appearance of flexibility which does not belong to it in its pure state. Hence there is often seen in old animals a cunning and sagacity which is not discoverable in those that are young; a difference which could not exist if both old and young were governed in all cases by an unmixed instinct.—It is necessary that this remark should be kept in view in considering the subject of instincts, if we are desirous of possessing a proper understanding of it.

§ 103. Instances of instincts in the human mind.

But it is not our design to enter particularly into the subject of the instincts of animals in this place, although this topic is undoubtedly one of exceeding interest both to the philosopher and the Christian. Such inquiries are too diverse and remote from our main object, which has particular, if not exclusive reference to the economy of human nature. There are certain instinctive tendencies in man as well as in the inferior animals; but they are few in number, and, compared with the other parts of his nature, are of subordinate importance. Some of them will now be referred to.

(I.) The action of respiration is thought, by writers who have given particular attention to the subject, to imply the existence of an instinct. We cannot suppose that the infant at its birth has learned the importance of this act by reasoning upon it; and he is as ignorant of the internal machinery which is put in operation, as he is of its important uses. And yet he puts the whole machinery into action at the very moment of coming into existence, and with such regularity and success that we cannot well account for it except on the ground of an instinctive impulse.

(II.) "By the same kind of principle," says Dr. Reid

(Essays on the Active Powers, iii., chap. ii), "a new-born child, when the stomach is emptied, and nature has brought milk into the mother's breast, sucks and swallows its food as perfectly as if it knew the principles of that operation, and had got the habit of working according to them.

"Sucking and swallowing are very complex operations. Anatomists describe about thirty pairs of muscles that must be employed in every draught. Of those muscles, every one must be served by its proper nerve, and can make no exertion but by some influence communicated by the nerve. The exertion of all those muscles and nerves is not simultaneous. They must succeed each other in a certain order, and their order is no less necessary than the exertion itself.—This regular train of operations is carried on according to the nicest rules of art by the infant, who has neither art, nor science, nor experience, nor habit."

(III.) The efforts which men make for self-preservation appear to be in part of an instinctive kind. If a man is in danger of falling from unexpectedly losing his balance, we say with much propriety that the instantaneous effort he makes to recover his position is instinctive. If a person is unexpectedly and suddenly plunged into a river, the first convulsive struggle which he makes for his safety seems to be of the same kind. His reasoning powers may soon come to his aid, and direct his further measures for his preservation; but his first efforts are evidently made on another principle. When a violent blow is aimed at one, he instinctively shrinks back, although he knew beforehand it would be aimed in sport, and although his reason told him there was no danger. We always instinctively close the eyelids when anything suddenly approaches them. Dr. Reid asserts that he has seen this tried upon a wager, which a man was to gain if he could keep his eyes open while another aimed a stroke at them in jest. When we are placed on the summit of a high tower or on the edge of a precipice,

although we are perfectly assured of our safety by the reasoning power, the instinct of self-preservation is constantly suggesting other precautions.

§ 104. Further instances of instincts in men.

(IV.) There is also a species of resentment which may properly be called instinctive. Deliberate resentment implies the exercise of reason, and is excited only by intentional injury. Instinctive resentment, on the other hand, operates, whether the injury be intentional or not, and precisely as it does in the lower animals.

Whenever we suddenly experience pain, which is caused by some external object, this feeling arises in the mind with a greater or less degree of power, and prompts us to retaliate on the cause of it.—A child, for instance, stumbles over a stone or stick of wood, and hurts himself, and, under the impulse of instinctive resentment, violently beats the unconscious cause of its suffering. Savages, when they have been struck by an arrow in battle, have been known to tear it from the wound, break, and bite it with their teeth, and dash it on the ground, as if the original design and impetus of destruction were in the arrow itself. All persons, of strong passions in particular, show the existence and workings of this instinct when they wreak their vengeance, as they often do, on inanimate objects, by beating or dashing them to pieces.

(V.) There is undoubtedly danger of carrying the doctrine of the instinctive tendencies of the human mind too far, but we may consider ourselves safe in adding to those which have been mentioned the power of interpreting natural signs. Whenever we see the outward signs of rage, pity, grief, joy, or hatred, we are able immediately to interpret them. It is abundantly evident that children, at a very early period, read and decipher, in the looks and gestures of their parents, the emotions and passions, whether of a good or evil kind, with which they are agitated.

It must be admitted, that the power of interpreting

natural signs depends in part on experience and on deductions drawn from that experience; but the power is evidently in some degree instinctive. Often, when we see, both in children and in older persons, the strong outward manifestations of grief, when we are at the same time assured that there is but little of suffering in fact, we find ourselves very sensibly affected. So, when we see an actor on the stage with distorted countenance and accents of deep grief, the outward signs carry a momentary conviction and a momentary pang to our own hearts, in spite of the admonitions of reason; a circumstance which cannot well be accounted for, except on the ground that these signs speak to us with a natural power; that is to say, are instinctively interpreted.

§ 105. Of the final cause or use of instincts.

Although the instincts, as a general statement, commend themselves less decisively to our regard and admiration than some other portions of the mind, they still have their important uses. It seems, in particular, to be the design of the instinctive part of our nature to aid and protect us in those cases where reason cannot come seasonably to our aid. According as the reasoning powers acquire strength, and prepare themselves more and more for the various emergencies to which we are exposed, the necessity of instinctive aids is proportionally diminished. But there are some cases which the reasoning power never can reach; and, consequently, our whole protection is in instinct.

It is evident, therefore, that they are a necessary part of our constitution; that they help to complete the mental system; and although of subordinate power and value in man, compared with the inferior animals, they still have their worth. As the reasoning power predominates in man, so instincts predominate in the lower animals; and as we do not expect to find the glory of reasoning in brutes, so we should not expect to discover the full excellence of instinctive powers in men, but should rather look for them in the

insect and the worm, in the beasts of the field, and the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, dwelling in them as a part of their nature, and blessing while they control and guide them.

CHAPTER III.

APPETITES.

§ 106. Of the general nature and characteristics of the appetites.

Under the general head of Desires, the subject of appetites seems next to propose itself for consideration. But as it is one of limited extent, and of subordinate importance in a metaphysical point of view, only a few remarks will be necessary. The arrangement, which brings the subject forward for discussion under the head of Desires, will recommend itself on a very little attention. The prominent appetites are those of hunger and thirst; but the appetite of hunger is nothing more than the desire for food; the appetite of thirst is a desire for drink.

Nevertheless, they appear to be sufficiently distinguished from the other desires. They are not, like the instincts, always gratified in a certain fixed and particular manner, nor are they like them in being wholly independent of the reasoning power. On the contrary, they may be restrained and regulated in some degree; and when it is otherwise, their demands may be quieted in various ways.

But, without dwelling upon such considerations, the statement has been made, with much appearance of reason, that they are characterized by these three things: (1.) They take their rise from the body, and are common to men with the brutes.—(2.) They are not constant in their operation, but occasional.—(3.) They are accompanied with an uneasy sensation.

It may be remarked here, that the feeling of uneasiness now referred to appears always to precede the desire or appetite, and to be essential to it.

§ 107. The appetites necessary to our preservation, and not originally of a selfish character.

Although our appetites do not present much of interest, considered as parts of our mental economy, they have their important uses in connexion with the laws and requirements of our physical nature.—"The appetites of hunger and thirst," says Stewart, "were intended for the preservation of the individual, and without them reason would have been insufficient for this important purpose. Suppose, for example, that the appetite of hunger had been no part of our constitution, reason and experience might have satisfied us of the necessity of food to our preservation; but how should we have been able, without an implanted principle, to ascertain, according to the varying state of our animal economy, the proper seasons for eating, or the quantity of food that is salutary to the body? The lower animals not only receive this information from nature, but are, moreover, directed by instinct to the particular sort of food that is proper for them to use in health and in sickness. The senses of taste and smell, in the savage state of our species, are subservient, at least in some degree, to the same purpose.

"Our appetites can with no propriety be called *selfish*, for they are directed to their respective objects as ultimate ends, and they must all have operated, *in the first instance*, prior to any experience of the pleasure arising from their gratification. *After* this experience, indeed, the desire of enjoyment will naturally come to be combined with the appetite; and it may sometimes lead us to stimulate or provoke the appetite with a view to the pleasure which is to result from indulging it. Imagination, too, and the association of ideas, together with the social affections, and sometimes the moral faculty, lend their aid, and all conspire together in forming a complex passion, in which the animal appetite is only one ingredient. In proportion as this passion is gratified, its influence over the conduct becomes the more irresistible (for all the active determinations of our nature are strengthened

by habit), till at last we struggle in vain against its tyranny. A man so enslaved by his animal appetites exhibits humanity in one of its most miserable and contemptible forms."*

§ 108. Of the prevalence and origin of appetites for intoxicating drugs.

There are not only natural appetites, but artificial or acquired ones. It is no uncommon thing to find persons who have formed an appetite for ardent spirits, for tobacco, for opium, and intoxicating drugs of various kinds. It is a matter of common remark, that the appetite for inebriating liquors in particular is very prevalent, especially among Savage tribes.—And it may be proper briefly to explain the origin of such appetites.

Such drugs and liquors as have been referred to have the power of stimulating the nervous system, and by means of this excitement they cause a degree of pleasure. This pleasurable excitement is soon followed by a corresponding degree of languor and depression, to obtain relief from which resort is again had to the intoxicating draught or drug. This results not only in a restoration, but an exhilaration of spirits, which is again followed by depression and distress. And thus resort is had, time after time, to the strong drink, the tobacco, the opium, or whatever it is which intoxicates, until an appetite is formed so strong as to subdue, lead captive, and brutalize the subject of it; so that the only way to avoid the forming of such a habit, after the first erroneous step has been taken, is quietly to endure the subsequent unhappiness attendant on the pleasurable excitement of intoxication, till the system has time to recover itself, and to throw off its wretchedness by its own efforts.

§ 109. Of occasional desires for action and repose.

Our occasional desires for action and repose are, in some respects, allied to our appetites. Although it has so happened that these desires have not been marked

* Stewart's Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, bk. i., chap. i.

by a separate and specific name, they may justly claim, as parts of our mental nature, some attention. Mr. Stewart remarks that they have the three characteristics of the appetites, and proceeds to explain them as follows:

"They are common, too, to man and to the lower animals, and they operate, in our own species, in the most infant state of the individual. In general, every animal we know is prompted by an instinctive impulse to take that degree of exercise which is salutary to the body, and is prevented from passing the bounds of moderation by that languor and desire of repose which are the consequences of continued exertion.

"There is also something very similar to this with respect to the mind. We are impelled by nature to the exercise of its different faculties, and we are warned, when we are in danger of overstraining them, by a consciousness of fatigue. After we are exhausted by a long course of application to business, how delightful are the first moments of indolence and repose! *O che bella cosa di far niente!* We are apt to imagine that no inducement shall again lead us to engage in the bustle of the world; but, after a short respite from our labors, our intellectual vigor returns; the mind rouses from its lethargy like a giant from his sleep, and we feel ourselves urged by an irresistible impulse to return to our duties as members of society."

§ 110. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the appetites.

In accordance with the remarks in the last section in the chapter on the Nature of desires, we may add here the general statement, that the operation of all the Appetites, of whatever kind, is twofold, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. So far as they are directed to their objects as *ultimate* ends, without taking into consideration anything else, that operation is obviously analogous to that of the pure instincts. But, after the first instance of their gratification, they may be instigated to subsequent actions, not so much by a view of the ultimate object as of the pleasure accessory to

its acquisition. And thus it sometimes happens that their action, in view of the enjoyment before them, is turbulent and violent. Nevertheless, we may avail ourselves of the aid of other principles of the mind to subject them to a degree of restraint, to regulate, and, in a certain sense, to cultivate them. And, so far as this can be done, they are obviously susceptible of what may be called a VOLUNTARY action.

And here is the basis of the morality of the appetites. So far as they are susceptible of a merely instinctive action, they cannot be said to possess any moral character, either good or bad. They are greatly useful in their place; but, in a moral point of view, are to be regarded simply as innocent. It is only so far as they are voluntary, so far as they can be reached and controlled by the will, that they can by any possibility be morally good or evil, virtuous or vicious. So that virtue and vice, considered in relation to the appetites, is located, not in the appetites themselves in their intrinsic nature, but in their exercises; and in those exercises only which are subordinate to the influence of the will.

CHAPTER IV.

PROPENSITIES.

§ 111. General remarks on the nature of the propensities.

As we advance further in the examination of this portion of the natural or pathematic sensibilities, we meet with certain forms of Desire, which are different from any we have hitherto attended to, and which accordingly require a distinct consideration. There is certainly no danger of their being confounded with the Instincts, inasmuch as they do not exhibit that fixedness and inflexibleness of action which is usually characteristic of those states of mind. They differ from the Appetites, first, because they are much less dependent for their existence and exercise upon the

condition of the body; and, secondly, because, in that comparative estimation which is naturally attached to the different active principles of our nature, they confessedly hold a higher rank. At the same time, they evidently, in the graduation of our regard, fall below the Affections, besides being distinguished from them in some other respects. Hence we may, with entire propriety, not only assign them a separate and distinct position, but shall find a convenience in designating them by a distinctive name.—Among the Propensities (for this is the name which we propose to attach to them) may be mentioned the principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence; curiosity, or the desire of knowledge; sociality, or the desire of society; self-love, or the desire of happiness; approbativeness, or the desire of esteem, the propensity to imitate, and some others.

Although we have briefly indicated some of the circumstances which separate the Propensities from the other leading principles coming under this general head, it will be noticed that we have not attempted to give a statement of what they are in themselves. It is true, they are all based upon desire, and they all have some object. But whatever is intrinsic or specifically characteristic in their nature will be best learned from the considerations that will necessarily arise as they pass successively under review.

§ 112. Principle of self-preservation, or the desire of continued existence.

The first of those original desires which we shall proceed to notice may be denominated the principle of SELF-PRESERVATION, or the desire of a continuance of existence.—The proof of the existence of such a desire is not only so abundant in what we see around us, but is so intimate also to our own consciousness that it can hardly be necessary to enter into details. "All that a man hath will he give for his life," was a sort of moral axiom in the earliest antiquity; and it stands as little in need of the verification of proof now

as it did then. It is true that the principle may, in its practical operation, be overcome by the ascendant influence of other principles, by the mere desire of esteem, by the love of country, or by the sentiments of duty; but, though annulled in its results, it can hardly be said to be extinct in its nature. It still lingers, unextinguished and unextinguishable, in the foundations and depths of the mind. Even in cases of suicide, the desire of the extinction of life, which is supposed to exist, is not absolute, but relative; the self-murderer would still cling to existence if it could be possessed separate from the evils which attend it; it is not life, in itself considered, which he hates, but the variety of unpleasant circumstances, either actual or imagined, which are connected with it.

§ 113. Of the twofold action of the principle of self-preservation.

The principle of self-preservation, or desire of the continuance of existence, as well as the appetites, has a twofold operation, viz., INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. These two aspects or methods of its operation are to be carefully distinguished from each other. The instinctive operation takes place when life is threatened or endangered on some sudden and unexpected emergencies. When a person is in danger of falling, he instinctively puts forth his hand to sustain himself; when a blow is suddenly aimed at him, he instinctively makes an effort to ward it off; and the operation of this instinctive form of the desire is exceedingly rapid, as well as effective. This instinctive action is highly important in all cases where an effort for self-preservation, based upon inquiry and reasoning, would come too late.—When the exercise of the desire under consideration exists in connexion with inquiry and reasoning, and, of course, is ultimately based upon decisions of the will, it is said to be VOLUNTARY. It is under the suggestions of this form of the principle in question that we are led to make all those prospective calculations and efforts which have particular reference to the continuance and protection of life. In

either point of view, whether considered as instinctive or voluntary, it is a principle evidently adapted with great wisdom to man's situation and wants. It is practically a powerful motive to action, and in its voluntary exercise is always morally good, so far as it exists in entire conformity with the requisitions of an unperverted conscience.

§ 114. Of curiosity, or the desire of knowledge.

Another of the leading Propensive principles is CURIOSITY, or the desire of knowledge; in respect to which it scarcely admits of a doubt, that it is to be regarded as one of the implanted and original characteristics of our mental constitution. Although it must be acknowledged that this principle exists in very various degrees, from the weakest form of life and activity to almost irrepressible strength, yet a person utterly without curiosity would be deemed almost as strange and anomalous as a person without sensation. If curiosity be not natural to man, then it follows that the human mind is naturally indifferent to the objects that are presented to it, and to the discovery of truth; and that its progress in knowledge is naturally unattended with satisfaction; a state of things which could not be expected, and is not warranted by facts. In what school of philosophy was it ever taught that the human mind, with this unbounded mental and material universe around it, adorned throughout and brilliant with truth, has no natural desire to possess and enjoy this beauty and radiance of knowledge, but is equally well-contented with the glooms of ignorance!

We see the operation of this principle everywhere. When anything unexpected and strange takes place, the attention of all persons is immediately directed towards it; it is not a matter of indifference, but all are anxious to ascertain the cause. Without the aids of this strong desire, how few persons would be found who would be willing to explore the intricacies of science, or search the labyrinths of history. And what an accession would there be to the multitude of vol-

umes that remain unopened and untouched on the shelves where they are deposited!

There is at least one class of writers whose prospects of being read depend in a great measure on the workings of this principle; we refer to novelists and writers of romance. However commonplace may be their conceptions, and however uninteresting their style, if they lay the plan of their novel or romance with so much skill as strongly to excite the curiosity, they can command readers. And this undoubtedly is the whole secret of success in a multitude of cases.

§ 115. Further illustrations of the principle of curiosity.

In further proof of the existence of this propensity as a natural or implanted one, it may be proper to refer to the whole class of the Deaf and Dumb, and to those unfortunate individuals who are blind, as well as deaf and dumb. These persons almost uniformly give the most striking indications of a desire to learn; it seems to glow in their countenance, to inspire their gestures, and to urge them on with a sort of violence in their inquiries. Certainly, if the principle of curiosity were not implanted, and did not exist in great strength, they would be entirely overcome by the multitude of discouragements with which they are encompassed.

Take, as an illustration, the case of James Mitchell, of whom Mr. Stewart has given a minute and interesting account. Although this unfortunate boy was afflicted with the threefold deprivation of being deaf, sightless, and without the use of speech, he exhibited a considerable degree of mental activity. The principle of Curiosity, in particular, existed in great strength. He showed a strong desire to examine, and to obtain a knowledge of all objects that came within his reach. We find him exploring the ground inch by inch; we see him creeping on his hands and knees on bridges and the tops of houses; examining not only men, but dogs, horses, carriages, furniture, and musical instruments; standing by the side of shoemakers, tailors,

and bricklayers, and intently curious to know the mode and the result of their labours. Inspired by the desire of extending his acquaintance with things, he would rush forth (blind, and deaf, and dumb as he was), and rapidly travel miles in the neighbouring country, so that it was necessary to employ a lad to follow him, that he might be kept from the numerous dangers to which he was exposed in these excursions.

"Solitary as Mitchell is," says Mr. Stewart, "in the midst of society, and confined in his intercourse with the material world within the narrowest conceivable limits, what a contrast does he exhibit to the most sagacious of the lower animals, though surrounded with all the arts of civilized man, and in the fullest possession of all the powers of external perception. Even in his childish occupations and pastimes, we may discern the rudiments of a rational and improveable nature, more particularly in that stock of knowledge, scanty as it is, which he has been led to acquire by the impulse of his own spontaneous and eager curiosity."

But it is unnecessary to dwell upon these general considerations, or to refer to extraordinary instances, when we constantly witness in all infants and children the most ample proofs that the principle of curiosity is deeply implanted in the human mind. It seems to be their life; it keeps them constantly in motion; from morn till night it furnishes new excitements to activity, and new sources of enjoyment. The poets, many of whom are entitled to the credit of an exact observance of human nature, have made this trait in infants and children the foundation of many striking passages, as in the following:

"In the pleased infant see its power expand,
When first the coral fills its little hand;
Throned in his mother's lap, it dries each tear,
As her sweet legend falls upon his ear;
Next it assails him in his top's strange hum,
Breathes in his whistle, echoes in his drum;
Each gilded toy, that doting love bestows,
He longs to break, and every spring expose."

§ 116. Of the twofold operation and the morality of the principle of curiosity.

The innate principle or propensity of curiosity, like that of self-preservation, has its twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY.—An action which is purely instinctive is always directed towards its object as an *ultimate* end; it looks at the object itself without regard to the good or evil which may be involved in it; it chooses and pursues it for its own sake. It is in this way that the principle of curiosity operates in the first instance. This is its instinctive operation. And, so far as it thus operates, it is neither selfish nor benevolent; neither morally good nor evil; but simply innocent and useful.

It possesses also a VOLUNTARY action, founded upon a view of consequences, and implying the exercise of reflection. We may direct it to proper objects; we may stimulate its exercise by considerations of interest or duty; we may restrain it when it becomes irregular or inordinate. And its action, so far as it exists under such circumstances, may, with entire propriety, be denominated voluntary. And, so far as it is of this character, morality is predicable of it; it may be either virtuous or vicious. If it be stimulated to action for good ends, and with a suitable regard to all other moral claims, its exercise is virtuous. If it have bad ends in view, or be put forth with such intensity as to violate other moral obligations, its exercise is vicious. It is in accordance with these views that Mr. Stewart remarks on, and disapproves of, the conduct of a certain ancient astronomer. It appears that, on a certain occasion, the astronomer was accused of indifference in respect to public transactions. He replied to the charge by the remark that *his* country was in the heavens; distinctly implying that he had deliberately merged the duties of the citizen in those of the astronomer, and that love to his country was essentially annulled by the higher love which he cherished for his chosen science. We obviously have here an instance of the inordinate exercise of the

principle under consideration. It was not duly subordinated. It became so intense as to conflict, in the view of an enlightened conscience, with the proper exercise of other feelings and with the discharge of other duties.

§ 117. Imitativeness, or the propensity to imitation.

Another of the original propensities of the human mind is the principle of Imitation, or the desire of doing as we see others do. We find the evidence of the existence of such a principle everywhere around us.

(I.) If this propensity be not natural, it will be difficult to account for what every one must have noticed in infancy and childhood. And we take this occasion to remark, that, on this whole subject, we shall refer particularly to the early periods of life. That is a time when human nature will be likely to show itself in its true features. And, in respect to the principle now before us, it is certain that children are early found to observe with care what others do, and to attempt doing the like. They are greatly aided by this propensity in learning to utter articulate sounds. It is not without long-continued efforts, in which they are evidently sustained by the mere pleasure of imitation, that they acquire the use of oral language.

At a little later period of life, after having learned to articulate, and having become old enough to take part in juvenile sports, we find the same propensity at work. With the animation and formidable airs of jockeys, they bestride a stick for a horse, and try equestrian experiments; they conduct their small and frail carriages through courts and streets, and journey with their rude sledges from one hill-top to another. Ever busily engaged, they frame houses, build fortifications, erect water-works, and lay out gardens in miniature. They shoulder a cane for a musket; practice a measured step and fierce look; and become soldiers, as well as gardeners and architects, before they are men.

(II.) But the operation of this propensity is not limited to children; men also do as their fathers have done before them; it often requires no small degree of moral courage to deviate from the line of precedents. Whether right or wrong, we feel a degree of safety so long as we tread in the path of others.

This is shown in the most solemn transactions, particularly in judicial decisions. Seldom does the judge appeal to original principles of right, and build his decisions on the immutable will of the Supreme Being, as it is revealed in the moral sentiments of mankind, if he must do it in the violation of a precedent. It is highly probable, that the idea of a system of law, built upon precedent, and essentially supported by the mere fact of antecedent authority, was suggested, at least indirectly, by the principle before us. So prone were men to follow in the steps of their fathers, that, even in cases of right and wrong, they were not willing to deviate from the beaten track; and although we are willing to admit that the decisions of the Common Law have ever been supported by various considerations of their safety and wisdom, it is nevertheless true that they derive a large portion of their stability from that effective trait in man's nature, which impels him, as if by a sort of enchantment, to walk in the path which his progenitors have trodden. If we could expel from the human bosom the principle of imitation, there would be far less efficacy attached to many of the opinions, and decrees, and doings of our ancestors than there is at present. But, undoubtedly for sufficient reasons, it is wisely ordered that such an expulsion is impossible.

§ 118. Practical results of the principle of imitation.

It may perhaps be supposed by some, whatever evidence may exist in favour of regarding the principle under consideration as an original one, that it has but a slight connexion with the advancement and the happiness of mankind. But it is a remark not unfrequently to be made in respect to the principles of the

mind, that often results of great magnitude are found to connect themselves with elements in human nature, that appeared in themselves exceedingly insignificant. Such, it is possible, may be the case here. We often speak of imitativeness as a principle which governs children; but are less willing to acknowledge, which is hardly less the fact, that it is a principle which governs men. We cannot doubt, from the reflection we have been able to bestow upon it, that the principle before us, whatever aspect it may present at first sight, was designed to be, and is in fact, one of the important supports of society; a source of knowledge, happiness, and power. If this principle were obliterated, the bond of union, which now holds so closely together the two great divisions of society, the old and the young, would be greatly weakened; an event in all points of view much to be deplored. Not only in childhood, but in mature age, as we have already had occasion to intimate, we walk in the steps of our fathers, following in arts and in manners the same practices, and sustaining the same institutions; and it is desirable, as a general thing, that we should do so. And we do it, not merely because we suppose them to be clothed with the attribute of superior wisdom, but also because we are prompted, often unconsciously to ourselves, by the influence of this powerful principle. And it is in this way, partly at least, that generation is connected with generation; that the torch of experience, lighted in the preceding age, is made to shed its beams over that which follows; and that society, kept in the vicinity of the beaten track, is not subject to sudden and disastrous convulsions.

We would merely add, if this principle has such vast influence, as we have no doubt that it has, it is incumbent on every one carefully to consider the nature and tendency of the example which he sets. He who sets a bad example, either in domestic or in public life, is not only blasted and withered in himself, but almost necessarily leads on in his train a multitude of others to the same results of degradation and

ruin. On the contrary, he who does good in his day and generation, infuses, whether he designs it or not, the effulgence of his example into a multitude of hearts, which nature has opened for its reception; and thus, with better and higher results, lights them upward to happiness and glory.

§ 119. Of emulation considered as a propensive principle.

Emulation is sometimes regarded as a distinct propensive principle; and yet, without venturing a positive affirmation on the subject, there is ground for saying that it is only one of the forms or modifications of Imitativeness. When we see a thing done by another whom we have been disposed to regard as an *equal*, we are led, it is true, by the principle of imitation to do as he has done; but we are attended with a conscious feeling also, in view of our supposed equality of power, that we are able to do it; and that, if it is a right thing, we ought to do it. It is reasonable to suppose that the Imitative propension receives a new impulse, and possibly to some extent a new direction, from the peculiarity of the circumstances under which it is now brought into action. It is under such circumstances, and with such resulting modifications, that Imitativeness is sometimes allowed to change its name. In other words, when the thing to be imitated, and, if possible, through the accessory suggestion and influence of self-love, to be surpassed by us, is brought to our notice by an *equal*, who thus stands in the position of a rival or competitor, Imitativeness, which proposes to do as well and perhaps better than the other party, is so modified in our consciousness, and also to the observation of others, that it is called Emulation.

§ 120. Of approbativeness or the desire of esteem.

Another important propensity, not resolvable into anything else, but original, and standing on its own basis, is approbativeness, or the *desire of esteem*.—In proof of the natural and original existence of this

principle in the human mind, we are at liberty to appeal, as in the case of all the other propensities, to what we notice in the beginnings of life and the first developements of the mental nature. Before children are capable of knowing the advantages which result from the good opinion of others, they are evidently mortified at expressions of neglect or contempt, and as evidently pleased with expressions of regard and approbation. As it is impossible satisfactorily to account for this state of things on the ground of its being the result of reasoning, experience, or interest, the only explanation left is, that this desire is a part of the connatural and essential furniture of the mind.

(II.) We may further remark, that the desire of esteem is found to exist very extensively and strongly in the more advanced periods of life. If we look at the history of nations and of individuals, how many men do we find who have been willing to sacrifice their life rather than forfeit the favourable opinion of others! When they have lost all besides, their health, their fortunes, and friends, they cling with fondness to their good name; they point triumphantly to their unsullied reputation, as a consolation in their present adversities, and the pledge of better things in time to come. This is especially true of those periods in the history of nations when the original sentiments and traits of the people have not been corrupted by the introduction of the arts of luxury and refinement.

(III.) There is this consideration also which has a bearing upon this topic.—We are sometimes in such a situation that the favourable or unfavourable opinion of others can have no possible bearing, so far as we can judge, on our own personal interests. And further than this, the unfavourable sentiment which we suppose to exist is not responded to in a single instance out of the particular circle of those who indulge it. It exists there, and there alone, without the possibility of affecting injuriously either our property or our general reputation. And yet it is difficult for

us not to be affected unpleasantly; we feel as if the intentions of nature had been violated; as if some real wrong had been done us; as if we had been deprived of that which is obviously a right.—If this view of the subject is correctly stated, as we have reason to think it is, it goes strongly against the doctrine that the desire of esteem is based upon personal and interested considerations, and not upon the intrinsic nature of the mind.

(IV.) It is an additional proof in favour of the natural origin of this propensity, that it operates strongly in reference to the future. We not only wish to secure the good opinion of others at the present time and in reference to present objects, but are desirous that it should be permanent, whether we shall be in a situation directly to experience any good effects from it or not. Even after we are dead, although we shall be utterly separated both from the applauses and the reprobations of men, still we wish to be held in respectful and honourable remembrance. Fully convinced as we are that no human voice shall ever penetrate and disturb the silence of our tombs, the thought would be exceedingly distressing to us if we anticipated that our memories would be calumniated. We may attempt to reason on the folly of such feelings, but we find it impossible to annul the principles planted within us, and to stifle the voice of nature speaking in the breast.

§ 121. Of approbativeness or the desire of esteem as a rule of conduct.

The operation of this principle, when kept within its due and appropriate limits, is favourable to human happiness. It begins to operate at a very early period of life, long before the moral principles have been fully brought out and established; and it essentially promotes a decency and propriety of deportment, and stimulates to exertion. Whenever a young man is seen exhibiting an utter disregard for the esteem and approbation of others, the most unfavourable anticipation may be formed of him; he has

annihilated one of the greatest restraints on an evil course which a kind Providence has implanted within us, and exposes himself to the hazard of unspeakable vice and misery. It is narrated of Sylla, the Roman Dictator, that, on a certain occasion, happening to see Julius Cæsar walking immodestly in the streets, he remarked to those around him that he foresaw in that young man many Mariuses; distinctly intimating that a person so destitute of regard for the feelings and opinions of others, would be likely to take a course dictated by his sensuality or ambition, irrespective in a great degree of the admonitions of conscience and of considerations of the public good. A prediction founded in a knowledge of the principles of human nature, and abundantly verified by the result.

But, while we distinctly recognise in the desire of esteem an innocent and highly useful principle, we are carefully to guard, on the other hand, against making the opinion of others the sole and ultimate rule of our conduct. Temporary impulses and peculiar local circumstances may operate to produce a state of public sentiment, to which a good man cannot conscientiously conform. In all cases where moral principles are involved, there is another part of our nature to be consulted. In the dictates of an enlightened Conscience, we find a code to which not only the outward actions, but the appetites, propensities, and affections are amenable, and which infallibly prescribes the limits of their just exercise. To obey the suggestions of the desire of esteem, in opposition to the requisitions of conscience, would be to subvert the order of the mental constitution, and to transfer the responsibility of the supreme command to a mere sentinel of the outposts.

§ 122. Of acquisitiveness, or the desire of possession.

We are so constituted that we naturally and necessarily have not only a knowledge of objects, but of a multitude of other relations which they sustain. And,

among other things, we very early form a notion of the relation of POSSESSION. There are but few suggestions of the intellect with which the mind forms so early an acquaintance as with this. Whenever we see children, as we constantly do, contending with each other for the occupancy of a chair or the control of a rattle, we may be assured that they have distinctly formed the idea of possession. They know perfectly well what it is, although they cannot define it, and may possibly not be able to give a name to it. Although there can, in reality, be no actual possession without involving the existence of a relation, since the fact or actuality of possession implies, on the one hand, an object which is possessed, and, on the other, a possessor; nevertheless, as the notion or idea of possession exists in its suggested and abstract form, it is to be regarded as a single and definite object, distinctly perceptible in the mind's eye, and sustaining the same relation to the sensibilities as any other object or relation, either mental or material, which is susceptible of being intellectually represented. Of possession, as thus explained, existing as it were distinctly projected and imbodied in the light of the mental vision, all men appear to have a natural or implanted desire. The fact of its existence, either actual or possible, is revealed in the intellect; and the heart, not by the command of the will, but by an instinctive impulse, corresponds to the perception of the intellect by yielding its complacency and love. And this well-defined desire, thus implanted by nature, is variously called the possessory desire or the possessory principle; and not inappropriately acquisitiveness, the name given by phrenological writers, some of whom have thrown much valuable light on this portion of the mind.

§ 123. Of the moral character of the possessory principle.

Although the desire of possession has undoubtedly, like the other propensities, its instinctive action, yet its morality, that is to say, its moral character, is just-

ly thought to depend upon the feature of its voluntary action. We are not disposed to speak, as some on a slight examination might be inclined to do, of the possessory principle as being, in a moral sense, an unmixed evil. So far as its action may be regulated, either in the form of restraint or of encouragement, by reason, reflection, and the control, either direct or indirect, of the will (all of which is implied when we speak of its voluntary action), just so far it is capable of being either right or wrong, reprehensible or meritorious. When, acting independently of all comparison and reflection, it assumes the form of an instinct, it is often in that form beneficial, and always innocent; when it usurps the authority due to other and higher principles, prompting us to look with an evil eye on the rightful possessions of another, and to grasp with an earnest and unholy seizure what does not belong to us, it becomes vicious; when, on the other hand, its action is the reverse of all this, prompted by upright motives, and adhering strictly to the line of rectitude, it is to be regarded as virtuous.

We apprehend it is impossible even to conceive of a being so far elevated in the scale of perception and feeling as to involve moral accountability, which shall be constituted on the principle of an entire exclusion of the possessory desire. If it desires its own existence and happiness, which we suppose to be a trait essential to every rational and accountable creature, it seems to follow, as a matter of course, that it will desire those attributes and gifts which are conducive to the preservation and perfection of such existence and happiness. What sin can there possibly be in desiring to expand the range of that existence, which in itself is such an invaluable good, provided it be done with a suitable regard to the relations and the claims of all other beings! So far from being a sin, it is, and must be, a duty. If it be not so, what shall be said of those passages of the Apostle Paul, not to mention other parts of Scripture of a similar import, where he directs the Corinthians not only "to covet

to prophesy," but, in general terms, "to covet earnestly the best gifts," 1 Cor., xii., 31; xiv., 39.

§ 124. Of perversions of the possessory desire.

Although the acquisitive propensity is susceptible, by possibility at least, of a virtuous exercise, there is too much reason to believe that its ordinary action is a perverted and vicious one. It is a great law of the mind, that the repetition of the exercise of the active principles increases their strength; and as the occasions of the exercise of the possessory principle are very numerous, it is the almost unavoidable result that it becomes inordinately strong. When this is the case, the otherwise innocent desire of possession assumes the form of the sin of Covetousness; a term which is universally understood to express an eagerness and intensity of acquisition, that presses upon the domains of some other active principles, and is at variance with some of the claims of duty. This is undoubtedly one of the great sins which attach to human nature; too prevalent, it is to be feared, in the heart of every individual; and which is not only condemned by philosophy, but receives, in all parts of the Scriptures, a decided and solemn rebuke.

When the possessory principle becomes, by further repetition, increased in the intensity of its action, it assumes the still more aggravated and guilty form of Avarice. In this form it not only loses that character of innocence which it originally possessed, but becomes exceedingly loathsome and abhorrent in the unperverted eye of moral purity.

§ 125. Of the desire of power.

Another of the original propensities is the desire of Power.—In regard to POWER, it is hardly necessary to say, that it is not an object directly addressed to, or cognizable by the senses; but is an attribute of mind, and is made known to us by an act of the Internal intellect; that is to say, of the intellect operating independently of a direct connexion with the senses.

We do not see Power as we see any extended object; nor do we touch it, nor is it an object of the taste or smell; but it is revealed to the mind by an act of Intuition or Suggestion, on the occasions appropriate to that species of mental action. (See § 190, vol. i.) But, although it is not cognizable by the senses, it is as much a reality, as much an object of emotion and desire, as if that were the case. It stands out as distinctly perceptible to the mind's eye, as an extended and coloured body does to the bodily eye. This being the case, we may with entire propriety of language speak of the desire of power; for, wherever there is an object, that object may, in possibility at least, be desired; but where there is no object before the mind, it is not possible for desire to exist.

These remarks are preparatory to what we have now to say, namely, that the desire of power is natural to the human mind; in other words, that the desire of power is an original principle of the mind.—In support of this view, which may, perhaps, fail at first sight fail to commend itself to the reception of the reader, the first remark we have to make is, that power, in its own nature, is a thing desirable. It cannot be doubted that power is in fact, and is to be regarded, as an essential attribute of all mental being. —Accordingly, if an intellectual and sentient existence is desirable, then power is desirable also, as being necessarily involved in such existence. The desire of existence, by common acknowledgment, is natural to us; the desire of happiness is natural also; and since there can be neither the one nor the other without power, it seems reasonable to think that the desire of power is essential to and is implanted in our nature. —There are various circumstances, obvious to every one's notice, which go to confirm this view of the subject, as will be seen in the following extract from the writings of Mr. Stewart.

§ 126. Facts in proof of the natural desire of power.

"The infant, while still on the breast, delights in

exerting its little strength on every object it meets with, and is mortified when any accident convinces it of its own imbecility. The pastimes of the boy are, almost without exception, such as suggest to him the idea of his *power*. When he throws a stone or shoots an arrow, he is pleased with being able to produce an effect at a distance from himself; and, while he measures with his eye the amplitude or range of his missile weapon, contemplates with satisfaction the extent to which his power has reached. It is on a similar principle that he loves to bring his strength into comparison with that of his fellows, and to enjoy the consciousness of superior prowess. Nor need we search in the *malevolent* dispositions of our nature for any other motive to the apparent acts of cruelty which he sometimes exercises over the inferior animals; the sufferings of the animal in such cases either entirely escaping his notice, or being overlooked in that state of pleasurable triumph, which the wanton abuse of *power* communicates to a weak and unreflecting judgment. The active sports of the youth captivate his fancy by suggesting similar ideas, of strength of body, of force of mind, of contempt of hardship and of danger. And, accordingly, such are the occupations in which Virgil, with a characteristical propriety, employs his young Ascanius.

> 'At puer Ascanius mediis in vallibus acri
> Gaudet equo; jamque hos cursu, jam præterit illos;
> Spumantemque dari pecora inter inertia votis
> Optat aprum, aut fulvum descendere monte leonem.'

"As we advance in years, and as our animal powers lose their activity and vigour, we gradually aim at extending our influence over others by the superiority of fortune and station, or by the still more flattering superiority of intellectual endowments, by the force of our understanding, by the extent of our information, by the arts of persuasion, or the accomplishments of address. What but the idea of power pleases the orator in managing the reins of an assembled multitude, when he silences the reasons of others by supe-

rior ingenuity, bends to his purposes their desires and passions, and, without the aid of force or the splendour of rank, becomes the arbiter of the fate of nations!"*

§ 127. Of the moral character of the desire of power.

If it be true that the desire of power is connatural to the human mind, it will probably be found, like other analogous principles, to possess a twofold action, INSTINCTIVE and VOLUNTARY. So far as its action is instinctive, we may suppose it to be innocent at least, and probably useful. So far as it is voluntary, the virtue or vice which attaches to it will depend upon its regulation. If it be kept in subordination to the dictates of an enlightened conscience, and to the feelings and duties we owe to the Supreme Being, its exercise is virtuous. If, on the contrary, it acquires inordinate strength, as it is very likely to do, and is excessive in its operation, pushing us forward to the pursuit of forbidden objects and the invasion of others' rights, it then becomes vicious.

When the desire of power becomes excessive, and exists and operates as a leading and predominant principle, we commonly denominate it Ambition, although it may be admitted that the term Ambition is susceptible of a modified and less objectionable sense. He, who is under the influence of AMBITION in this unfavourable sense of the term, desires power, not because it assimilates him to his Maker, not because it affords him the increased means of usefulness, nor for any other reason which commends itself to a strictly virtuous mind, but simply because it administers to the gratification of an unrestrained and inordinate selfishness.

§ 128. Veracity, or the propensity to utter the truth.

It is in the propensive part of our nature that we are to locate the important principle of Veracity; in other words, that disposition and tendency to utter the

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, chap. ii., § 4.

truth, which characterizes men generally, and which there seems abundant reason to regard as original or connatural to the mind. When we utter the truth, we fulfil the functions of our nature; the action of the mind flows easily in an undisturbed and even channel; there are none of those mental jars and revulsions which generally attend an effort of falsification. To utter a falsehood is against nature; and is as much at variance with the structure of the Pathematic as of the Moral Sensibilities. That is to say, when we deliberately utter a falsehood, we are not only condemned by Conscience, but are obliged to stem the natural current of the Desires.

There are undoubtedly occasional exceptions to this statement, but they may probably be reduced to two classes of persons: first, those in whom the original principle has been perverted by the influence of evil example or some other unfavourable cause; second, those, still fewer in number, who are the subjects of an original mental malformation. In the first class, the tendency to falsehood is the work of the man rather than of his nature; the second indicates a state of mind more or less approaching the regions of insanity.—In addition to these cases, it may be said further, that sometimes, under the influence, perhaps, of a sudden and powerful temptation, men of acknowledged veracity are betrayed into the utterance of an untruth. But still the general fact, to which these cases must be regarded merely in the light of exceptions, remains good. The utterance of the truth is in conformity with nature; falsehood is against it. And this is so much the fact, that, in ordinary cases, the utterance of thousands of truths secures to a man no especial credit, for this is what we naturally expect; while the utterance of a very few falsehoods will be likely to destroy his reputation forever.

§ 129. Of the twofold action of the propensity to truth.

The principle of Veracity, as might be supposed from the circumstance of its being admitted into the

class of the propensions, has the twofold action already often mentioned.—In all ordinary cases, the probability is, that its action is INSTINCTIVE. A thousand times a day, in answer to the questions of others, or in giving directions, or on some other occasions, we utter what is true in fact, or what we suppose to be true. And we do this without stopping to reflect whether it is a matter of duty, but apparently and in reality by a natural or instinctive movement, just as the hungry man instinctively seeks to gratify his appetite for food.

In other cases, the action is obviously VOLUNTARY. If, for instance, a man is strongly tempted, by the presentation of some pecuniary inducement, to utter a falsehood, the instinctive action of the principle is interrupted. By an effort of the Will we check it; we stop; we examine the nature and weight of the inducement which is presented; conscience is called in to give its decision in the case; and the action of the principle under such circumstances evidently becomes a voluntary one.—It is, indeed, difficult in some cases to draw the line distinctly between the instinctive and voluntary action; but it is the latter alone which can properly be said to have a moral character. When, under the influence of a strong temptation, the instinctive tendency is overruled, and we utter the truth in compliance with the mere dictates of conscience, we are the subjects of moral merit. When, on the other hand, we deliberately and voluntarily utter falsehood, we are the subjects of crime. And it may also be added, that the circumstance of the utterance of the truth being in all ordinary cases instinctive, increases the crime of its violation; because falsehood under such circumstances generally implies a high degree of deliberate and voluntary effort.

§ 130. Propensity of self-love, or the desire of happiness.

We proceed to explore this part of our sentimentive nature still further by adding that the desire of enjoyment or happiness appears to be an original or connatural element of the mental constitution. No

one will presume to assert that the desire of suffering is natural; that we ordinarily rejoice in the prospect of coming woes, and endure them with gladness of heart. Nor are there satisfactory grounds for the opinion that enjoyment and suffering are indifferent to the human mind, and that there is no choice to be had between them. Such a supposition would be contrary to the common experience and the most obvious facts. On the contrary, our own consciousness and what we witness in others effectually teach us, that the desire of happiness is as natural as that of knowledge or esteem, and even hardly less so than it is to desire food and drink when we experience the uneasy sensations of hunger and thirst.

Under the instigation and guidance of this strong propensity, men not only flee from present evil and cling to present happiness, but, foreseeing the events of the future, they prepare raiment and houses, fill their granaries in anticipation of a day of want, and take other measures for the prolonging of life, health, and comfort. It is kindly provided that they are not left, in taking precautions subservient to their preservation and well-being, to the suggestions and the law of reason alone, but are guided and kept in action by this decisive and permanent principle. And it is proper to add, that this desire operates not only in reference to outward and bodily comforts, but also in relation to inward consolations, the inspirations and solaces of religion in the present life, and the anticipated possession of that more glorious happiness which religious faith attaches to a future state of existence.

But it should ever be remembered, that the desire of our own happiness, like the other desires which have been mentioned, ought to be subjected to a suitable regulation. An enlightened conscience will explain under what conditions our personal welfare may be pursued, and in what cases, whether it relate to the present or the future, it should be subordinated to considerations of public benefit and of universal benevolence.

§ 131. Of selfishness as distinguished from self-love.

We cannot but suppose, for the reasons that have just been suggested, that the desire of happiness, or propensity of personal good, is an attribute of man's nature. This opinion is not only accordant with the suggestions of the light of nature, but is sanctioned by other and higher authority. The pursuit of our own happiness is obviously recognised in the Scriptures, and is urged upon us as a duty. While we are required to love our neighbour, it is nowhere said that we must perform this duty to the exclusion of a suitable regard for our own felicity.—The desire of happiness thus implanted in our own constitution we denominate by a simple and expressive term, SELF-LOVE. But it cannot be denied that the import of the term is frequently misunderstood, and that the term itself is liable to erroneous applications.

This is owing to the fact that the principle is not always, and perhaps we should say, is not generally regulated and restrained as it ought to be, but frequently degenerates into a perversion, which ought to be carefully distinguished from its innocent exercise. It is not self-love, but the *perversion* of self-love, which is properly called SELFISHNESS; and while self-love is always innocent, and, under proper regulations, is morally commendable, as being the attribute of a rational nature and approved by God himself, SELFISHNESS, on the contrary, is always sinful, as existing in violation of what is due to others, and at variance with the will of God.—It is due to the cause of morals and religion, as well as of sound philosophy, to make this important distinction. Self-love is the principle which a holy God has given; selfishness is the loathsome superstructure which man, in the moments of his rebellion and sin, has erected upon it.

§ 132. Modifications of selfishness; pride, vanity, and arrogance.

Selfishness, it will be kept in mind, is employed as the general name for any excessive or inordinate exercises of self-love whatever. But selfishness is sus-

ceptible of various modifications, and exhibits itself to the notice of others in different ways and under different aspects. One of the most marked and important of its modifications is Pride.

Pride not only implies an inordinate estimate and love of our own interests, but appears to be distinguished from the other forms of selfishness in being attended with a desire that others, either for the sake of our own gratification or for the sake of humbling them, should be made sensible of what we suppose to be our superiority.—Accordingly, the feeling of pride is not to be considered as limited, in the occasions of its exercise, to the possession of any one object or quality, or to any single circumstance or combination of circumstances. It will be likely to attach itself to any object whatever which becomes predominant in our affections, and in which we suppose ourselves to have the advantage over others. One is proud of his ancestry, another of his riches, a third of his intellectual ascendency, and a fourth of the beauty of his dress or person.

We may not only consider pride as one of the modifications of selfishness, but pride itself seems to be susceptible of some subordinate modifications, so distinct as to be known by appropriate names. When, for instance, it is very officious, and makes an ostentatious display of those circumstances in which the subject of it supposes his superiority to consist, it is termed VANITY. When it discovers itself, not so much in the display of the circumstances, or supposed circumstances of superiority, as in a contempt, and in sneering disparagements of the inferior qualities of others, it is termed HAUGHTINESS or ARROGANCE.

It may be further added, that we are always, if we would be exact in our discrimination of the sources of human action, to make a distinction between pride and a mere desire of esteem, which has already come under our notice. The desire of esteem may exist in all its forms distinct from pride; and, when properly regulated, is not only useful, but is morally commend-

able. But pride, considered as distinct from the desire of esteem, and as essentially a modification of selfishness, is morally evil. Perhaps no state of mind, if we consider our numerous infirmities and wants, is less suited to our situation, or is more fitted to bring upon us the disapprobation and rebukes of our Maker.

§ 133. Reference to the opinions of philosophical writers.

It would be easy to introduce passages in support of the greater part of the views of this chapter, if it were deemed necessary, from writers whose opinions are received with deference, and are justly entitled to be so. It appears from the recent Work of Dr. Chalmers on the Moral and Intellectual Constitution of Man, that he regards the desire of possession (the possessory principle, as it may be conveniently designated) as connatural to the human mind. (Vol. i., chap. vi., § 8–13.) Mr. Stewart takes the same view in regard to the principle of self-love, or the desire of happiness. (Active and Moral Powers, bk. ii., chap. i.) On this important subject, which, in some of its aspects, is closely connected with the requisitions and appeals of revealed religion, we find the following explicit statement in Dr. Wardlaw's recently-published treatise, entitled Christian Ethics.

"Self-love is an essential principle in the constitution of every intelligent creature, meaning by self-love the desire of its own preservation and well-being. By no effort of imagination can we fancy to ourselves such a creature constituted without this. It is an original law in the nature of every sentient existence. In man, it is true, in regard especially to the sources from which it has sought its gratification, it is a principle which, since his fall, has been miserably perverted and debased, degenerating, in ten thousand instances, into utter selfishness, and in all partaking of this unworthy taint. Between selfishness, however, and legitimate self-love, there is an obvious and wide discrepance. The latter is not at all distinctive of our nature as degenerate, but was inwoven in its very tex-

ture, as it came from the Creator's hand. The former is properly the corruption of the latter. It leads the creature who is under its dominant influence to prefer self to fellow-creatures and to God, so as to seek its own real or supposed advantage at the expense of the interests and the honour of both. So far, on the contrary, is self-love from being unwarrantable, that, in that part of God's law which prescribes our feelings and conduct towards our fellow-creatures, it is assumed as the standard measure of the commanded duty, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as THYSELF.' Take away self-love, or suppose it possible that the human heart should be divested of it, and you annihilate the command by rendering it unintelligible.

"There is not, assuredly, any part of the divine word by which we are required, in any circumstances, to divest ourselves of this essential principle in our constitution. That word, on the contrary, is full of appeals to it, under every diversity of form. Such are all its threatenings, all its promises, all its invitations."

CHAPTER V.

PROPENSITIES CONTINUED.—SOCIALITY, OR THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY.

§ 134. The principle of sociality original in the human mind.

IN examining the propensive principles, it is a matter of but little consequence, either philosophically or practically, in what order they present themselves for consideration. The principle of sociality, or desire of society, is deferred to the present chapter, and is made the subject of a distinct consideration, not because the order of nature required it, but because its importance seemed to entitle it to a more detailed and extended notice than the principles which have preceded.—The doctrine which we propose to maintain is, that men naturally (not moved to it primarily by the influences of education or considerations of inter-

est, but of themselves and *naturally*) have a desire of the company or society of their fellow-men; a tendency of the mind expressed by the single term SOCIALITY OR SOCIABILITY.

§ 135. The principle of sociality not selfish.

We are aware that the desire of society, as well as some of the other original propensions, has sometimes been regarded as a mere modification of *selfism*. It is the fact, however, that, in its first operation, the desire of society acts instinctively, being directed to its object as an *ultimate* end, wholly irrespective of any pleasure which may subsequently be found attached to its attainment. It is one of the characteristics of Desire, as we have already seen, that the attainment of its object is attended with more or less pleasure. And this is as true of the successful issue of the principle of Sociality as of any other principle, involving, as a part of its nature, the desiring element. Accordingly, after the experience of pleasure attendant upon its successful exercise, even in a single instance, it is possible that its subsequent action may be prompted rather by a regard to the concomitant enjoyment than to the object which originally called it forth. Such an exercise of the principle under consideration may, with some appearance of propriety, be termed a *selfish* one; but this is rather a secondary than an original exercise; and does not so much indicate what the principle is by nature as what it may become by subordinate or by perverting influences. In itself considered, it is innocent and highly useful; it may indeed, after its first exercise, be indulged from a regard to personal or self-interested considerations; that is to say, from a regard to our own happiness or pleasure; but even the exercise of the principle from such considerations is not to be regarded, as some may suppose, as morally wrong, provided it is so regulated as not to conflict with the proper operation of other principles and with the claims of duty.

§ 136. Reference to the doctrine of Hobbes on this subject.

We shall enter a little more minutely into the consideration of this principle than of those which have preceded; for this reason, among others, that the doctrine which we propose to maintain has not been universally received. We have reference in this remark to the opinions of those persons who, in concurrence with the doctrines of Mr. Hobbes, the author of the political treatise of the Leviathan and of some philosophical writings, maintain that men do not naturally seek, but rather avoid each other's society, being inspired with sentiments of aversion, and regarding their fellow-men as enemies and not as friends. If the great fact, which meets them at the first step in the inquiry, that men actually live in society, be objected to them, they answer, not by denying the fact, but by saying that this is a matter of necessity; in other words, that men live in society, not because they love it, but because, in all the circumstances of the case, they had rather do this, painful as it is, than suffer other evils still greater. The weak, they say, found themselves in danger of being overrun and destroyed by the more powerful; and, in order to protect themselves, were willing to enter into a companionship and union with their fellow-men, which they would otherwise have gladly avoided. And, in proof of the correctness of their opinions, they refer to those precautions against the injurious attacks of others which are generally considered necessary, such as locks, keys, bars, bolts, prisons, civil officers of justice, and a military force.

§ 137. Remarks on the statements of the preceding section.

In order that the subsequent part of the discussion may be less embarrassed, it will be proper to delay a moment in the consideration of these statements. As to the fact that such precautions as have been specified are generally taken, and that there is a reason for them, we do not suppose that it is at all a matter of question. But it will be recollected, if there were

only one unprincipled and violent man in a community of some hundreds or thousands, who felt disposed, in secrecy and darkness, or at any other time, to exert his power to the injury of his neighbours, these precautions would be rendered necessary. The view, therefore, which we may properly take is, that the facts referred to, although they may be admitted to exist, do not necessarily prove the absence of the principle of sociality, considered as a general element of human nature, but merely prove the presence and influence of other principles, which have the effect, in some instances, to restrict and overrule the social element.—The general rule, resting, as we shall endeavour to show, on satisfactory evidence, is, that man is a social being, seeking and delighting in the society of his fellow-men; and the facts just referred to merely show, and so far they may be admitted to be conclusive, that the general rule is liable to occasional exceptions.

§ 138. The doctrine of an original principle of sociality supported by the view that it is necessary to man in his actual situation.

In proceeding to bring forward some considerations in support of the doctrine that the desire of society is a connatural element of our mental nature, it may be remarked, as introductory to other considerations of a more decisive character, that the various relations which man sustains seem to require it. In other words, his situation is such, being unable, in point of fact, to exist independently of society, as to demand just such a principle as this. If he be destitute of this principle, it may be said, with no small degree of plausibility, that he is not fitted with entire wisdom to those circumstances in which he is actually placed. But this state of things would obviously be at variance with the analogy of nature in other cases, and would seem to imply not only a deficiency of wisdom, but a want of goodness also in the Supreme Being. In other cases He has fitted, with an admirable adjustment, the objects of his creation and care to the situ-

ations in which he has designed them to live and act. The wing of the bird is precisely adapted to the air; the fin of the fish is adapted to the element where it is placed; the organ of respiration is conformed to the properties of the atmosphere; the eye exhibits a wonderful adaptation to the light; the organ of touch is skilfully adapted to the nature of the external bodies with which it is conversant; and the same of instances innumerable. As man, therefore, is found existing as a member and part of society, and, by general concession, cannot live happily and effectively, if he can live at all, out of society, we should be naturally led to expect that the principles of his internal constitution would be such as to correspond to the facts and incidents of his external condition. Society is necessary to him; and the principle of SOCIALITY corresponds to this necessity, by furnishing a firm and broad basis for the existence of society. And this correspondence indicates wisdom. But what shall we say of that wisdom or that goodness which, in connexion with the undeniable necessity of the social constitution of things, implants in the human mind a principle of repulsion, which tends to arm every man against his neighbour, and to scatter society in a thousand directions!

§ 139. Of this principle as it exists in the lower animals.

Before we advance to the direct proofs on this subject, there is one other consideration which, although of subordinate importance, may still be thought worthy of some notice. It is, that the principle of sociality exists, with but few exceptions, in the various classes of the lower animals. Those of the same class are found constantly herding together, and no small part of the pleasure which they experience appears to result from the fact of a participation in each other's company. Whenever they are compelled to separate from each other for any length of time, particularly the young animals, they almost invariably exhibit a high degree of uneasiness and unhappiness.

So strong is their desire of society, that animals which happen to be separated from those of their own kind will not unfrequently form a friendship with other animals, whose companionship, under other circumstances, would be far from being sought after.—If this principle is necessary in the lower animals, and contributes to their happiness, as it obviously does, why should not man, who stands equally in need of it, be put in possession of the benefits of the same principle? We certainly should expect to find it to be so.

§ 140. The existence of the principle shown from the conduct of children and youth.

We now proceed to remark, that the existence of the propensity under consideration is shown, in the first place, like that of some of the propensive principles of the last chapter, by what we notice in the early periods of life. No one is ignorant that infants and very young children exhibit a strong attachment to their parents and others who tend upon them, and a desire for their company, and uneasiness at their absence. When left alone, even for a very short time, they discover a great degree of unhappiness, which may sometimes be ascribed to fear, but more often to the mere sense of loneliness and the desire for society.

When other infants and children are brought into their company, whom they have never seen before, this propensity is at once shown in their smiles, their animated gestures, and sparkling eyes. And when they are old enough to go out and play in the streets, we find them almost always in groups. Their sports, their wanderings in fields and forests, their excursions in fishing and hunting, are all made in companies; and the privilege of amusing themselves in these ways, on the condition of not being allowed the attendance of others, would be deemed scarcely better than a punishment.

In corroboration of what has just been said, we may properly recur a moment to those strong attachments

which are formed in early life. Wherever we go, and whatever vicissitudes of fortune may attend us, our thoughts and affections revert with eagerness to the associates of our early days. The basis of this strong attachment, it can hardly be doubted, is to be sought for in the operations of the principle of sociality. It was under the influences of this principle that we so frequently sought them out; that we flew eagerly to their arms in the first moments of relaxation from duty; that we visited with them the banks of the river and the recesses of the forest; and grew up in the reciprocation of those charities and acts of kindness, which render that period of life so hallowed in the recollection. If this principle, so powerful in its operation, had not been implanted in the human bosom, we should have looked in vain for these marked results.

§ 141. The same shown from the facts of later life.

In the second place, this propensity, which shows itself with so much strength in children, continues to exist, and to give interesting and decisive proofs of its existence, in manhood and age. It is true that those who are further advanced in years, from the circumstance of their finding greater resources in themselves, are in general more capable of supporting retirement and solitude than children. But it is very evident, in the maturity as well as in the earlier periods of life, that man's proper element (that in which alone he can secure the developement of his powers and be happy) is society, in some shape and in some degree. Hence the frequency of family meetings, of social and convivial parties, of commemorative celebrations, of religious, literary, and political assemblies, which constantly occur in all communities throughout the world, and which seem to be almost as necessary as the air they breathe, or their daily food.

It is true that some persons appear disposed to speak of these things as resulting from, or at least as very closely connected with, the comforts and conveniences

of civilized life. In other words, they suppose that men seek society, not from any natural impulse of the mind, but merely from the anticipation of the benefits which society, considered as the source and centre of civilization and the arts, will be likely to confer. That the desire of society is increased by this consideration, it is perhaps not necessary either to affirm or deny; but that it is originated or created by such views, which is the statement that we object to, is a position which does not appear at all warranted by the facts that are presented to our notice. Look, for instance, at those portions of the human race that are confessedly in a state of barbarism, and consider the results which are there presented. Where do we find the social principle showing itself more strongly than among groups of wandering Gipsies, than in the tents of stern and restless Arabs, in the wigwams and hunting-parties of American savages, or the cheerless abodes of the poor and desolate Esquimaux? Unpolished in manners, and rough in temper, and wanting even the necessaries of life, it must be something more than the mere refinements and pleasures of civilization which brings them together, day after day and night after night, and makes the walls of their miserable habitations tremble with their tumultuous companionship.—It is one of the excellences of this great principle, that it is the friend of the ignorant and the wretched. Bereft of those comforts which are generally understood to attend the condition of refinement and opulence, they are prompted by the operations of the social principle to throw themselves into the arms of their fellow-men; and, as the ordinary result, they find, in the mere naked fact of social intercourse, a degree of substantial consolation.

§ 142. The social principle exists in the enemies of society.

It may be remarked, in reply to what has been said, that there are individuals, and even masses or bodies of men, who are in a state of contention and war with society, and in whom, of course, the social principle

has no place. The fact which is stated we do not deny; but the conclusion which is drawn from it does not follow, and is not true. On the contrary, it is a striking fact, that the social principle, although restricted in its range, is found to exist, with undiminished strength, in those who are generally regarded as the outcasts and enemies of society. These men would be more desolate and wretched than they are if there were not some with whom they could associate; some whom they could call their friends, and with whom they could participate in their good or evil fortune. The influence of the desire of esteem may be overruled and annulled; the sentiments of filial and parental affection may be extinguished; the light of conscience may be put out; and yet they may find themselves unable (and, in point of fact, this is almost invariably the case) to sunder entirely the tie which binds them to their fellow-men. They can bear the pain, so insupportable to an unperverted and ingenuous mind, of having their names cast out as evil, but they are unable to endure the wretchedness of an entire and absolute seclusion from society.

§ 143. Proofs of the natural desire of society from the confessions and conduct of those who have been deprived of it.

Let us now attend a moment, in the third place, to the condition of those who are so unfortunate as to be separated from society, particularly from their friends. We presume to say that it will require no further proof than is involved in the mere statement itself, when we assert that the grief they suffer is in all ordinary cases sincere and deep, and that, not unfrequently, it is extreme. If the record of human misery could at once be unfolded to our view, it would abundantly appear in respect to multitudes who have perished in prison and in exile, that it was the deprivation of human society, particularly the society of their friends, which infused the deadliest ingredient into their cup of suffering. If the social propensity be not natural to us, it is not easy to explain why an

exclusion from intercourse with our fellow-men should be attended with such unspeakable wretchedness. Even the stern and inflexible Coriolanus, for whom all the forms of danger and even death seem to have had no terrors, could not endure his protracted banishment from Rome without bitter complaint: "*Multo miserius seni exilium esse.*"

If we felt at liberty thus to take up the time of the reader, we might, without doubt, illustrate the subject by some affecting statements. It will answer our purpose, however, briefly to recur to a single incident in the history of the Republic of Venice. In the year 1450, a young man by the name of Foscari, the only surviving son of the Doge of the same name, was banished from the Republic on a charge, of which it was subsequently ascertained that he was innocent. Having suffered the wretchedness of banishment for five long years, he at last wrote to the Duke of Milan, imploring his assistance; but the letter was put into the hands of the Venetian Council of Ten. As the laws of the Republic forbade any application to foreign princes in anything which related to the Government of Venice, the Council considered the circumstance such as to require that he should be sent for, and tried upon this new crime. Being brought before them, he made this remarkable statement to the Council: That he wrote the letter in the full persuasion that the merchant, whose character he knew, would betray him, and deliver it to them; the consequence of which, he foresaw, would be his being ordered back to Venice, the only means he had in his power of seeing his parents and friends; a pleasure for which he had languished with insurmountable desire for some time, and which he was willing to purchase at the expense of any danger or pain.—The event showed that he was sincere in what he said, for, on being ordered back to the place of his banishment, he died in a short time of pure anguish of heart.

§ 144. Further proofs and illustrations of the natural origin of the principle of sociality.

The considerations which have hitherto been advanced are plain, obvious, and incontrovertible, showing undeniably that society is man's natural element, and that his permanent removal from it is attended with immeasurable pain. Such instances as those last referred to, which, unfortunately, are found thickly scattered in history, indicate how much of truth and nature there is in the following passage of Thomson's Agamemnon:

"Cast on the wildest of the Cyclad isles,
Where never human foot had marked the shore,
These ruffians left me. Yet believe me, Arcas,
I never heard a sound so dismal as their parting oars."

But we proceed, in the fourth place, to remark, that there is another class of facts, of a very interesting character, which not only show the existence of this propensity, but illustrate its strength in a most striking manner. Facts can be brought to show that the desire of society is so inseparable from man's nature and so strong, that, if men are entirely excluded from the company of their fellow-men, they will establish an acquaintance and companionship with sheep, dogs, horses, goats, mice, spiders, anything whatever, which has life and motion.

"As the old man crept out of his little hut," says Walter Scott, "his two she-goats came to meet him, and licked his hands in gratitude for the vegetables with which he supplied them from his garden."* The Black Dwarf acknowledged the gratitude of these animals, and asserted that, outcast and deformed as he was, the finest shape that ever statuary moulded would be an object of indifference or of alarm, should it present itself instead of the mutilated trunk, to whose services they were accustomed.

Although the fictitious delineations of this celebrated writer are hardly less valuable in relation to the human mind than if they were given as the au-

* The Black Dwarf, chap. vii.

thentic details of history, we find, in his Life of Napoleon, an incident parallel to the above, and which throws light on the subject before us. Speaking of the banishments and other forms of suffering connected with the French Revolution, he remarks, that "strangers are forcibly affected by the trifling incidents which sometimes recall the memory of those fearful times. A venerable French ecclesiastic being on a visit at a gentleman's house in North Britain, it was remarked by the family that a favourite cat, rather wild and capricious in his habits, paid particular attention to their guest. It was explained by the priest giving an account of his lurking in the waste garret, or lumber-room, of an artisan's house for several weeks. In this condition he had no better amusement than to study the manners and habits of the cats which frequented his place of retreat, and acquire the mode of conciliating their favour. The difficulty of supplying him with food, without attracting suspicion, was extreme, and it could only be placed near his place of concealment in small quantities and at uncertain times. Men, women, and children knew of his being in that place; there were rewards to be gained by discovery, life to be lost by persevering in concealing him; yet he was faithfully preserved, to try upon a Scottish cat, after the restoration of the Monarchy, the arts which he had learned in his miserable place of shelter during the Reign of Terror. The history of the time abounds with similar instances."*

§ 145. Other illustrations of a similar kind.

The instances of the preceding section are introduced to show that men, if deprived of human society, will endeavour to satisfy the natural demands of their propensities by forming a species of intimacy with the lower animals; a circumstance which seems to us decisively to evince not only the innate existence, but the great strength of the social tendency.

* Scott's Life of Napoleon Bonaparte, chap. xvi.

There are multitudes of other facts of the same kind, and still more striking than those which have already been noticed. Baron Trenck, for instance, in order to alleviate the wretchedness of his long and dreadful imprisonment, made the attempt, and was successful in it, to tame a mouse. The mouse, according to his account of him, would not only play around him and eat from his hand, but discovered extraordinary marks of sagacity as well as of attachment.

"This intelligent mouse," he remarks, "had nearly been my ruin. I had diverted myself with it during the night; it had been nibbling at my door, and capering on a trencher. The sentinels happened to hear our amusement, and called the officers; they heard also, and added, all was not right in my dungeon. At daybreak my doors resounded; the town-major, a smith, and mason entered. Strict search was begun; flooring, walls, chains, and my own person were all scrutinized, but in vain. They asked what was the noise they had heard. I mentioned the mouse, whistled, and it came and jumped upon my shoulder. Orders were given that I should be deprived of its society; I earnestly entreated that they would at least spare its life. The officer on guard gave me his word of honour he would present it to a lady, who would treat it with the utmost tenderness.

"He took it away, turned it loose in the guard-room, but it was tame to me alone, and sought a hiding-place. It had fled to my prison door, and, at the hour of visitation, ran into my dungeon, immediately testifying its joy by its antic leaping between my legs. It is worthy of remark that it had been taken away blindfold, that is to say, wrapped in a handkerchief. The guard-room was a hundred paces from my dungeon. How, then, did it find its master? Did it know or did it wait for the hour of visitation? Had it remarked the doors were daily opened?

"All were desirous of obtaining this mouse, but the major carried it off for his lady; she put it into a cage, where it pined, refused all sustenance, and in a few

days was found dead.—The loss of this little companion made me for some time quite melancholy."

§ 146. Other instances in illustration of the same subject.

Mr. Stewart, in illustrating this very subject, makes the following statement.—"The Count de Lauzun was confined by Louis XIV. for nine years in the Castle of Pignerol, in a small room where no light could enter but from a chink in the roof. In this solitude he attached himself to a spider, and contrived for some time to amuse himself in attempting to tame it, with catching flies for its support, and with superintending the progress of its web. The jailer discovered his amusement and killed the spider; and the Count used afterward to declare, that the pang he felt on the occasion could be compared only to that of a mother for the loss of a child."

More recently we find statements of a similar purport in the interesting little work of Silvio Pellico, which gives an account of his Ten Years' Imprisonment.—"Being almost deprived of human society," he remarks, "I one day made acquaintance with some ants upon my window; I fed them; they went away, and, ere long, the place was thronged with these little insects, as if come by invitation. A spider, too, had weaved a noble edifice upon my walls, and I often gave him a feast of gnats or flies, which were extremely annoying to me, and which he liked much better than I did. I got quite accustomed to the sight of him; he would run over my bed, and come and take the precious morsels out of my hand."

On a certain occasion, being detected in conversation with his fellow-prisoner, Count Orobini, Pellico was not only reprimanded, but strictly ordered never afterward to converse from his window. He resolutely refused, in language that clearly indicates the workings and longings of the human heart. "I shall do no such thing. I shall speak as long as I have breath, and invite my neighbour to talk to me. If he refuse, I will talk to my window bars, I will talk to the hills

before me, I will talk to the birds as they fly about. I *will* talk."—On another occasion, after having been visited by some one who took a more than usual interest in his situation, he exclaims, "How strange, how irresistible is the desire of the solitary prisoner to behold some one of his own species! It amounts to almost a sort of *instinct*, as if to prevent insanity, and its usual consequence, the tendency to self-destruction. The Christian religion, so abounding in views of humanity, forgets not to enumerate among its works of mercy the visiting of the prisoner. The mere aspect of man, his look of commiseration, his willingness, as it were, to share with you, and bear a part of your heavy burden, even when you know he cannot relieve you, has something that sweetens your bitter cup."

We hold it to be quite certain, that such considerations and facts as have been brought forward cannot be satisfactorily explained except on the ground that the love of society is originally implanted in the human mind. We might, therefore, be safe in leaving the subject here; but there are some other facts, similar to those which have been mentioned, that seem to possess no small degree of interest. We refer not so much to the case of distinguished individuals who have been subjected to long and severe imprisonment, as to some of the more general results that may be gathered from the history of prison discipline.

§ 147. The subject illustrated from experiments in prison discipline.

In the year 1821, the Legislature of New-York directed the Superintendent of the Auburn State Prison to select a number of the most hardened criminals, and to lock them up in solitary cells, to be kept there day and night, without any interruption of their solitude, and without labour. This order, which was regarded, and was designed to be regarded, in the light of an experiment, was carried into effect in September of that year, by confining eighty criminals in the manner prescribed. On this experiment Messrs. Beaumont and Tocqueville, who some years since were

commissioned by the French government to examine and to report on the American system of Prison Discipline, make the following remarks: "This trial, from which so happy a result had been anticipated, was fatal to the greater part of the convicts; in order to reform them, they had been subjected to complete isolation; but this absolute solitude, if nothing interrupt it, is beyond the strength of man; it destroys the criminal without intermission and without pity; it does not reform, it kills.—The unfortunates on whom this experiment was made fell into a state of depression so manifest that their keepers were struck with it; their lives seemed in danger if they remained longer in this situation; five of them had already succumbed during a single year; their moral state was no less alarming; one of them had become insane; another, in a fit of despair, had embraced the opportunity, when the keeper brought him something, to precipitate himself from his cell, running the almost certain chance of a mortal fall.—Upon these and similar effects the system was finally judged. The governor of the State of New-York pardoned twenty-six of those in solitary confinement. The others, to whom this favour was not extended, were allowed to leave the cells during the day, and to work in the common workshops of the prison."

The Philadelphia Penitentiary appears to be constituted on what may be considered a mixed principle of punishment, viz., solitary confinement combined with labour, and alleviated by opportunities of reading, and by frequent visits from official persons, such as the inspectors, wardens, and chaplain. When Messrs. Beaumont and Tocqueville visited this Penitentiary, one of the prisoners said to them, in language which feelingly intimates how repugnant entire solitude is to the natural sentiments of the human heart, "It is with joy that I perceive the figure of the keepers who visit my cell. This summer a cricket came into my yard; it looked like a companion. When a butterfly or any other animal happens to enter my cell, I never do it any harm."

It may be added here, on the authority of the Translator of the Work from which the foregoing extracts have been made, that "the fatal effects of solitary confinement without labour, both to the body and the mind of the prisoners, has not been limited to the Auburn Prison. The Penitentiaries of Maryland, Maine, Virginia, and New-Jersey, in their experiments of this kind, have not exhibited happier results. In the latter prison, ten persons are mentioned as having been killed by solitary confinement."*

§ 148. Relation of the social principle to civil society.

It is on such considerations that we maintain the principle which has now been the subject of examination, to be connatural to the human mind. If men are frequently found in a state of contention, jealous of each other's advancement, and seeking each other's injury, we are not to regard this as their natural position, but rather as the result, in many cases at least, of misapprehension. If they understood, in every case, the relative position of those with whom they contend, and especially if they were free from all unfavourable influences from those who happen to be placed in positions of authority, the great mass of mankind would find the principle of sociality successfully asserting its claims against those causes of repulsion and strife which, for various reasons, too often exist.

In concluding this subject, we may properly revert a moment to the strange notion of Hobbes, and those who think with him, that man is kept in society only by the fear of what he significantly calls the Leviathan; that is to say, of Civil Society in the exercise of force. These writers give us to understand that it is the chain, the sword, and the fagot which sustain the uniformity of the social position. We have no doubt that civil Government, in its proper administration, has a favourable effect, even in the exercise of

* Lieber's Translation of Beaumont and Tocqueville's Penitentiary System of the United States, p. 5, 51, 151, 188.

force. But, at the same time, it is a great and important fact, that Civil Society has a different, and, in all respects, a better foundation than this. It is based on the constitution of the mind itself, on the unfailing operations of the social principle. It is true that the tendencies of this principle are sometimes temporarily annulled by counteracting and adverse influences; but the principle itself is never, in a sound mind, perfectly extinguished. There is a philosophical truth, as well as poetical beauty, in the well-known expressions of Cowper:

> "Man in society is like a flower
> Blown in his native bed; 'tis there alone
> His faculties, expanded in full bloom,
> Shine out; there only reach their proper use."

§ 149. Of the form of desire denominated hope.

Before leaving the Propensities, and ascending, in the gradation of the Desiring or Desirive Sensibilities, to the still higher class of the Affections, we may delay a moment upon a state of mind which, although we may not have authority to give it a distinct place, has a name in every language, and perhaps we may add with strict truth, a residence in every breast. We refer to the state of mind denominated Hope, which does not appear to be a distinct form of desire, separate from every other, but rather a modification of all its forms. When the desire, whether it appear in the form of a propensity, or an affection, or in any other possible shape, is attended with a belief of the attainment of the object towards which it is directed, it is generally accompanied, in consequence of this belief, with a pleasant emotion. The effect of this collateral or accessory emotion is to stimulate the action of the desire, whose success it anticipates, and to diffuse over it a portion of its own glow of happiness. Of course, this pleasurable emotion will be greater or less, according as there is a greater or less probability of the object being attained. When the probability is small, the emotion of pleasure is weak; when it is great, the pleasure becomes strong. It is in the latter case that

we often speak of "gay" hope, of "cheering" or "bright" hope, and regard it as spreading a sort of rapturous light over the distant objects which it contemplates.

> "With thee, sweet Hope! resides the heavenly light,
> That pours remotest rapture on the sight."

The influence of that peculiar modification of pleased and vivid desire which, in order to distinguish it from other forms of desire, we denominate Hope, is undoubtedly very great; and, in most cases, it is to be presumed that its tendency is beneficial. Scarcely a duty or a situation of life can be named in which its influence is not felt more or less. The schoolboy is encouraged in his task by some hope of reward; and, when grown up to manhood, he cheers himself, after a thousand disappointments, with some good in prospect. The poor peasant, who laboriously cultivates his few steril acres, sees them, in his anticipation, rich, and blooming, and prodigal of wealth. It proffers its aid in the chambers of the sick and suffering; and the victim of oppressive tyranny, the captive in the dungeon, is encouraged to summon up the fortitude necessary to prolong his existence, by the hope, however poorly founded, of future deliverance.

CHAPTER VI.

THE MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

§ 150. Of the comparative rank of the affections.

It will be recollected, after some general remarks on the Nature of desire, we proposed to prosecute the examination of what may be called, in distinction from the emotive, the *desiring* portion of the Pathematic sensibilities, under the subordinate heads of the Instincts, the Appetites, the Propensities, and the Affections. Having examined, so far as seemed to be necessary for our purpose, the first three divisions, we are now prepared to proceed to the last.

The Affections are distinguished from the other

forms of the "desirive" or propensive nature, besides other subordinate marks or characteristics, which will naturally present themselves to our notice as they come separately under examination, in being, in the first place, more complex, and also by the circumstance of their sustaining a higher place in the graduation of our esteem and honour.—It may be difficult to explain how it happens, but it is unquestionably the fact, that there is a difference in the sentiments of esteem with which we contemplate different parts of our nature; some being regarded with higher, and some with less honour. In the graduation of our regard, it appears to be the fact, that we generally estimate the appetites as in some degree higher than the instincts, and the propensities as higher than either. To the Affections, especially the Benevolent affections, which occupy in our estimation a still more elevated position, we look with increased feelings of interest. They obviously stand at the head of the list; and when we shall have completed their examination, nothing more will remain to be said on the regular or ordinary action of the Natural Sensibilities.—We shall then be at liberty to proceed to another and still more important class of subjects.

§ 151. Of the complex nature of the affections.

The Affections, unlike the Appetites and Propensities, as they exist in their primitive or original developement, are not simple states of mind, but complex. Accordingly, the term AFFECTION denotes a state of mind, of which it is indeed true that some simple emotion is always a part, but which differs from any single simple emotion in being combined with some form of that state of mind called DESIRE. "As to every sort of passion," says Kames, "we find no more in the composition but an emotion, pleasant or painful, accompanied with desire."

The affections are susceptible of being divided, although it may not be in all respects easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details, into the two

classes of Benevolent and Malevolent. The malevolent affections, as a general thing, include a painful emotion, accompanied with a desire of evil to the unpleasant object. The benevolent affections, on the contrary, include, for the most part, a pleasant emotion, accompanied with the desire of good to the pleasing object. But what distinguishes and characterizes the two classes is probably not so much the nature of the emotion, as the desire of good or evil which attends it.—It is on the basis of this division that we proceed in the examination of this subject.

It is proper to remark here, that the term PASSIONS, in conformity with the authorized use of language, is susceptible of being employed as entirely synonymous with AFFECTIONS. In this sense we shall sometimes have occasion to use it, although it is frequently the case that it is employed also as expressive not merely of the existence of the affections, but as implying their existence in a raised or eminent degree.

§ 152. Of resentment or anger.

The first of the MALEVOLENT affections which we propose to consider (that which may be termed the foundation or basis of all the others) is Resentment or Anger. This affection, like all others, is of a complex nature, involving an unpleasant or painful emotion, accompanied with the desire of inflicting unpleasantness or pain on the object towards which it is directed. In its original or natural state, the desire appears to be, to some extent, the counterpart of the emotion; that is to say, having experienced an unpleasant or painful emotion, in consequence of the actual or supposed ill-conduct of others, we naturally desire, in the exercise of the Resentment arising under such circumstances, a corresponding retribution of pain on the offending agent. But in saying that they are reciprocally counterparts, we do not feel at liberty to assert, although there seems to be grounds for such a suggestion, that they possess to each other a precise and *exact* correspondence.

There are various modifications of Resentment, so distinct from each other as easily to admit of a separate notice, and to be entitled to a distinct name, such as Peevishness, Jealousy, and Revenge. These will be considered, although in as brief a manner as possible, in their proper place. It is necessary to remark a little more at length upon the passion now before us, which may be regarded as in some important sense the foundation and the place of origin to all the others.

§ 153. Illustrations of instinctive resentment.

The AFFECTIONS, agreeing in this respect with what has been said of the Appetites and Propensities, have a twofold action, instinctive and voluntary; operating, in the one case, suddenly and without thought; in the other, operating on reflection and with deliberate purpose of mind.—Accordingly, we proceed to remark, in the first place, on the instinctive form of resentment. The occasions on which this form of resentment arises, or is liable to arise, are all cases of harm or suffering, whether such harm or suffering be caused intentionally or not. The harm which we experience is followed by the resentment at once; the rapidity of the retributive movement may be compared to that of a flash of lightning; quick as the operation of thought is universally allowed to be, there is no opportunity for its interposition between the harm which has been experienced and the resentment that follows. Under such circumstances, it is, of course, impossible that the resentment should be regulated by the consideration whether the hurt which we have experienced was intentional or not. It is the harm, in itself considered, which arouses us, exclusive of any reference to the circumstances under which it is inflicted.

We not unfrequently see instances of instinctive resentment corresponding to what has been said. It is under the influence of this form of resentment that the child who has been accidentally hurt by a stone or a billet of wood wreaks a momentary anger upon the inanimate object; that the Savage breaks and

fiercely tramples upon the arrow which has wounded him; and that men, in the first moments of their suffering, almost universally discover a sudden and marked displeasure with the cause of it.

§ 154. Uses and moral character of instinctive resentment.

The object (or FINAL CAUSE, as it is sometimes termed) for which the principle of instinctive resentment is implanted in man, seems to be to furnish him with a degree of protection in the case of sudden and unforeseen attacks. The reasoning power is comparatively slow in its operation; and if the constitution of our nature were such as to require us always to wait for its results before acting, we might, in some cases, fail of that protection which an instinctive effort would have given. Hence the practical importance of this form of the principle under consideration.

It may be added, that instinctive resentment has no moral character. It is the glory of the moral nature that it lays back, if we may be allowed the expressions, of the intellective nature; and that it does not aud cannot act, independently of the antecedent action, to a greater or less extent, of the intellect. In other words, the nature of conscience is such as to require as the basis of its action a knowledge of the thing and its relations upon which it is about to pronounce its opinion, which knowledge can be acquired only by the perceptive and comparing acts of the intellect. But such is the rapidity of instinctive action, that it entirely excludes a suitable knowledge of the event which calls it forth; and as it in this way excludes the cognizance and authority of conscience, it cannot be said to have a moral character, either good or evil.

§ 155. Of voluntary in distinction from instinctive resentment.

The second, and, in a practical and moral point of view, the more important form of this affection, is what may be denominated Voluntary Resentment. By inquiring into the cause of the resentment which

we have instinctively experienced, and by suggesting reasons either for its increase or diminution, we are enabled to modify its action, and to impart to it the character of voluntariness and accountability.

The proper occasion of deliberate or Voluntary in distinction from instinctive Resentment, is INJURY, as it stands distinguished from mere harm or hurt. That is to say, Voluntary resentment, when exercised in accordance with the intentions of nature, takes into view not only the harm or suffering which has been occasioned, but the motive or intention of the agent. The final cause or object of instinctive resentment is immediate protection; nor does it appear to have anything further in view. The final cause of voluntary resentment is not only protection, but justice. In other words, while it aims to secure protection, it does not propose the attainment of that object, except in conformity with what is strictly proper and right. It always, therefore, in its appropriate and legitimate exercise, dispenses its retribution, not simply with a reference to the harm, loss, or suffering which has been endured, but chiefly with reference to the feelings which at the time existed in the mind of the agent or cause of the suffering.

A moral character, accordingly, attaches only to the voluntary form of resentment. If there is an exact proportion between the resentment and its cause; in other words, if the resentment precisely corresponds to what justice requires, it is right. But if it exceeds this just proportion and thus violates justice, it is wrong.

§ 156. Tendency of anger to excess, and the natural checks to it.

Few principles are more operative in man, in point of fact, than that of resentment. And although, reasoning on the principles of nature merely, without taking into view the duty of forgiveness inculcated in the Scriptures, we may justify its deliberate and voluntary exercise in many cases, it must be admitted, on the whole, that it is particularly liable to a

perverted and excessive action. It is too frequently the fact, that man is found wreaking his anger on those who, on a full and candid examination of all the circumstances of the case, would be found entitled to no such treatment.

One cause of the frequency of excessive and unjustifiable resentment is to be found in the fact, that, in consequence of the suffering or loss we endure, our thoughts are wholly taken up with our own situation, and we find it very difficult to estimate properly either the facts or the motives of our supposed adversary's conduct. If we could turn away our thoughts from ourselves, so far as fully to understand all the circumstances of a proceeding which, in itself considered, we have found so injurious to us, we should frequently be willing to check the vehemence of our anger, if we did not wholly extinguish it.

Nature, however, has herself instituted some checks on the undue exercise of this passion.—First. The exercise of this passion is, in its very nature, painful. It is in this respect very different from the exercise of the benevolent affections, which is pleasant. So great is the pain attendant upon deliberate and protracted anger, that it is not uncommon to hear persons assert they have themselves endured more suffering in their own minds than the gratification of their passions has caused to their opponents. Nature seems to have attached this penalty to the exercise of this passion, in order to remind men, at the most appropriate moment, of the necessity of keeping it in due subjection.

Second. Whenever our resentment passes the proper bounds, the feelings of the community, which were before in our favour, immediately turn against us. We are so constituted, that we naturally desire the good opinion of others; and, consequently, the loss of their good opinion operates upon us as a punishment, and not unfrequently a severe one. Under the influence of the experience or the anticipation of this incidental retribution, it is not unfrequently the case,

that men restrict within proper bounds those angry feelings which, under other circumstances, they would probably have indulged to excess.

Third. The tendency of the indulgence of anger is to lower a man in his own estimation, and still more so in the estimation of others, who will be less ready to admit those mitigating circumstances that partially justify his feelings to himself. The mere outward signs of the angry passions give a shock to our sensibilities, and are hateful to us, while those of an opposite character beam upon the soul with the pleasantness of a tranquil morning's light. The smile of benevolence wins upon our affections; but the scowl of anger, whether it be directed against ourselves or others, fills us with pain and dread. And, moreover, while the indulgence of anger tends, as a general thing, to degrade the subject of it in our view, we look with increased respect and honour on those who successfully resist its approaches, and are calm and forbearing amid insult and injury.

§ 157. Other reasons for checking and subduing the angry passions.

In addition to those checks to the angry passions which nature herself seems to have furnished, it may be proper to mention a few considerations, drawn from reason and the Scriptures, which, if they have the weight they are entitled to, will tend to the same desirable result.—(1.) We should always keep in recollection, in the first place, that, when the mind is much agitated by passion, it is rendered by that circumstance itself incapable, to a considerable degree, of correct judgment. Actions, considered as the indications of feeling and character, do not at such times appear to us in their true light. They are seen through an unfavourable medium, and represented unnaturally, with distorted and discoloured features. It is said to have been a saying of Socrates to his servant on a certain occasion, that he would beat him if he were not angry; a remark which seems to indicate, that, in the opinion of the author of it, anger is a state of

mind unfavourable to a correct judgment of the merit or demerit of the person towards whom it is directed.

(2.) We should consider, in the second place, even if we have no particular reason to distrust our powers of judging, that we may, by possibility at least, have mistaken the motives of the person whom we imagine to have injured us. Perhaps the oversight or crime which we allege against him, instead of being premeditated or intentional, was mere inadvertence. It is even possible that his intentions were favourable to us, instead of being, as we suppose, of a contrary character. And if it were otherwise, if the wrong done us were an intentional wrong, it is still possible that this hostile disposition may have originated from serious misconceptions in regard to our own character and conduct. And obviously the easiest and best way would be to correct these misconceptions, and thus to secure safety for the future, and, in all probability, recompense for the past.

(3.) There is another consideration which ought to prevent the indulgence of this passion, and to allay its effects. It is, that all have offended against the Supreme Being, and stand in need of pardon from Him. If we ourselves were without sin, if we could boast of perfect purity of character, there might seem to be some degree of reasonableness in our exacting from others the full amount of what is due to perfect and inflexible rectitude. But the actual state of things is far different from this. Every one who knows his own heart must see and feel himself to be a transgressor. How unsuitably, therefore, to the circumstances of his own situation does that man conduct, who talks largely of satisfaction and revenge, when he is every moment dependent on the clemency and forgiveness of a Being whom he has himself so often sinned against.

In the fourth place, there are many passages of Scripture which expressly require us to subdue the malevolent passions, and to forgive the injuries which

have called them into action. And this, we may here take occasion to remark, is one of the great and striking characteristics of the Gospel revelation. The doctrine that we are to love and do good to our enemies, obviously distinguishes the Christian Code from every other, and gives to it, as compared with mere human systems, an inexpressible elevation. Its language is: "Ye have heard it hath been said, thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you."

We are aware that these precepts of Christ, and others of a like import, so different from the general thought and practice of the world, have sometimes been regarded as unreasonable in principle, and not calculated to produce good results. But it is to be remembered, that they are addressed to his own followers; those who are destined to be fashioned after his own pattern and image. In virtue of their discipleship, and as a necessary result of it, the true disciples of Christ are the recipients of a spiritual illumination, which establishes them, in many respects, on a different and higher plane of being. And then it is to be remembered further, that they and all others are to be judged according to the light which they have, and not according to the light which they have not; and that differences in position, involving differences in knowledge and power, always involve differences in responsibility, and imply and require differences in action. Now, on the supposition that we are Christians after the pattern of Christ, and that our life is a life of truth, and goodness, and love, such as Christianity requires, it is unreasonable and unphilosophical to suppose that we are or can be the subjects of attacks and injuries from others, certainly as a general thing, except on the ground of ignorance, of misapprehensions, of peculiar and heavy temptations such as sometimes arise from great want and great sorrow,

or from a low and stolid brutishness, resulting from inherited evil tendencies, or from other involuntary causes, such as are fitted to call forth our deepest pity. Under these circumstances, while those who are on a lower plane may be expected to hold strongly to the LEX TALIONIS of the Mosaic code and to return blow for blow, the true Christian, in accordance with the spirit of Christ, feels that it is right and just, as well as a Christian precept, that it is a divine philosophy and not merely an imperative dogmatism, that he should be patient with such an adversary; that he should give him explanations calculated to enlighten his ignorance; that he should show acts of kindness likely to allay his ill feelings, and thus win him to truth and rectitude by the power of love.

§ 158. Modifications of resentment. Peevishness.

When, in all ordinary cases, the resentful feeling shows itself, we variously denominate it by the terms resentment, hostility, anger, hatred, indignation, and the like; but there are some modifications of the feeling, distinguished either by excess or diminution, or in some other way, which may be regarded as possessing a distinctive character. One of these is PEEVISHNESS or FRETFULNESS; a species of malevolent passion which, probably with more frequency than its decided manifestations, interrupts the peace and happiness of life.

Peevishness differs from ordinary anger in being excited by very trifling circumstances, and in a strange facility of inflicting its effects on everybody and everything within its reach. The peevish man has met with some trifling disappointment (it matters but little what it is), and the serenity of whole days is disturbed; no smiles are to be seen; everything, whether animate or inanimate, rational or irrational, is out of place, and falls under the rebuke of this fretful being.—Anger, in its more marked and decided manifestations, may be compared to a thunder-shower, that comes dark and heavily, but leaves a clear sky after-

ward. But peevishness is like an obscure, drizzling fog; it is less violent, and lasts longer. In general, it is more unreasonable and unjust than violent anger, and would certainly be more disagreeable, were it not often, in consequence of being so disproportioned to its cause, so exceedingly ludicrous.

§ 159. Modifications of resentment. Envy.

One of the most frequent forms of resentment is Envy. By this term we are accustomed to express that ill-will or hatred which has its rise from the contemplation of the superiority of another. Considered as a mere state of the mind, Envy is to be regarded as only one of the perversions of resentment; but considered in respect to the occasions of its origin, it must be added, that it is one of the most degrading and hateful perversions. There is no passion which is more tormenting in the experience, as might be expected from its hatefulness; and none which is more decisively condemned by the sentiments of justice.

If we are asked why it is that, on the mere contemplation of the more favourable situation and the greater advancement of another, we experience such an odious perversion of a principle apparently good in itself, we shall probably find a reason in the irregular and inordinate action of the principle of Self-love. Men frequently become so intensely selfish that they cannot admit others to an equal participation of what they enjoy, much less see them advanced to a higher situation, without a greater or less degree of repining and discontent. And it is this state of mind which is appropriately denominated Envy.

§ 160. Modifications of resentment. Jealousy.

There are still other varieties of that Resentment or Hostility, which may be regarded, in some important sense, as the basis of the whole series of the Malevolent passions. Among these is Jealousy, which includes a painful emotion, caused by some object of *love*, and attended with a desire of evil towards that

object.—The circumstance which characterizes this passion and constitutes its peculiar trait is, that all its bitterness and hostility are inflicted on some one whom the jealous person loves. The feeling of suspicious rivalship, which often exists between candidates for fame and power, is sometimes called jealousy, on account of its analogy to this passion.—There are various degrees of jealousy, from the forms of mere distrust and watchful suspicion, to its highest paroxysms. In general, the strength of the passion will be found to be in proportion to the value which is attached to the object of it; and is, perhaps, more frequently found in persons who have a large share of pride than in others. Such, in consequence of the habitual belief of their own superiority, are likely to notice many trifling inadvertencies, and to treasure them up as proofs of intended neglect, which would not have been observed by others, and certainly were exempt from any evil intention.

The person under the influence of this passion is incapable of forming a correct judgment of the conduct of the individual who is the object of it; he observes everything, and gives it the worst interpretation; and circumstances, which in another state of the mind would have been tokens of innocence, are converted into proof of guilt. Although poetry, it is no fiction:

> "Trifles light as air
> Are to the jealous confirmations strong
> As proofs of holy writ."

Hence it is justly said to be the monster that "makes the meat it feeds on;" for it perseveringly broods over the slightest suggestion, even when made with the most sincere kindness, and rears up a shapeless and frightful form, which in turn nourishes the baleful passion from which is derived its own existence.

It may be remarked of this passion, that it is at times exceedingly violent. At one moment the mind is animated with all the feelings of kindness; the next it is transported with the strongest workings of

hatred, and then it is suddenly overwhelmed with contrition. Continually vacillating between the extremes of love and hatred, it knows no rest; it would gladly bring destruction on the object whom it dreads to lose more than any other, and whom, at times, it loves more than any other.

§ 161. Modifications of resentment. Revenge.

Another of the marked modifications of Resentment is REVENGE. By the spirit of revenge, as we sometimes express it, we generally understand a disposition, not merely to return suffering for suffering, but to inflict a degree of pain on the person who is supposed to have injured us, beyond what strict justice requires. So that revenge seems to differ from resentment rather in degree than in kind; in other words, it is unrestrained or excessive resentment. It is true, however, that it generally implies something more than mere excess. It commonly exhibits the aspect of coolness and deliberateness in its designs, and is as persevering in the execution of its hostile plans as it is deliberate in forming them. If resentment, when properly regulated, may be considered, on the principles of nature, as morally right, revenge, which is the unrestrained or inordinate form of resentment, is always morally wrong. It is a passion which is not only greatly inconsistent with the due exercise of the other powers of the mind, but is equally condemned by enlightened conscience and the Scriptures.

§ 162. Illustrations of the malevolent passions.

It would not be a difficult matter to bring forward some affecting illustrations of the unrestrained and undue influence of the malevolent passions which have thus far come under our notice. In the tragedy of Othello, the pen of Shakspeare has successfully employed itself in developing the workings and the results of the fatal passion of Jealousy; and if this great poem be styled a fiction considered in relation to history, it will probably be admitted to be immutable

truth considered in relation to nature. Revenge, in its more determined and persevering exhibitions, is a passion at least equally dreadful. Among Savage tribes in particular, as we learn from the frequent testimony of those who have travelled among them, to take vengeance, deep, unabated, ample, would seem to be the surest passport to an honourable place and name. But it is not among Savage nations alone that revenge is found, even in its more embittered forms. There is mention made in the writings of Garcilasso of a Spanish gentleman named Aguire, who, having on one occasion offended a governor of some of the cities of South America, was sentenced to be ignominiously scourged in public. The citizens took an interest so far as to interpose and entreat a remission of the punishment; and the person himself implored that death might be substituted instead of it, but without effect.—"Aguire, esteeming himself eternally disgraced, retired from the military service, and patiently awaited the expiry of the governor's appointment, when he followed him incessantly as his shadow. The governor, warned of his danger, armed himself in mail, and hurried from place to place in quest of safety. But no sooner had he hopes of rest, than he found his implacable enemy treading on his footsteps. He fled again; and again Aguire pursued him. Thus did three years elapse, while many hundred miles were traversed by both. At last, Aguire ventured to enter the governor's house, and, finding him asleep in an inner chamber, he pierced him with a dagger where unprotected by his armour."

Such are the deplorable evils that are likely to result when the malevolent passions gain an ascendancy. And as, in the present imperfect and perverted state of man, there is a constant proneness to inordinate malevolent action, it becomes the more important to restrain and duly regulate a tendency so unfavourable, by allowing their full weight to the forgiving and benevolent principles of the Gospel.

§ 163. Nature of the passion of fear.

We conclude this review of this portion of the Affections with a single other notice. The passion of Fear, like the other passions or affections that have passed under examination, embraces both a simple emotion of pain, caused by some object which we anticipate will be injurious to us, and also, additional to the painful emotion, the desire of avoiding such object or its injurious effects. The question might suggest itself, with some appearance of reason, whether Fear, in view of the definition just given, should be included under the general head of the Malevolent passions. And this is one of the cases referred to, in separating the Affections into the twofold division of the Benevolent and Malevolent, when it was remarked, it might not, in all respects, be easy to carry the arrangement into effect in its details. Nevertheless, the fact that we experience pain in viewing the object feared, accompanied with a desire of avoiding it, seems very clearly to involve the idea that it is an object of greater or less aversion. In other words, that we have more or less of ill-will towards it. It is certainly the case, if the object is of such a nature that its presence is painful, that we can hardly be said to love it. So that, at least, it would seem to come more naturally under the head of the malevolent affections than under the other class.

But to return to the nature of the passion itself. The strength or intensity of fear will be in proportion to the apprehended evil. There is a difference of original susceptibility of this passion in different persons, and the amount of apprehended evil will consequently vary with the quickness of such susceptibility. But whatever causes may increase or diminish the opinion of the degree of evil which threatens, there will be a correspondence between the opinion which is formed of it and the fearful passion.

When this passion is extreme, it prevents the due exercise of the moral susceptibility, and interrupts correct judgment of any kind whatever. It is a state of

mind of great power, and one which will not bear to be trifled with. It may serve as a profitable hint to remark, that there have been persons thrown into a fright suddenly, and perhaps in mere sport, which has immediately resulted in a most distressing and permanent mental disorganization.—In cases where the anticipated evil is very great, and there is no hope of avoiding it in any way, the mind exists in that state which is called DESPAIR. But the consideration of this deplorable state of mind, so far as it may be necessary to meet the objects of the present Work, will more properly come under the head of Disordered or Alienated Sensibilities.

CHAPTER VII.

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.

§ 164. Of the nature of love, or benevolence in general.

WE proceed now to the consideration of the other great division of the Affections. As the original principle of Resentment is the basis of the Malevolent affections, so Love, in its more general form, appears to be at the foundation, as a general thing at least, of those which are termed, by way of distinction, Benevolent. The affection of Love, like the other affections, is a complex state of mind, embracing, FIRST, a pleasant emotion in view of the object, and, SECOND, a desire of good to that object.—Hence there will always be found in that object some quality, either some excellence in the form, or in the relations sustained, or in the intellect, or in the moral traits, or in all combined, which is capable of exciting a pleasurable emotion. This emotion is the basis of the subsequent desire; but it is the strict and indissoluble combination of the two that constitutes the Affection properly so called.

It is proper to remark here, that there are many modifications or degrees of this affection, such as the unimpassioned preference of friendly regard and es-

teem, the warmer glow of friendship in the more usual acceptation of the term, and the increased feeling of devoted attachment. There are not only differences in degree, but the affection itself, considered in respect to its nature simply, seems to be modified, and to be invested with a different aspect, according to the circumstances in which it is found to operate. The love which children feel for their parents is different in some respects from that which they feel for their brothers and sisters. The love of parents for their children possesses traits, difficult to be described in language, but recognisable by Consciousness, which distinguish it from their love to mankind generally, or their love to their country or their friends. Hence we are enabled, in consistency with what is the fact in respect to them, to consider the Affections under different forms or heads, viz., the Parental affection, the Filial affection, the Fraternal affection, Humanity, or the love of the human race, Patriotism, or the love of country, Friendship, Gratitude, and Sympathy, or Pity.

§ 165. Love, in its various forms, characterized by a twofold action.

Love, not only in its more general form, but in all the varieties which, in consequence of our situation and of the relations we sustain, it is made to assume, is characterized, like the opposite principle of resentment, by its twofold action. It is sometimes seen, particularly in parents and children, to operate INSTINCTIVELY; that is to say, without deliberation or forethought. At other times it is subjected to more or less of regulation, being either stimulated or repressed in its exercise by the facts and reflections which are furnished by reasoning, and then it is said to possess a deliberate or VOLUNTARY exercise.—This trait or characteristic, which pervades the whole series of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, has been so often referred to, that it is unnecessary to delay upon it here.

§ 166. Of the parental affection.

The principle of benevolence, love, or good-will, which in its general form has thus been made the subject of a brief notice, is susceptible, like the malevolent affection of Resentment, of various modifications. One of the most interesting and important of these modifications is the Parental Affection. — The view which we propose to take of this modification of benevolence or love is, that it is an original or implanted principle. In support of this view a number of things may be said.

(I.) It is supported, in the first place, by the consideration that the relation between the parent and child is much more intimate and indissoluble than any other. The child, in the view of the parent, is not so much a distinct and independent being as a reproduction and continuance of himself. He sees not only the reflection of his person and dispositions in his offspring, but of his hopes, joys, and prospects; in a word, of his whole being. Under such circumstances, it is almost impossible that the parental affection should be less deeply seated, less near to the root and bottom of the soul, than any other which can be named.

(II.) Such an affection seems, in the second place, to be required in order to enable parents to discharge effectually the duties which are incumbent upon them. The cares and troubles necessarily incidental to the parental relation, the daily anxieties, the nights of wakeful solicitude, the misgivings, the fears, and the sorrows without number, it would be impossible for human nature to support without the aid of an implanted principle.—And hence it is that, in the ordering and constitution of nature, this principle rises in such inexpressible beauty upon the parental heart. It diffuses its light upon it like a star upon a tempestuous ocean, and guides it forward in comparative safety.

(III.) In the third place, the acknowledged fact that this affection has an instinctive as well as a voluntary action is a strong circumstance in favour of

its being regarded as implanted. A purely voluntary affection cannot, from the nature of the case, be implanted, because it depends upon the Will; and will either exist or not exist, in accordance with the mere volitional determination. An instinctive affection cannot be otherwise than implanted; because, as it does not depend upon the will, it has no other support than in nature. Now, although this affection has a voluntary action based upon inquiry and reason, it has also, at its foundation, an instinctive action, which is to be regarded as the work of the Author of the mind himself. So that, although it is proper to accompany the statement with the remark that it has a twofold action, the affection, regarded as a whole, may justly be looked upon as an original or implanted one.

(IV.) In the fourth place, its universality is a circumstance in favour of the view which has been taken. We should naturally expect, in regard to any affection not implanted, and which depends exclusively upon the decisions of the reason and the will, that there would be frequent failures in its exercise. We may even be confident that this would be the result. But the parental affection, in a mind not actually disordered, never fails. In all climes and countries, and among all classes of men, however debased by ignorance or perverted by the prevalence of vice, we may find the traces, and, with scarcely an exception, the marked and distinct traces of this ennobling principle. There is no portion of the human race so degraded that it would not turn with abhorrence from the man that did not love his offspring.

§ 167. Illustrations of the strength of the parental affection.

(V.) Another circumstance in favour of regarding the principle as an implanted one is its great strength. Secondary affections, or those which, by a process of association, are built upon others, are sometimes, it is true, exceedingly strong; but this is found to be the case only in particular instances, and not as a general trait. In respect to the affection before us, it is not

found to be strong in one mind and weak in another; but is strong, exceedingly strong, as a general statement, in all minds alike. It might be interesting to give some illustrations of this statement, as, in truth, scarcely any of the facts illustrative of the mind's action in its various departments are wholly destitute of interest. But on this subject, such is the universal intensity of this affection, that they multiply on every side. He who has not noticed them has voluntarily shut his eyes to some of the most interesting exhibitions of human nature. So that a single incident of this kind, which will not fail to find a corroborative testimony in every mother's heart, will suffice.

"When the Ajax man-of-war took fire in the Straits of Bosphorus in the year 1807, an awful scene of distraction ensued. The ship was of great size, full of people, and under the attack of an enemy at the time —the mouths of destruction seemed to wage in contention for their prey. Many of those on board could entertain no hopes of deliverance: striving to shun one devouring element, they were the victims of another. While the conflagration was raging furiously, and shrieks of terror rent the air, an unfortunate mother, regardless of herself, seemed solicitous only for the safety of her infant child. She never attempted to escape; but she committed it to the charge of an officer, who, at her earnest request, endeavoured to secure it in his coat; and, following the tender deposite with her eyes as he retired, she calmly awaited that catastrophe in which the rest were about to be involved. Amid the exertions of the officer in such an emergency, the infant dropped into the sea, which was no sooner discovered by the unhappy parent, than, frantic, she plunged from the vessel's side as if to preserve it; she sunk—and was seen no more."*

§ 168. Of the filial affection.

As a counterpart to the interesting and important

* On the Origin and Progress of the Passions (Anonymous), vol. i., p. 148.

affection which has thus been briefly noticed, nature has instituted the filial affection, or that affection which children bear to their parents. The filial affection, although it agrees with the parental in the circumstance of its being implanted or connatural in the human mind, differs from it in some of its traits.—It is understood, among other things, to possess less strength. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that it does not, as a general thing, flow forth towards its object with the same burning, unmitigated intensity. And this is just what we might expect, on the supposition that the human mind comes from an Author who possesses all wisdom. The great practical object for which the parental affection is implanted in the bosoms of parents is to secure to their offspring that close attention and care, which are so indispensable in the incipient stages of life. The responsibility which rests upon them in the discharge of their duties to their children, is, in the variety of its applications and in the aggregate of its amount, obviously greater than that which rests upon children in the discharge of their duty to their parents. Nothing could answer, so far as we are able to judge, the requisitions which are constantly made on the parent to meet the child's condition of weakness, suffering, and want, and to avert its liabilities, both mental and bodily, to error, but the wakeful energy of a principle stronger even than the love of life. But it is different on the part of the children. As a general thing, no such calls of constant anxiety and watchfulness in the behalf of another are made upon them, at least in the early part of their life. Hence their love to their parents, although unquestionably strong enough for the intentions of nature, burns with a gentler ray.

§ 169. The filial affection original or implanted.

We took occasion, in the preceding section, to remark incidentally, that the filial affection, as well as the parental, is original or implanted, in distinction from the doctrine of its being of an associated or sec-

ondary formation. It is not our purpose, however, to enter minutely into this inquiry; and yet there are one or two trains of thought, having a bearing upon it, which we are unwilling wholly to omit.—Our first remark is, that if the filial affection were wholly voluntary and not implanted; in other words, if it were based wholly upon reason and reflection, there is no question that it would be extinguished much more frequently than it is in point of fact. But that mere reason and reflection are not the entire basis of the affection seems to be evident from the fact that we continue to love our parents under circumstances when reason, if we consulted that alone, would probably pronounce them unworthy of love. Our parents, as is sometimes the case, may treat us with great and unmerited neglect; they may plunge into the commission of crimes; they may become degraded and despised in the eyes of the community; but they still have a pure and elevated place, which nature has furnished for them in their children's hearts.—This train of thought (which, it is proper to remark in passing, is equally applicable to parental love, and tends to confirm the views brought forward under that head) goes with no small weight to show that the affection before us has an instinctive or natural basis.

Our second remark, which is also equally applicable to the parental affection, is, that men, with scarcely an exception, show, by their judgments and treatment of this affection, that they regard it as constitutional or implanted. It is evident that they expect us to treat our parents with great forbearance and kindness under all circumstances. If another person should insult and injure us, public sentiment would probably justify us in inflicting some sort of punishment. But it would not justify us, under precisely the same circumstances of provocation, in inflicting punishment upon, or even in showing marked disrespect to a parent, because it would be a violation of nature. Not merely the disapprobation, but the contempt and abhorrence of mankind, inflicted with

scarcely the possibility of a failure, is the fearful penalty which nature has attached to a want of filial love, even when the conduct of the parent himself has been reprehensible.—This is evidently the work of nature. Men act in this case as their nature prompts them. But nature is never at variance with herself. If she in this way distinctly intimates that she requires us to love our parents at all times, in adversity and in prosperity, in honour and in degradation, in good and in evil report, it is obvious that she has not left the affection to mere reason and reflection, for it is impossible that love so unchangeable could be sustained in such a manner, but supports it upon an instinctive or constitutional basis.

We merely add, leaving it to the reader himself to make the application of the remark, that nearly all the considerations which were brought forward to show the connatural origin of the parental affection might be properly adduced to show the same thing in the case of the filial affection.

§ 170. Illustrations of the filial affection.

Interesting instances of the results of the filial affection are to be found wherever there are men. And while it is admitted that there are some unfavourable tendencies in human nature, it is pleasant to contemplate it in an aspect so amiable and honourable. It is the fact, indeed, that children, as a general thing, do not appear to be willing to labour and suffer for parents so much as the parents do for the children. There are more frequent instances of a failure of filial than of parental love. Nevertheless, in all ages of the world, the filial affection has sustained itself in such a way as to bring honour to the Being that implanted it. Children have not only supported and consoled their parents in the ordinary duties and trials of life, but in multitudes of instances have followed them with their presence and their consolations into banishment and to prison.

At the accession of the late Emperor Alexander of

Russia, many prisoners, who had been confined for political and other reasons in the preceding reign, were set at liberty.—"I saw," says Kotzebue, who was in Russia at this interesting period, "an old colonel of the Cossacks and his son brought from the fortress to Count de Pahlen's apartments. The story of this generous youth is extremely interesting. His father had been dragged, for I know not what offence, from Tscherkask to Petersburg, and there closely imprisoned. Soon afterward his son arrived, a handsome and brave young man, who had obtained, in the reign of Catharine II., the cross of St. George and that of Wolodimer. For a long time he exerted himself to procure his father's enlargement by solicitations and petitions; but, perceiving no hopes of success, he requested, as a particular favour, to be allowed to share his captivity and misfortunes. This was in part granted him; he was committed a prisoner to the fortress, but was not permitted to see his father, nor was the unfortunate old man ever informed that his son was so near him. On a sudden, the prison bolts were drawn; the doors were opened; his son rushed into his arms; and he not only learned that he was at liberty, but, at the same time, was informed of the noble sacrifice which filial piety had offered. He alone can decide which information gave him most delight."*

It is true, there have been instances of parents who have done more than this; who have not only been ready to suffer banishment or imprisonment, but have willingly and joyfully offered their lives for the welfare of their children. In the time of the French Revolution, General Loizerolles, availing himself of a stratagem in order to effect the object, died upon the scaffold in the place of his son. It might not be easy to bring instances, although some such have probably existed, of children dying for their parents. But history furnishes some affecting cases, where the child has poured back into the parental bosom the fountain

* Kotzebue's Exile, p. 254.

of life which had been received.—"The mother of a woman," says the writer referred to, § 168, "in humble life, being condemned at Rome, the jailer, rather than execute the sentence, wished, from humanity, to let her perish of famine. Meantime, no one but her daughter was admitted to the prison, and that after she was strictly searched. But the curiosity of the man being aroused by the unusual duration of her survivance, he watched their interview, and discovered the daughter affectionately nourishing the author of her days with her own milk. The people among whom this incident occurred were not insensible of its virtue, and a temple, dedicated to Piety, was afterward erected on the spot. So was an aged father, under similar circumstances, preserved by similar means: he too was thus nourished by his daughter."

§ 171. Of the nature of the fraternal affection.

There is one other affection, connected with the family or domestic relation, which bears the marks, although, perhaps, somewhat less distinctly than in the cases already mentioned, of a natural or implanted origin. We refer, as will be readily understood, to the Fraternal Affection, or the love of brothers and sisters. The love which we bear to our brothers and sisters, although, in the basis or essentiality of its nature, it is the same with any other love, has something peculiar about it; a trait not easily expressed in words; which, in our internal experience or consciousness of it, distinguishes it from every other affection.

We are aware that some will endeavour to explain the origin of this affection by saying that it is owing to the circumstance of brothers and sisters being brought up together beneath the same roof, and thus participating in an early and long companionship. Nor are we disposed to deny that this circumstance probably has some weight in imparting to it an increased degree of intensity. But there is a single fact, which furnishes an answer to the doctrine, that

denies a distinct nature to the Fraternal Affection, and regards it as a mere modification of love in general, occasioned by the circumstance of early and long-continued intercourse. It is this: When other persons, not members of the same family, are brought up beneath the same roof, although we love them very much, yet we never have that *peculiar* feeling (distinct from every other, and known only by experience) which flows out to a brother or sister. There is something in having the same father and mother, in looking upward to the same source of origin, in being nourished at the same fountain in infancy, in feeling the same life-blood course through our veins, which constitutes, under the creative hand of nature, a sacred tie, unlike any other.

There are other views of the subject, besides that which has just been noticed, which contribute to show the connaturalness and permanency of this affection. A number of the remarks which have been made in support of the implanted or connatural origin of the Parental and Filial affections will apply here. But we leave the subject to the decision of such reflections as will be likely to suggest themselves to the mind of the reader himself.

§ 172. On the utility of the domestic affections.

In the institution of the affections, which have now passed under a rapid and imperfect review, and which, taken together, may be spoken of under the general denomination of the Domestic affections, we have evidence of that benevolence and wisdom which are seen so frequently in the arrangements of our mental nature. These affections are not only sources of happiness to individuals and families, diffusing an undefinable but powerful charm over the intercourse of life; they also indirectly exert a great influence in the support of society generally.

It was, indeed, a strange notion of some of the ancients, of Plato in particular, that the domestic affections are at variance with the love of country; and

that, in order to extinguish these affections, children should be taken from their parents at their birth, and transferred to the state, to be educated at the public expense. But the domestic affections are too deeply planted, particularly that of parents, to be generally destroyed by any process of this kind; and if it were otherwise, the result would be as injurious to the public as to individual happiness. It is unquestionable, that one of the great supports of society is the family relation. Who is most watchful and diligent in his business? Who is the most constant friend of public order, and is most prompt in rallying to the standard of the law? Who, as a general thing, is the best friend, the best neighbour, and the best citizen? Not he who is set loose from family relationships, and wanders abroad without a home; but he, however poor and unknown to fame, who has a father and mother, wife and children, brothers and sisters; who sees his own sorrows and happiness multiplied in the sorrows and happiness of those around him; and who is strong in the advocacy and support of the common and public good, not only because it involves his own personal interest, but the interest and happiness of all those who are linked arm in arm with himself by the beauty and sacredness of domestic ties.

§ 173. Of the moral character of the domestic affections, and of the benevolent affections generally.

One of the most interesting inquiries in connexion with the domestic affections, and the benevolent affections generally, and one, too, on which there has been a great diversity of opinion, is, whether these affections possess a moral character, and what that character is. The more common opinion seems to have been, that all affections which are truly benevolent are necessarily, and from the mere fact of their being benevolent, morally good or virtuous. Nor is it, perhaps, surprising that this opinion should be so often entertained. Certainly, as compared with the other active principles, coming under the general

head of the Natural or Pathematic sensibilities, they hold the highest rank, and we frequently apply epithets to them which indicate our belief of their comparative pre-eminence. We speak of them not only as innocent and useful, but as interesting, amiable, and lovely; and from time to time apply other epithets, which equally show the favourable place which they occupy in our regard. All this we allow; but still they are not necessarily, and in consequence of their own nature simply, morally good; in other words, they are innocent and good, without necessarily attaining to the position of moral merit.

The correct view on this subject we apprehend to be this (the same that has been taken of other principles, that are analogous in their nature and operation): So far as the benevolent affections are, strictly speaking, constitutional or instinctive in their action, they are indifferent as to their moral character, being neither morally good nor evil. So far as they have a deliberate and voluntary action, they will be either the one or the other, according to the circumstances of the case. When, for instance, the mother hears the sudden and unexpected scream of her child in another room, and impetuously rushes to its relief, we allow the action to be *naturally* good, and exceedingly interesting and lovely; but we do not feel at liberty to predicate virtue of it, and to pronounce it *morally* good and deserving of moral merit because it is obviously constitutional or instinctive. If the act done under such circumstances be necessarily virtuous, then it clearly follows that virtue may be predicated of sheep, cows, and other brute animals, who exhibit, under like circumstances, the same instinctive attachment to their offspring. So far, therefore, as the benevolent affections are instinctive in their operation, they are to be regarded, however interesting and amiable they may appear, as neither morally good nor evil.

§ 174. Of the moral character of the voluntary exercises of the benevolent affections.

But, so far as the benevolent affections are voluntary; in other words, so far as they exist in view of motives voluntarily and deliberately brought before the mind, they may be, according to the nature of the voluntary effort, either virtuous or vicious. Take, as an illustration, another instance of the operations of the maternal affection. The basis of this affection is unquestionably pure instinct. But it has, in addition to this, a voluntary operation; and this accessory operation, it is to be presumed, is in the majority of cases virtuous. Nevertheless, whenever this amiable and ennobling affection becomes inordinately strong; when, under its influence, the mother leaves the child to vicious courses, against the remonstrances of the sentiment of duty, its exercise evidently becomes vicious.—On the other hand, if the mother, perhaps in consequence of the improper conduct of the child, or a perplexing inability to meet its numerous wants, or for some other reason, finds its affection falling below the standard which is requisite in order to fulfil the intentions of nature, and in this state of things restores and invigorates its exercise by a careful and serious consideration of all the responsibilities involved in the maternal relation, it is equally clear that its exercise at once assumes the opposite character, not merely of amiableness, but of virtue.

It is proper, perhaps, to remind the reader, that sometimes a theological or religious difficulty is presented here. It is said, and we suppose said correctly, not only that the great element of the religious life is LOVE, but that the consciousness of Christians indicates an extraneous origin and continuance of it. That is to say, it is implanted, is the gift of God, rather than a thing of their own voluntary creation. And yet Christian love, although it is the gift of God rather than a purely volitive or voluntary product, is unquestionably a virtuous or holy state of mind. But there is really no difficulty here which is of such a

nature as to place itself in opposition to the views which have been presented. The truth is, Christian love will be found so effectually to carry with itself the consent of the understanding and the harmonious concurrence of the Will, that, as it seems to us, there is no impropriety and no philosophical obstacle in the way of ascribing to it the character of virtue, which is asserted to belong to it.

§ 175. Of the connexion between benevolence and rectitude.

We may add to what has now been remarked, that the highest and most ennobling form of benevolence exists in connexion with strict justice. Perfect justice is, by the constitution of things, indissolubly conjoined with the general and the highest good. All forms and degrees of benevolence, which are at variance, whether more or less, with perfect rectitude, although they are aiming at good or happiness, are nevertheless seeking something less than the greatest possible happiness. Even benevolence, therefore, is, and ought to be, subjected to some regulating power. Whenever we distinctly perceive that its present indulgence, in any given cases, will tend, whatever may be its immediate bearing, to ultimate unhappiness and misery, we are sacredly bound, by the higher considerations of duty, to repress it. And there is as much virtue in repressing its action at such times, as there would be at other times in stimulating it.

One of the most benevolent men of whom history gives us any account was Bartholomew Las Casas, bishop of Chiapa. In 1502 he accompanied Ovando to Hispaniola, who had been commissioned and sent out as the Spanish governor to that island. He there witnessed, with all the pain of a naturally benevolent heart, the cruel treatment which was there experienced by the native inhabitants; the deprivation of their personal rights, the seizure of their lands, their severe toil, and inexorable punishment. He was deeply affected; and from that time devoted the whole of his subsequent life, a period of more than sixty years, to

exertions in their behalf. Under the impulse of a most unquestionable benevolence, this good man recommended to Cardinal Ximenes, who was at that time at the head of Spanish affairs, the introduction of Negro slaves into the West India Islands as one of the best methods of relief to the native inhabitants.

We introduce this statement for the purpose of illustrating our subject. The measures of Las Casas, which tended to introduce enslaved Africans into the Spanish islands, were the results, beyond all question, of a holy and exalted benevolence. But if he could have foreseen the treatment of the Negroes, still more dreadful than that to which the native inhabitants were subjected; if he could have beheld, in anticipation, the desolations which have spread over Africa in consequence of the Slave-trade, it would have been his duty, whatever good might have immediately resulted to the Indians in whose behalf he was so deeply interested, to have checked and controlled his benevolent feelings, and to have endured the present rather than have been accessory to the future evil. The indulgence of his benevolence to the native inhabitants, under such circumstances and in such a form (however amiable and interesting benevolence, *in itself considered*, undoubtedly is in all cases whatever), would have been a violation of duty, and, consequently, a sin.—So erroneous and injurious is that system which ascribes to benevolence, in its own nature and independently of its relations to the law of rectitude, the character of virtue.

§ 176. Of humanity, or the love of the human race.

Another of the implanted affections is HUMANITY, or the love of the human race.—On this subject there are only three suppositions to be made, viz., that man is by nature indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-man, or that he naturally regards him with feelings of hostility, or that he has a degree of interest in his welfare, and loves him. That man is by nature entirely indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-beings,

is a proposition which will not be likely to meet with many supporters; still less the proposition, although some have been found to advocate it, that he is by nature, and instinctively, the enemy of man. But, in endeavouring to support the third proposition, that he has naturally a degree of interest in, and a desire for the welfare of the members of the human race generally, expressed by the terms HUMANITY or PHILANTHROPY, we wish it to be understood that we do not, as a general thing, claim for the exercise of this affection any marked intensity. It is too evident that it possesses but little strength compared with what it should; and that it falls far short of the Scriptural requisition, which exacts the same love for our neighbour as for ourselves. The fact undoubtedly is, that the principle is impeded in its action and diminished in its results by the inordinate exercise of the principle of SELF-LOVE, which is constantly recalling our attention within the restricted circle of our personal interests. But the affection of HUMANITY, although thus restricted in its action, and depressed far below the standard which its great Author justly claims for it, has nevertheless an existence.

This is shown, in the first place, from the great interest which is always taken, and by all classes of persons, in anything which relates to human nature, to man considered as a human being, irrespective in a great degree of his country and of the period of his existence. There are numerous other subjects of inquiry; and we undoubtedly feel a considerable degree of interest in whatever reaches us from different quarters of the earth in respect to their structure, climate, and resources. But it is chiefly when man is mentioned that the heart grows warm. We listen to the story of his situation and fortunes, even for the first time, as of one in whom flows the same fountain of life. When we touch a string here, we find a vibration in every human heart. It was for this reason that a Roman audience, composed of people from different countries and of different names, and brought

up under the influence of different associations and customs, expressed their unanimous and enthusiastic admiration on hearing the memorable verse of Terence,

"Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto."

They felt that the expressions conveyed a great truth of nature, which it was honourable to recognise, and which it was a violation of the sentiments of their own hearts to deny. The mere aspect of man, the mere sound of the human voice, unaided by a multitude of associations which often enhance their effect, awakens emotions of regard and interest. And seldom can we find a person so immersed in his own selfishness as boldly and openly to avow that the pursuit of his personal interests, with whatever good reasons it may in itself seem to be justified, is a valid and honourable excuse for annulling the claims of humanity and sundering the tie of universal brotherhood.

§ 177. Further proofs in support of the doctrine of an innate humanity, or love of the human race.

In the second place, the testimony of individuals, who have been so situated as to put the natural sentiments of mankind in this respect to a fair trial, is favourable to the doctrine of the natural existence of humane or philanthropic feelings. We refer here, in particular, to the statements of travellers, who, either by design or by accident, have been placed for a considerable time among Savage tribes, without meaning, however, to exclude those who in civilized lands have been favourably situated for ascertaining the tendencies of the human heart. Kotzebue, for instance, who was suddenly seized and sent as an exile into Siberia, where he remained some time, was thrown into the company of various classes of persons under such circumstances that he could hardly fail to form a correct judgment in the matter under consideration. The Narrative of his Exile, which is exceedingly interesting, discovers the human mind, considered as naturally disposed to the misery or happiness of the

human race, under a decidedly favourable aspect. In the recollection of the good and the evil he had experienced, and in view of the numerous facts recorded in his book, he exclaims, "How few hard-hearted and insensible beings are to be met with in my Narrative! My misfortunes have confirmed me in the opinion that man may put confidence in his fellow-man."

Almost all the travellers into the interior of Africa, Vaillant, Park, Sparman, Clapperton, Denham, the Landers, and others, although they travelled among tribes in the highest degree ignorant and degraded, constantly speak of the kindness they experienced.—On a certain occasion, Park, for reasons connected with the circumstance of his being an entire stranger in the country, was obliged to remain all day without food. About sunset, as he was turning his horse loose to graze, and had before him the prospect of spending the night in solitude and hunger, a woman happened to pass near him as she was returning from her employment in the fields. Astonished at seeing a white man, she stopped to gaze upon him; and, noticing his looks of dejection and sorrow, kindly inquired from what cause they proceeded. When Park had explained his destitute situation, the woman immediately took up his saddle and bridle, and desired him to follow her to her home. There, after having lighted a lamp, she presented him with some broiled fish, spread a mat for him to lie upon, and gave him permission to remain in her humble dwelling till the morning. Park informs us that, during the chief part of the night, the woman and her female companions were occupied with spinning, and that they beguiled their labour with a variety of songs, one of which had reference to his own situation. The air was sweet and plaintive, and the words were literally as follows: "The winds roared and the rains fell. The poor white man, faint and weary, came and sat under our tree. He has no mother to bring him milk, no wife to grind him corn. Let us pity the white man; no mother has he to bring him milk, no wife to grind him corn."

This agrees with the testimony of the traveller Ledyard, who expressly says: "I have always remarked that women, in all countries, are civil and obliging, tender and humane.—To a woman, whether civilized or savage, I never addressed myself in the language of decency and friendship without receiving a decent and friendly answer." In man, undoubtedly, there is more hardihood of character, and the benevolent affections are less lively. There are some things in his situation, also, as the defence of the community rests chiefly upon him, which are calculated to draw out and to impart inordinate strength to the resentful feelings. But it is absurd to suppose that there is a radical difference in the benevolent sensibilities of man and woman; and while sentiments of the most friendly and affectionate regard towards the human race are acknowledged to exist in woman's heart, that man is naturally either indifferent or hostile to his fellow-man. The language in both cases, from man as well as from woman, and from black as well as from white, when nature, unperverted by adverse influences, is left to itself, is the same. "The poor white man, faint and weary, came and sat under our tree. Let us pity the white man."

§ 178. Proofs of a humane or philanthropic principle from the existence of benevolent institutions.

It will be noticed, we do not assert that the principle of love to our fellow-men, considered simply as members of the human race, is as strong in the human mind as it should be. All we propose to assert and maintain is, that it actually has an existence there to some extent. And, among other proofs, we might, in the third place, properly refer to those numerous benevolent institutions, such as hospitals, infirmaries, asylums, houses of refuge, charity schools, and charitable societies of every description, which exist in all parts of the world. It is true that institutions of this kind flourish most, and it is a circumstance exceedingly honourable to the tendencies of the Christian

religion, in Christian countries. But the fact undoubtedly is, that, on suitable inquiry, we may find evidences, in a diminished degree, of benevolent efforts and traces of benevolent institutions, such as have been now referred to, in lands not thus highly favoured. Denham, for instance, after remarking that hospitality was ever habitual to the Arabs, a class of people with whom we are accustomed to associate everything which is most remote from kindness, goes on to remark: "Nor does this feeling of liberality extend to the chiefs alone, or to Arabs of high birth. I have known the poor and wandering Bedouin to practise a degree of charity and hospitality far beyond his means, from a sense of duty alone."* De Lamartine, a distinguished French traveller well known to the literary world, speaks of the Arabs much in the same manner. Among other things, he has translated and published the interesting narrative of another traveller among those wandering tribes, who remarks: "We were universally well received. In one tribe it was a poor widow who showed us hospitality. In order to regale us, she killed her last sheep, and borrowed bread. She informed us that her husband and three sons had been killed in the war against the Wahabees, a formidable tribe in the neighbourhood of Mecca. When we expressed our astonishment that she should rob herself on our account, her reply was, 'He that entereth the house of the living and does not eat, is as though he were visiting the dead.'"†

We repeat, we do not mean to assert that the benevolence of those nations who are not enlightened by Christianity, and are not stimulated to benevolent exertion by considerations drawn from that source, is such as it should be. It is enough for our purpose to show that it is not, as an attribute of human nature, extinct; but has a real, although, compared with what it ought to be, a feeble existence. Nor is the benevolence of Heathen or Pagan nations limited, as some

* Denham's Travels, Introductory Chapter.

† De Lamartine's Pilgrimage to the Holy Land, vol. iii., p. 212.

may be led to suppose, to individual instances and solitary acts, such as have been referred to. There are traces among some unchristianized nations (however cruel, owing chiefly to their mistaken systems of religion, their conduct may appear in some things) of permanent institutions of benevolence. In the recently-published life of the missionary Swartz (chap. xi.), we find the following incidental remark, which throws light upon the state of things in India. Speaking of the territory of Tanjore, the writer says, "Its capital, bordering on the Delta of the Coleroon and the Cavery, is wealthy and splendid, adorned with a pagoda, which eclipses in magnificence all other structures in the south of India; and exceeding, in the number of its sacred buildings and *charitable institutions*, all the neighbouring provinces."

Among other facts, kindred with those which have now been alluded to, it is well known that, when any portion of the human race have been subjected, by fire, war, famine, the pestilence, or some convulsion of nature, to great affliction, an interest is felt and efforts are made in their behalf in other countries. As an illustration of what we mean, it will suffice to remark, that when, some years since, the Greek nation, and, still more recently, the inhabitants of the Cape De Verd Islands, were in a state of extreme want, although they were a remote people and scarcely known among us, a number of vessels, in both cases, were sent from this country to their assistance, loaded with provisions at the expense of private individuals. Many facts of this kind might be mentioned, which are obviously inconsistent with the idea that man is indifferent to the welfare of his fellow-man, much more that men are naturally hostile to each other.

§ 179. Other remarks in proof of the same doctrine.

In the fourth place, the principle of HUMANITY is requisite, in order to render human nature at all consistent with itself.—We have, for instance, implanted within us the desire of Esteem, which is universal in

its operation. But why should we be so constituted as naturally to desire the esteem of those, whom, at the same time, we naturally hate or are indifferent to? There is no question that Sociality, or the desire of society, is connatural to the human mind; but is it presumable that men are so created as earnestly to covet the society of others, when, at the same time, those whose company they seek are, by the constitution of nature, the objects of entire indifference or of decided aversion? We have within us, as we shall have occasion to notice hereafter, the distinct principle of Pity or Sympathy, which prompts us both to prevent suffering and to relieve it when it exists; a principle which no one supposes is designed by nature to be limited in its operation to the immediate circle of our relatives and friends, but which has men *as* such for its object, and the wide world for the field of its exercise. But on what grounds of wisdom or consistency is it possible that nature should prompt men to relieve or prevent the sufferings of others, whom she also imperatively requires us to regard with sentiments of hostility, or, at least, with unfeeling coldness? Furthermore, our conscience requires us to treat our fellow-men, in all ordinary cases, with kindness, and we experience an internal condemnation when we do not do it, which would, at least, not be the case if we were the subjects of a natural hostility to them.—It is on such grounds, we assert, that human nature, in order to be consistent with itself, requires a principle of good-will or love to man, considered simply as possessing a kindred origin and nature.

Add to these considerations the fact that the lower animals, as a general thing, evidently discover an affection for those of their own kind. In some cases there are antipathies existing among those of different tribes, but never, it is believed, as a characteristic of those of the same species. And why should a barrier, either by the mere negation of love or the presence of actual hostility, be raised between man and

man? A condition of things which, in a very important respect, places him below the brutes.

§ 180. Objection from the contests and wars among mankind.

We are aware that the frequent wars which have existed among mankind may be brought forward as an objection against these views. But, although wars may be considered as in some sense incidental to the operations of human nature in the present state of things, yet it does not follow, and is not true, that war is the natural state of man. The simple fact is, that mankind, owing to a concurrence of unpropitious circumstances, have been placed in a wrong and most unfortunate position in respect to each other, which they at length begin to perceive.

In the first place, nations have frequently been led into wars in consequence of a misapprehension of the actual state of things. They have been made to believe (we do not undertake to say under what influences or in what way) that they are bound to maintain what are called national interests at any expense whatever. In making an estimate of the hazard and injury of these interests, as preparatory to a state of war, they have frequently laboured under great mistakes. In other words, in placing an estimate on their own interests, they have not allowed enough for the peculiar situation, the passions, and the interests of others. Either from being too intensely occupied with their own concerns, or from wanting suitable means of information, or from hasty and inaccurate judgments on the facts that have come to their notice, they have supposed others to be prompted by a deeper hostility towards them than was actually the case. And they have too frequently acted upon this erroneous supposition. If they had been so situated as to understand each other better, the natural sentiments of kindness would have gained the ascendency, and they would not have committed the great error of placing the supposed claims of their country above the claims of mankind. This error they begin in some degree to perceive. But this is not all.

In the second place, nations have frequently been plunged into war, and have shed the blood of other nations, when the great mass of the people have never been consulted in respect to it, or if they have been consulted, their feelings have been disregarded. Owing to the prevalence of monarchical and despotic forms of government (a state of things which is undergoing a rapid modification), the destiny of nations has often been placed in the hands of individuals, who were too ignorant, prejudiced, or unjust to sustain a responsibility so immense. The result has frequently been, that the most trifling circumstances, operating upon minds of such a structure, have plunged nations into wars, when, at the same time, the great body of the people entertained towards each other entirely friendly sentiments. We will illustrate what we mean by a single instance out of hundreds, perhaps we may say, thousands of others. Frederic of Prussia (Frederic the *Great*, as he is commonly designated in history) entered into a war with Maria Theresa, the queen of Hungary and Bohemia. This king afterward wrote a history of the war. In the manuscript history, as it was originally written, he gave the following concise statement of the motives under the influence of which he engaged in it: "I had troops entirely prepared to act; this, the fulness of my treasury, and the vivacity of my character, were the reasons why I made war on Maria Theresa, queen of Hungary and Bohemia." In a few sentences afterward he added more explicitly some other motives, which are to be united with these: "Ambition, interest, and a desire to make the world speak of me, vanquished all, and war was determined on."* It certainly cannot be pretended that such a war as this is a proof that the Prussians, Bohemians, and Hungarians possess an implanted or connatural enmity to each other. The probability is, that they were as much taken by surprise, and as much astonished, as

* See the Memoir of Voltaire, appended to Condorcet's Life of Voltaire.

the whole civilized world were at its occurrence. A war, existing under such circumstances, may prove that the rulers are perverse and cruel, but does not necessarily prove this in respect to the people generally.—It will, of course, be seen, that things of this nature are to be taken into consideration, before we are at liberty to say, in opposition to the arguments which have been brought forward, that man is by nature, and instinctively, the enemy of his fellow-man.

§ 181. The objection, drawn from wars, further considered.

But there is a third view of this objection which remains to be taken. If we could arrive at the truth on the subject before us, it would undoubtedly be seen (and the distinction in respect to all inquiries into the active principles of human nature is frequently an important one) that, in times of national war, men fight together as *corporations* rather than as *individuals;* and while, in battle, they shoot at the man who happens to be opposite to them, they subdue the voice of pity and conscience by the mistaken and illusive consideration that the wound is aimed, not so much at the poor bleeding individual as at the state or nation. If they could thrust aside this idea, and separate the man from the political corporation to which he belongs, it is beyond doubt that they would reach forth the hand of kindness, bind up the wounds of their victim, and breathe their consolations into his dying bosom.

In consequence of early associations, and what are supposed to be conflicting national interests, it is not an uncommon thing for Englishmen to say that they hate the French nation, while the same persons will frequently admit that they have no hatred to individual Frenchmen, but, on the contrary, have a regard and love for those with whom they happen to be acquainted. We maintain, therefore, that a hatred against nations, under the existing facts and circumstances, is not necessarily a hatred against humanity. And men begin to understand this. They make a

broader distinction than they were wont to do formerly between the nation, or the government representing the nation, and the people; between the responsibilities of public policy and the responsibility that attaches to private individuals. And, accordingly, in times of war, if the action of armies in the vicinity of each other is suspended by a truce, nothing is more common than to see both officers and soldiers reciprocating acts of hospitality and friendship. Acting as men, and with the natural feelings of men, they sympathize in each other's personal sufferings, and endeavour to render each other happy. And yet, acting in their national capacity, and as members of their respective political corporations, they will be found, in a few days after, coolly putting each other to death. The fact is, that it is impossible for us either to love or hate *masses* of beings, considered in the mass. And hence war necessarily involves the pathematic and moral anomaly of destroying those who would be found, when separated from the mass and considered individually, to be entitled to our esteem and affection.

§ 182. Illustration of the statements of the foregoing section.

The doctrine of the foregoing section, that bodies or masses of men may fight with and destroy each other, while, at the same time, each party entertains towards the opposite party, *individually considered*, no other than humane or friendly sentiments, is not a mere assertion. Strange and paradoxical as it may appear, it is proved beyond doubt by history, particularly by that interesting and instructive portion of history which appears in the form of private Memoirs. A single extract, illustrative of this apparently contradictory view of human nature, and in confirmation of what has been said, will be introduced here. In the late bloody war, generally known as the Peninsular War, two detachments of the French and English armies were stationed near each other on the banks of the Tagus, the one at Almeyrim, the other at Santarem. The following statement of the feelings and

intercourse that existed between the two parties, when not engaged in battle, is given by a member of the English army in the interesting Work entitled Recollections of the Peninsula; and when we consider that it relates to men who, both before and afterward, were engaged to their utmost ability in destroying each other, it is to be regarded as one among a thousand other proofs that war is a horrible delusion, and is against nature.

"About the middle of February," says this writer, "as I was one day walking by the river side with three or four companions, we observed an unusual crowd on the opposite bank, and several French officers. They saluted us with a 'Bon jour, Messieurs,' and we soon fell into conversation. They were exceedingly courteous. They spoke in the highest terms of Romana, who had lately died, calling him 'Le seul général Espagnol digne de son grade.' They asked after Lord Wellington, saying he had done wonders with the Portuguese, and praising him greatly for his conduct of the campaign. They next inquired if our king was not dead; and on our replying that he was not, one of them spoke, but inaudibly; another, in a louder voice, repeated, 'Le général dit, que tout le monde aime votre Roi George, qu'il a été bon pére de famille, et bon pére de son peuple.' We were thus at once let into the rank of one of their party, and not a little delighted at the manner in which they had spoken of our excellent and unfortunate sovereign. A great deal of good-humour prevailed; we quizzed each other freely. They asked us how we liked bacallao and azete instead of English roast beef; and we, what they did at Santarem without the restaurateurs, cafés, and salles de spectacle of their dear Paris. They replied, laughing, that they had a theatre; and asked us to come over and witness the performance of that evening, which would be 'L'Entrée des François dans Lisbon.' A friend of mine most readily replied that he recommended to them 'La répetition d'une nouvelle piéce, La Fuite des Fran-

çois.' They burst into a long, loud, and general laugh: the joke was too good, too home. Their general, however, did not think it wise to remain longer; but he pulled his hat, and wishing us good-day with perfect good-humour, went up the hill, and the group immediately dispersed."

§ 183. Of patriotism, or love of country.

One of the most important modifications of that more general and extensive form of good-will or benevolence, which extends to all mankind, is PATRIOTISM, or love of country. It seems to be the intention of nature, when we consider the diversities of customs and languages that exist, and particularly that in many cases countries are distinctly separated from each other by large rivers, lakes, gulfs, mountains, and seas, that mankind, instead of being under one government, shall exist in separate and distinct communities or nations, each having its own institutions and civil polity. And such, at any rate, is the fact. We are not only members of mankind and citizens of the world (a relation which ought to be more distinctly and fully recognised than it ever has been), but are members, and, as such, have appropriate duties to fulfil, of our own particular community. And it is thus that a foundation is laid for that particular state of mind which we denominate Patriotism.

This affection we regard as secondary rather than original. It is that love which we exercise, and ought to exercise, towards the members of our species, considered as such, heightened by the consideration that those towards whom it is put forth are sprung from the same race, inhabit the same territory, are under the same constitutions of government, speak the same language, and have the same interests. So that the love of our race, as it is modified in the form of love of our country, while it is more restricted, becomes proportionally more intense. And, in point of fact, it is unquestionably one of the predominant and ruling principles which regulate the conduct of men.

Nevertheless, we are not to suppose that there is necessarily any conflict between these two principles. For, in doing good to our country, we are doing good to mankind; and to that particular portion of mankind, which Providence, by placing them more immediately within the scope of our observation and effort, seems to have assigned as the especial field of our beneficence. At the same time, it cannot be denied, that patriotism, in its irregular and unrestrained exercise, does sometimes, and but too frequently, interfere with Philanthropy, or the love of man. The passion of patriotism, as a general thing, has become disproportionate in degree, as compared with the love of the human race. The interests of our country, by being continually brooded over, are exaggerated to our perception, while those of mankind are too much lost sight of. There is too much ground for the feeling lamentation of Cowper:

> "Lands intersected by a narrow frith
> Abhor each other. Mountains interposed
> Make enemies of nations who had else,
> Like kindred drops, been mingled into one."

§ 184. Of the affection of friendship.

Another interesting modification of that feeling of good-will or love, which, as men, we naturally bear to our fellow-men, is denominated Friendship. It is a passion so distinctly marked that it well deserves a separate notice, although there are no good grounds for regarding it, considered as a distinct affection, as connatural. The love which we bear to our species is so diffused, that it cannot be said, as a general thing, to possess a high degree of strength. As it withdraws from the vast circumference of the human race, and contracts its exercise within the narrow circle of our country, it acquires increased energy. Retreating within the still more restricted limits which imbody those with whom we are most accustomed to associate, it assumes a new modification, being not only characterized by greater strength, but a source of

greater pleasure. And this, in distinction from Humanity or Philanthropy, which extends to all mankind, as well as in distinction from Patriotism, which merely spreads itself over the extent of our country, we call FRIENDSHIP.

This affection, like the other benevolent affections which have been mentioned, includes in itself an emotion of pleasure, combined with the desire of good to its object. It exists, or may be supposed to exist, in respect to those persons who are not only so situated as to be the subjects of our intimacy, but possess such qualities as to be deserving of our esteem. It is, perhaps, a common remark, in connexion with this particular view of the subject, that a similarity of character is requisite as a basis of this affection. This, to some extent, is true; but the remark is not to be received without some limitation. It is certainly the case, that friendship is consistent with diversities of intellect. Persons who differ much in the quickness and amplitude of intellectual action, may nevertheless entertain for each other a sincere friendship. But it must be admitted, it does not readily appear how such friendship can exist in the case of persons who differ essentially in moral character. The fact that one of the parties is virtuous, the other vicious; that one of them attaches his highest veneration and esteem to that rectitude which the other regards as of no value, can hardly fail to interpose between them, as far as the reciprocation of friendship is concerned, an insuperable barrier.

It seems to be the opinion of Mr. Stewart, although we may entertain feelings of decided regard and goodwill to a great number of persons, that Friendship, in the strict and appropriate sense of the term, is necessarily much more limited. It will be understood that we speak now of real Friendship; of an attachment firm and unwavering; and not of that mere aspect or semblance which so often bears the name. It is true, there are some persons who profess to have a wide circle of friends, and this is undoubtedly sometimes

the fact. But, in a majority of cases, we have reason to think, that those whose apparent friendships are very much multiplied, seek the company and cherish the acquaintance of others, not so much because they entertain feelings of true friendship towards them, as for the purpose of gratifying an inordinate and restless desire of society. It is certain that the desire of society, when not properly regulated, frequently operates in this way, and thus furnishes occasion for a semblance of friendship, which has for its support, instead of an emotion of genuine benevolence, nothing higher or better, if the desire of society be of that unregulated and inordinate kind which has been supposed, than a basis of selfishness.

§ 185. Of the affection of pity, or sympathy.

It is not unfrequently the case that we find around us objects of suffering; those who, from want, or disease, or some other cause, are justly entitled to the aid of their fellow-men. In order to meet this state of things, Providence has kindly implanted within us the principle of Pity, which prompts us, by an instinctive and powerful impulse, to render the aid which is so frequently needed. This benevolent affection differs from others in being based upon a painful instead of a pleasant emotion. The occasion of the exercise of the affection of Pity or Sympathy is some case of suffering. On contemplating the scene of suffering, it is the result, in all ordinary cases, that we experience a painful emotion, which is followed by a desire to relieve the suffering object.

This principle is practically a very important one. It is a sentiment of Bishop Butler, expressed in connexion with this very subject, that the misery of men is much more directly, and to a much greater extent, under the power of others than their happiness. The sources of happiness, both mental and bodily, are to a great extent in ourselves; and although they are susceptible of increase through the instrumentality of the kind offices of others, yet not ordinarily in a very

great degree. But it is in the power of any individual, who is thus evilly disposed, to plunge others, not one or two merely, but even whole neighbourhoods, into misery. The principle of Pity, which is called forth not only in the actual, but also in the anticipated prospect of suffering, aids, in connexion with other causes, in keeping under proper restraint any tendency to a wrong exercise of this important power. It not only exercises the important office of preventing suffering, by operating, as it were, in anticipation, but it visits, watches over, and relieves it when it has actually occurred. And in this last point of view particularly, as well as in the other, it commends itself to our notice and admiration, as a practical principle eminently suited to the condition and wants of man.

§ 186. Of the moral character of pity.

It is an opinion sometimes expressed, that an affection so amiable, and generally so useful as that of Pity, cannot be otherwise than virtuous. It is not wonderful, when we take into view the interesting character of the affection, that such an opinion should be entertained; but we cannot regard it as strictly correct. It is well understood, so much so as not to be considered a matter of doubt, that this affection operates in the first instance instinctively. And it is easy to see the intention of nature in instituting this form of its action. In a multitude of cases where we can relieve the sufferings of our fellow-men, our assistance would come too late if we acted on the hesitating and cautious suggestions of reason. An instinctive action, therefore, is necessary. And, so far as the action of the principle is of this kind, it must be obvious that it is neither virtuous nor vicious.

But there is another view of this subject. The principle of sympathy may be checked in its exercise when it is too intense, or increased when deficient, under the influences of a deliberate and voluntary effort. And, under these circumstances, its action may have a voluntary character, being right or wrong

according to the circumstances of the case. It is right when it is subordinated to the requisitions of an enlightened conscience, but otherwise is wrong. And it may be wrong by excess as well as by defect. If, for instance, we happened to see a person severely but justly punished under the authority of law, we might exercise pity in his behalf. But if, under the mere impulse of pity, we should be led to attempt his rescue, in violation of the rights and interests of society, such an exercise of it would be wrong. Again, we can hardly fail to pity the wretchedness of the emaciated beggar who asks for our assistance; but if we are well persuaded that the bestowment of alms will only tend to encourage those vicious habits which have led to this wretchedness, it may become a duty both to check our sympathy and to withhold our aid. —(See § 174–176.)

At the same time, we do not deny that we may very justly draw inferences in favour of the virtuousness of that man's character in whom this interesting passion is predominant. And we say this, because, although sympathy does not necessarily imply virtuousness, yet, in point of fact, it is seldom the case that they are at variance with each other. They generally run in the same track, acting harmoniously together.

§ 187. Of the affection of gratitude.

Another distinct modification of that general state of the mind which is denominated love, is the implanted or connatural affection of GRATITUDE. Although this, like the other benevolent affections, includes an emotion of pleasure or delight, combined with a desire of good or a benevolent feeling towards the object of it, it nevertheless has its characteristics, which clearly distinguish it from them. We never give the name of gratitude, for instance, to this combination of pleasant and benevolent feeling, except it arise in reference to some benefit or benefits conferred. Furthermore, GRATITUDE involves, as the basis or occasion of its origin, not only the mere fact of a good conferred, but of

a *designed* or *intentional* benefit. If the benefit which we have received can be traced to some private or selfish motive on the part of the person from whom it comes, we may be pleased, as we probably shall be, with the good that has accrued to us; but shall cease, from the moment of the discovery of his motive, to entertain any gratitude to the author of it. Gratitude, therefore, can never be excited within us, except in view of what is in fact, or is supposed to be, true, unadulterated benevolence.

Different individuals manifest considerable diversity in the exercise of grateful emotions. There are some persons who exhibit, in the reception of the favours conferred upon them, but slight visible marks of grateful regard; others are incapable of such a passive reception of benefits, and are strongly affected with their bestowal. This difference is probably owing, in part, to original diversities of constitution, and is partly to be ascribed to different views of the characters and duties of men, or to other adventitious circumstances.

The affection of gratitude, under whatever diversities of aspect it may show itself, at different times and in different persons, is undoubtedly to be regarded as, on the whole, one of the interesting and ennobling traits of human nature. It imparts a feature of loveliness, a mingled aspect of amiability and justice to the human character which it might not otherwise possess. It is also practically important, inasmuch as it affords an indirect, but still a decided encouragement to deeds of benevolence. And although there are some in whom the principle, if it exists at all, exists in too slight a degree, yet, in general, the man who has received what he knows to be a well-meant kindness will not withhold this tribute of nature. There are some interesting lines of Southey, which Bishop Heber, on the occasion of his leaving England for India, has quoted as descriptive of his own personal experience, that may be appropriately introduced in connexion with this subject:

"I've *heard* of hearts unkind—kind deeds
With scorn or hate returning.
Alas! the *gratitude* of man
Has oftener left me mourning."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE BENEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.—LOVE TO THE SUPREME BEING.

§ 188. Man created originally with the principle of love to God.

In order to preserve the other principles of human nature in the position which the great Author of that nature has assigned to them, and to render their action just in itself and harmonious in its relations, there remains the important principle of love to the Supreme Being. That man must have been created originally with such a principle of love, overruling and regulating all the subordinate principles, we think must be evident, in the first place, from the considerations furnished by Analogy.

In all the departments of the mind, so far as it has hitherto passed under our examination, we have seen evidences of contrivance and wisdom; everything has its place, adaptations, and uses; and nothing, so far as we can judge, is done imperfectly. If it were necessary in this inquiry to put out of view the Intellect, so wonderful in its adaptation and its resources, we should hardly fail to find, in the distinct departments of the Sensibilities, ample illustrations and proofs of this remark. The Instincts, which naturally arrest our attention first, have obviously their appropriate place and office; and, although they rank lowest in the enumeration of our active principles, are yet indispensable. If man were constituted physically as he is at present, and yet without the Appetites, the next higher class of the principles involving desire, there would obviously be a want of adaptation between his mental and physical arrangements. The Propensities, also, as we advance still upward, have each their sphere of action, their specific nature and uses; and are adapt-

ed with wonderful skill to the necessities of man, and to the relations he sustains. The same remark, and perhaps in a still higher sense, will apply to the Affections.—As a father, man has a natural affection for his children, that he may thus be supported in the discharge of the arduous duties he owes to them; as a child, he has naturally an affection for his parents; and as man simply, he is evidently constituted with a degree of love for his fellow-man.

When we consider the relations which men sustain to the Author of their existence, still more important than those which are the basis of the principles which have just been mentioned, are we not justified in saying, on the ground of Analogy, that there must have been originally in the human constitution a principle of love to the Supreme Being? If there was not originally in the mental constitution such a principle as love to God, was not the structure of the mind in that respect obviously at variance with what the Analogy of its nature in other respects requires? If, from the urgent necessities of our situation, there must be strong ties of love binding together parents, and children, and brothers; if these ties must reach and bind, with some degree of strictness, all the members of the human family, on what principle can the doctrine be sustained, that man was originally created without an implanted love to that Being who is infinitely more and better to him than any earthly brother or father?

§ 189. That man was originally created with a principle of love to God, further shown from the Scriptures.

In the second place, we have great reason to believe, from the testimony of the Scriptures, that man was, in the first instance, created with the distinct and operative principle of love to his Creator. At the creation, it is worthy of notice, that everything which came from the hands of the great Architect was pronounced to be GOOD; and if the Bible had not made that grand utterance, the light of nature would not have failed to do so. But if man, raised from nothingness into ex-

istence, furnished with high powers of thought and action, and supported by the daily gifts of the Divine bounty, was created without a principle of love to his Maker (analogous to the other implanted affections, only that it existed in an exceedingly higher degree, corresponding to the greatness of the object), we cannot deny that we are utterly unable to perceive in such a result the basis of so marked a commendation, as far as the parents of the human race were concerned. It would seem, on the contrary, that such a work, framed with such a disregard of the most important relations, could not be pronounced good, even in the estimate of human reason, much less in that of a reason infinitely comprehensive and divine.

And as another, a third consideration, bearing upon this subject, it is to be remembered, that man is expressly said to have been created in the image of his Maker. That is to say, in the great outlines of his mental constitution he was, in the first instance, a copy (on a very limited scale, it is true, but still a copy, in fact) of the Divine Mind. And the light of nature, if it do not affirm this so clearly as it affirms the truth of the essential or relative goodness of all God's works, nevertheless looks strongly in that direction. In taking the position that man is made in the image of God, we are at liberty to argue from the nature of God to the nature of man. Now we cannot do otherwise than suppose that God, both in his administration of justice and benevolence, in all that He does and in all that He ought to do, is regulated by a wise and full consideration of the relations of things. He always loves, from the very perfection of his nature, what is worthy to be loved; and if he created man in his own image (that is to say, with affections and moral sentiments corresponding to the nature and relations of things), He must have created him with a disposition to love himself. We are not at liberty to suppose that he could by possibility create a being who should either hate or be indifferent towards another being, whom he knew not only to be infinitely

wise and good, but to sustain the relation of a Creator, preserver, and benefactor. A being thus created, so utterly wanting in those affections, which are required by the immutable relations of things, could hardly be said, with any degree of truth, to be created in the image of God. We infer, therefore, from the statement of man's being created in the Divine image, that he was created with a principle of love to his Maker. And the same reason leads us to believe that the principle was paramount to every other; corresponding, as far as the limited powers of man would permit, to the infinitely exalted nature of its object.

§ 190. Further proofs that man was thus created.

Again: many of those passages of Scripture, which are addressed to man in his present imperfect and evil state, appear to contemplate the restoration of this great principle. When the Saviour, on a certain occasion, was asked, in respect to the commandments, which of them was to be regarded as having the first or leading place, his answer was, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment."—Matt. xxii., 37, 38. This language implies, to say the least, the possibility of the existence of this principle; and particularly, that in a sinless or perfect state of the human race it is indispensable. And, as harmonizing with this argument from the teachings of Christ, we may further refer to the anticipated developement and renovation of our nature, which is so frequently spoken of in the New Testament under the name of a New Creation or New Birth, and which is so great and fundamental that it is represented as being brought about by Divine assistance. To be what he is required to be, man, in the process of the new birth, must again be essentially what he was in his first and original state of rectitude; and in order to be in this situation, the great requisite is, to "love God with all the heart."

We feel authorized, therefore, not without a due

sense of the difficulties of the subject, in taking the position that originally supreme love to God was an essential element of human nature, and that at the present moment it is, or ought to be, in every human bosom, a distinct and operative principle. It is the idealism of the perfect man, and nothing short of its practical realization will constitute the true greatness and glory of man. And while its presence makes man what he was designed to be, its absence, or, if it be preferred, even its entire prostration, furnishes an easy and philosophical explanation of those evils which, in the present state of things, so frequently press themselves on our notice.

§ 191. On the twofold action of the principle of divine love.

And now we proceed to say further, that the principle of supreme love to God, harmonizing in this respect with other implanted principles, possessed originally, and can never fail to possess, whenever and wherever it exists, a twofold action, instinctive and voluntary. Of the instinctive action of the principle under consideration, we have evidence in the remarkable fact that all nations and tribes of men, under all variety of circumstances, are found groping after God. In the most degraded conditions of humanity they seek Him with an unutterable cry of anguish; they prostrate themselves before stocks and stones and seek Him there; they go up to the mountains and down to the valleys, if haply they may find Him; everywhere they build their altars, and every where raise the great cry, Oh God, where shall we find Thee? Such facts can hardly fail to show the structure of the mind in this important respect.

But the principle of divine love has also a voluntary action. And no exercise of such love can meet the demands of reason and sound philosophy, saying nothing of what the Scriptures require, which does not carry with it the concurrence and the authority of the will. The early history of the human race seems to have turned, in a great degree, upon the ex-

ercise of this great principle in its volitional form. The early intimations and beliefs found in the primitive records and traditions of those nations that are not instructed from biblical sources, harmonize essentially with the Bible, that there was once a better time and a better land, a chosen Paradise, a garden of delights, a golden age. It was then that the instinctive and volitional tendencies of the mind harmonized with each other in their action, and that God and the angels of God may be said to have dwelt with men. But God, who is truth as well as love, in giving man the mighty and crowning power of the will, which, in thus constituting the completion of his being, made him a true son of God, gave him a power which He could not violate. It is a great truth, which we propose more fully to consider at a future time, that God does not, and cannot, interfere with the action of the human will in any sense which implies a violation of its freedom. Knowing, however, that man's happiness and glory would be brought into danger by a wrong volitional position, He tested his willingness to harmonize his will with the divine will, and thus secure its perfect action, by laying his command upon him, as He had a right to do, and as it was an act of benevolence to do. Human history, which proclaims everywhere the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience, is the record of the result.

We do not propose, however, to delay upon these thoughts. Without rejecting or adopting the traditionary or the poetical statements of a golden age, and without interpreting historical records, which in the opinion of theologians may either be regarded as exact and veritable histories, or as allegories which are designed to instruct us in great interior truths, is it too much to say, in a sense which commends itself to a sound religious philosophy, that man is still born in the garden of Paradisal beauty, the garden of a mother's love? Is it too much to believe that he is born also with religious instincts, such as have been

spoken of, which in their tendencies lead him in the direction of the Infinite, but at the same time with a true and effective freedom of the will, which, by possibility at least, in the exercise of the great power that is given it, may lead him in a different direction? And is it possible to doubt that the command of God, uttered alike by the voice of nature and the voice of the great Master and Teacher, a command in its truth and essence as old as the beginnings of the universe, and as wide and deep as its vast and everlasting foundations, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself*, is still uttered in his hearing, and is still binding upon the responsive action of his heart?

§ 192. Relation of the principle of supreme love of God to the other principles of the pathematic sensibilities.

In giving an account, in their succession and place, of the principles of action which go to constitute the department of the Natural sensibilities, we feel at liberty, from what has been remarked, to place at their head, both as most important in its results and as highest in rank, the principle of supreme love to God. The wisdom which we claim for the structure of human nature cannot be asserted with confidence to exist, except on the supposition that this great pillar of its support originally belonged to it, and may yet, by possibility, belong to it. And now, supposing this principle to exist in the human mind, either by being originally implanted, as in Adam, or by being restored under the name of a Regeneration or New Creation, or in any way and by any true spiritual process which enlightened wisdom may suggest, we naturally proceed to inquire what relation it holds to the other principles in this department of the mind, and what results are likely to attend upon it. In point of mere rank (that is to say, in the position which it occupies and ought to occupy in our estimation), we cannot hesitate to say that it stands first; not only before the Appetites and Propensities, but before all the other

Affections, the class with which it is itself properly arranged; taking the precedence, by an incalculable remove, not only of the love of country and the love of friends, but of the love of parents and children. "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me."—Matt. x., 37. The beneficial results connected with the exercise of this principle are such as might be expected from the pre-eminent rank it sustains. When it is in its full exercise, rendered to its appropriate object, in the language of Scripture, with all the heart, and mind, and soul, it may be regarded as a matter of course, that all the subordinate principles will be kept in their place. The appetites, the propensities, and the domestic affections still exist; but such is the ascendency of love to the Supreme Being, that every inordinate tendency is rebuked, and they all revolve in the circle which God in the beginning assigned to them.

§ 193. Illustration of the results of the principle of love to God from the character and life of the Saviour.

We have an impressive illustration of these favourable results in the character and life of Jesus Christ, who, we are informed in the Scriptures, is set before us as an example for our imitation. The Saviour, it will be recollected, appeared on earth not only in the fashion of a man, but was constituted also with those various attributes which pertain to man as a human being. He was hungry and thirsty, he ate and drank, he toiled and was susceptible of fatigue, he showed indignation, he loved, and rejoiced, and wept as other men. Not only this, we are expressly assured that he was tempted in all points as we are, *and yet without sin;* and this is just what might be expected when we take into view his feelings towards God. In him the principle of love to God the Father was a supreme principle. It sustained an unshaken dominion. And, under its pervading and paramount influence, the appetites asked for no inordinate indulgence; the pro-

pensities fulfilled the intentions of nature without degenerating into unseemly and sinful perversions, and all the departments of the mind maintained a harmony with each other.

And this will be the result in all other similar instances. The Saviour is set before us as an example, not merely in bodily and outward action, but still more in the propensions and affections of the heart. All that has been said of him, considered simply as a son of man, may, by possibility, be true of all men in every situation of life. Under the blaze of a burning love to God, the appetites of men, so far as they are inordinate and sinful, will necessarily wither and die. We do not mean to say that the appetites and propensities, or any other of the natural or pathematic principles, will actually cease to exist; but the mind will be so occupied with the higher and paramount principle, so long as it operates with a power proportioned to its object, that they will attract to themselves only the interest and influence to which they are entitled, and, although they will have their place and action, it will be impossible for them to become excessive.

§ 194. The absence of this principle attended with an excessive and sinful action of other principles.

Now take for a moment the opposite view, and let us see if we may not account for what has sometimes been called the Depravity of human nature, without the necessity of supposing the implantation of principles which, in themselves necessarily and under all circumstances, are evil. If the principle of Supreme love to God be removed from the place which both Scripture and reason agree in assigning to it in the original and in the renovated constitution of the mind, one of the most important checks on the undue exercise of the subordinate principles is, of course, taken away. The love which is drawn from the great Source of all good will naturally centre in ourselves, and the principles which have relation to our present enjoy-

ment and interest will become predominant. Hence we see the disorders which all impartial inquirers, even heathen philosophers,* acknowledge to exist in the human race; and which it is the aim of enlightened reason and philosophy, and particularly of religion, in its instructions and its special influences, to rectify. The Appetites, which before had their appropriate place and offices, have now broken over their allotted limits, and are, on every hand, leading their victims into the various forms of excess and debauchery. The Propensities, many of which connect us closely with our fellow-beings, and, in their proper exercise, impart no small degree of strength and enjoyment to human character, have become inordinately intense in their action. Conscience, it is true, continues to repeat its remonstrances; and the Will, under the suggestions of Conscience, makes more or less of resistance; but, as they are not sustained by the love of the Supreme Being, which could not fail, if it existed, to operate in their favour, the contest becomes unequal, and the efforts which they make are found to be unavailing. In this state of things, men who, under other circumstances, would have leaned, and loved to lean, on the great arm of the Almighty for support, now find their chief enjoyment in the pursuit of wealth and power, and in the unrestricted intercourse and the uncertain enjoyments of the world. —It is in such a condition of things as this that we find the true source of the follies and crimes which afflict the human race. The dethronement of God in the heart necessarily involves the predominance of

* Cicero repeatedly asserts the fact of human depravity, not only in decided language, but in terms which, in their import, nearly coincide with the views which appear to be communicated in the Holy Scriptures. "*Simul atque editi in lucem et suscepti sumus, in omni continuo pravitate, et in summa opinionum perversitate, versamur; ut pœne cum lacte nutricis errorem suxisse videamur.*"—"*Sed cum tot signis eadem natura declarat quid velit, anquirat, ac desideret; obsurdescimus tamen nescio quomodo; nec ea, quæ ab ea monemur, audimus.*" (*Questiones Tusculanæ*, iii., 1. *De Amicitia*, c. 24.) There are a number of passages in Seneca, particularly in the Treatises *De Ira* and *De Clementia*, of a similar import.

principles which, however innocent and useful in their just exercise, become in their excess evil, "and only evil continually." In the striking language of Ovid (Metam., vii., Fab. 1),

> "Si possem, sanior essem.
> Sed trahit invitum nova vis; aliudque cupido,
> Mens aliud suadet. Video meliora proboque,
> Deteriora sequor."

§ 195. Further illustrations of the results of the absence of this principle.

The topic of the last section is one of no small importance. The section, it will be noticed, consists chiefly of a statement of facts, without any attempt at explanations. As some persons may not at first readily perceive how it happens that the suspension or obliteration of the principle of love to God is necessarily or naturally attended with the evil results there ascribed to it, we will delay upon the subject a little longer. It is sometimes the case that a mere additional illustration, placing the subject in a new light, will have the effect upon the mind of the inquirer of an argument or proof. If the suspension or obliteration of any other principle will be followed by results analogous to those which have been described as accessory to the extinction of love to God, we shall clearly have in this circumstance an evidence that the results in the last case have been correctly indicated. And, on the other hand, if the extinction or utter inaction of subordinate principles be not attended with irregularity and perversion in other parts of the mind, it will furnish a strong presumption that the extinction or utter inaction of the higher principle will, in its collateral results, be equally harmless. By the aid of these statements we may easily bring the subject, in a considerable degree, to the test of common observation. And what is the fact?

We will make the supposition that, in the case of some individual, the domestic affections have, for some reason, become permanently extinct, either in their nature or in their action. Such instances, though not

by any means frequently, may yet sometimes be found. The person in whom this obliteration or utter inaction of the domestic affections takes place, has no attachment for his children or any of his family, such as he used to have. It is a matter of common observation and remark, that a person in such a situation will be much more likely than another to fall under the dominion of the lower appetites; to addict himself, for instance, to licentious practices, or to become a drunkard. While the domestic affections existed, while he looked with deep interest on his parents, his children, and his wife, he was furnished with powerful auxiliary motives to restrain his appetites. He saw distinctly, if he indulged them, they would not only interfere with his duties to his family, but would plunge them into deep disgrace and sorrow. So great influence had this view of his situation upon his mind, that he was enabled to sustain himself in opposition to the approaches of the evil habits which threatened him. But, as soon as the domestic affections became extinct, as soon as the love of kindred was blasted in his bosom, he fell before them.

Again: if we suppose, in addition to the extinction of the domestic affections, the further obliteration of love to his country and of love to the human race (and, still more, if we add the extinction of the principles of pity and gratitude), the probability of his falling under the dominion of the bodily appetites, and of degrading himself to the condition of a brute, will be obviously increased by this state of things. With the removal of these leading principles of human action, there is, of course, a removal of an important class of motives, which had a favourable tendency. And if it were possible for him to stand against the solicitations of the appetites before, he will be likely to fall now. The Will, whose office it is, under the direction of the Conscience, to regulate and restrain the appetites, received important assistance from the sources which have been alluded to; but with the removal of that assistance, its power is proportionally

diminished, and all hope is gone. The cravings of nature must have food of some kind; and if it fails to be furnished with the ennobling aliment which is generated in the love of our families, our country, and mankind, it will inevitably fatten itself on the mire of a debasing sensuality.—This is the common-sense view of the subject; one which will be likely to commend itself to the sober judgment and acceptance of all.

It is clear that these illustrations will apply in their full strength to the principle of love to God. Just so long as this principle is predominant, it is impossible, as has been before stated, for the inferior principles to become excessive and morally evil in their action. We feel, under the influence of this exalting affection, that we cannot so much dishonour our Maker; we cannot estimate so lightly those claims of gratitude which He has upon us; we cannot so basely contemn our infinite obligations to his wisdom and benevolence, as to indulge for a moment any exercise of the passions which he has forbidden. They stand rebuked and withering in the presence of the object that has the dominion in our hearts. But only obliterate the principle of Love to God, and at once a thousand motives, which enabled us to keep them in their proper place, are lost in the extinction of the principle on which they rested; and other principles, infinitely below it, at once gain the ascendency.*

* "It is easy," says President Edwards, "to give an account how total corruption of heart should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though that was but one act of sin, *without God's putting* any evil into his heart, or *implanting* any bad principle, or *infusing* any corrupt taint, and so becoming the *author* of depravity. Only God's *withdrawing*, as it was highly proper and necessary that he should, from rebel man, being, as it were, driven away by his abominable wickedness, and men's *natural* principles being *left to themselves*, this is sufficient to account for his becoming entirely corrupt, and bent on sinning against God."—Edwards's Doctrine of Original Sin, part iv., chap. ii.

CHAPTER IX.

HABITS OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 196. General remarks on the nature of habit.

We propose to bring the subject of this department of the Sensibilities to a conclusion by some slight references to the results of the law of Habit, considered in connexion with this portion of our nature. As we have already had occasion to make some remarks upon the general nature of Habit, and have seen in repeated instances its bearing upon mental action, it will not be necessary to spend much time upon that subject here. The term Habit, when analyzed to its cause, implies the existence of a power; but when considered as a result and in its application to the various mental powers, expresses the simple fact, *That the mental action acquires facility and strength by repetition or practice.* The following remarks, made on a former occasion (vol. i., § 98), may properly enough be repeated in this place.

"The fact that the facility and the increase of strength implied in HABIT is owing to mere repetition, or what is more frequently termed practice, we learn, as we do other facts and principles in relation to the mind, from the observation of men around us, and from our own personal experience. And as it has hitherto been found impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or principle more elementary, it may justly be regarded as something ultimate and essential in our nature.

"The term Habit, by the use of language, indicates the facility and strength acquired in the way which has been mentioned, including both the result and the manner of it. As the law of habit has reference to the whole mind of man, the application of the term which expresses it is, of course, very extensive. We

apply it to the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of the accountant, to the coup d'œil or eye-glance of the military engineer, to the tact and fluency of the extemporaneous speaker, and in other like instances.—We apply it, also, in cases where the mere exercise of emotion and desire is concerned; to the avaricious man's love of wealth, the ambitious man's passion for distinction, the wakeful suspicions of the jealous, and the confirmed and substantial benevolence of the philanthropist."

§ 197. Of habits in connexion with the appetites.

In considering the results of Habit in connexion with that portion of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities which involves desire, viz., the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections, we shall adhere to the arrangement which has hitherto been followed with the exception of the Instincts, to which the law of Habit does not apply.—We proceed to remark, therefore, that there may be appetitive habits; in other words, that the Appetites, the class of sentimentive principles next in order to the Instincts, acquire strength from repeated indulgence. The appetites, in their first or original operation, act instinctively; but it is incidental to their nature, as it is to all the modifications of Desire, that their gratification is attended with more or less of pleasure. In connexion with this experience of pleasure, we frequently stimulate them to action a second time, under circumstances when there would be but little, and perhaps no occasion for a purely instinctive exercise. But the desire, as it is thus, by a voluntary effort, or, at least, by a voluntary permission, indulged again and again, rapidly becomes more and more intense, till at last it is found to acquire a complete ascendency. That such is the process appears to be proved by what, unfortunately, we have so frequent occasion to notice in those who are in the practice of taking intoxicating drinks. If they had indulged their appetite only a few times, they would undoubtedly have retained

their mastery over it. But, as this indulgence has been repeated often, and continued for a considerable length of time, the appetite, growing stronger with each repetition, has gradually acquired the predominance, till it has brought the whole man, as it were, into captivity.—(See § 100, vol. i., § 108, vol. ii.)

§ 198. Of habits in connexion with the propensities.

The Propensities, as well as the Appetites, are subject to the influence of this law; in other words, there may be propensive as well as appetitive habits. The principle of Sociality, for instance, has an instinctive action; but there is no question that we have the power, as it is undoubtedly our duty, to subject it to suitable regulation. But if, instead of doing this, we indulge it continually for the mere sake of the pleasure we experience, without regard to the other claims existing upon us, we shall find it rapidly acquiring undue strength, and every day will render it more difficult to regulate it properly. And, in point of fact, it is sometimes the case, that we find persons who, in consequence of an unrestricted indulgence of a principle otherwise naturally good, have brought themselves into such a situation, that retirement, which every reasonable man ought sometimes to desire, is always exceedingly irksome to them.

Perhaps not one of the Propensities can be named which may not be greatly strengthened in the same way. It is well known in what countless instances the desire of Possession, growing stronger by continued repetition, becomes an ascendant and controlling principle. We are not to suppose that the intense love which the miser has for his possessions existed in him naturally and originally. We do, indeed, admit that the seed or element of it, the basis on which it rests, existed in him naturally, as it exists in all men. But how does it happen that it shows itself in this exaggerated and intense form? This is the work of the man himself, and for which the man himself is accountable, rather than the original tendencies of his

nature. From morning till night, from day to day, and from year to year, the Possessory principle has been voluntarily kept in intense exercise. And the natural and necessary result has been, that it has become the ruling sentiment of the heart.

So of the desire of Power. In itself considered, power may properly be regarded as one of the various forms of natural good. And, accordingly, we are at liberty to take the ground, as was formerly seen in the remarks on that subject, that the desire of power, if duly subordinated, is not reprehensible. But in a multitude of instances, this desire is far from showing itself in the aspect of a subordinate principle. And the reason is, that it has acquired inordinate strength by repetition; a habit of mind has been formed, which has resulted in its becoming predominant. The individual in whom it exists in this intense form is not satisfied with anything short of the prostration of every other person at his own feet. It would hardly be going too far to say that he looks upon the Supreme Being, when he contemplates his greatness and elevation, in the light of a rival and an enemy.

§ 199. Of habits in connexion with the affections.

Remarks similar to what have been made in respect to the lower active or motive principles, will apply in like manner to the higher class of the Affections. We sometimes see, for instance, decided indications of the result of Habit in the progress of the Malevolent Affections. A man entertains a degree of dislike to his neighbour; it appears, perhaps, at first, in the form of a mere unpleasant suspicion; these suspicious and unpleasant feelings are frequently indulged; we see them gradually growing deeper and deeper; assuming, under the influence of Habit, a more fixed and determinate form, and ultimately appearing in the shape of malignant and permanent hatred.

The law of Habit applies in the same manner to the Benevolent affections. The Parental affection is strong and decided in the very beginning of its exist-

ence. But the dependent situation of the beloved object on which it fastens keeps it almost constantly in exercise. And thus, unless there are some improprieties in the conduct of the child, which check and diminish the results naturally following under such circumstances, it rapidly acquires immense strength. And hence it may be explained in part, that when a son or daughter, in the maturity of youth or on the verge of womanhood, is taken away by death, the grief of the parent, always great at such times, is more intense and excessive than when death takes place in infancy. The death of the child at the later period of life not only blasts a greater number of hopes, but as love, by a long-repeated, cumulative process, has been added and incorporated with love, it carries away, if one may be allowed the expression, a greater portion of the heart.

We are informed in Scripture, that when an infant child of David was taken away by death, the king was so far able to control his sorrow as to arise from his prostration on the earth, and wash and anoint himself, and change his apparel, and come into the house of the Lord and worship. But when Absalom died, who was but little worthy of his affection, his language was, "Oh, my son Absalom! my son, my son Absalom! Would God I had died for thee, oh, Absalom, my son, my son!"

We may unquestionably apply these views to all those affections which are properly characterized as Benevolent, to Friendship, Patriotism, Gratitude, and Sympathy. He who is so situated that he is required to think much on the interests and good of his country, and whose love of country is in this way kept constantly in exercise, will be found, other things being equal, to exhibit in the day of trial a more intense ardour of patriotism than others. He who, by his untiring attentions to the poor, the sick, and the prisoner, has kept his sympathetic affections in action for a long series of years, will find the principle of sympathy more thoroughly consubstantial in his nature

and more intensely operative than if it had lain dormant. And we may add, that this doctrine, in all its extent, is applicable to the highest of all the Benevolent affections, that of love to God. This ennobling principle, this pre-eminent trait, which allies us not only to just men made perfect, but to angels, is an improveable one. Under the influence of Habit, we find it, even in the present life, going on from one degree of brightness and strength to another. The more we think of God, the more frequently we connect him with all our ordinary transactions, the more will the broad orb of his glory expand itself to our conceptions, and call forth the homage and love of the heart.

§ 200. Of the origin of secondary active principles.

It is here, in connexion with the views of this Chapter, that we find an explanation of the origin of what are called SECONDARY principles of action. Some individuals, for instance, are seen to possess a decided passion for dress, furniture, and equipage. We are not to suppose that this passion is one which is originally implanted in the human mind, although it may be so permanent and so decided in its action as to have something of that appearance. The probability is, setting aside whatever may be truly interesting or beautiful in the objects, that they are chiefly sought after, not so much for what they are in themselves, as for some form of good, particularly some esteem and honour, to which they are supposed to be introductory and auxiliary. But the desire, existing, in the first instance, in reference to some supposed beneficial end, has been so long exercised, that we at last, in virtue of what may properly be called a Habit, so closely associate the means and the end, that it is exceedingly difficult to separate them. So that, after a time, we apparently have a real love or affection for the means itself (the dress, furniture, equipage, or whatever it is), independently, in a great degree, of the ultimate object, in connexion with which it first excited an interest in us.

There are some men, to illustrate the subject still further, who appear to have a strong love for money; we do not mean property in the more general sense of the term, but MONEY, the gold and the silver coin in itself considered, the mere naked issue of the mint. This is one of the various forms which the too common vice of Avarice sometimes assumes. But we cannot suppose that the love of money, in this sense of the term, is a passion connatural to the human mind, and that men are born with it. It is loved, in the first instance, simply as a means subordinate to some supposed beneficial end. The person has looked upon it for years as the means of enjoyment, influence, and honour; in this way he has formed a Habit of associating the means and the end; and they have become so closely connected in his thoughts, that, in ordinary cases, he finds himself unable to separate them.

Again: we are not to suppose that men are born with a natural desire for the company of mice and spiders, such as we have reason to think they naturally entertain for that of their fellow-men. But, in the entire exclusion of all human beings, we find the principle of sociality, deprived of its legitimate and customary sources of gratification, fastening itself upon these humble companions. A man, as in the case of Baron Trenck and Count Lauzun, may form an acquaintance with these animals, which, aided by the principle of Habit, will, after a time, exhibit a distinctness and intensity which are commonly characteristic only of the original passions.—In this way there may unquestionably be formed a series of SECONDARY appetites, propensities, and affections almost without number. And we have here opened to us a new and interesting view of human nature, capable of being so applied as to explain many things in the history and conduct of men, which, however, we are not at liberty in this connexion to explore more minutely.

§ 201. Objection to these views in respect to habit.

It is proper to mention here that an objection has been raised to these views; not to the doctrine of Habit in general, but to the alleged extent of it. While it is admitted that it exists, and produces its results in most cases, it is contended that our passive feelings, as they are sometimes called, are not strengthened in this way. Passive feelings, as the term is used in this objection, are those where we suffer or endure. This seems to have been the original meaning of the epithet, which is derived from the participle of the Latin PATIOR, to suffer. So that the objection, stated in more obvious phraseology, has reference in particular to painful or unpleasant feelings. The statement, which is made in respect to feelings of this description, is that, instead of growing stronger by repetition, they diminish in power.

The opinions involved in this objection are brought forward in the philosophical works of Bishop Butler. We learn from him, in express terms, that frequent exposure to danger lessens fear and begets intrepidity; and that a frequent acquaintance with scenes of distress lessens the passion of pity. "Let a man," he says, "set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life with which he must become acquainted."*

Some further illustrations will help to show what is meant, although the objection has always appeared in a somewhat perplexed and indefinite form.—Among other instances referred to in connexion with this subject, it is said of the physician, which perhaps was the very instance had in view by Bishop Butler in the remark just quoted, that at first he is affected as much as another man at the sight of suffering; but the repetition of such scenes, to which he is constant-

* Butler's Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion, pt. i., ch. v. The passage at the place here referred to in Butler is avowedly the basis of a number of remarks and illustrations in Mr. Stewart's Elements (vol. i., ch. vii., § 5), in which similar sentiments are maintained.

ly called, blunts and does away the painful feeling, instead of increasing its strength.—Again, it is said of the sailor, when exposed for the first time to a storm on the ocean, that he is filled with the painful emotion of fear; but the feeling grows weaker at every repetition of danger. The soldier, in particular, felt a degree of pity for his writhing and groaning comrades in his first fields of battle; he wept as well as others; but, after a few campaigns, the feelings of sympathy grew weaker and weaker, and he no longer had tears to shed.

It is not necessary to multiply instances; the difficulty will probably now be understood; the facts are in appearance precisely, or very nearly such as have been stated; nevertheless, they are susceptible of being satisfactorily accounted for, consistently with the great law which has been laid down.

§ 202. Explanation of the above-mentioned cases.

In explanation of the instances mentioned in the preceding section, we would remark, in the first place, that the law of Habit is not so strong as not to be overcome by others; it may be weakened, subdued, apparently annulled, when coming in contact with other strong principles; and that is the fact in these cases. When the sailor was first exposed to the storm, it was but natural that the idea of danger should be prominent in his mind, and that his fears should be strong. After the repetition of similar situations, he finds that the danger is less than he at first imagined; and not only this, he finds that, in order to escape the danger, whatever it is, he must discharge his duty; he must make every effort; he must put forth a cool judgment, which is inconsistent with the agitations of fear; he must call into exercise other feelings. Every strong and energetic principle of the soul, ambition, courage, and hope, are summoned forward, to counteract and destroy the action of the law in question, and the effort is successful. This is the explanation.

And so in the case of the physician. He finds it absolutely necessary that his sympathy or pity for the objects suffering before him should be overruled and subdued. It is more necessary for them than for himself. He must subdue pity in order to show pity; his mind must be perfectly calm and collected, which would be inconsistent with his dwelling much on the actual distress of the patient; he must be able to observe and collate the symptoms of the disease, and to prepare the remedy. His heart has not become truly and intrinsically harder than other men's; his judgment has gained an ascendency over his heart, and checked its emotions; he has made it hard for particular occasions and for sufficient reasons; but place him in other situations, where this necessity is not laid upon him; smite this seeming rock at other times, and the waters of sorrow will freely gush out.

§ 203. Further illustrations of the foregoing instances.

In the cases which have been mentioned, and others like them, the persons concerned have formed, in some sense, an opposite habit; they have called into exercise, repeated, and strengthened, emotions and desires of a different kind; they have banked up, as it were, their fears and their sympathies, lest they should overflow.

An explanation, similar to what has been already given, will apply universally, and, among other cases, to that of the soldier. How often did Napoleon look on the heaps of slain, on the lifeless piles of young men, the hope of their parents; of the men of middle age, the support of their families; of veterans and renowned officers, without discovering a single emotion! The lamentation of millions arose around him; but he heeded them not, felt not, wept not. But no one undertakes to assert that the heart of the French Emperor was naturally without kindly feeling. There is much reason to believe it was far otherwise; it was the supposed necessity of his situation, and his philosophy, which made it so. He had placed before him

his own chosen object, and he had long and laboriously taught himself to care for nothing else. His hardness of heart was a matter of calculation and discipline; and possibly we may find a proof of it in what some will consider a trifling incident.

It is said that he once rode along one of his fields of battle, and, amid the fearful desolation around him, happened to fix his eye on a dog that remained to watch and to mourn over his lifeless master's body; and he was affected, even agitated with emotion. And how did this happen? The explanation seems to be, that he had hardened his heart against sympathy with human beings, and had not counted on a contest with his sympathy for dogs. Here he was unprepared. He had left an opening, of which he was not aware, in the Chinese wall which he had built around his natural feelings of commiseration. He could meet the grief of mothers, and the lamentations of orphans, and the despair of widows, as the rock meets the dashing of the ocean, and remain unmoved; but with all this premeditated and immoveable induration of heart, the fact still remains, explainable only in the way which has been intimated, that his firmness was shaken and his spirit troubled by the humble sorrows of a mourning brute animal.

§ 204. The objection to the extent of the law of habit further considered.

In forming a conclusion on this subject, we are to consider, furthermore, the results which would follow on the adoption of those views which we have thus seen reason to object to. In the case of physicians, for instance, it would seem to follow universally, that they must, as they advance in life, become an unfeeling and hard-hearted race of men. But the facts, as we have already had occasion to intimate, are far from warranting us in making any such assertion. Men who are naturally of decidedly kind and sympathetic feelings, and who, under the impulse of such feelings, are in the habit of visiting the chambers of the sick and the dungeon of the prisoner, and in whom, of

course, painful feelings must almost constantly be in exercise, would be subject, on this doctrine, to a sure and rapid process of sentimentive induration. Howard himself, who spent his life amid scenes of suffering, must, on a strict and philosophical application of this system, have become, at last, one of the most hard-hearted of men. But this does not seem to have been the fact. On the contrary, his desire to relieve suffering appears to have grown stronger and stronger till the last moments of life.

There are a considerable number of men at the present day, who, with no small portion of Howard's spirit, have left their native country, and the endearments and charities of home, that they may relieve the physical sufferings, and enlighten the mental darkness of their fellow-men. The hearts of these men, according to their own accounts, are continually pained with the view of vices and sufferings that are constantly presented to their notice. No other emotion than a painful one can possibly arise in the view of these vices and sufferings, in themselves considered. But on the system, some of the results of which we are endeavouring to indicate, these painful emotions will necessarily, after a time, cease to exist. And as the affection of Pity or Sympathy, as we have already had occasion to see, is based upon painful emotions, it will also become extinct with the extinction of these emotions. The heart will become sealed up, and its fountains of sorrow for the ruin which is witnessed, and of pity for the subjects of it, will be effectually closed.—These are the results in theory; but we do not hesitate to say, that, as a general thing, they are far from being the results in fact. These devoted men, to whose philanthropic toils we have alluded, still labour on, month after month and year after year, without either any diminution of their grief at witnessing the wide-spread sin and misery around them, or any decrease of that benevolence which prompts them to labour for its removal. On the contrary, as their life wears away, they appear to experi-

ence stronger emotions, and to put forth still more strenuous efforts.

§ 205. The objection noticed in connexion with the malevolent affections.

A single remark more remains to be made. The exercise of the Malevolent affections is always painful. These affections are not only attended with pain, but, as was seen when they came under examination, they are in their nature based upon a painful emotion. And it is universally admitted that a resentful and malevolent state of mind is an exceedingly unhappy one. Now if we apply to this statement the doctrine which we are controverting, it will seem to follow, that the way to terminate and extinguish the Malevolent affections, inasmuch as they are painful, is to keep them in exercise. The more freely we let our disorderly tempers run on, the more prodigally we indulge in resentful and angry passions, the sooner will the atmosphere of the mind be cleared up, and, instead of clouds and darkness, shine forth in the aspect of purity and peace.—But the idea that such a result can be secured by such a process is equally inconsistent, so far as we are able to judge, with philosophy, the Scriptures, and fact.

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES OR CONSCIENCE.

MORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS SENTIMENTS.

CLASS FIRST.

EMOTIONS OF APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

CHAPTER I.

PROOFS OF A MORAL NATURE.

§ 206. Reference to the general division.

In entering upon the examination of the interesting and important department of the mental nature which now presents itself to our notice, it is proper to revert a moment to that general division of the mind which we have endeavoured throughout to adhere to as the basis of our inquiries. The general classification, it will be recollected, was into the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will. In passing from the purely intellectual region to that of the Sensibilities, we first find ourselves in the subordinate department of the Emotions. And leaving the emotions, we may advance onward, and come in contact with the still more interior and remote department of the Will, either by passing through the region of the Desires on the one hand, or through the space occupied, if we may be allowed to use such expressions in connexion with the mind, by the feelings of Moral Obligation on the other. In accordance with this plan, we made it our first object to examine some of the leading emotions which come under the head of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. And then, taking the direction of the Desires, endeavoured, in a variety of remarks on the Instincts, Appetites, Propensities, and Affections, to explain what may properly be included under that head.

Having completed, in such manner as we were able, that part of the subject, we propose to return again to the region of the Emotions, a part of which are included under the general head of the Moral Sensibilities, and to approach the Will in the opposite direction. But, in carrying this plan into effect, and in giving a philosophical account of the Moral, in dis-

tinction from the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, we shall attempt, in the first place, to consider the general question, whether, in point of fact, man possesses such Moral Sensibilities or not. After having satisfied ourselves as to the general fact of the existence of a conscientious or moral nature, we shall be prepared to enter with more satisfaction into the consideration of the subordinate elements and the characteristics of that nature.

§ 207. Proof of a moral nature from consciousness.

(I.) In proceeding, in the present chapter, to bring forward some considerations in proof that man has a moral nature, the first remark we have to offer is, that we have evidence of this in the intimations of our own Consciousness. In other words, we shall find evidence of the fact under consideration by consulting our own internal experience, and carefully noticing what takes place there.

If it be a fact that we have a moral nature, it may, of course, be expected to follow, that this nature will manifest itself on suitable occasions in the exercise of its appropriate acts. Accordingly, it is generally the case, that in those instances of actual right and wrong in which we ourselves are the agents, we possess unquestionable evidence of such inward manifestations. In other words, we find ourselves conscious or cognizant, according as we act right or wrong, of an internal sanctioning or condemnation, approval or disapproval. The results of our moral nature, when we are not in action ourselves, but are simply noticing the conduct of others, are the same; at some times we approve, at others condemn.

It merely remains to be added here, that the emotions we have at such times, and which we commonly designate as emotions of approval and disapproval, are SUI GENERIS; that is to say, they have a distinct and specific nature. It is true we are not able to define them, for the reason that they are elementary and simple. But it is certain, as they are manifested in

our Consciousness, we never find any difficulty in distinguishing them from other emotions, those of beauty or sublimity, for instance.

§ 208. Evidence of a moral nature discoverable in what we notice in children.

(II.) Again, we may unquestionably discover the evidences of a moral nature in the operations of the mind, as they develope themselves in early life. It can hardly have escaped the notice of any one, that if some affecting story of cruelty and crime on the one hand, or of benevolence and virtue on the other, be rehearsed in the presence of children, they will generally discover decided feelings, not only of mere joy or sorrow, but of approval or condemnation, corresponding to the facts in the case. Beattie, in his poem of the Minstrel, describes Edwin, the progress of whose thoughts and feelings it is his principal object to unfold, as being made acquainted at an early period with the affecting old Ballad called the Children in the Wood.

"Behold, with berries smear'd, with brambles torn,
The babes, now famish'd, lay them down to die;
Mid the wild howl of darksome woods forlorn,
Folded in one another's arms they lie,
Nor friend nor stranger hears their dying cry."

But when, in the conclusion of the Ballad, it appears that the awakened anger of Heaven, in the most terrible forms of want and death, overtook the uncle, who for private ends had been guilty of this horrible cruelty, the poet adds, with entire truth to nature,

"A stifled smile of stern, vindictive joy
Brighten'd one moment Edwin's starting tear."

But it is unnecessary to appeal, in support of what is a matter of every day's observation, to testimonies of this kind, however frequently they may be found, particularly in the earlier and simpler forms of literature. It is not easy to witness the sports of children, even for a few moments, without having evidence, loud and eloquent evidence, of their disposition to appeal to the right and wrong of actions. The oft-

en-repeated declaration that wrong play will never prosper, expresses the secretly-lurking conviction, not only that there is such a thing as justice, but that justice will be found capable, in some way or other, of vindicating its own rights.

While, however, we may properly appeal, in support of our general proposition, to those exhibitions of moral sentiments which we often notice in early life, we are aware that some exceptions are to be made, and some explanations to be offered, in order to present this view of the subject in a proper light.—We do not mean to say, nor is it true, that children will give a correct moral decision on all possible moral subjects. There are many subjects involving high moral principles, which, in whatever aspect they may appear to mature minds, will probably fail of eliciting from children and youth either approbation or disapprobation. And the simple reason is, because they have not capacity enough to understand them. It is one of the leading characteristics of the moral nature, as we shall have occasion to see more fully hereafter, that its operation depends upon the antecedent operation of the intellect; in other words, that it cannot act otherwise than in view of knowledge. When, therefore, we maintain that there are decided evidences of a moral nature in children, it is proper to add, that this is the case so far, and so far only, as they are capable of understanding the subjects brought before them. When the matter proposed to them is one level to their comprehension, if it involve anything of a moral nature, they seldom fail to show, and that, too, promptly and decisively, that they have a knowledge of it in that respect.

§ 209. Proofs of a moral nature from the manner of our intercourse with our fellow-men.

(III.) In the third place, the existence of conscience is taken for granted in our intercourse with our fellow-men. We make our agreements and bargains with them (we do not say always, but, at least, as a

general thing) as if they had a conscience; we converse with them, and consult with them, and rejoice with them, and weep with them, as if they had a conscience; and in our more formal addresses and exhortations, we always take the same thing for granted. How many customers would a tradesman have, how long would any person be admitted into good company, how many public and responsible duties would any citizen whatever be called to fulfil, if it were known or suspected that they had no conscience!

We shall feel more fully the force of the facts we have now in view, if we consider the mode of address which is usually employed when a person wishes to persuade men to pursue a certain course. He appeals at first, we will suppose, to their INTEREST; he tells them of the various advantages which would attend the course he proposes; but he reserves, as his last and most efficacious argument, an appeal to their sense of DUTY. If every other consideration is found to fail, the orator assures them of his perfect persuasion that they will not so disgrace themselves in the eyes of the whole world as to refuse obedience to the calls of conscience. He calls upon conscience to speak out on this important occasion, and he knows full well, if that voice of God and nature, implanted in the human bosom, can be made to utter itself, there will no longer be occasion for his own humble efforts.

§ 210. Proofs of a moral nature from the terms used in different languages.

(IV.) Another proof of the existence of a moral nature is to be found in the fact, that there are terms in all languages, probably we may say without a single exception, expressive of such a nature and its operations. If it be true that there is no such thing as a moral nature and no such thing as original moral sentiments in men, the fact is obviously unprecedented and unaccountable, that terms expressive of a moral power, and of moral distinctions and sentiments, are to be found so generally.

The ancients, it is well known, were accustomed to speak of the SENSUS RECTI ET HONESTI; by which there can be no question they intended to intimate what at the present time we commonly express by the term Conscience. They also, in particular, made a distinction between the HONESTUM or honourable, and the UTILE or beneficial, considered as principles of action; and it certainly would be easy to show that like distinctions are to be found in all modern tongues. In English, for instance, we not only constantly speak of a man's acting from interest and also acting from the sense of duty, but always regard these two modes of action as involving, in our apprehension, two distinct active or motive principles. We repeat, therefore, that, on the doctrine of the negation or absence of a moral nature, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is inexplicable. Without the existence of a moral nature as their basis, there would seem to be no import and no propriety in them. On the contrary, the use of such terms and the making of such distinctions is what would naturally be expected on the supposition that the foundation of moral emotions and of feelings of moral obligation is actually laid in the human constitution. We may, therefore, properly infer from them, among many other sources of proof, the existence of such a moral constitution.

§ 211. Proofs from the operation of the passions of anger and gratitude.

(V.) It may be remarked, in the fifth place, that the manner in which the passions of anger and gratitude are often found to operate, implies the existence of a power of moral perception.—The facts to which we refer are these: If we suffer what we suppose to be an injury, we are angry; and this, too, not merely with an instinctive, but a voluntary and deliberate anger. On the other hand, if we receive what we suppose to be a benefit (not merely a good, but a designed or *well-meant* good), we are grateful. Now we will suppose, that soon after we discover, on the one hand, that the injury was wholly accidental, and, on

the other, that our supposed benefactor was governed by selfish motives, seeking his own good instead of ours. We shall generally find, under these altered circumstances, that both our anger and our gratitude will immediately disappear.

But it does not appear why this marked and sudden change should take place, if we have not the power of making moral distinctions. The actual benefit on the one hand, and harm or suffering on the other, remain the same as they were at first. So far as the mere effects to ourselves are concerned, there is obviously no reason for a change in our feelings. The basis of the change which we experience is not a perception of any difference in the beneficial or hurtful results, but simply in the motives which led to them. It is the knowledge of the real nature of the motives which causes this sudden alteration. The moral sense (and, so far as we can judge, nothing short of or other than the moral sense) requires and exacts from us, as soon as their motives are discovered, that we shall place a new and far different estimation on the persons concerned.

§ 212. Proofs of a moral nature from feelings of remorse.

(VI.) Another proof of the existence of a moral nature (it will be recollected that we are considering the subject now in the most unrestricted point of view, and directing our attention simply to the general fact of a moral department) is to be found in the important circumstance that men are evidently constituted with a susceptibility of feelings of REMORSE.

It is unquestionably a matter of common consciousness, that the feelings of remorse are to some extent distinct and peculiar in their nature. Considered in reference to the classifications which have been made, they obviously belong, although no distinct notice was taken of them under that head, to the class of moral Emotions; being feelings of disapproval, but sharpened and intensified, and thus discriminated from other forms of disapproval by the circumstance that

the object of them is the person himself who exercises these emotions. They are unpleasant or painful feelings, and in this respect agree with many others; but the suffering which is involved in them is of a peculiar character, altogether different from the mere sadness or grief which we often experience on other occasions.

Now what we wish to remark here is, that the existence of these feelings always and necessarily involves, as the basis of their existence, the fact of a moral nature. When we meet with disappointment, when we become the subjects of injuries and misfortunes, which are not to be attributed in their origin to any misconduct of our own, we may experience feelings of sadness or grief, but never feelings of remorse. It is impossible that we should. Feelings of remorse always imply some responsibility and some action of our own. Nor is it every kind of action which is the occasion of their being called into existence. They imply a course of action which is morally reprehensible; that we have not merely been the occasion of harm, but have committed a wrong; that we stand arraigned, disapproved, and culpable in the decisions of our own conscience.

§ 213. Evidence of a moral nature from the ideas of merit and demerit, reward and punishment.

(VII.) Among other sources of proof on this subject, we may add the fact that we are capable, as will no doubt generally be admitted, of framing the abstract conceptions of moral merit and demerit. We had occasion, in explaining the origin of these ideas, to remark expressly (vol. i., § 193), that it would be impossible for us to frame them without possessing the antecedent notions of right and wrong. For what merit, it was inquired, can we possibly attach to him in whom we discover no rectitude; or what demerit in him in whom we discover no want of it! But the perception of right and wrong, of virtue and of the opposite of virtue, implies the existence of a moral nature.

Our ideas also of rewards and punishments are obviously based upon the fact of moral distinctions. We always make a distinction between punishment and mere suffering. The former, although in the mere amount of pain there may be no difference between the two, involves the additional idea of some real or supposed ill-desert. There is the same distinction between good and reward. Reward implies not only a good or benefit conferred, but the additional notion of its being deserved. There can be no question that both reward and punishment, in the common acceptation of the terms, are understood to imply good and ill desert, or merit and demerit; and, consequently, as the ideas of merit and demerit involve the fact of a moral nature, the ideas of reward and punishment cannot be supposed to involve less.

§ 214. The existence of a moral nature involved in systems of moral philosophy, and in other writings and treatises of a moral nature.

(VIII.) The doctrine of a moral nature is necessarily involved, in the eighth place, in all treatises of Moral Philosophy, and in all works of whatever nature, the object of which is to correct the conduct of men and to make it better, not merely in the matter of pecuniary interest and supposed personal good, but *in a moral point of view.* Works of this kind are numerous; and they are obviously prepared upon the principle that there is such a thing as right and wrong, moral good and evil, and that men are so formed as to be capable of distinguishing the one from the other. In the opinion of these writers, at least, and in the opinion of those who receive them as correct expositors of the actual and prospective state of things, there must be in man the elements of a moral nature; the susceptibility of moral emotions and of moral obligation; otherwise it is obvious that their statements and reasonings must be essentially destitute of meaning and of application.

These remarks will apply not only to Systems of Moral Philosophy, and to formal Treatises and Essays

on Morals, but to all those lighter forms and varieties of literature (some of the Essays of Johnson and Addison, for instance), the object of which is not merely to amuse the reader, not merely to aid him in the correction of the slighter improprieties of conduct, but to impress moral truths, and to secure, in the case of those who had given themselves up to vice, a moral renovation. The remarks will apply, among other varieties of literature, to Satires, the professed object of which is to point out and to correct the prevailing vices. The Satires of Juvenal not only recognise throughout the abstract distinctions of Right and Wrong, but distinctly announce that there are original elements of moral judgment, and sources of reward and punishment in the human breast. It would be difficult to refer, in any uninspired writer, to more decisive indications of a natural conscience, and to more energetic and fearful descriptions of the miseries attending its violation, than are to be found in his Thirteenth Satire. The very first lines of this celebrated production are worthy of notice in this respect. And near the conclusion he expresses himself, in respect to those who have been guilty of violations of right, in the following significant terms:

> "Cur tamen hos tu
> Evasisse putes, quos diri conscia facti
> Mens habet attonitos, et surdo verbere cædit,
> Occultum quatiente animo tortore flagellum?"

§ 215. Proofs from the uniformity of law.

(IX.) Another circumstance, which is entitled to no small weight in the decision of this inquiry, is, that systems of law or jurisprudence, as well as of morals, have been the same, in their leading principles, in all ages of the world, and are essentially the same at the present time. It is true, there are peculiarities, founded in some cases on the physical or political condition of the country, and in others on long-established associations, which distinguish one code from another; but the great rights of persons and property are recog-

nised in all. "Lawgivers and statesmen," says Sir James Mackintosh, "but, above all, moralists and political philosophers, may plainly discover in all the useful and beautiful variety of governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive truths, the sacred master principles which are the guardians of human society, recognised and revered, with few and slight exceptions, by every nation upon earth."* This passage is taken from his published Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations. In another unpublished discourse on that great and interesting subject, from which an Extract is given in his recently-published Memoirs, he illustrates his general observation by going more into particulars. "I have said, in my printed Discourse," he remarks, in the Extract just referred to, "that morality admits no discoveries; and I shall now give you some reasons for a position, which may perhaps have startled some, in an age when ancient opinions seem in danger of being so exploded, that when they are produced again they may appear novelties, and be even suspected of paradox. I do not speak of the theory of morals, but of the rule of life. First examine the fact, and see whether, from the earliest times, any improvement, or even any change, has been made in the practical rules of human conduct. Look at the Code of Moses. I speak of it now as a mere human composition, without considering its sacred origin. Considering it merely in that light, it is the most ancient and the most curious memorial of the early history of mankind. More than three thousand years have elapsed since the composition of the Pentateuch; and let any man, if he is able, tell me in what important respects the rule of life has varied since that distant period. Let the Institutes of Menu be explored with the same view; we shall arrive at the same conclusion. Let the books of false religion be opened; it will be found that their moral system

* Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations, Lond. ed., p. 35.

is, in all its grand features, the same. The impostors who composed them were compelled to pay this homage to the uniform moral sentiments of the world. Examine the codes of nations, those authentic depositories of the moral judgments of men; you everywhere find the same rules prescribed, the same duties imposed: even the boldest of those ingenious skeptics, who have attacked every other opinion, has spared the sacred and immutable simplicity of the rules of life. In our common duties, Bayle and Hume agree with Bossuet and Barrow. Such as the rule was at the first dawn of history, such it continues till the present day. Ages roll over mankind; mighty nations pass away like a shadow; virtue alone remains the same, immortal and unchangeable."*

Perhaps the best illustration of the idea which we wish to impress in this section, unless some should see reason to make an exception in favour of the Spirit of Laws of Montesquieu, is to be found in the great work of Grotius on the Law of Nations. It is rather a remarkable feature in respect to the principles which this great writer lays down, that they are supported throughout by a variety of quotations from the poets, historians, orators, and philosophers of different ages and countries. In doing this, it is to be presumed he had a more important and ennobling object than the mere display of the variety and extent of his learning. He wished to show, as he himself gives us to understand, by the conspiring testimonies of such various authorities, that the whole human race, with no exceptions whatever that are not explainable in consistency with the general statement, have one opinion, one feeling, and one voice in respect to the leading principles of political justice.

We infer from the unanimity of mankind in respect to the great principles of right and wrong, as they develope themselves in their systems of Law, both internal and international, that there is, and must of necessity be, as the basis of this unanimity, a conscience,

* Memoirs of the Life of Sir James Mackintosh, 2d Lond. edit., p. 120.

a moral element of some kind, existing as an essential attribute in the universal mind of man.

§ 216. Evidences of a moral nature even among Savage nations.

(X.) The leading principles of morals and justice, both as seen in the conventional rules which regulate the intercourse of life, and also in the few and simple laws which support the civil and political fabric of their little communities, are known and distinctly recognised, as a general statement, among barbarous and Savage tribes. We do not doubt that there have been, and that there are, among Savage tribes, great perversions of the moral nature; but we speak now of the general fact simply, and not of the exceptions.—Mr. Stewart, in his Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers (bk. ii., chap. iv.), speaks expressly of the gratification which a liberal mind experiences in recognising under the ignorance, superstition, and sensualities of Savage life, the kindred features of humanity, and the indelible vestiges of that Divine image after which man was originally formed. In illustration of his remark, he introduces, with no small degree of satisfaction, a short statement from Sparman's Travels through the Southern Parts of Africa, in relation to a portion of the human race who have generally been regarded as ranking among the lowest in the scale of civilization.—"A Hottentot," says this traveller, "is rich in proportion to the number of his cattle; but the richest is clothed, fed, and attended no better than the poor." After some other remarks in illustration of what he had just said, he adds, "That which constitutes the distinction of rank in this simple race of men, is the divine pleasure of doing good to their fellow-creatures." The testimony of Vaillant in respect to the same ignorant and degraded people is much to the same effect. "To convey some idea of the character of the savage Hottentots," he observes (Travels in Africa, p. 179), "and of what I had to expect from them, it will be sufficient to offer one remark, which is a truth confirmed by experience. In all countries,

wherever the Savages are absolutely separated from civilized nations, and live sequestered, their manners are mild; but they change and become corrupted the nearer they approach to them."—"When on the northward of the Cape, I found myself under the Tropic among remote nations; when I saw whole hordes surround me with signs of surprise and of the most childish curiosity, and, approaching me with confidence, stroke my beard, my hair, and my face with their hands, I said to myself, I have nothing to fear from these people; this is the first time they ever saw a white man." A portion of Dillon's Narrative of a Voyage in the South Seas is occupied with giving some account of the religion, morals, and customs of the inhabitants of the islands in those seas, called the Friendly Islands. "There is implanted," says the writer, speaking, in particular, of the people of Tonga (vol. ii., p. 27), "a knowledge or sentiment, which enables us sometimes, if not always, to distinguish between the beauty of disinterestedness and the foul ugliness of what is low, sordid, and selfish; and the effect of this sentiment is one of the strongest marks of character in the natives of these islands. Many of the chiefs, on being asked by Mr. Mariner what motives they had for conducting themselves with propriety besides the fear of misfortune in this life, replied, 'the agreeable and happy feelings which a man experiences within himself when he does any good action, or conducts himself nobly and generously, *as a man ought to do*:' and this question they answered as if they wondered that such a question should be asked. After this, we cannot but suppose (unless we are led by prejudice) that the seeds of very great virtues are implanted in their breasts."

§ 217. Further remarks on the morality of Savage tribes.

We have not the least doubt (and we make the remark, not as a matter of conjecture, but from an examination prosecuted to no small extent, in reference to this very subject) that the testimony of travellers

among Savage tribes will show conclusively that there is no tribe of men so ignorant and degraded as not to give some evidences of a natural regard for kindness, truth, and justice. At the same time, it is due to the truth to admit, that we find among some of these tribes instances of cruelty and violations of right which are abhorrent to the nature and moral sensibilities of a Christian people. We shall endeavour to show, however, in its proper place, that these deviations from the more common and predominant features of humanity may be explained in consistency with the general statement.

As we do not feel at liberty to multiply quotations, especially as we do not suppose that those who read these remarks will generally consider it necessary, we leave the subject of this section, with merely opening a train of thought in connexion with it, which has very seldom been alluded to. We refer to the fact, that all savage tribes, so far as we have been able to learn, not only have some form of religion, but, as a general thing, recognise the duty, on certain occasions of a private or public nature, or both, of performing expiatory ceremonies and offering expiatory sacrifices. They seem to feel that something must be done, either by enduring suffering in their own persons, or by inflicting suffering somewhere else, to prevent those evils, either to themselves personally or their country, which they believe will be the result of their transgressions. What we have to add is, that expiatory ceremonies and expiatory sacrifices, wherever they are found to prevail, clearly imply as their basis the existence of certain sentiments of ill-desert or wrong, and, of course, involve the existence of the elements of a moral nature.

§ 218. The existence of civil or political society implies a moral nature.

(XI.) We may add to the other considerations which have been brought forward the circumstance that society, in its *civil* or *political* form, is supported, in a very considerable degree, by the sentiment of moral

obligation. If we are asked why obedience is rendered to the civil laws, the answer is, because they are enacted by the society or social body. If we are asked why we render so much deference to the will of the society or social body, the answer is, because we have agreed to. In other words, we have promised, have pledged ourselves, either expressly or by implication, to conform to it. If we are asked why we so strictly fulfil our promise, why we so scrupulously conform to our word, all the answer we can give is, that we feel under a moral obligation to do it. In other words, in order to give anything like a satisfactory answer to this question, we are obviously thrown back upon our moral constitution.

There is no doubt that the natural desire of society, especially when stimulated, as it sometimes is, by a knowledge of the benefits which flow from social intercourse, tends powerfully to keep men together in masses or bodies. But, after all, whatever suggestions may sometimes be made to the contrary, the principal secret of the stability of the social position, when it exists in the form of civil and political society, that which, more than anything else, keeps it from disastrous fluctuations, and gives it a degree of permanency and uniformity sufficient to enable it to sustain the vast fabric of government and laws, is to be found in the strong and broad column of the Moral Sensibilities.

§ 219. A moral nature implied in the motives of human conduct which are recognised in historical works.

(XII.) We find an additional proof of the existence of the department of the Moral Sensibilities in those principles, in relation to the estimate of the conduct and characters of men, which pervade historical composition. History, in distinction from the mere registers and annals of events, professes to give us not only the acts, which, as subjects of history, are proper to be recorded, but, so far as they are ascertainable, the motives and characters of the agents. Accordingly, the

historians of all ages and countries, while they have condemned some actions, have been equally warm in their commendations of others. In a multitude of cases, the highest possible commendations have been bestowed, and for no other reason, in connexion with the perception or supposed perception of high moral traits in the actors. If it could be ascertained in any way that Leonidas and his companions bled at the pass of Thermopylæ from views of a pecuniary nature, or from a selfish desire of fame, and not from a sense of the duty which they owed to their country, the glory of that celebrated action would be blasted at once.

In order to illustrate the subject more fully, let us consider a moment an instance in Roman history still more directly to our present purpose. The Roman Regulus was a prisoner at Carthage. The Carthaginians sent him to Rome in order to procure a peace; but with the expectation, and on the condition, if peace were not procured, of his returning. He no sooner arrived at his native city, than, contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Carthaginians, he advised and urged the Romans to continue the war. Some persons, when he had seen fit to take this course, proposed to him not to return, as the most distressing results would be likely to follow. Regulus replied, "Though I am well acquainted with the tortures which await me at Carthage, I prefer them to an act which would cover me with infamy in my tomb. It is my duty to return, and for all else let the gods provide." And accordingly, acting on this sentiment of duty, he went back, and was put to death with unheard-of sufferings.—This high-minded act of the noble Roman has been applauded, not only by the historians who record it, but by the whole human race, although nothing could be more unwise under the existing circumstances, if there was no such thing as a moral nature, no such thing as conscience and conscientious or moral obligations.

It may perhaps be suggested that the conduct of

Regulus is partly or wholly explainable on the ground of self-interested or prudential motives in this way. He knew, if he remained at Rome in violation of his promise, he would suffer the loss of reputation to such an extent that he could not retain his previous social position, and would be the subject of general reproach and neglect. And looking at the subject in this point of view, and in the choice of inevitable results, he would naturally prefer, and on the ground of self-interest alone, the few hours of severe physical suffering which would follow from his going back, to the long-continued rebuke and martyrdom of popular aversion and contempt. But this view, which is not destitute of ingenuity, only throws the question one step further back. The question still remains, why is it that a man, renowned for memorable public services, becomes, by the violation of his promise in a single instance, an object of disapprobation and dislike; so much so that his former glory at once departs, and that his presence, which was once the signal of congratulations and honours, is now regarded as a discredit and a contamination? The answer is written in man's nature. It is because God, who made man, made him with a conscience.

§ 220. Evidence of a moral nature from Scripture.

We close this examination of the reasons which may be brought forward in support of the general doctrine of a moral nature by remarking further, that the doctrine is fully recognised in the Scriptures. All those passages in which men are called upon to do what is just and right, in distinction from pursuing their own selfish and private ends, imply not only that there is a right and wrong, but that men are capable of understanding what is right, and that they are under obligation to do what is right. The term CONSCIENCE, in particular, as expressive of the fact of man's moral nature, is frequently used in the Scriptures. Men are directed to have a good conscience; the testimony of conscience is spoken of as a matter

of rejoicing; the Apostle and his associates are said to commend themselves to every man's conscience; passages which, together with others like them, can hardly be said to have any meaning, if there be not in man some moral element which is capable of taking cognizance of the right and wrong of things, in distinction from the merely prudential view, the mere apparent expediency or profitableness of things.

And not only this, God himself, in various passages, calls upon men to sit in judgment upon the course, whatever it may be, which he has thought fit to pursue. He does not simply appeal to them for a decision whether his providential administration is an advantageous one or not, but whether it is *right.* All passages of this kind appear to take it for granted that man has a power of moral judgment.—But the passage of Scripture which, standing by itself, is most decisive on this subject, is to be found in Romans, ii., 14, 15. The passage, which we commit without comment to the reader, is as follows: "*For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their Conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing, or else excusing one another.*"

§ 221. Concluding remarks on the general fact of a moral nature.

In view of the various considerations which have been brought forward, we may certainly feel authorized to speak with entire confidence of the existence of the Moral Sensibilities as a portion of man's nature essentially distinct from the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. When we give to these considerations the weight to which they are obviously entitled, the only matter of wonder is, that the subject should have hitherto been involved in so much obscurity and doubt; and that men of no small learning and of no dishonourable reputation should have lent the countenance of their authority to doctrines the op-

posite of those we have endeavoured to support. In making this remark, we have not reference so much to such writers as Hobbes, and Mandeville, and others of that class, who have never had great weight with the popular mind, as to the distinguished and highly-influential names of Locke and Paley. The circumstance that such men have had doubts as to the fact of an original and distinct moral department in the mind is one reason, aside from the intrinsic interest and value of the subject, why we have been led in this Chapter, and shall be led hereafter, to pursue the investigation with a degree of minuteness, and with a regard to such objections as may be likely to be suggested, which might not otherwise have been supposed to be necessary.

CHAPTER II.

EMOTIONS OF MORAL APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL.

§ 222. Classification of the Moral Sensibilities.

The remarks of the preceding chapter, it will be noticed, have had a relation exclusively to the general subject. If we are satisfied on the general question whether man has a moral nature, we are ready to commence a consideration of what that nature is.

We proceed, accordingly, to make the general remark, that the Moral nature is less complicated than the Pathematic, although the general division of the Moral Sensibilities corresponds precisely to the general division of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities. As the Natural Sensibilities resolved themselves, in the first instance, into the subordinate classification of the Emotions and Desires, so the Moral Sensibilities, in a manner precisely corresponding, resolve themselves into the subordinate classification of moral Emotions and feelings of Moral Obligation. But both divisions of the Natural Sensibilities, it will be recollected, viz., the Emotive and the Desiring or Desirive, were found to be susceptible of numerous mi-

nor divisions. It is not so in the moral department. The class of moral emotions, and the obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation, which are based upon them, will be found, exclusive of any subordinate divisions, to comprehend the whole subject.

It might be supposed, therefore, that this subject would be despatched in a few words. And so it would if the discussion could properly be limited to the mere examination of these feelings. But the moral sentiments, both the emotive and the obligatory, sustain such important relations, and involve so many important consequences, that it seems to be proper not only to examine them in their own nature, but also to consider them, to some extent, in their multiplied connexions.

§ 223. Nature of the moral emotions of approval and disapproval.

In accordance with what has been said in the foregoing section, we repeat, that there are but two classes of mental states which belong, in strictness of speech, to the Moral sensibilities, considered as being by nature an essential portion of the human mind; although it is very true that there are a number of things in the mind, such as the abstract conceptions of right and wrong, and the feelings of remorse, which have both theoretically and practically an important connexion with morals. The Moral Nature, properly so called, putting out of view the incidental relations it sustains, exists and developes itself, FIRST, in the moral Emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval; and, SECOND, in the feelings of moral Obligation.

While there are many kinds of the Natural or Pathematic emotions, such as the emotions of beauty, of sublimity, of the ludicrous, of cheerfulness, of surprise, of reverence, of shame, and the like, there is but one kind or class of Moral emotions. And these are known, considered as distinct states of mind, by the names by which they have just been described, viz., as feelings of APPROVAL and DISAPPROVAL. Of

these states of mind we now proceed to give some account.—And our first remark is, that they are original feelings; which implies, that in the appropriate circumstances of their existence, they are called forth by the original or constitutional tendencies of the mind, and also that they are elementary or simple. Of course they are not susceptible of definition, since defining, except that sort of apparent defining which consists in the mere use of synonymous terms, is predicable only of what is complex. Hence, in their distinctive or appropriate nature, in that which constitutes them what they are, considered as separate from anything and everything else, they cannot be known by description, but by consciousness only. Nevertheless, we are not at liberty to suppose that their nature is either absolutely unknown, or, as a general thing, even misunderstood, inasmuch as the consciousness of such feelings is universal, and as no form of knowledge, it is generally admitted, is more distinct to our apprehension than that which has consciousness for its basis. Whoever, therefore, has had placed before him any case of right and wrong, of such a nature that he could have, and did in fact have, a clear apprehension of it, in itself and in its relations, must, we suppose, have a knowledge (and if he has not, it is impossible he ever should have) of emotions of approval and disapproval.

§ 224. Of the place or position, mentally considered, of the emotions of approval and disapproval.

Moral emotions, or emotions of moral approval and disapproval, occupy a place, considered in reference to other departments of the mind, immediately successive to intellections, or acts of the intellect.—In this respect they agree with the natural or pathematic emotions, which occupy the same position. It is, for instance, impossible for us to feel the beauty of an object, which is an act of the Natural sensibilities, without first having a perception or knowledge of the object itself. In like manner, it is impossible for us

to approve or disapprove a thing, in the moral sense of the terms, without first having some perception, some knowledge of the thing approved or disapproved.

And as the natural emotions are immediately followed by Desires, so the moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval (for these are all the states of mind that are properly comprehended under that phrase), are followed, in like manner, by Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation. The position, therefore, of moral emotions, and they are found nowhere else, is between perceptions or intellective acts on the one hand, and Obligatory sentiments or Obligations on the other. And as there can be no moral emotions without antecedent perceptions, so there can be no feelings of moral obligation without antecedent emotions of approval and disapproval. Accordingly, if we are said in any given case to be under obligation either to do a thing or to abstain from doing it, we may always find a reason for our thus being under obligation in the antecedent action of the mind, viz., in our approval or disapproval, as the case may be, of the thing to which the obligation relates. (See § 14.)

§ 225. Changes in the moral emotions take place in accordance with changes in the antecedent perceptions.

If the emotions of approval and disapproval, which are the basis of the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, are naturally founded upon antecedent perceptions, we may expect, and such is the fact, that they will change in their character in accordance with changes in those perceptions. If, for instance, a statement of facts is made to us, clearly establishing in our view a case of great crime, our emotions of disapproval are prompt and decided. But if it should happen that afterward some new facts are mingled in the statement, throwing a degree of doubt and perplexity upon what was believed to have taken place, the feelings of disapproval would at once become per-

plexed and undecided, in a degree precisely corresponding to the perplexity and indecision that, under the new circumstances, pervade the intellectual perception in the case. If, still subsequently, the introduction of other facts should show that what was supposed to be a crime was directly the reverse, our moral emotions would undergo a new change, and, instead of condemning the transaction either more or less decidedly, would approve.

Nor is this changeableness in the character and the degree of the moral emotions to be regarded as implying any defect in the moral nature. On the contrary, it is unquestionably one of the most decisive indications of its value. If the moral nature were so constituted as not only to pronounce a thing right or wrong under certain given circumstances, but necessarily to adhere to that decision under essential changes in the circumstances, it certainly could not be regarded as a safe rule for men's guidance. A man kills another by means of the infliction of a heavy blow, and, as we suppose, with evil intention or malice prepense, and the action is at once disapproved and condemned by conscience. But it subsequently appears that the blow, which had the appearance, at first, of being intentional, was entierly a matter of accident; and the conscience or moral nature immediately conforms its decision to the new aspect of the transaction, and annuls the disapproving and condemnatory sentence which it had before pronounced. If it were otherwise, if it did not promptly and fully conform itself, by changes in its own action, to antecedent changes in the percipient or cognitive action, it would confound vice and virtue, guilt and innocence; and, as a rule of moral conduct, would not only be without value, but absolutely and exceedingly injurious.

§ 226. Of objects of moral approval and disapproval.

We are not to suppose that the sphere of that moral adjudication, which is involved in the existence of

emotions of moral approval and disapproval, extends to all objects indiscriminately. It is a proper inquiry, therefore, and in some respects an important inquiry, what are the appropriate objects of approving and disapproving emotions?—In answer to this question, we remark, in the first place, that such objects are voluntary agents. The feelings in question, in their announcements of the right and the wrong of any case that comes before them, have nothing to do with things without life. And more than this, they require, as the objects of their exercise, something more than mere vegetable and animal life, viz., intellective, sentient and volitional life. In other words, they require, in the appropriate objects of their adjudication, those attributes of perceiving, feeling, and willing, which are necessarily implied in voluntary agency.

(II.) In the second place, the legitimate objects of approval and disapproval are not only voluntary agents, but MORAL agents. No being is the object of moral emotions (that is to say, no being can by possibility be approved or disapproved in the moral sense of the terms) except such as have a conscience or moral nature. It is impossible that any others should have a knowledge of right and wrong; and, of course, impossible that they should conform themselves to the rule of right. Hence no one regards brute animals as the proper objects of these emotions.

(III.) Again, moral agents (this expression, of course, implies that they are voluntary agents) are morally accountable; in other words, are the proper objects of moral approval and disapproval, in respect to those things only which are truly in their power. This remark, which limits the sphere of moral approval and disapproval not only to moral agents, but to what is actually in the *power* of moral agents, is practically an important one. So far as we can regulate our outward actions, we are accountable; that is to say, we are the proper objects of the emotions of moral approval and disapproval. So far as we can regulate the action of the intellect, the sensibilities, and the

will, we are accountable also. So far as the action, whether physical or mental, is either involuntary or instinctive, it is not an appropriate object of the notice and adjudication of conscience; for all such action, although it belongs to and is not separable from the agent, is nevertheless not under his control.—Accordingly, when the moral agent, in the exercise of all his various powers, does what he ought to do, he stands approved. When, in the exercise of the same powers, he fails to do what he ought to do, he stands condemned. The extent of his capability is the basis of his duty, and the law of conscience is the measure of its fulfilment. And this simple statement intimates both the rule by which he is judged, and the vast amount of his responsibility.

§ 227. Of the original ground or basis of moral approbation and disapprobation.

If what has been said in the course of this chapter be true, we are so constituted that, in all cases of actual right and wrong which we are capable of understanding, we have the feelings, whenever such cases come to our knowledge, of approval and disapproval, corresponding both in kind and degree to the occasion which excites them. But there remains another interesting inquiry.—It has ever been, in the speculative and theoretical aspect of moral subjects, a much agitated question, what trait or quality it is in the thing approved or disapproved which excites the corresponding emotion. To this question different individuals are found to give different answers. We approve of an action, says one, because it is useful; because, says another, it is commanded by a higher power; because, says a third, it is agreeable to the fitness of things; because, says a fourth, it is in conformity to the will of God. But an answer of this kind does not appear to be satisfactory, because the question may always return with undiminished propriety and force, why utility, or the command of a superior, or the fitness of things, or conformity to the will of God, should, in

themselves considered, excite within us feelings of moral approbation more than anything else.

The fact is, that this question, viz., what is the foundation or basis in the thing approved of the emotion of approval which we exercise towards it, lies, in all probability, upon the extreme boundaries of human knowledge. Whenever we touch that boundary, we must either rest satisfied, or return in the track of our own footsteps. Whatever efforts we may make to resolve and explain a question which, by the nature of things, is placed in the outskirts and limits of human perception, we always find the train of thought moving, as it were, in a circle; and answering itself in a change of terms, and not in a change of position. If, for instance, we are asked why we approve the will of God, it may be answered with entire propriety, because it is morally right or virtuous. If we are asked why we regard his will as morally right or virtuous, the answer is, because, considered in all its circumstances, it is *approved* by an enlightened moral sense. If we are asked why it is that we thus put forth emotions of moral approval in relation to his will, then, instead of being able to take a new position and to give a new and distinct reason, we necessarily move round to a former one, and say, because his will is morally virtuous or right.—And the same in other similar cases. On being asked why we approve of a particular action, we may give a different answer, and say, with a degree of propriety, because it is beneficial or useful. On being further asked why we approve of a useful or beneficial action, we may answer again, because such an action is morally right or virtuous. If we are still further asked why an act of kindness or benevolence is to be regarded as morally right or virtuous, we answer, because in its own nature it commends itself to our conscience; in other words, excites within us emotions of moral approval. Which is the same as to say, in the assignment of reasons, that we approve, because we have emotions of approval. An instance, as well as the former one, of that

sort of Paralogism or false reasoning which is called reasoning in a circle.

§ 228. Emotions of moral approval are called forth in connexion with the existence of right or rectitude in the things approved of.

It is unquestionable, however, when we take into view the necessarily limited nature of the human mind, that there is a suitable and satisfactory stopping-place in this successive announcement of reasons. The proper answer in all these cases, when we are asked why we approve of a thing, is, *because it is right.* With the assignment of this reason, if the circumstances of the case obviously warrant us in assigning it, we may rest satisfied.

But then comes the question, what is RIGHT? We approve of a thing because there is in that thing the trait or quality of RIGHT. What is Right? The examination of this significant inquiry will more properly come up in another place. Nevertheless, a word or two may be said here.—We admit that Right or Rectitude, like many other things that are elementary and are intellectually revealed to us, cannot be defined. But can we define what existence is; what identity is? Can we define intelligence, or power, or succession, or space, or time? From the nature of the case, there must be some things elementary and ultimate. We are too apt to forget that there are, and of necessity must be, limits which the human mind cannot pass; and that there are ultimate moral suggestions or intuitions as well as intellectual. When we say an action is approved because it is right, the expression not only has meaning, but proclaims a truth which has nature for its basis. That is to say, the expression imbodies in language a conviction, which in some way or other is necessarily attendant on the action, considered as the occasion of its origin, of the Moral Sensibilities, viz., that there is, in fact, such a thing as Right or Rectitude. At the same time, we do not hesitate to admit, as has already been intimated, our inability to explain what Right is. While we claim that it is per-

ceptible in the mind, we do not deny that it is unexplainable, in the sense of being defined, in language. Nevertheless, we have no hesitation on this account, either in asserting its existence, or in assigning it as a reason for whatever naturally depends upon it.—(See vol. i., § 192, 193, and the subsequent chapter on the Immutability of Moral Distinctions.)

CHAPTER III.

RELATION OF REASONING TO THE MORAL NATURE.

§ 229. Of the doctrine which confounds reasoning and conscience.

We are now prepared, in view of what has been said in the last Chapter, particularly in connexion with the subject of the grounds or principles on which changes take place in moral emotions, to proceed to another subject not more interesting than it is practically important.—The opinion has sometimes been advanced, that those moral decisions or judgments, which, as moral beings, we are capable of forming, are the direct results of REASONING. The advocates of this doctrine, rejecting the idea of a distinct moral principle or conscience, appear to regard the reasoning power as entirely adequate to the causation of all those results in the mind which have a moral aspect. In a word, they may be regarded, either as denying entirely the existence of conscience, or, what is philosophically, if not practically, the same thing, as identifying it with mere ratiocination.

It is not surprising, on the whole, that this mistake, which is certainly a very serious and prejudicial one, should have been committed, when we consider how close the relation is which reason sustains to conscience. It will be noticed that we speak without any hesitation of the doctrine referred to as a mistaken one. We do not suppose it to be necessary, after what has already been said, to attempt to show that reasoning and conscience are not identical, and that the moral nature has a distinct and substantive

existence. Nevertheless, we freely admit the intimate and important relation which they sustain to each other—a relation so important in a practical, as well as in a philosophical point of view, that we shall delay here for the purpose of entering into some explanations of it.

§ 230. Of the close connexion between conscience and reasoning.

Reasoning, it will be recollected, is purely an intellectual process, consisting of successive propositions arranged together, and a succession of relative suggestions or perceptions, but, in itself considered, involving nothing which is properly called an emotion or desire. This single circumstance separates the reasoning power entirely from the moral nature, which, in its appropriate action, never originates, like the reasoning power, perceptions or new intellectual views, but merely moral emotions and feelings of moral obligation. Probably every one can say with confidence that he is conscious of a difference in the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement which are characteristic of reasoning. In the view of consciousness, there can be no doubt that they are regarded as entirely diverse in their nature, and as utterly incapable of being interchanged or identified with each other. The moral feeling is one thing; and the intellectual perception or suggestion, involved both in the process and the result of reasoning, is another.

Although the reasoning power and the conscience or moral being are thus distinct from each other in their nature, they are closely connected in their relations, as has been intimated already, inasmuch as the intellect, particularly the ratiocinative or deductive part of it, is the foundation or basis of moral action. We must first know a thing; it must first be an object of perception, before we can take any moral cognizance of it. And this is not all. The moral cognizance, as we have already had occasion to explain, will conform itself with great precision to the intel-

lectual cognizance. That is to say, it will take new ground in its decisions, in conformity with new facts perceived. Consequently, we cannot rely perfectly on a moral decision which is founded upon a premature or imperfect knowledge. The more carefully and judiciously we reason upon a subject, the more thoroughly we understand it in itself and its relations, the more confidently may we receive the estimate which the voice of conscience makes of its moral character.

§ 231. Illustration of the preceding section.

The views of the preceding section may be easily illustrated. When, for instance, one man is alleged to have stolen the property of another, we find the conscience, as a general thing, ready to discharge the duty which the Author of our nature has assigned to it; but it is sometimes the case, that its decisions are arrested and postponed, in order to give time for the inquiries and conclusions of the reasoning power. Such inquiries inform us, perhaps, that the theft was long and coolly premeditated; and was committed, not only without any special temptation to it, but with a full knowledge of the aggravation of the crime. In view of this state of things, conscience immediately passes its decision. Perhaps our inquiries inform us that the theft was committed at a time of extreme want and consequent great temptation; and, furthermore, was committed upon a species of property, in respect to which the right of individual possession is regarded by common consent as less strict and exclusive than in other cases. The conscience here, as in the former instance, condemns the criminal, but probably with a mitigated sentence. On further inquiry, we learn that, although the property was taken, and that, too, much to the damage of the owner, it was taken wholly by mistake; it was a thing entirely accidental. In this case, conscience, adapting itself to the newly-discovered circumstances, pronounces the supposed thief altogether guiltless.

The conscience, therefore, however distinct the two may be in themselves, is aided and supported by the powers of perception and comparison or judgment, and particularly by the reason. The reasoning power, however high the rank which we justly ascribe to it, sustains, in this case at least, a subordinate position, and is to be regarded as the servitor and handmaid of the moral power. And, moreover, the latter will vary in exact accordance, if there are no collateral disturbing influences, with the new facts and the new relations which are from time to time presented by the former.—It is in consequence of this close connexion, and the important assistance rendered to conscience by reason, that they have sometimes been confounded together. But it is very essential to right views of the mind that this erroneous notion should be corrected, and that the precise relation existing between these two distinct parts of our mental nature should be fully understood.

§ 232. Further illustrations of the same subject.

We may, perhaps, further illustrate the subject of the connexion existing between the perceptive nature, particularly the reasoning power, and the moral nature, by the interesting case of Caius Toranius, which Dr. Paley, in a translation from Valerius Maximus, has introduced in his Moral Philosophy in nearly the following terms.—The father of Caius Toranius had been proscribed by the Roman Triumvirate. Caius Toranius, coming over to the interests of that party, discovered to the officers the place where his father had concealed himself, and gave them, withal, a description by which they might distinguish his person when they found him. The old man, more anxious for the fortunes and safety of his son than about the little that might remain of his own life, began immediately to inquire of the officers who seized him whether his son was well; whether he had done his duty to the satisfaction of his generals. "That son," replied one of the officers, "so dear to thy affections, be-

trayed thee to us; by his information thou art apprehended and diest." The officer, with this, struck a poniard to his heart, and the unhappy parent fell, not so much affected by his own fate as by the means to which he owed it.

"Now the question is," says Dr. Paley, "whether, if this story were related to the wild boy caught some years ago in the woods of Hanover, or to a savage without experience and without instruction, cut off in his infancy from all intercourse with his species, and, consequently, under no possible influence of example, authority, education, sympathy, or habit, whether, I say, such a one would feel, upon the relation, any degree of *that sentiment of disapprobation of Toranius's conduct* which we feel, or not?

"They who maintain the existence of a moral sense, of innate maxims, of a natural conscience, that the love of virtue and the hatred of vice are instinctive, or the perception of right and wrong intuitive (all which are only different ways of expressing the same thing), affirm that he would. They who deny the existence of a moral sense, &c., affirm that he would not. And, upon this, issue is joined."

§ 233. Remarks upon the case stated in the foregoing section.

Upon the case as thus stated, and upon the diverse opinions which are said to be entertained in connexion with it, one or two remarks are to be made, which are naturally suggested by the train of thought in this chapter. First, the supposition that a Savage, who is *entirely* ignorant (which we understand to be the condition of his mind in the statement given), is able, in any case whatever, to pronounce a moral judgment, is an impossibility. It is arranged in great wisdom, that the Moral Sensibilities, as well as the Natural, are placed *behind* the Intellect; that is to say, they are subsequent in action, and are conditioned upon the antecedent existence of intellective acts. It is in view of this state of things in particular we make the assertion, that a negation of all knowledge, an intel-

lect which, like a fragment of perfectly white paper, is entirely free from any delineations of thought, necessarily involves the impracticability of any moral judgment. It is impossible, therefore, that the wild boy of Hanover, or any other Savage, cut off in infancy from all intercourse with his species, without sympathy, experience, or instruction of any kind, should pronounce a moral judgment upon the case of Caius Toranius, or upon any other case of morals. And the reason is what has just been referred to, that the antecedent condition is wanting, viz., *knowledge*.

We remark further, however, that it is not meant to be implied, in what has been said, that the wild boy or Savage must necessarily possess a wide extent of knowledge. We may suppose it possible that he is absolutely ignorant of everything else; yet, if he has a full knowledge of the facts and relations of the thing under consideration, there is a foundation laid in his mind for a moral movement. In the case of Caius Toranius, if the Savage, however ignorant he might be on other subjects, were made fully acquainted with the relation existing between the father and the son, with the nature and degree of the acts of kindness which are always implied in the history of those who sustain the parental relation, he would be in a situation to pronounce a moral decision on the son's conduct: otherwise he would not. And on the supposition that he possessed such knowledge, it is difficult to suppose that he would be indifferent to the son's conduct, much less approve it, or that he could look upon it otherwise than with feelings of decided disapprobation.—(See, in connexion with this subject, § 225 in the preceding chapter.)

§ 234. Of the training or education of the conscience.

We infer, from what has been said in this chapter, that there is such a thing, philosophically considered, as a training or education of the conscience. We propose to remark more fully on the subject of moral education in another place; but we may properly re-

fer to it a moment here, in connexion with the views which have now been taken. No man is at liberty to say, in regard to any given case, that I am willing to refer this case to conscience, and to abide by the decisions of conscience, without first taking the pains to lay the case fully and fairly before the power that is to sit in judgment upon it. We might as well expect the judge in a court of civil justice to give an upright decision, without facts, without evidence, and without law, as to expect a correct decision from the spiritual judge, that exercises authority in the judgment-seat of the Sensibilities, without a full and fair presentment of the facts by the Intellect. And when we say it is necessary to make a full statement of the facts, we may add further, that they are to be stated not only in themselves, but also in their relations and bearings upon each other.—This is one form of moral training or moral education. In other words, in order to have a right conscience in respect to the vast multitude of things which are the proper subjects of moral adjudication, it is necessary to extend the field of our knowledge; to know much, to think much, to compare much.

§ 235. Of guilt when a person acts conscientiously.

The question has sometimes been started, whether a person is in any case to be considered as guilty, and to be punished for actions done *conscientiously;* for instance, when certain ignorant Savages are supposed to act conscientiously in leaving their aged and infirm parents to perish. In view of what has been said in this chapter, we seem to be prepared to answer this question in the affirmative.

We have seen that the moral nature, in consequence of its intimate connexion with the powers of perception and reasoning, is in some measure under our own control. On the one hand, it may be enlightened and guided; on the other, darkened and led astray, and, in some cases, be made to approve of actions of the most unworthy and sinful kind. Men, therefore, are

to have a right conscience; this great and exalting principle is to receive and ought to receive the very first attention; and they are accountable whenever it is neglected. Otherwise we furnish a very easy and convenient excuse for all the cruelties of the Inquisition, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by the Catholics, for all the persecutions of the Protestants by each other, for all the acts of unkindness and tyranny which have ever been exercised upon individuals and communities.

And the position that men are accountable and guilty for having a wrong conscience, in proportion to their means of knowledge and their ability of rectifying the conscience, holds good in respect to the most ignorant and degraded Savage tribes, as well as in respect to civilized nations. It is true, no individual ought to assume the province of judging in all cases what that degree of guilt is, for no one is competent to it. All that is meant to be asserted is, that when persons feel an emotion of approval in doing wrong (that is, in doing what is condemned by the general moral sentiments of mankind, and by the will and law of God), and yet have within their reach neglected sources of knowledge, which, on being laid open to the mind, would have caused different feelings, they are criminal for such neglect of the information before them, and, consequently, cannot, under such circumstances, be rendered otherwise than criminal by any internal approbation.

§ 236. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section from the case of the apostle Paul.

The Apostle Paul was at one time a great persecutor. He shut up the early Christians in prison; "and when they were put to death, he gave his voice against them." Nevertheless, he expressly says, in reference to these very transactions: "I verily thought with myself that I *ought* to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." He evidently, from his own statement, supposed he was doing right;

in other words, he was *conscientious* in his conduct. Here is a case in point, to which the principles of the preceding section may be made to apply.

That Paul, as he by implication asserts himself to have been, was conscientious in his persecutions of the early Christians, there can be no doubt. That he was, at the same time, exceedingly guilty, seems to be equally certain. He had not made himself acquainted with all the facts in the case; he was too bigoted to his own sect, too passionate, and too cruel to make a full and impartial investigation of the merits and demerits of those whom he had determined to destroy. He acknowledges that, at the very time when he supposed he was acting conscientiously, he was "exceedingly mad against them." But every one knows that an exceedingly excited state of the passions is very unfavorable to a minute and impartial inquiry. The presumption is, whatever the reason of it may have been, that he had no correct knowledge of the life, miracles, and doctrines of Jesus Christ, or the belief, practices, and character of Christians. His conscience, accordingly, as is its nature, acted in view of what he actually knew, and not in view of what he *might* have known. His conscience, in the circumstances of the case, could not do otherwise than it did, viz., approve his conduct. Nor, in strictness of speech, are we to say that he was to blame for acting according to his conscience, but to blame, exceedingly to blame, for not having, as on proper inquiry he might have had and would have had, a right conscience.

CHAPTER IV.

NATURE OF MORAL BEAUTY.

§ 237. Of the origin of emotions of moral beauty.

It seems to be a proper place here, as incidental to the main subject, to remark upon the nature of Moral Beauty. We have already had occasion to refer to

this subject, in connexion with some remarks on natural beauty (§ 38); but it seems to be deserving of a more particular notice.—Our first remark in the explanation of this topic is, that there is a close analogy between natural and moral beauty; and that, consequently, the nature of the latter may be easily understood by a reference to the former. The beauty of outward objects, whatever may be its inherent or intrinsic nature (a subject which, like that of the inherent or intrinsic nature of rectitude, is probably beyond the limits of the powers of the human mind), is revealed to, and is cognizable by us, in consequence of the structure of the natural sensibilities. In other words, we are so constituted that the perception of certain objects is naturally and necessarily followed, in our Sentimentive nature, by the existence of emotions of beauty. It is the existence of these emotions, which, it is proper to remark, do not depend upon our volition, but are the work of nature alone, that reveals to us the beautiful object, as having the character of beauty. Without this we should know, it is true, the mere existence of the object; but the additional and distinctive fact of its beauty would not be known. These are not only the facts in the case, but they are *ultimate* facts, and contain, in the outlines at least, a statement of nearly all that is to be said.

This statement will apply, with but slight alteration, to moral as well as natural beauty. A moral object (we speak now of one which is morally good), in distinction from a mere natural object, becomes such to us (that is to say, we know it to be such) in consequence of its being stamped with moral approbation. When clothed, as it were, with this new garment, it assumes, even in the view of the intellectual apprehension, a character unknown before. Intellectually considered, it stands forth distinctly as a new object. And as it thus imbodies itself in the intellectual apprehension, or, as we more commonly express it, as it thus appears in the view of the intellect, it is followed in the sensibilities, the same as any physically beauti-

ful object is, by emotions of beauty. The soul is delighted with the contemplation. And the same as in any instance of natural beauty, it diffuses here also, by means of the principle of association, the splendour of the inward emotion over the outward cause. And thus moral objects, as well as physical, and even in a still higher degree, are made to shine forth with an attractive lustre.

The phrase Moral Beauty appears to be based upon the experience which has just been described. It merely designates the abstract conception, which, in connexion with that experience, we are enabled to form of beauty of a moral kind.

§ 238. Of the origin and import of the phrase moral deformity.

We sometimes speak of MORAL DEFORMITY as well as of moral beauty; nor are we to suppose that the phrase, which is a very common one, is without meaning. It originates in precisely the same way, as far as the mental action is concerned, as its opposite. When an object which is morally wrong is before the mind, it excites an emotion directly the reverse of an emotion of beauty. In other words, it is impossible for us to contemplate a case of moral wrong without having, in addition to those feelings of disapproval by means of which its immorality is revealed in the mind, other emotions more or less painful. We not only condemn it as a violation of rectitude, but it is at once clothed, in our view of it, in features that are unlovely and hateful.

The phrase Moral Deformity, like the opposite one of Moral Beauty under the reverse of circumstances, has its origin in the internal experience which has just been described. It is used to designate the abstract conception, which, in connexion with that experience, we are enabled to form of Deformity of a moral kind.

§ 239. Of the correspondence between the degrees of moral beauty, and the quickness or liveliness of the moral sensibilities.

The ability to contemplate moral worth, wherever

it exists, in the aspect of the beautiful, and to throw around it a lustre, which has its origin in the fountains of the heart, is unquestionably an important fact in the history of the mind. We have thus a source of pleasure opened to us, which is not only abundant, but flows forth without any corrupting ingredient. But it is proper to add, that moral beauty does not shine equally upon all minds; while to some it walks in brightness like the clear sun in the heavens, to others it appears dimly, in clouds and vapours. There are a number of causes which have more or less influence in accounting for this difference.

The first is original or constitutional difference in the moral sensibilities. It appears to be regarded as an admitted fact, that there are original differences of moral as well as of intellectual character; and as there are some who are naturally dull in the comprehension of the truths of science, so there are some also who are naturally sluggish and obtuse in the matter of moral perspicacity. The latter, for this reason, take less pleasure than they otherwise would in the contemplation of moral objects; and the objects themselves, which in the eyes of persons of livelier moral sensibilities possess the highest attractions, are almost wholly destitute of beauty.

Another reason why, in the minds of some persons, moral beauty is comparatively so lustreless and unattractive, is because they voluntarily yield too great an ascendency to the lower principles of our nature. He who does not keep those lower appetites and propensities, which we have in common with the brutes, under suitable regulation, must not only undergo the penalty of bodily suffering, but will inevitably find a thick mist of impurity spreading itself over the mind, which will not only obscure the inward eye of moral perception, but will of course extinguish, in a corresponding degree, the glow of outward moral excellence.

> "He that hath light within his own clear breast,
> May sit in th' centre, and enjoy bright day;
> But he that hides a dark soul and foul thoughts,
> Benighted walks under the midday sun."

§ 240. Of the perception of moral beauty considered as a source of happiness.

But, while this source of happiness is closed, in a considerable degree, to the vicious, it remains fresh and undiminished in the heart that is animated by pure and upright sentiments. There are other sources of happiness, which, in a true estimate of our condition, are not to be lost sight of; but there is none so pure and exalting, excepting that which is connected with the possession of virtue in our own bosoms, as the pleasure which results from the contemplation of virtue in others.

It was the case with some of the old English theologians, that they divided the affection or passion of Love into two kinds, viz., the love of BENEVOLENCE and the love of COMPLACENCY. By the love of benevolence they seem to have intended to express a desire for the good of others, irrespective of their character. There are probably some persons in whose characters it is impossible for us to take delight, but for whose good we may nevertheless have an ardent desire. This is the love of BENEVOLENCE; and is such as we may suppose the Supreme Being to exercise towards the human race in their state of rebellion and opposition to himself.

By the love of COMPLACENCY, in distinction from the other form of love, the theological writers referred to appear to have intended to express that pleased or joyful emotion of the soul, which arises in view of any form of existence that is intrinsically excellent, particularly in view of moral excellence. Although the terms which were formerly employed to intimate this kind of benevolence are in some degree gone out of use, it is unquestionable that they express an important fact in the philosophy of the mind. The mind is so constituted that it is not only capable of perceiving, as has already been explained in its proper place, physical, or, rather, material beauty, but also intellectual and pathematic, and particularly moral beauty. It is the last which is the highest kind or perfection of beauty.

The emotions which are involved in the revelation of any form of moral beauty to the mind (for it is by means of emotions that beauty in any case whatever is disclosed to us) are impregnated with happiness. They flow out on every side with emanations of pure, unmixed beatitude. Of course, the degree of the happiness will be in proportion to the vividness or energy of the emotion; but, so far as it exists at all, whether more or less, it is not only unalloyed, but is pure to the degree of celestial brightness. Here is a fountain of enjoyment, too often unvisited, which those that taste of shall live. Here is a river of pleasure, which, amid all the disappointments and sorrows of life, can never fail.

§ 241. Of the moral beauty of the character of the Supreme Being.

These views are susceptible of a religious application. Theologians appear to agree in asserting that one great source of happiness, both in this and in a future life, consists in the contemplation of the character of the Supreme Being. The character of God is revealed to us internally rather than outwardly; to the intellectual rather than to the bodily vision. We are given to understand by theological writers, and by writers on practical religion generally, that this great idea, as it exists in the intellect or understanding, is susceptible of being invested with a radiance and intensity of beauty, which beams forth from the natural sensibilities or heart. Without assuming to give an opinion on the theological or scriptural correctness of this view, it is beyond question that it is, and must be, *philosophically* true. From the nature of the case, whatever is beautiful, and is *perceived* to be beautiful, must "walk in brightness." And the idea of the Supreme Being, when revealed in its due and full proportions, whether the revelation be made to angels or to men, cannot be otherwise than infinitely glorious. "Thy sun shall no more go down; neither shall thy moon withdraw itself; for the Lord shall be thine everlasting light." And as there never can be a per-

ception of beauty without involving more or less of happiness, we can in some degree understand how it is, when the idea or image of the Supreme Being takes possession of a purified and holy mind, that it becomes a fountain of blessedness, perpetual and unutterable.

But in regard to beauty, material as well as moral, it is to be recollected that all beauty is practically nothing, and is the same as if it had no existence, unless it is perceived. And the light of moral beauty is not perceptible, and, from the nature of the case, cannot be perceptible to the mind which is itself involved in moral obscuration. Accordingly it is said in Scripture, "Blessed are the PURE IN HEART, for they shall see God." These expressions imply that the moral excellence of the Deity cannot be fully perceived, and the blessedness attendant on its perception cannot be fully realized, except by hearts that are themselves morally pure. This is a great truth; and is as strongly founded in philosophy as it is express and unquestionable in religion. Accordingly, as the heart becomes pure, the upward glory is let in. At first dimly, like the glimmerings of the new moon, and afterward in full-orbed magnificence. And hence it frequently happens, that those who have laboured, through a large portion of life, to correct their moral deformities, and begin at last, through Divine assistance, to bring their souls into a morally right position in reference to the Supreme Being, speak of the enlargement of the Divine manifestation, of glory accumulated to glory, and of happiness poured upon happiness.—"The Sun of Righteousness," we quote the language of one who thus describes his own personal experience, "has been gradually drawing nearer and nearer, appearing larger and brighter as he approached, and now he fills the whole hemisphere; pouring forth a flood of glory, in which I seem to float like an insect in the beams of the sun; exulting, yet almost trembling, while I gaze on this excessive brightness, and wondering, with unutterable wonder, why God should deign thus to shine upon a sinful worm."

CHAPTER V.

NATURE OF MORAL SUBLIMITY.

§ 242. Remarks in explanation of the moral sublime.

We proceed now to remark further, as incidental to the main subject of the Moral Sensibilities, that there is a Moral Sublimity as well as a Moral Beauty. Such is the constitution of our mental being, that we naturally regard those actions of men as Morally Sublime which, in the first place, are morally good in their character, but which are characterized by being put forth under such circumstances as strongly to affect our feelings. Moral sublimity, accordingly, does not appear to differ from Moral Beauty so much in kind or nature as in degree. There appears to be a progression from the morally Beautiful to the morally Sublime, which is precisely analogous to what we have already seen to exist in respect to the Beautiful and Sublime in the natural world. All, therefore, that seems to be necessary to an understanding of Moral Sublimity, in distinction from Moral Beauty, is to contemplate some of those traits which are morally beautiful, under such circumstances as will present them to view in an increased and intense aspect. It is chiefly the intensity of the morally beautiful action which enhances it to the character of moral sublimity; because an energetic or intense action, when it comes under our notice, necessarily produces in us a corresponding vividness or intensity of emotion; and it seems to be conceded, that the inward emotion, when founded upon a true perception of the object, and not in any way perverted and weakened in itself, may justly be regarded as the true measure both of beauty and sublimity.

Whenever, for instance, we look abroad upon men, and witness the trait of unconquerable fortitude;

whenever we behold great self-possession in sudden and fearful emergencies, or see a readiness to share voluntarily in another's sufferings, or become acquainted with other moral excellences of a like kind, we cannot but experience a strong emotion. It is not easy, by a mere form of words, to communicate an exact notion of this feeling, except, perhaps, in the circumstance of its great strength. It is evident, however, that it is analogous to that agitation, and heaving, and expansion of the soul, which exists when we contemplate what is vast, and terrible, and mighty in nature.

§ 243. Instances and illustrations of the moral sublime.

At the celebrated pass of Thermopylæ, three hundred Spartans met, and fought with the Persian army of a million. The remark was made by some one of the Spartans at the commencement of the battle, that the Persian arrows would fly so thick as to obscure and shut out the light of the sun; the reply of Dieneces was, "So much the better, for we shall then fight in the *shade*;" and this has justly been set down as an instance of moral sublime. That short reply, made almost with a degree of levity, disclosed a mind which, in the defence of its country and its country's rights, was prepared to meet every hazard, and to make the best of every form of adversity.

Such instances of striking calmness and self-possession amid great dangers are not unfrequent, and seldom fail to enlist a strong feeling in their favour. On some urgent occasion Julius Cæsar put to sea in an open boat; a violent storm arose, and the pilot discovered great terror. "*Quid times*," said the Roman, "*Cæsarem vehis*."—We see in this incident, as in that of Dieneces, a marked degree of firmness; an indication of spiritual hardihood, which could stand unshaken both against the opposition of men, and the frowns and persecutions of the elements of nature.

The reply of the wounded and dying Warwick, in the Henry VI. of Shakspeare, is full of a moral nobleness.

"*Somerset.* Ah! Warwick, Warwick, wert thou as we are,
We might recover all the loss again.
The queen from France has brought a puissant power.
E'en now we heard the news. Ah! couldst thou fly!
Warwick. Why then I *would not fly*."

§ 244. The moral sublime involves the morally beautiful.

In the remarks which were made in a former part of the Work, in the Chapter on the Natural Sublime, the principle was laid down that sublime natural objects usually have a degree of beauty, and that a progression may be traced from the beauty to the sublimity. And the same principle, as we have already had occasion to notice, will hold good in respect to the Moral Sublime.—The idea which we wish to convey by this statement may be illustrated thus. The benevolent man is a pleasing or beautiful object; but when, in the pains and agonies of death, he requests with his dying breath that the poor may continue to be fed from his substance, the exercise of benevolence under such circumstances strongly excites our feelings; and ascending, as it were, from the region of mere Beauty, becomes an instance of the Moral Sublime.

Again, whenever we see an individual undisturbed, composed, and even cheerful in ordinary difficulties and pressures, such an individual is undoubtedly an object of moral beauty. The trait of character which particularly interests us is firmness or strength of purpose. But let these misfortunes be increased, let him be driven from home and country, let the world, as it were, be combined against him, and the man who, in such circumstances, betrays no diminution of fortitude, but holds up an unshaken stability of soul amid the blackness of the desolations around him, is a sublime object.*

* Note.—Emotions of sublimity, as has been repeatedly intimated, connect themselves with Mind and with mental objects as well as with Matter and material objects. Furthermore, there seems to be ground for saying that there is a Natural as well as Moral sublimity, even when both forms of it are equally based upon mental manifestations. The emotions, for instance, which exist in view of great and wonderful

§ 245. A degree of moral sublime in acts of strict and undeviating integrity or justice.

Instances of decided and unwavering integrity, not, perhaps, in ordinary circumstances, but when the sense of justice is strongly opposed by considerations of interest or of natural affection, have a degree of moral sublimity. Sometimes, however, instances, which are not remarkable in themselves, acquire a degree of sublimity by combination. One of the distinguished citizens of Athens may be adduced as illustrating this remark. Such was the undeviating rectitude of his life, that Aristides, by the unanimous consent of the Athenians, was surnamed the Just. Whether followed by the acclamations of the multitude, or driven into ignominious banishment, he always retained his truth and integrity; and many acts are related of him which are deserving of lasting remembrance.

Being once called to act as a judge between two private persons, one of them declared that his adversary had greatly injured Aristides. "Relate rather, good friend," said he, interrupting him, "what wrong he hath done yourself; for it is *your* cause, and not *my own*, which I am now required to judge of."—We are aware that there is nothing particularly remarkable in this incident; but it illustrates the prevalent temper of the man, and shows how lively were his sentiments of justice, even on ordinary occasions.

The people of America take a great satisfaction in acknowledging that a strict, inflexible integrity was one of the remarkable traits in the character of Washington. During a long life of the most trying public services, it is impossible to point out a single act where there is any reason to believe that he subjected his principles to his interest. Accordingly, in the view

manifestations of Wisdom and Power, independently of any moral connexions, are the results of what may be called the Natural sublimity of the mental objects before us. But exhibitions of endurance under suffering, of self-possession in danger when duty evidently requires such self-possession, of benevolence, of unshaken truth, of honour, forgiveness, and the like, may properly be regarded, in distinction from the sublimity of mere Wisdom and Power, as instances of Moral Sublimity.

of his countrymen, there is a sort of sublimity throwing its unextinguishable light around that illustrious name, arising not so much from particular acts of integrity as from their multiplication. The separate rays of virtue imbody themselves in the complex conception of his character; the stars that shine apart congregate into one centre; and, as in the case of Aristides, present, by their mingled and united influence, an object of contemplation truly sublime.

§ 246. Other instances of the sublimity of justice.

There are other instances of justice or integrity, where a high degree of moral sublimity will be found to attach even to a single transaction. We have already had occasion to mention the conduct of Regulus. From a mere regard to the obligation involved in the promise which he had given to the Carthaginians, he returned to Carthage and suffered a cruel death; willingly encountering suffering for the sake of his good name, and holding his honour far above his life.

But perhaps the most strikingly triumphant and sublime instance of rectitude is to be found in the history of the first Roman Consul. It was the memorable and unhappy lot of Lucius Junius Brutus to be placed in circumstances where his duty to his country and its laws required him, according to the view which he took of his situation and responsibilities, to pronounce the sentence, and see the punishment of death executed, at the same time, upon two of his own children. Nothing could be more terrible than such an exigency. Not only the measureless weight of a father's affection, but even the desires of the surrounding multitude, that were melted into compassion at an event so melancholy, conspired to weaken and dethrone the stern sense of justice that had hitherto reigned in the heart of the illustrious liberator of his country. But he did not sully his high fame; he would not condescend to ask or accept for his own children what he felt himself bound to deny to those

of others. Though borne down with inexpressible misery, he caused them to be executed as traitors to their country, and was present at their death; thus showing, under circumstances fearfully calculated to make him falter in the expression of such exalted sentiments, that the duty we owe to God and the authority of the laws is higher than that which we owe to our dearest friends and kindred.

§ 247. Instances of friendship and the parental affection illustrative of the subject.

Sincere friendship is an interesting and exceedingly pleasing trait in the human character, and it may exist in such a degree of intensity as to partake of the Moral Sublime. The same may be said of the filial and parental affections. In the history of these affections we may read many lessons, in the highest degree creditable to human nature, and entitled to a lasting admiration.

And here we cannot forbear remarking, that there may be kindness and nobleness of mind even in the rude Savage, and that, too, in such a degree as to call forth the blush on those who claim for themselves the exclusive honour of civilization and refinement. The patience and fortitude of the Aborigines of America under the most excruciating sufferings have often been eulogized, but it has not been so generally acknowledged that they were capable of other virtues. The benevolent affections of the Savage, as well as those of an opposite kind, are often found to exist in the highest possible degree, as may be seen in the following instances.

It is related in Mr. Jefferson's Notes on Virginia, that Colonel Byrd, of that state, was sent at a certain time to the Cherokee nation to transact some business with them. "It happened," says this writer, "that some of our disorderly people had just killed one or two of that nation. It was therefore proposed, in the council of the Cherokees, that Colonel Byrd should be put to death, in revenge for the loss of their country-

men. Among them was a chief called Silouèe, who, on some former occasion, had contracted an acquaintance and friendship with Colonel Byrd. He came to him every night in his tent, and told him not to be afraid, they should not kill him. After many days' deliberation, however, the determination was, contrary to Silouèe's expectation, that Byrd should be put to death, and some warriors were despatched as executioners. Silouèe attended them, and, when they entered the tent, he threw himself between them and Byrd, and said to the warriors, 'This man is my friend; before you get at him, you must kill me.' On which they returned, and the council respected the principle so much as to recede from their determination."

Some years since, an Indian of the Collapissas nation, near the Mississippi, slew a Choctaw in a moment of excited passion. The circumstances were such as to render it necessary that the guilty person, whose name was Tychou Mingo, should die. At the time appointed for the execution, the aged father of Mingo came forward, and expressed an earnest desire to be put to death in his son's stead. He urged his request by saying that he was an old man, and no longer good for anything; that his son was young and vigorous, and his life was necessary for the support of a mother, wife, and four infant children. The surrounding multitude (among whom were many French soldiers present) were affected to tears; the Choctaws accepted the offer of the heroic old man, and with a hatchet severed his head from his body.

§ 248. Of the moral sublimity of great benevolent undertakings.

Brief as the remarks are which have been made, we indulge the hope that a train of thought has been opened which may lead to a correct understanding of this interesting subject. The inquiry, however, is too extensive to be pursued here at great length; being not less wide than the limits of whatever is morally good and beautiful in human nature, which is

susceptible of being increased to an intensity of action. There may be a sublimity in courage, a sublimity in piety, a sublimity in benevolence, a sublimity in mere consistency and perseverance. Every trait in human character may become sublime, which is of such a nature as to secure to itself the approval of our moral sentiments, and can, at the same time, strongly interest and excite us. But we are under the necessity of leaving the subject, with merely adding a few remarks on the sublimity of benevolent enterprises and of the spirit of forgiveness.

Ordinary acts of benevolence are merely pleasing. Almost every person performs such acts from time to time, but the knowledge of them is not expected to excite any very strong feeling. But it is different when the object is one of great difficulty in the attainment, and requires to be pursued with great perseverance and sacrifices even for successive years. The enterprise then acquires a high degree of moral sublimity.

The abolition of the Slave-trade was a distinct object; one of incalculable importance in the estimation of every real friend of man, and surrounded with a multitude of difficulties. A few persons (among whom the distinguished names of Clarkson and Wilberforce stood pre-eminent) engaged in this great contest with no object but that of securing the rights of humanity, and with no arms but a strong faith, determined perseverance, and the approbation of God. The public mind was to be enlightened; the moral apathy which existed on this momentous subject was to be dispelled; the influence of a powerful party, who were directly interested in the traffic in slaves, was to be overcome; jealousies and hostile passions, arising from other causes, were to be met, resisted, and subdued.

The prominent individuals in this noble enterprise, though few in number, and almost wholly unsustained except by the exaltation and purity of their object, laboured unceasingly for twenty years, amid every

form of opposition, rebuke, and discouragement. They determined, while the press of England remained free or God gave them the power of speech, to vindicate, in print, and in conversation, and on the floor of Parliament, the cause of a greatly-injured people. There was no swerving from their purpose; no disposition to take up with half-way measures, and make a compromise with this fearful abomination; no relaxation of effort, because their undertaking brought them into conflict with men high in power and office. And thus, after long years of unwearied and unchangeable effort, they succeeded in causing it to be solemnly acknowledged in their National Senate, and to be written on the statute-books of their country, that differences of complexion cannot annul the claims of nature, and that minds are never to be sold.

It was then that the light first dawned upon benighted and suffering Africa; and, in view of the struggles that preceded the rising of that light, we may assert with confidence, that even the gentle feeling of benevolence may become so quickened and so prolonged, and so active and irresistible, as to be truly overwhelming in the contemplation of it.

§ 249. The spirit of forgiveness in some cases sublime.

There may be sublimity also in forgiveness. It will generally be conceded, that forgiveness, even when the injury is a small one, is a pleasing and somewhat striking trait; the more so, because men in general are much less apt to forgive than to return injury for injury. But when the injury has been a great one, the forgiveness which is exercised calls forth an increased degree of admiration.

It is related of Demetrius (surnamed the *conqueror of cities*), that, having received a marked and undoubted provocation, he laid siege to the city of Athens. The inhabitants made a desperate resistance, but were at last obliged to surrender in consequence of a great scarcity of provisions. Demetrius then ordered them, with the exception of the women

and children, to be assembled together in one place, and to be surrounded with armed soldiers. Every one was in the greatest fear, conscious how much they had injured him, and expecting every moment to be put to death. It is not surprising, therefore, that they were overwhelmed with joy and admiration when they heard him, with a magnanimity honourable to human nature, thus address them: "I wish to convince you, oh Athenians, how ungenerously you have treated me; for it was not to an enemy that your assistance was refused, but to a prince who loved you, who still loves you, and who wishes to revenge himself only by granting your pardon, and being still your friend. Return to your homes; while you have been here, my soldiers have been filling your houses with provisions."

It may with propriety be added here, that the duty of a sincere and unlimited forgiveness, even under the most trying circumstances, is clearly recognised and enjoined in the Christian system. And one of the earliest professors of that system gave a practical exhibition of the obligation attending it. When the martyr Stephen was stoned to death by a cruel and infuriated multitude, as he cast his dying eyes upward to the heavens and the visible throne of the Almighty, his prayer was not, in the language of an old Roman, "Be ready, gods, with all your thunderbolts, and dash them to pieces;" but, in a far more generous and sublime temper of soul, he cried, with a last and loud voice, "*Lord Jesus, receive my spirit. Lord, lay not this sin to their charge.*"

THE SENSIBILITIES.

PART SECOND.

THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES, OR CONSCIENCE.

MORAL OR CONSCIENTIOUS SENTIMENTS.

CLASS SECOND.

FEELINGS OF MORAL OBLIGATION.

CHAPTER I.

EXISTENCE OF OBLIGATORY OR OBLIGATIVE FEELINGS.

§ 250. Feelings of moral obligation distinct from feelings of moral approval and disapproval.

It was remarked in a former chapter that the Moral Sensibilities or Conscience would be found, on an examination of its elements, to resolve itself into two classes of feelings, viz., Moral Emotions, and Obligatory feelings, or feelings of Moral Obligation. Having remarked, so far as seemed to be necessary, upon Moral Emotions, viz., the feelings of moral approval and disapproval, which are all the states of mind which properly come under that head, and also upon some of those collateral subjects which seemed to be particularly connected with them, we are now prepared to proceed to the consideration of the second class, viz., Obligatory feelings, or, if a single term be preferred, Obligations.

It is proper to remark here, that this class of mental states, considered as a separate and distinct class, has received but little notice in philosophical systems; having generally been confounded, under the familiar designations of conscience and the moral sense, with the moral emotions which have already been considered. On this account, therefore, and also for the reason that they have an important connexion with the actual operations and with the philosophy of the Will, it will be necessary to examine them with some degree of care.

§ 251. Proof of the existence of obligatory feelings from consciousness.

Our first inquiry relates to the actual and distinct existence of the states of mind which now come under consideration. The existence of feelings of this description is evinced, in the first place, by our own consciousness. We might safely appeal to the internal

conviction and the recollections of any man whatever, and ask whether there have not been periods in the course of his life in which he has experienced a new and authoritative state of mind; a peculiar but undefinable species of mental enforcement, which required him to perform some particular act, and to avoid doing some other act, even when his interests and his desires seemed to be averse to the requisition thus made upon him. And, if so, we have here an instance of moral obligation, a feeling or sentiment of duty, the precise thing which is meant when we say we *ought* to do or *ought not* to do.

Take a common and simple illustration. A person, in passing along the streets, saw an old man sitting by the wayside who bore about him the most convincing marks of want, wretchedness, and sincerity in his applications for relief; he gave him bread, clothing, and money, conscious that it was done, not in view of any personal interest or gratification, or of any selfish object whatever, but under the impulse and guidance of a peculiar enforcement within, such as we commonly have when we speak of doing our duty; and, if so, he then and there had a distinct knowledge of the moral sentiment or feeling under consideration. And this knowledge was from Consciousness.

§ 252. Further proof from the conduct of men.

The existence of feelings of obligation is further shown by the general conduct of men.—It cannot be denied that other motives, distinct from convictions of duty, often operate upon them. Their desires, hopes, fears, sympathies, their present and future interests, all have an effect. But it would certainly argue an evil opinion of human nature altogether unwarranted to maintain that they are never governed by motives of a more exalted kind. In a multitude of cases they are found to perform what is incumbent upon them in opposition to their fears, in opposition to their sympathies, and their apparent interests. Different persons will undoubtedly estimate the amount

of interested and selfish motives as greater or less, according as a greater or less portion of the good or evil of human nature has come within their own cognizance; but it is impossible, after a cautious and candid review of the principles of human action, to exclude entirely the elements of uprightness and honour. If there is any truth in history, there have always been found, even in the most corrupt periods of society, upright and honourable men. And if we are at liberty to infer men's character from their actions, as assuredly we are, we may assert with confidence that there are such at the present time. But a man of true uprightness and honour is one who acts from the sentiment of duty, the feeling of moral obligation, in distinction from motives of an inferior kind.

§ 253. Further proof from language and literature.

The existence of obligatory feelings is further proved not only by each one's consciousness, and by the conduct of men generally, but by language and literature. In most languages, and probably in all, there are terms expressive of obligation, or a sentiment of duty. No account could be given of the progress of society, and of the situation and conduct of individuals, without making use of such terms. If the words rectitude, crime, uprightness, virtue, merit, vice, demerit, right, wrong, ought, obligation, duty, and others of like import, were struck out from the English tongue (and the same might be said of other languages), it would at once be found unequal to the expression of the phenomena which are constantly occurring in the affairs of men. Now, as these terms occur, it is rational to suppose that they intimate something, that they have a meaning, that they express a reality. But it does not appear how this can be said of them, unless we admit the actual existence of obligatory feelings.

Turning our attention from single words and phrases, if we enter into an examination of the literature of a language, we shall come to the same result.

—A great portion of every nation's literature is employed in giving expression and emphasis to moral principles and sentiments. They find a conspicuous place in the most valuable speculations, not of professed moralists merely, but of historians, poets, orators, and legislators. But their frequent introduction would seem to be altogether misplaced, unsuitable, and unmeaning, if there were no real and permanent distinction between virtue and vice, between the sacred requisitions of duty and those of mere personal interest. One of the Roman historians* very happily remarks of the elder Cato, that he never performed an upright action in order that he might have the appearance of being an upright person in the view of men, but because *he could not do otherwise* (QUI NUNQUAM RECTE FECIT, UT FACERE VIDERETUR, SED QUIA ALITER FACERE NON POTERAT).

Every one who is familiar with the characteristic traits of Cato will assent to the justness of the remark, but still it would be nugatory and unmeaning without the existence of original principles, involving an internal and moral obligation. If any one will take the pains to peruse the writings of Tacitus in particular, he will fully see the bearing of these observations. That celebrated historian sketches, in colours dark and terrible, the pictures of cruelty and selfishness, treachery and deceit, but at the same time he diffuses over the nether horrors of flame and smoke the sun-like radiance of benevolence and patriotism, of honour and truth. Now, if you strike out from the human breast the emotions of approval and disapproval, and those feelings of obligation which are subsequently built upon them, you necessarily strike out, not only from Tacitus, but from almost all historians of acknowledged merit, the most eloquent and ennobling passages; everything, in fact, which places truth in opposition to falsehood, and contrasts meanness and selfism with justice, rectitude, and honour.

* Paterculus.

§ 254. Further proof from the necessity of these feelings.

And, in connexion with the observations which have been brought forward, we may further ask, what would men be, or what would society be, without the basis of moral obligation? There must be somewhere a foundation of duty. It does not appear how the bond which unites neighbourhoods and states can be maintained with any requisite degree of permanency and strength without something of this kind. Annihilate this part of our constitution, and would not society be dissolved? Would not violence, and wrath, and utter confusion immediately succeed? The natural desire of society, the sympathies, and the selfish interests of our nature, might do something by way of diminishing these evil results, but could not wholly prevent them. With the dislocation of the great controlling principles which regulate the action of the moral world, there would soon be an utter confusion in the movements of society, and all the unspeakable evils attendant on such a state of things.

We are aware it can be said that we have the feelings of approval and disapproval, which are of a moral nature. This is true. By means of these feelings we are enabled to pronounce a decision on the merit or demerit of the conduct of others; and they thus discharge an important office. It is undeniably necessary, when we consider the various relations we sustain to other accountable beings, that we should be able to pass a judgment on them. It is necessary also, when we consider our own nature and destinies, that there should be within ourselves some power of decision on our own conduct. Accordingly, the Moral Sensibility, in the exercise of emotions of approval and disapproval, effects this great object. But this is not enough. It is not only necessary to be able to distinguish between right and wrong, but to pursue the one and avoid the other. We need within us not only a monitor which shall assure us what right is, but something also which shall speak, as it were, with a voice of authority, and strongly urge us to do what

is right. And this object is designed to be effected through the medium and agency of feelings of obligation.

Undoubtedly the two classes of feeling are closely connected; emotions of approval and disapproval are antecedent to, and are the foundation of, feelings of obligation; but the fact of their close connexion does not prove their identity. Both exist, and both are necessary. The absence of either, particularly of feelings of obligation, would have a disastrous bearing on the conduct of men, and on the various interests of society.

CHAPTER II.

NATURE OF OBLIGATORY FEELINGS.

§ 255. Feelings of obligation simple, and not susceptible of definition.

In view of what has been said, we assert with confidence that feelings of moral obligation, or obligatory feelings, in distinction from the antecedent acts of the Moral Sensibility, which consist in mere approval and disapproval, actually have an existence. In looking into their nature, in distinction from the mere fact of their existence, although we do not flatter ourselves with being able, by a mere verbal statement, to give a satisfactory notion of them, we would direct the attention to some characteristic marks. And the first observation to be made is, that these states of mind are simple. We cannot resolve them into parts, as we can any complex state of mind. And, as a necessary consequence of this, they are not susceptible of definition. Still we cannot admit that this simplicity, and the consequent inability to define them, renders men ignorant of their nature. It is true, that the man who has never experienced the sentiment of obligation in his own bosom can have no better means of knowing it from the descriptions of others than the blind man can have for understanding the nature of the colours of the rainbow. But such a case is hard-

ly a supposable one; among all the tribes of men and amid all the varieties of human degradation, it will probably not be found to exist; and we may therefore say with confidence that every man knows what the feeling of obligation is, not less than he knows what the feeling of joy, of sorrow, or of approval is. In other words, men have as ready and clear an idea of it as of any other simple notion or feeling.

§ 256. They are susceptible of different degrees.

In obtaining this knowledge, however, which evidently cannot be secured to us by any mere process of defining, we must consult our consciousness. We are required to turn the mind inward on itself, and to scrutinize the process of interior operation, on the various occasions of endurance, trial, and action, which so often intersect the paths of life. The same consciousness which gives us a knowledge of the existence of the feeling and of its general nature, assures us, furthermore, that it exists in various degrees. This fact may be illustrated by remarks formerly made in reference to another state of mind. The word *belief* is the name of a simple mental state; but no one doubts that belief exists in different degrees, which we express by a number of terms, such as presumption, probability, high probability, and certainty. In like manner, the feeling of obligation may evidently exist in various degrees, and we often express this variety of degrees by different terms and phrases, such as moral inducement, slight or strong moral inducement, imperfect obligation, increased strength of obligation, and perfect obligation.

§ 257. Of their authoritative and enforcing nature.

It may be remarked further in respect to obligatory feelings, that they always imply action, something to be done. And again, they never exist except in those cases where not only action, but *effective* action, is possible, or is supposed to be so. We never feel under moral obligation to do anything which we are

convinced at the same time is beyond our power. It is within these limits the feeling arises; and, while we cannot define it, we are able to intimate, though somewhat imperfectly, another characteristic. What we mean will be understood by a reference to the words enforcement, constraint, or compulsion. Every one is conscious that there is something in the nature of feelings of moral obligation approaching to the character of enforcement or compulsion; yet not by any means in the material sense of those terms. There is no enforcement analogous to that which may be applied to the body, and which may be made irresistible.

The Apostle Paul says, "the love of Christ *constraineth* us." What is the meaning of this? Merely that the mercy of Christ, exhibited in the salvation of men, excited such a sentiment of obligation, that they found in themselves a great unwillingness to resist its suggestions, and were determined to go forth proclaiming that mercy, and urging all men to accept it. And it is in reference to this state of things we so frequently assert that we are bound, that we are obliged, or even that we are compelled to pursue a particular course in preference to another course; expressions which, in their original import, intimate the existence of a feeling which is fitted by its very nature strongly to control our volition. But, although these expressions point to this trait of the feeling, they do it but imperfectly and indistinctly, and consciousness alone can give a full understanding of it.

§ 258. Feelings of obligation differ from those of mere approval and disapproval.

It is possible that the question may be started why we do not class these feelings with Emotions, particularly those of a moral kind. And, recognising the propriety of avoiding an increase of classes where it is not obviously called for, we shall endeavour to say something, in addition to what has already been intimated in the preceding chapter, in answer to this

question.—We have not classed the mental states under examination with Emotions, in the first place, because they do not appear to be of that transitory nature which seems to be characteristic of all emotions. Ordinarily they do not dart into the soul with the same rapidity, shining up, and then disappearing like the sudden lightning in the clouds; but, taking their position more slowly and gradually, they remain like the sun, bright and permanent. In the course of an hour, a person may experience hundreds and even thousands of emotions of joy or grief, of beauty or sublimity, and various other kinds. They come and go, return and depart again, in constant succession and with very frequent changes; but it will probably not be pretended that the feelings of duty, which are destined to govern man's conduct, and which constitute his most important principles of action, are of such a rapid, variant, and evanescent nature. A man feels the sentiment of duty now, and it is reasonable to anticipate, unless the facts presented to his mind shall essentially alter, that he will feel the same tomorrow, next week, next month, and next year. He may as well think of altering and alienating the nature of the soul itself, as of eradicating these feelings when they have once taken root, so long as the objects to which they relate remain the same in the mind's view.

§ 259. Feelings of obligation have particular reference to the future.

A second reason for not classing feelings of obligation with emotions, particularly moral ones, is the fact that obligatory sentiments or obligations have special reference to the future. Moral emotions are of a peculiar kind; they have a character of their own, which is ascertained by consciousness; but they merely pronounce upon the character of objects and actions that are either past or present; upon the right or wrong of what has actually taken place in time past, or is taking place at the present moment; with the single exception of hypothetical cases, which are

brought before the mind for a moral judgment to be passed upon them. But even in these cases, as far as the action of the moral sense is concerned, the objects of contemplation are in effect present. The conscience passes its judgment upon the objects in themselves considered, and that is all. It goes no further.

But it clearly seems to be different with the feelings under consideration. The states of mind involving obligation and duty have reference to the future; to something which is either to be performed, or the performance of which is to be avoided. They bind us to what is to come. They can have no possible existence, except in connexion with what is to be done, either in the inward feeling or the outward effort. The past is merged in eternity, and no longer furnishes a place for action. Obligation and duty cannot reach it, and it is given over to retribution.

§ 260. Feelings of obligation subsequent in time to the moral emotions of approval and disapproval.

Another and third important circumstance to be taken into view, in making out the distinction under our notice, is, that the sentiments or feelings of obligation are always subsequent in point of time to moral emotions, and cannot possibly exist unless preceded by them. The statement is susceptible of illustration in this way. Some complicated state of things, involving moral considerations, is presented before us; we inquire and examine into it; emotions of approval or disapproval then arise. And this is all that takes place, if we ourselves have, in no way whatever, any direct and active concern, either present or future. But if it be otherwise, the moral emotions are immediately succeeded by a distinct and imperative feeling, the sentiment of obligation, which binds us, as if it were the voice of God speaking in the soul, to act or not to act, to do or not to do, to favor or to oppose.

How common a thing it is for a person to say that he feels no moral obligation to do a thing, because he does not approve it; or, on the contrary, that, approv-

ing any proposed course, he feels under obligation to pursue it; language, which undoubtedly means something, and which implies a distinction between the mere moral emotion and the feeling of obligation; and which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, that obligation is subsequent to, and dependent on approval or disapproval. On looking at the subject in these points of view, we cannot come to the conclusion to rank feelings of obligation with moral emotions, or with any other emotions, but are induced to assign them a distinct place. But it is not surprising, on the whole, that moral emotions are often confounded with them, when we consider the invariable connexion between the two just spoken of, and when also we consider the imperfection of language, which not unfrequently applies the same terms to both classes of mental states.

§ 261. Feelings of obligation differ from desires.

For the reasons which have now been stated, feelings of obligation are not classed with Emotions. We are next asked, perhaps, why they are not classed under the general head of Desires. And, in answering this question, we say, in the FIRST place, that consciousness clearly points out a difference. It is believed that few matters come within the reach and cognizance of consciousness, which can be more readily decided upon than the difference between our desires and our feelings of obligation. We admit that, in the particular of their fixedness or permanency, and also of their relation to the future, the latter closely approach to the characteristics of the former; and yet a little internal examination will detect a distinction between them which is marked and lasting.

(2.) We may not only consult our own consciousness in this matter, but may derive information from a notice of the outward conduct of men. In speaking of men's conduct, we not unfrequently make a distinction; and we attribute it sometimes to the mere influence of their desires or wishes, and at other times

to the predominance of a sense of duty, which is only another name for a sentiment or impulse within, which is morally obligatory. But there would evidently be no propriety in this distinction if desire and feelings of duty or obligations were the same thing, and it would certainly be premature and unjust to charge men with universally making such a distinction when there are no grounds for it.

§ 262. Further considerations on this subject.

If there is not a fixed, permanent, and radical distinction between desires and feelings of obligation, then there is an utter failure of any basis of morality, either in fact or in theory. It will readily be conceded that morality implies a will, a power of choice and determination. But the mere moral emotions, viz., of approval and disapproval, do not of themselves reach the Will. They operate on the Will through the feelings of obligation; that is to say, they are always succeeded by the latter feelings before men are led to action. All other emotions operate through the Desires. So that the will, in making up its determinations, takes immediate cognizance of only two classes of mental states, viz., Desires and Feelings of obligation. But brute animals, as a general statement, have all the desires that men have; we mean all those modifications of feeling which have been classed under that general head, viz., instincts, appetites, propensities, and the various forms of affections, such as resentment, love, and the parental affection. But still, being evidently destitute of all feelings of obligation, we never speak or think of them as possessing a moral character. We never applaud them for doing their duty, nor punish them for neglecting its performance. Our treatment of them proceeds on altogether different principles. And it would be the same with men if they were wholly destitute of feelings of moral obligation, and had no motive of action but the various forms of desire. They could never, in that case, be considered morally accountable. They

would be without reward when they went right, and without rebuke when they went wrong.

CHAPTER III.

UNIFORMITY OF ACTION IN THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

§ 263. Of uniformity in the decisions of the moral nature, and the principles on which it is regulated.

THE two classes of feeling which have been considered, viz., moral emotions, by means of which we approve and disapprove of actions, including perhaps feelings of remorse, which may be regarded as modifications of feelings of disapproval, and the subsequent feelings of moral obligation, embrace all the states of mind which are properly and strictly included under the head of the Moral Sensibilities; although there are a number of collateral or incidental inquiries, some of which have been attended to, which are worthy of notice. One of the most interesting of these inquiries relates to the Uniformity of moral decisions.—In entering upon the subject of the Uniformity of the decisions of our Moral Nature, we remark, in the first place, that there are two kinds of uniformity, viz., uniformity in fact or principle, and uniformity in manifestation or appearance. Uniformity in principle, which is the most important view of the subject, necessarily implies a rule or law, by means of which the uniformity which is alleged to exist may be measured and known. And the rule or law upon which the uniformity of the moral nature is unquestionably based is, that its decisions (excepting those extremely perverted acts which may justly be supposed to imply a state of moral alienation or insanity, and which do not properly come into consideration here) *will in all cases conform to the facts perceived;* in other words, will conform to the facts and their relations, as they exist in the view of the intellect.

Estimated by this law, we can hardly entertain a doubt that the decisions of conscience may justly be

regarded as being, at the bottom, uniform throughout the world. It is not true, as some seem to suppose, that nature has established one code of morals for civilized and another for Savage nations, one law of rectitude on the banks of the Thames, and another on the banks of the Ganges; but in all parts of the world, in every nation and in every clime, she utters the same voice, announces the same distinctions, and proclaims the unchangeableness of her requisitions.

§ 264. The nature of conscience, considered as a uniform principle of action, requires that it should vary in its decisions with circumstances.

It is well known that one of the greatest and the only formidable objection which has been brought against the doctrine of a connatural moral sensibility or conscience is a want of uniformity in its decisions; in other words, that it approves at one time and in one place what it condemns at another time and place. The remarks which have been made enable us to meet this objection fairly and satisfactorily. We admit that there is a want of that kind of uniformity which, by way of distinction, we have denominated uniformity in manifestation or appearance; but it is not true (with the exception of those extreme perversions which come under the denomination of moral insanity or alienation) that there is a want of uniformity in fact or principle. It is the latter kind of uniformity only which we are desirous to witness as an attribute of the conscience. A uniformity of decision based upon any other view would be disastrous to its own authority. In meeting the objection, therefore, which has been referred to, all we have to do is to show that the moral sense or conscience conforms to its own law; in other words, is uniform in its action, relatively to the facts that are placed before it. As a general thing, we have already shown this in the Chapter on the Proofs of a Moral Nature; it appears to be unnecessary to prosecute that view of the subject further; and what alone seems to be requisite in order to complete the inquiry is to explain the apparent deviations.

And our first remark here is, that the nature of conscience itself involves that it must vary in its decisions in accordance with a variation or change of circumstances. And the important law of its own uniformity not only permits this, but requires it. As its uniformity exists in relation to the facts perceived, and involves the uniformity or sameness of those facts, it follows that a change in the facts and their relations will be attended by a change in the moral cognizance. The decisions of conscience, therefore, although erected upon a basis of uniformity, and although, in fact, uniform in reference to the principle which has been laid down, are nevertheless in their manifestations exceedingly diverse; like the multiplied forms of the kaleidoscope, which, although they always exist in accordance with fixed optical principles, are susceptible of almost every possible variety.—Going on the supposition, therefore, that the general uniformity of the decisions of conscience is understood and acknowledged, inasmuch as we have already had occasion to give some proofs of it, and particularly as it is not generally denied, we proceed now to give some account of its variations; and, in doing this, shall endeavour to show that they all take place in entire consistency with the permanent principle of its own nature; in other words, that the uniformity is real, and that the deviations are merely apparent.

§ 265. Differences in the decisions of conscience dependant in part on differences of intellectual power.

The diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend partly, in the first place, on differences of intellectual power.—We may illustrate this view of the subject by a case of this kind. Two men are required to give an opinion on some question which involves moral duty. The question we will suppose to be, whether it would be right, in a supposed case, to attempt a revolution in the civil government. Of these two individuals, one will pronounce it to be right, the other will pronounce it to be wrong.—It is admitted

that we have here a manifested or apparent deviation in the moral action. At the same time, it is unquestionably the fact, that it is not owing to a difference of structure in their moral nature, but rather to a difference in their perceptive and comparing powers.

The one who pronounces the attempt to be right, in consequence of his greater reach of thought, is able to foresee, after the first convulsive struggles, the subsidence of the angry passions into a state of permanent quiet, and the reorganization of the convulsed frame of society into greater strength and beauty. With these views, he thinks it right to attempt to introduce a change into the government of the country. The other, whose intellectual vision is more limited, unable to extend the perceptive eye into the future, sees only the evils of the present moment; the discord and clamour, the breaking up of old habits and associations, the agony, and the blood. With these views, he thinks it would be wrong to attempt the change in question. The moral nature in each instance pronounces according to the light which is placed before it, and in each case does what it would naturally be expected to do.

The want of uniformity in this case, so far from being an evidence, as some seem to suppose, that there are no good grounds for the doctrine of a moral sense, is rather an evidence of the contrary. Although there is not an external or apparent uniformity, there is a uniformity in principle; that is to say, the conscience in each case decides according to the facts before it, which is the only proper ground of decision.

§ 266. Diversities in moral decisions dependant on differences in the amount of knowledge.

Diversities in the decisions of conscience will depend, in the second place, on differences in the amount of knowledge, whether such differences in knowledge be owing to differences of intellective power or to any other cause. In other words, the conscience may be led astray, so far as to decide other-

wise than it would under other circumstances, either by a want of facts, or by false statements of facts, or by an incorrect combination of facts. This simple statement, if properly applied, can hardly fail to explain numerous mistaken moral judgments which have been adduced in opposition to the doctrine of conscience. When, among other things, it is said that the conscience of the heathen decides, on many points of a moral and religious nature, differently from that of a Christian people, it must be recollected that the latter, through the medium of the Scriptures, have a vast amount of moral and religious knowledge which the heathen have not.

The objector to the doctrine of an original moral nature alleges, for instance, in support of his views, that the inhabitants of some countries, as is alleged to be the case in some parts of India, worship the sun, and that they appear to be conscientious in it; while the inhabitants of other countries, particularly those where the Christian religion prevails, condemn such worship as morally wrong. But if the worshippers of the sun, in the destitution of those sources of information which other nations possess, are fully convinced that the orb of day is not only the source of light, as it obviously is, but the source of being also; that it not only has in itself the principle of vivification, but is also the quickening and vivifying spirit to all things that exist, it is no evidence against the existence of a Moral Nature that they stand, in the view of their own conscience, morally approved in the matter of the worship which they render. The result, so far as the action of the conscience is concerned, is what might reasonably be expected. The difficulty is not in the operations of the conscience, but in the antecedent operations of the intellect, which, either from a want of facts or a false application of facts, have ascribed the attributes of Deity to a mere mass of matter. If the people referred to possessed the same amount of knowledge in relation to moral and religious subjects which Christian nations generally pos-

sess, the probability certainly is, that there would be no diversity in their moral judgments.—It will be noticed, we do not say that the worshippers of the sun are to be regarded as guiltless in the course which they take. What we assert here has reference merely to the matter under consideration; and merely goes to show that the conscience, in deciding in accordance with the facts before it, conforms to the principles of its own nature, and that the seat or ground of the error, whatever the amount of that error may be, lays somewhere else than in the action of the moral sensibilities.

§ 267. Of diversities in moral judgment in connexion with differences in civil and political institutions.

We may reasonably expect, in the third place, to find diversities and occasional oppositions of moral judgment in connexion with differences of civil and political institutions.—This statement might be illustrated by numerous instances from history. The objectors to a moral nature maintain that theft, or the unlawfully taking of the property of another, is a crime; and that conscience, if it exists as a part of the mental constitution, will not fail to condemn it universally. And, in connexion with this, they bring forward the fact, that in some countries, theft, instead of being condemned as it should be, prevails very much, and is scarcely regarded as a crime. They state, among other things that are brought forward in support of their views, that theft was not only permitted, but approved and rewarded by the laws of Sparta.

The fact that we may reasonably expect to find diversities of moral judgment in connexion with differences of civil and political institutions, throws light upon the case last mentioned. The Spartans, it is well known, were trained up by their political institutions to regard property as of little value; their lands were equally divided; they ate at public tables; and the great end of all their civil regulations

was to render the citizens athletic, active, patient, and brave. Everything else was considered subordinate. The permission which was given to the Spartan lads to steal was a part of the public regulations. It was a sort of tax, which the citizens voluntarily imposed upon themselves, in order to encourage vigilance, endurance, and address in the younger part of the community; and hence, when they were detected immediately after the theft, they were severely punished for deficiency of skill. Accordingly, the theft, which was permitted and approved by the Spartans, was a very different thing from what goes under that name with us. The mere act may have been the same, but there was no correspondence in the results and attendant circumstances, and in the degree of evil intention.—Similar inquiries in other instances will go far in explaining many apparent deviations from the permanent distinctions between vice and virtue, and will reduce the number of cases of supposed want of uniformity in moral sentiments.

§ 268. Additional illustration of the same view of the subject.

Under this head we may properly notice, in particular, the statement made by travellers, that some Savage tribes are very much given to theft. Captain Cook informs us, that, when he visited the Sandwich Islands in 1778, the inhabitants exhibited a thievish disposition, taking everything which came within their reach. In explanation of this statement, it is to be remarked, first, that the idea of theft involves the idea of property; and that the right of property is more or less strict and absolute in different countries and under different political systems. In consequence of the richness of their soil and the favourable nature of their climate, there is no question that the right of property was held by the Sandwich Islanders to be less strict and exclusive than it is found to be in less productive countries. The familiar distinction of MEUM and TUUM, of our own and another's, was not so clearly drawn and so strenuously adhered to as it

generally is in civilized nations; and the probability is, that nearly all the various forms of property were held in common. As the right of property was in their estimation less strict, the violation of it was less criminal, and they did not look upon the offender with that decided disapprobation which in other places would attach to him in taking the same articles. They probably regarded him with nearly the same feelings with which we regard a man who, in passing through an orchard that belongs to us, takes a few apples, or who occasionally draws water from our well. He takes our property, it is true; but as the right of property in those cases is held, by common consent, to be a loose or mitigated one, we do not call it theft, nor regard it as criminal.

And further, in looking at Captain Cook's account a little more minutely, we see evidence in the narration itself of the correctness of this view. "At first," he says, "on entering the ship, they endeavoured to steal everything they came near, *or, rather, to take it openly, as what we either should not resent or not hinder.*" In another place he says, in explanation of their conduct, "they thought they had a *right* to everything they could lay their hands on." We learn also, that, after they were made to understand the English notions of property and the penalty attached to a violation of it, they soon laid aside such conduct.— It is obvious, if they had attached the same ideas to taking property which we attach to stealing, they would not have taken it *openly*, as much so as if they supposed they either had a right to it, or that the owners would not resent or hinder their taking it.

§ 269. This view of the subject further illustrated from cases of assassination.

It would be easy to introduce other illustrations, which would seem properly to come under this head. For instance, there is no crime in respect to the enormity of which the opinion of mankind is more decided and unanimous than that of assassination. But

the objector to the doctrine of an original moral sense assures us, that about two centuries ago assassinations were frequent in Scotland, and that they appeared to be committed without any symptoms of compunction, a state of things which is sometimes alleged to be inconsistent with an implanted and universal moral nature.

As to the fact of the frequency of assassinations at that period, and of their being perpetrated with but little remorse, there can be no doubt. But, before we can properly pronounce this state of things to be inconsistent with a moral nature, we ought to inquire into the civil and political condition of the country. It appears from Dr. Robertson that the power of the Scottish princes was at that time limited; so much so that an attempt to punish the crimes of a chieftain, or even of his vassals, often excited rebellions and civil wars; and that, as a general thing, the administration of justice was extremely feeble and dilatory. "Under a government so feeble," he adds, "men assumed, as in a state of nature, the right of judging and redressing their own wrongs." There seems to have been a practical abandonment of all just public authority; and each man was in a great degree left, in the protection of his person and rights, to his own efforts. Under such circumstances, might we not reasonably expect that assassinations would be frequent? Was not this state of things essentially a mere transfer of the right of Capital Punishment, which was then universally supposed to exist, from the hands of the magistrates to the hands of individuals? If the right of taking life was acknowledged to be possessed by magistrates, might not private individuals naturally be led to suppose that the same right, in extreme cases, devolved upon them when the magistrate failed to afford protection? And, furthermore, if this condition of things, dreadful as it undoubtedly was, proves that the Scotch people were by nature destitute of a moral sense then, does it not follow that they have no moral sense, no conscience now?

§ 270. Reference to a cruel law of the Athenians.

In connexion with the view of the subject which is now before us, we ask the attention of the reader to a single instance more. At one period of the history of Athens, it was decreed, that when the city was besieged, all the useless people should be put to death. "This," says Montesquieu, "was an abominable political law, *in consequence of an abominable law of nations.* Among the Greeks, the inhabitants of a town taken lost their civil liberty and were sold as slaves. The taking of a town implied its entire destruction, which is the source not only of those obstinate defences and of those unnatural actions, but likewise of those shocking laws which they sometimes enacted."

§ 271. Of diversities and obliquities of moral judgment in connexion with speculative opinions.

Furthermore, we may reasonably expect, in the fourth place, that there will be diversities of moral judgment, based upon diversities in important speculative opinions in morals, politics, and religion, and, in truth, upon almost any subject.—Some years since, the speculative opinion seems to have been prevalent through nearly the whole of the civilized world, that the Negroes were an inferior race, located in the graduation of rank somewhere between the brute animals and man. This was the speculative belief. And what has been the consequence? The fires of desolation have been kindled upon the coast of Africa; villages and towns have been destroyed; a continual war has been kept up among the native tribes; and probably forty millions of persons have been torn away from their native country, and consigned to perpetual slavery.

While this erroneous speculative opinion held possession, to a considerable extent, of the minds of men, the authority of conscience was paralyzed; her voice, if it was heard at all, was feeble, and scarcely excited notice. And why should it be otherwise? If the Negroes are truly an inferior race to white men, dark-

ened in intellect and imbruted in the affections, incapable of taking care of themselves, and, still more, of any intellectual and social advancement, what harm is there in bringing them into vassalage, and making them grind, like the brute animals to which they are so nearly related, in the prison-house of the more favoured species? The difficulty is not so much with the conscience as with the erroneous opinion.

We learn from the memoirs of the Rev. John Newton, of England, a man as much distinguished for his piety as for his intelligence and eloquence, that he was for some years personally engaged in the Slave-trade; and that, too, after he had professed, and, to all appearance, with great sincerity, to be guided by the principles of the Christian religion. Such were the prevalent notions in regard to the blacks, that the traffic does not appear to have occurred to him as being morally wrong. He expressly says: "During the time I was engaged in the Slave-trade, I never had the least scruple of its lawfulness." He pursued it without any of those compunctious visitings, which could not fail to have troubled him if he had regarded them, as surely they ought to be regarded, as children of the same common parent, and as participators, in the view of unprejudiced justice, in the same common inheritance of natural rights. But, at the present time, owing to the meritorious exertions of such men as Clarkson and Wilberforce, and the general progress of just and liberal sentiments, the speculative opinion is in a great degree demolished; the black man stands forth in the eye of philosophy and religion as our brother; and he who engages in this nefarious traffic is branded as an outlaw and a pirate.

§ 272. Further illustrations of the influence of wrong speculative opinions.

The speculative opinion has formerly existed very extensively, and does still to some degree, that the civil authority has a right, in relation to its own subjects, to exact conformity in the matters of religion.

And the result has been, that thousands and hundreds of thousands, at various times and in different countries, have been subjected to imprisonment, the torture, exile, and death. And those who have been the leading agents in these horrible transactions, from an unconverted Saul of Tarsus down to the Lauds and Bonners of later times, have perpetrated them, in their own estimation, with washed hands and a pure heart. They have gone from the Oratory to the dungeon of the Inquisition; they have, with unquestionable sincerity, looked up to heaven for a blessing, as they have applied to their mangled victims the screw and the wheel of torture; they have arisen from the knee of supplication, to kindle, with a pious haste, the fires of Smithfield, and to wield the exterminating sword of the St. Bartholomew. They have done all this merely in consequence of entertaining a wrong speculative opinion *conscientiously*.

§ 273. Of the effect of wrong speculative opinions among heathen tribes.

And if such are the effects of wrong speculative opinions in civilized and Christian lands, what can we reasonably expect will be the result of erroneous opinions in lands which are neither Christian nor civilized? "If they do these things in a green tree, what shall be done in the dry?"—It is a truth of universal application, that a wrong intellect will make a wrong conscience, because it is the nature (and although it sometimes suffers under the application of its own principles, yet, on the whole, it is the excellence and glory of its nature) that it acts in conformity with the intellectual perception.

It is said that Indian mothers on the banks of the Ganges sometimes throw their children into the sacred stream. Is this a proof that they are by nature destitute of the natural affections? Certainly not. Nor is it a proof that they are naturally destitute of a conscience. The whole is probably the result of a wrong speculative opinion, viz., that the gods whom they wor-

ship are in some cases propitiated by these precious sacrifices, and require them to be made. Under these circumstances, they hush, with a fortitude worthy of a better cause, the clamours of parental affection; and in the belief that the will of their gods is paramount to every other claim, they consummate the act of unparalleled cruelty with scarce a whisper of internal condemnation.

It is on the ground, also, of a false speculative opinion of a similar kind that we are probably to account for the system of self-torture, such as falling on spikes of iron, dancing with bamboos thrust through the sides, and swinging on hooks, which is to this day so prevalent in some Eastern nations. Conscience naturally condemns any uncalled-for injury to our persons, and all infliction of unnecessary suffering; but when it is a part of men's settled speculative belief that the will of the gods imposes such suffering and exacts such injury, conscience, acting in conformity with the principles of its own nature, necessarily approves.

§ 274. Influence of early associations on moral judgments.

Our moral judgments, in the fifth place, are sometimes perplexed, and led in a direction different from what they would otherwise be, by means of early associations.—The principle of association does not operate upon the moral capacity directly; it operates indirectly with considerable influence. When a particular action is to be judged of, it calls up, in the mind of different individuals, different and distinct series of accessory circumstances. It has the effect to place the thing, intellectually considered, in a different position. This difference in the tendencies of the associating principle can hardly fail to have considerable effect in modifying the sentiment of approbation or disapprobation resulting from the consideration of any particular action.

Accordingly, when vices are committed by near friends, by a brother or a parent, although they fill us with the deepest grief, it is frequently the case

that they do not excite within us such abhorrence of the actual guilt as we should be likely to feel in other cases. Our prepossessions in favour of the persons who have committed the crime suggest a thousand circumstances, which seem to us to alleviate its aggravation. We frame for them a multitude of plausible excuses, which we should not have thought of doing had it not been for the endearments and intercourse of our previous connexion.—Savage life also gives us an illustration of the views now expressed. Owing to the peculiar situation of those in that state, and the consequent early associations, a factitious and exaggerated importance is attached to mere courage; and gentleness, equanimity, and benevolence are, as virtues, proportionally depressed.

§ 275. Illustration of the principle of the preceding section.

In an expedition to the Rocky Mountains, undertaken some years since by order of the Government of the United States, various interesting facts were ascertained concerning the Savage tribes through which the party passed. Among other things, it was ascertained that the Omawhaws,* a tribe of some note, dwelling at that time a little distance from the river Missouri, are wanting in respectful regard to their old people, and that they look upon them as useless burdens to the community. When the aged go out on a hunting-party, or on warlike expeditions against an enemy, they are sometimes left under a hastily-erected shelter, and are thus permitted to perish after consuming the scanty stock of provisions with which they are furnished.

Here, in all probability, we see the influence of early associations. The Omawhaws are taught, even from the cradle, to attach their chief honour to *active* bravery, to feats in battle, and to achievements in hunting. And they transfer (as a Savage would be likely to do) the unquestionable discredit of moral and physical debility in the earlier periods of life to the

* Long's Expedition to the Rocky Mountains, vol. i., chs. x., xi.

period of old age. They carry these views so far, that when, through want of provisions, some of the tribe or of the party must die, the lot inevitably falls on the aged instead of the young. But we hold that this fact does not necessarily prove these Savages destitute of natural conscience. It does not appear that they expose their old men to death in this way before the exhaustion of their provisions. And the probability is, that when, in that exigency, they leave them to perish, they do it with feelings of regret, and with the consent and choice of the aged sufferers themselves. On the supposition that such are the circumstances under which their old men are exposed, the most that can justly be said is, that the feelings of nature, already weakened by the influence of unfortunate associations, are made to bow to the exigencies of their situation. It may appear that they have a wrong or perverted conscience (that is to say, a conscience led astray by their early habits and associations), in permitting the sacrifice of the aged in preference to that of the young; but it by no means follows that they have no conscience at all. Especially as they are described as being hospitable, so far as they have anything to give; courteous and respectful in their general intercourse, affectionate in their families, and not wanting in justice in the ordinary distribution and management of what little they possess.

Let those who, in civilized lands and under equal governments, are comparatively free from suffering, remember, before they pronounce unfavourably and harshly upon the moral obliquities of others, the intense and uncounted evils which they sometimes endure. The heart that thrilled with sensibility, and was alive to every moral impulse, may be left, in the intensity of bitter experience and of agonized recollections, to the perpetration of deeds of unspeakable horror. A missionary, dwelling among the Natives of South America, once reproached a woman with the fearful crime of having put her own infant daughters to death. She replied to the missionary in words of the following purport:

"Father, if you will allow me, I shall tell you what passes in my mind.—Would to God that my mother, when she brought me forth, had shown as much regard and compassion for me as to have spared me the pain I have hitherto suffered, and must continue to suffer until the end of my days. Had she buried me when I was born, I should not have felt death, and she would have preserved me from all I am indispensably subjected to, as well as from labours more cruel than death is terrifying. Alas! who knows the troubles awaiting me before it arrives? Can a mother do anything more profitable to her daughter than save her from multiplied disasters and a slavery worse than death? Would to God, father, I repeat, would to God that she who gave me life had testified her affection by depriving me of it at my birth: my heart would have had less to endure, and my eyes less to weep."*

§ 276. Of diversities of moral judgment in connexion with an excited state of the passions.

Furthermore, there may be diversities of moral judgment; in other words, the moral nature may occasionally be perplexed and led astray in its action, under the influence of a state of excited passion. The action of all the parts of the mind is a *conditional* one; that is to say, it takes place only under certain assignable circumstances. It is, for instance, one condition of moral action, as we have repeatedly had occasion to notice, that there must be an antecedent perception of the thing, whatever it is, upon which the moral judgment is to be passed. This condition of moral action is violated in the case under consideration, as well as in others. In a time of great excitement of passion, the moral emotion, which would have existed under other circumstances, has failed to arise, because the soul is intensely and wholly taken up with another species of feeling. The perceptive and comparing part of the mind is not in a situation

* Historical Illustrations of the Passions (Anonymous), vol. i., p. 162.

to take a right view of the subject, whatever it is. But after the present passion has subsided, so as to give the person an opportunity to inquire and reflect, the power of moral judgment returns. And at once the individual, who has been the subject of such violence of feeling, looks with horror on the deeds which he has committed. So that the original susceptibility, the existence of which has been contended for, cannot justly be said to be extinct in such cases, although its due exercise, as is sufficiently obvious, is prevented by the accidental circumstance of inordinate passion.

Further: those who imagine that there are no permanent moral distinctions, because they are not regarded in moments of extreme passion, would do well to consider, that at such times persons are unable rightly to apprehend any truths whatever, whether they relate to morals or anything else. A murderer, when drawing the blade from the bosom of his victim, probably could not tell the quotient of sixteen divided by four, or any other simple results in numbers; but certainly his inability to perceive them under such circumstances does not annul numerical powers and distinctions, nor prove the absolute want of a power to perceive them. Why, then, should the same inability take away moral distinctions, or prove the absolute absence of a moral susceptibility?

§ 277. Of the action of the conscience in connexion with strong temptation.

We may add to the considerations which have now been brought forward, that there may be expected to be some diversities in the decisions of the moral sensibility, occasioned by diversities in the degree of temptation which happens to bear upon it. The moral sensibility or conscience, as it developes itself in the feelings of moral obligation, is in immediate contact with the will, and furnishes a powerful motive to action. But the power of these feelings, considered as motives to action, is of course limited; it has its boundaries; it cannot overcome everything. Of

course, if our desires, which are the antagonist principle of action, are very strong, there is a possibility, at least, of the sentiments of duty being overcome. And, in point of fact, this is sometimes the case.

But how does it happen that the feelings of obligation, or sentiments of duty, which so frequently predominate, have less power in these particular cases than the desires? It is because the intellect, under the instigation of the desires, gives a distorted view of things, representing our own claims in the most favourable light, and darkening and depressing the claims of others. The conscience labours under the disadvantage of having before itself an erroneous view of the facts; which have the twofold effect of reacting upon and increasing the intensity of the desires, and, at the same time, of blunting the edge of moral perception. Hence another class of what are called violations of conscience; that is to say, of apparent want of uniformity in its decisions.

Under this head we may properly introduce a statement from the travels of Mungo Park. He is speaking of a tribe of Africans called the Mandingoes. After saying that they discovered an insurmountable propensity to steal the few articles of property which he possessed, he goes on to remark as follows: "For this part of their conduct no complete justification can be offered, because theft is a crime in their own estimation; and it must be observed, that they are not habitually and generally guilty of it towards each other. This, however, is an important circumstance in mitigation; and, before we pronounce them a more depraved people than any other, it were well to consider whether the lower order of people in any part of Europe would have acted, under similar circumstances, with greater honesty towards a stranger than the Negroes acted towards me. It must not be forgotten, that the laws of the country afforded me no protection; that every one was at liberty to rob me with impunity; and, finally, that some part of my effects was of as great value in the estimation of the

Negroes, as pearls and diamonds would have been in the eyes of a European. Let us suppose a black merchant of Hindostan to have found his way into the centre of England with a box of jewels at his back, and that the laws of the kingdom afforded him no security; in such a case, the wonder would be, not that the stranger was robbed of any part of his riches, but that any part was left for a second depredator. Such, on sober reflection, is the judgment I have formed concerning the pilfering disposition of the Mandingo Negroes towards myself. Notwithstanding I was so great a sufferer by it, I do not consider that their natural sense of justice was perverted or extinguished; it was overpowered only for the moment, by the strength of a temptation which it required no common virtue to resist.

"On the other hand, as some counterbalance to this depravity in their nature, allowing it to be such, it is impossible for me to forget the disinterested charity and tender solicitude with which many of these poor heathens, from the sovereign of Sego to the poor women who received me at different times in their cottages when I was perishing of hunger, sympathized with my sufferings, relieved my distresses, and contributed to my safety."*

§ 275. Of the existence of a moral nature in connexion with public robbers and outlaws from society.

In concluding this subject, there are one or two topics remaining which may be worthy of a brief notice.—Those who object to the doctrine of a moral sense will be likely to appeal, in support of their own view of the subject, to the conduct of robbers and outlaws from society. In regard to these persons, we are to consider, in the first place, that they are few in number compared with the whole number of mankind. And the fact that a few persons appear to be destitute of a conscience ought not to be admitted in positive disproof of a doctrine which is supported by

* Park's Travels in Africa, p. 297.

the evidence presented in so great a majority of cases. Furthermore, before the cases of those persons referred to can be entitled to much weight in the present discussion, it might be important to know under what circumstances they seceded from society, and became the enemies of their species. Is it not possible that some, perhaps many, of these individuals were driven into their present evil course by cruel disappointment and poverty, combined with contempt, injustice, and oppression on the part of their fellow-men? It is certainly supposable, under circumstances so trying, that misanthropy, deeply rooted and terrible, may spring up in hearts that, in better days, were distinguished from others only by a higher degree of sensibility and honour.

It is somewhere related, that, a few years since, an Englishman was impressed on board a ship of war. He left behind him a wife and a number of children. The woman some time afterward was found guilty of stealing a piece of cloth, and was executed. At her trial and execution she confessed the crime, and simply mentioned, in extenuation of her guilt, that the deed was committed under the influence of temptation, originating from the extreme want and suffering of herself and her children, consequent on the cruel and constrained absence of her husband. Is it easy to imagine the terrible feelings which must have convulsed the bosom of the husband on his return? With the bitter recollection constantly present to his thoughts that he had himself been torn away from his family by the unfeeling hand of arbitrary power, and that his wife was ignominiously put to death by the same power for a crime of which, unquestionably, his own forced absence was the occasion, it would not be greatly surprising if he became from that moment the enemy of his country and his species, and lived only for revenge. But as we see him afterward a pirate and a robber, burning with hatred and clothed with blood, we are not at liberty to say absolutely that he has no conscience. The truth is, that such over-

whelming feelings of grief, hatred, and revenge have seized the mind, that the conscience, if we may so express it, is smothered beneath them. In the fever and madness of the brain, in the convulsions and clamors around, and above, and beneath it, its still small voice has ceased to be heard.—Things of this nature are obviously to be taken into consideration in forming a just estimate of all cases of this kind.

§ 279. Illustration of the fact that there are the remains of conscientious feeling even in the most depraved of men.

But there is another view which is worthy of notice in connexion with this subject, viz., that among the most depraved and hardened of mankind, among thieves and robbers, we sometimes discover a kindness to one another, and a strict regard to their word as it has been pledged among themselves, and in some cases to others not of their own party, which shows the remains of a moral nature.—Some years since, the island of Sicily, in the Mediterranean Sea, was infested with Banditti. Mr. Brydone gives his readers to understand, in his well-known Tour into that country, that he took some pains to inquire into the character of these robbers. A certain individual, in whom he seems to have had confidence, gave him the following account of them:

"He says, that in some circumstances these banditti are the most respectable people of the island, and have by much the highest and most romantic notions of what they call their point of honour. That, however criminal they may be with regard to society in general, yet, with respect to one another, and to every person to whom they have once professed it, they have ever maintained the most unshaken fidelity. The magistrates have often been obliged to protect them, and even pay them court, as they are known to be perfectly determined and desperate; and so extremely vindictive, that they will certainly put any person to death who has ever given them just cause of provocation. On the other hand, it never was known that

any person who had put himself under their protection, and showed that he had confidence in them, had cause to repent of it, or was injured by any of them in the most minute trifle; but, on the contrary, they will protect him from impositions of every kind, and scorn to go halves with the landlord, like most other conductors and travelling servants, and will defend him with their lives if there is occasion. That those of their number who have thus enlisted themselves in the service of society are known and respected by the other banditti all over the island, and the persons of those they accompany are ever held sacred. For these reasons, most travellers choose to hire a couple of them from town to town, and may thus travel over the whole island in safety."

Mr. Brydone himself further adds in a subsequent passage, "I should have mentioned that they have a practice of borrowing money from the country people, who never dare refuse them; and if they promise to pay it, they have ever been found punctual and exact, both as to the time and the sum, and would much rather rob and murder an innocent person than fail of payment at the day appointed; and this they have often been obliged to do, only in order (as they say) to fulfil their engagements and to save their honour."

§ 280. Of errors in the statements of travellers.

The views which have been presented in this Chapter obviously explain, so far, at least, as to make them consistent with the doctrine of a natural conscience, many of those cases of wrong and cruelty in the conduct of Savage tribes which have attracted so much of the notice of travellers. It is proper, however, in order to have a fair view of the subject, to make one remark more, viz., that the statements which travellers have given of the immoralities, irreligion, and cruelties of such tribes, are in some cases either mistakes of the facts or exaggerations of the facts. Mr. Stewart distinctly asserts that this is the case to a considerable extent; without supposing, however, that, as

a general thing, such mistakes or exaggerations are intentional. In this view Sir James Mackintosh seems to concur. Speaking of the universality of those great social and moral principles which are the guardians of human society, he remarks, "the exceptions, few as they are, will, on more reflection, be found *rather apparent than real.* If we could raise ourselves to that height from which we ought to survey so vast a subject, these exceptions would altogether vanish; the brutality of a handful of Savages would disappear in the immense prospect of human nature, and the murmurs of a few licentious sophists would not ascend to break the general harmony."*

Certainly the probability is, that a full and just statement of the moral condition of Savage tribes, containing not only an exact specification of the facts, but a philosophical analysis of them considered in reference to the peculiarities of their situation, has never been given to the world. In some instances, travellers have been so much influenced by first impressions as to give an intensity and vividness of coloring to their statements, which is far from being warranted by subsequent inquiry. In other instances they have been too hasty in their inductions, and have ascribed a trait of immorality or cruelty to a tribe or nation, which in strictness should have been limited to individuals; and perhaps it may be said, have not, as a general thing, exhibited that degree of philosophical perception and analysis which is requisite to an accurate and just understanding of this subject.

§ 281. Instances in proof of the preceding views.

In some of the early accounts of the Savage tribes of North America (those of Winslow, Hearn, and Colden, for instance), it was confidently asserted that those tribes were destitute of any religion whatever. This was unquestionably a mistake. Winslow afterward corrected it in his Work, entitled, Good News from New-England. "Whereas," he says, "myself

* Discourse on the Law of Nature and of Nations, 2d ed., p. 36.

and others, in former letters, wrote that the Indians about us are a people without any religion or knowledge of any God, therein I erred, though we could then gather no better."*

Niebuhr, a traveller of deserved celebrity and weight, in speaking of the Arabians, makes the following statement, which may be considered as confirmatory of the suggestion that the narrations of travellers are, in some respects at least, to be received with some degree of caution. "Several travellers," he says, "accuse them of being cheats, thieves, and hypocrites. An arbitrary government, which impoverishes its subjects by extortion, can have no favourable influence indeed upon the probity of the nation; yet I can say, from my own experience, that the accusations laid against them have been exaggerated above the facts."† And perhaps it may not be improper for me to add, that, since this chapter was first written, a residence of some months among the Arabs of the Nile and of the vast deserts between Egypt and Palestine gave me some personal opportunities to test the correctness of Niebuhr's statement, and to confirm its truth.

A single other instance will tend to illustrate and confirm what has been said on this subject. It has been narrated by travellers, as a prevalent custom among the uncivilized tribes of Africa, that those mothers who bear twins immediately put one of them to death. On this subject Vaillant speaks of himself as having made particular inquiries. The result of his inquiries was, that some of the tribes, the Gonaquas, for instance, are exempt from this reproach. In other tribes he admits that the crime exists, but asserts it is very rare. He represents the people as revolting at the very idea of it. And in those few cases in which it actually exists, he expressly adds: "It has its source, however incredible it may seem, in the tenderest love. It is a dread of not being able to

* See Francis's Life of Eliot, p. 33.

† Niebuhr's Travels through Arabia and other Countries in the East, sect. xxix., chap. iv.

nourish two children, or of seeing them both perish, that has induced some mothers to sacrifice one of them." And he subsequently makes the further remark: "It would therefore be a great calumny against these people to give as a constant practice a few barbarous actions, which they condemn, and which they belie so well by their conduct."*

CHAPTER IV.

IMMUTABILITY OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS.

§ 282. Remarks on the reality of right and wrong, and on the standard of rectitude which is involved in their existence.

If on some occasion we are asked why we approve of some actions and disapprove of others, the answer which we are very likely to give is, because the action which is approved is RIGHT, and the action which is disapproved is WRONG. If we are asked again why we feel under moral obligation to do some things and to avoid the doing of others, the answer of the same purport will probably be, because the performance in the one case would be RIGHT, while the performance in the other would be WRONG.—This language, if it be properly employed, evidently involves that there is such a thing as right and such a thing as wrong. And the existence of right and wrong further involves, that there is a great standard of Rectitude, by a reference to which the morality of every action is to be measured. This idea we hold to be in the highest sense an important one.

If there is such a thing as right and wrong, and if there is such a thing, as we shall endeavour in this chapter to show, as an immutable distinction between them, it is impossible that the character of human actions, so far as they are done deliberately and voluntarily, should be indifferent. There is a great law, a great rule and measurement of justice held over them, expansive as creation, and lasting as eternity.

* Vaillant's Travels in Africa, p. 296.

§ 283. Of the origin of the ideas or abstract conceptions of right and wrong.

Of the origin of the ideas of right and wrong we have formerly had occasion to speak (vol. i., § 192). Of course it will be the less necessary to delay upon that subject here. It may be proper, however, to remind the reader, that the terms right and wrong (which some, perhaps, might regard as a reason for distrusting the reality and permanency of rectitude) do not express anything which is perceptible by the senses. Whatever Right or Rectitude may be, in itself considered, it is obviously not an object of the mere outward perceptivity; we cannot see it nor touch it; we cannot define its shape nor designate its locality. Nevertheless, it is not a matter in any sense remote or doubtful, but is brought home and fully made known to us in a manner less liable to uncertainty and skepticism, viz., by means of the action of the Internal or Pure Intellect; that is to say, the Intellect, operating in virtue of its own nature, and independently of the direct instrumentality of the senses. It is in this way that we know it, although not under a material shape. Like the Deity himself, it is ever present, but ever invisible; silent, but always operative; enthroned in the centre of the universe, but pervading its utmost limits; and estimating, by the standard of its own perfect and unalterable purity, all moral actions.

It is the business of the moral Sensibility or Conscience, by means of the moral Emotions and the feelings of moral Obligation, to bring us into conformity to this standard, and to indicate all deviations from it. The standard of right, as we have just had occasion to intimate, is revealed in the Intellect; and not in the Intellect acting on the doubtful information of the senses, but by its own inherent and unerring promptings. The power, the object of which is to secure a conformity to this standard, exists in the Sensibilities. Accordingly, it may be added, although men may go astray, and, in point of fact, this is too often the case,

notwithstanding the admonitions of the Conscience, yet Rectitude itself remains unchanged. It is not a mere outside, a mere superficies without any substantiality. Nor is it a mere image, of which it can be said, in the spirit of cavilling and skepticism, that it is inscribed over with characters of doubt and uncertainty. In its developement in the inward vision, it not only reveals itself with a stamp and likeness of its own, which cannot possibly be mistaken for anything else, but it is also true, which is both philosophically and practically of great importance, that it stands in its own nature immutably and eternally based, not, as some seem to suppose, in the fickle foundations of personal interest and of mere positive enactment, but in the unalterableness of the constitution of things.—This, at least, is essentially the view which we feel ourselves obliged to take of it, and which we now propose to support by the following considerations.

§ 284. The immutability of moral distinctions supported by the views which men take of things in their nature or essence.

The doctrine of the permanent nature of Rectitude, and of the immutability of Moral distinctions, seems to find support, in the first place, from the views which men are generally found to take of things in their nature or essence.—Everything which exists necessarily has a *nature;* not merely in the general sense of that term, but a specific nature of its own. "Everything," says Bishop Butler, "is what it is, and not another thing." In other words, there is something (although perhaps that something is wholly unexplainable) which renders the thing that exists what it is in distinction from everything else; some element, some distinctive quality, some primordial characteristic, *something* (we do not profess nor consider it necessary to be exact in the expression of it) which is truly and absolutely essential both to its existence and the mode of its existence, and without which it would not be what it is. And this is equally true, whether the thing in question be made known to us as something material or

immaterial; whether it is objective or subjective, an object which the mind contemplates exterior to itself, or an internal and purely mental modification; whether it be regarded as an independent entity, an attribute, or a mere relation. This seems to be self-evident and undeniable; because, if the thing which exists has not a specific or distinct nature, then it is not a distinct existence, but is identical with something else. And this is so clear that we need not hesitate to assert, although God, to the full extent of his omnipotence, can create things even out of nothing, and can modify them with every possibility of modification, He cannot do either without giving them a nature; without imparting some distinctive element. These simple and common-sense views we may apply to everything which exists or is conceived to exist, to the whole universe of mind and of matter, of thought and of objects of thought.

§ 285. Illustrations of the views of the preceding section.

(1.) Beginning with those things which are addressed to the senses, we may remark, in illustration of what has been said, that every kind of *colour* has something in it by which it is distinguished from every other colour which is truly diverse from it. Every variety of the sensations of taste also, such as sweet, bitter, acrid, sour, has its specific nature (whether we consider the sensation merely, or include the outward cause that produces it), which stamps and characterizes it as such a sensation, and not another one. All the varieties of sound, numerous as they are, have each their peculiarity, their distinctive trait or quality, and which cannot fail, really and for ever, to separate them from all other varieties of sound. In no one of these cases can one sensation or perception be another; each stands by itself in its own nature and essence, and it is not possible even to conceive of them as interchangeable.—(2.) If we turn our attention to those objects of thought which are internal, and which are not so closely connected with and de-

pendant on outward causes, as those things just mentioned, we shall find it to be the same. We are able, by means of that power of Intuitional Suggestion, which constitutes one of the effective elements and characteristics of our mental structure, to frame the abstract notions of existence, unity, identity, succession, number, power, time, space, and the like. And all these have respectively a nature appropriate and peculiar to themselves. Although we are unable to give a verbal definition of Unity or of Time, yet every one knows what is meant by these terms; every one has a knowledge for himself, sufficiently clear and satisfactory for all the common purposes of reasoning and practice. But while, in themselves considered, they lie clear and distinct in our perceptions, we also perceive, with the entire clearness of intuition, that they are not the same; that each has its appropriate sphere; that they stand truly and for ever apart from each other. The same may be said of Space and Power. Both of these are made known to us by the intuitional or suggestional power of the mind alone; and as the mind is the source, so it is the measure of the knowledge which we have of what we thus term. And we may confidently assert that the mind pronounces them not only wholly distinct, but wholly unlike. And it is utterly impossible for the human mind (as we doubt not every one will find on fully making the experiment) to conceive of Power becoming Space, or of Space becoming Power, as much so as to conceive of the actual identity of UNITY and TIME, or of the identity of mere EXISTENCE and SUCCESSION. And it is the same with every other simple notion which we form, whether of external or of internal origin; that is to say, whether wrought in the mind by the presence of some external object, or flowing from its own fulness. Whatever we perceive or feel to exist which is elementary and simple, we never can perceive or feel to exist otherwise than it is; and perceiving it to be just what it is, and nothing else, we cannot possibly perceive it to be something different.—(3.) We might

carry these illustrations into the Sentimentive part of our nature. As an example, every man is capable of putting forth, or, what is, perhaps, a more proper expression of the fact, of *experiencing* the emotions of pleasure and pain; and although it is admitted we cannot give an available definition of these emotions, still every one knows what they are. And if there is any elementary proposition whatever, which is so simple as to be beyond doubt and to possess a truly *intuitive* character, it is, that our experience of pleasure is not the experience of pain, and, on the contrary, our experience of pain is not the experience of pleasure. And, furthermore, the abstract notions which we are obviously able to form of the emotions of pleasure and pain, and which, in point of fact, we always do form whenever we make them the subjects of abstract inquiry and philosophical analysis, are entirely distinct from each other, as well as the emotions themselves. But, in respect to the *emotions* in particular, the pleasure and pain actually experienced, the difference which by nature exists between them is perhaps more fully and promptly recognised. Without the least hesitation, we may appeal to the testimony of any man's consciousness whether it is not utterly impossible for him even to conceive (we do not say of the mere *substitution* of pleasure and pain for each other, which is a wholly different thing) of pleasure, in itself considered and in its own nature, as actually being pain, or of pain, while it exists as pain, as actually being pleasure. In themselves considered and in their own nature, they are utterly, fundamentally, and entirely distinct; so much so that the human mind itself cannot mingle and confound them, without confounding and subverting its own nature as a percipient. Even the Supreme Being, although he may cause, and prolong, and diminish them in particular cases, cannot make them identical. While they exist, there is necessarily something which constitutes and authenticates their existence; and this constitution or nature of the thing can never be any otherwise than what it is.

§ 286. Application of the foregoing views to the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions.

The views which have been given, and which are obviously fundamental, apply to the abstract conceptions of RIGHT and WRONG, as well as to any other thoughts, emotions, or objects of thought which have been referred to. As to the fact that men universally form the notions of RIGHT and WRONG, there can be no question. These ideas take their place as clearly and distinctly in the series of our intellectual conceptions as the notions of *existence*, *personality*, *duration*, *space*, and the like. A person who should be known to be incapable of forming them would be considered an anomaly; a creature altogether out of the line of the ordinary precedents of human nature. And if we are able to frame these notions, as we obviously are, then each of them has its distinctive nature; and if there is any foundation for the remarks and illustrations already given, as we cannot doubt there is, we cannot possibly conceive of them as identical, or interchangeable with each other. They are as truly unlike as our conceptions of *unity* and *time*, or of *space* and *power*. We can no more conceive of their being identical, than we can conceive of the identity of black and white, of bitter and sweet, of pleasure and pain, of love and hatred, of a square and a circle, of a triangle and a hexagon, or of any other things in nature which are entirely diverse from each other. They are placed for ever apart; they respectively occupy their own sphere, and stand upon their own basis; they do indeed sustain a sort of relation to each other, and perhaps it may be said that we cannot have a conception of them without at the same time having some conception of this relation; but this relation itself not only involves their entire diversity, but places them at the greatest possible remove, and stamps them as the direct opposites and antipodes of each other.

Hobbes maintained, and in this he seems to have followed in the track of some ancient philosophers, that our ideas of right and wrong are not representa-

tive of something permanently existing in the nature of things, but are relative to the enactments and operations of human laws and systems of government. In other words, he maintained that nothing is either right or wrong in its own nature, but is made either the one or the other by the laws of the land: what they pronounce to be right *is* right, and what they pronounce to be wrong *is* wrong, without regard to anything else. This is a great fallacy. It is true that the laws of the land can make our conduct, considered in relation to those laws, very different from what it was before their enactment; but this is not because they can, by a direct operation, change virtue into vice or vice into virtue, but simply because they change the circumstances and relations under which that conduct exists. It is just as inconceivable that a mere human law can make an action either virtuous or vicious, while the circumstances under which it is performed remain the same, as that such a law can make black white, pleasure pain, truth falsehood, space time, a square a circle, or make anything else *identical* which is at the same moment and in its very nature *diverse*.

On this great question, therefore, we stand upon strong ground, because we go to the bottom; it is not easy to see that there can be any mistake; but we willingly leave others to judge.

§ 287. The immutability of moral distinctions shown, secondly, from the terms and the structure of languages.

(II.) The unchangeableness of rectitude and the immutability of moral distinctions is shown, in the *second* place, from the terms and the structure of all languages.—So far as we have been able to notice, those writers who object to the doctrine under consideration do for the most part resolve rectitude into some form of good and happiness on the one hand, or into some form of enactment and law on the other. This is the predominant direction and train of thought among them. But do the terms and the structure of the different languages which are spoken by men sus-

tain this course? Certainly not. We are not ignorant that Horne Tooke, in his Diversions of Purley, has endeavoured to show, by etymological considerations, that the English word *right* is, in its original import, synonymous with the words *commanded* or *ordered*. But the question is, not what is the derivation of the English word *right*, nor what was the specific import of its root, but what is its precise meaning at the present time? There certainly can be no great obscurity or misapprehension in regard to it; it is a word used by writers of no doubtful powers of discernment; it is often enough found in those great masters of pure English, Fox and Burke, Junius and Chatham.

But while we assert that it is not obscure, we do not hesitate to admit that it is undefinable, which is necessarily the case when we consider that it is the name of a simple, inseparable element of thought. It nevertheless lies clear and distinct in every one's conceptions; and if, in consequence of its being the name of a simple idea, we cannot define what it is, we can unhesitatingly assert what it is *not*. And, accordingly, we do not hesitate to insist, that the term *right* is used at the present time as expressive of something distinct from mere personal good, interest, or happiness. On a multitude of occasions, men use the terms interest, personal good, and happiness as expressive of what, in their own opinion at least, is so far from being identical with right or justice, that it is at the very greatest remove from it. There are some men who have unceasingly pursued their interest all their days, and who, if interest and rectitude are identical, ought to be accounted exceedingly *upright* men, instead of being stigmatized by the unanimous voice of the public, as they very justly are, with the character of base, dishonest, and unrighteous. There is hardly any practical distinction so frequently made, and made with so good reason, too, as that of acting from views of interest in the shape of some personal good, and acting from views of right and duty. If men have occasion

to intrust their property and the management of their affairs to others, they invariably make distinctions; they inquire as to traits of character; it is not enough to tell them that their proposed agents are men more or less influenced by views of interest; they wish to know, and are not often satisfied short of knowing, whether they are men of honesty, men of uprightness. If they have occasion to address motives to their fellow-men, in order to induce them to pursue a certain course, we again find them making distinctions, and addressing some motives to their views of interest, and, as a distinct consideration, addressing others to their convictions of rectitude. But it can hardly be considered necessary to give instances of what is so palpable in the transactions of the whole mass of society. What is true of the English language, what is true of the Latin—where we find the terms *utile* and *honestum* conveying what we express in English by the interested or beneficial and the upright—will undoubtedly be found to be true of all other languages, which are so far developed as to be anything like an adequate mirror of the perceptions and feelings of those who speak them.

Men also universally make a distinction between what is right and what is merely ordered or commanded; between the legality of an action or course of action, and its moral rectitude, as we shall have occasion to remark more particularly hereafter.—Now it is to be kept in mind, that language, in its terms and in its structure, is an index, an expositor (and, perhaps, more completely so than almost anything else) of the opinions and belief of mankind. If it be indisputably true that men in all parts of the world use words with this distinction of meaning, we may look upon it as absolutely certain that they suppose and fully believe that such a distinction actually exists. And this universality of belief, like everything else, must have its adequate cause; but we are unable to lay our hands on such a cause, except it be that the very structure and action of the human mind does of itself develope clear

and abundant evidence of the distinction in question, marking out lucidly the province of rectitude or virtue, and separating it from that of every other possible motive. The human mind, in its structure and its original and natural action, cannot lie, if the God from whom it came is a God of truth; and constructed as it is, and acting as it does, if it clearly announces the distinction between rectitude on the one hand, and mere personal interest and mere authoritative command on the other (insulating it, and placing it on an immoveable basis of its own), then it is certainly true that such a distinction actually has place, and that there is truly such a separate, appropriate, and unchangeable position of virtue.

§ 288. The immutability of moral distinctions shown, thirdly, from the operation of the passions of gratitude and anger.

(III.) We have evidence, in the *third* place, of the independent and immutable nature of moral right, from the manner in which feelings of gratitude and anger are exercised in view of the reception of supposed benefits or injuries.—We have already had occasion (§ 211) to refer to this subject, in support of the general doctrine that man has a moral nature. We introduce it again, and nearly in the same terms, in order to illustrate more specifically the existence of right and wrong, and the unchangeable difference between them. Man is so constituted that feelings of gratitude follow favours or benefits bestowed. And, on the other hand, feelings of dissatisfaction and anger follow the infliction of injuries. The argument which we here offer depends upon the alterations which are found suddenly to take place in the exercise of these feelings. If, for instance, in some period of great misfortune and poverty, a stranger freely gives us a sum of money, and thereby relieves us from our distresses, we feel a degree of gratitude to him. We have received an essential benefit, and we cannot help feeling grateful. But if we shortly afterward discover that, in bestowing this gift, he was influenced ex-

clusively by personal and selfish motives, by some anticipation of ultimate benefit to himself, our feelings of gratitude at once cease; it is impossible that we should be grateful to him under such circumstances. We very justly conclude that no moral merit attaches to him, in consequence of the bestowal of his gift, and that he has not the least possible claim upon us for feelings of that description. But it will be noticed, that we ourselves are just as much benefited by his gift as if he had bestowed it from purely benevolent motives, while, at the same time, we may suppose that the personal and self-interested objects of the donor are secured. Here are benefits on both sides, to the giver and the receiver. Now if mere interest, if mere benefit to ourselves or others, did of itself, and independently of all other considerations, constitute right or virtue, then our feeling of gratitude would not change; the circumstance of the man's acting from interested motives would make no difference; we should be just as grateful to him for his kindness as we were at first. But this is not the case; and such is the constitution of our nature that it cannot possibly be the case. We accordingly have here very striking evidence, that the circumstance of an action's being a beneficial one to the agent, or even to any one else, does not necessarily make it a right one; and that mere self-interest or good to ourselves is very far from being identical with uprightness.—And it is essentially the same under the reception of supposed injuries. We are at such times dissatisfied, indignant, angry, and have reason to be so. But if we subsequently discover that the sufferings which we have endured were occasioned by mere accident or by some unavoidable necessity, without any degree of ill-feeling or evil intention, our feelings at once change; we may grieve and lament at what has happened, but it is impossible, in any proper sense of the term, to be longer angry. Now, although our feelings in respect to the person who has injured us are changed, we may suppose that we ourselves suffer just as much as we did

before, but still we do not feel at liberty to make our suffering the measure of the evil intention or wrong. That is something which we intuitively perceive to stand by itself, independently of any results which may have happened, and which is to be estimated, not by a reference to any accidental circumstances whether favourable or unfavourable, but from a contemplation of its own nature. All these considerations go to show, that in every case of voluntary conduct which is not perfectly indifferent, there is a right or wrong; which right or wrong, whatever may be their attendants and accessories, cannot be resolved into mere happiness and unhappiness, into mere good and evil, or into anything else.

§ 289. Shown, in the fourth place, by the character of the emotions which arise in view of actual instances of right and wrong.

(IV.) That there is an immutable standard of right and wrong, is shown, in the fourth place, by the existence and character of those emotions which are always found to arise within us when any instance of right or wrong in actual life comes under our notice. The origin of the abstract notions of right and wrong is, where Cudworth has placed it, in the INTELLECT, using the term in distinction from the sentient part of our nature. We are so constituted, that, whenever occasions of actual right or wrong occur, these ideas or *intellections* (if we may use a good term, though somewhat antiquated) naturally and necessarily arise within us. God has so constituted us, that, in the matter of Morals, the intellect has a share as well as the sensibilities. It is the intellect, sometimes we say the *pure* intellect (that is to say, the intellect, wholly disconnected in its action from the senses), which makes known to us the abstract conception, the pure and beautiful ideality of rectitude, and which, therefore, constitutes for every action an inflexible rule or standard of right or wrong; but it is the Moral Sensibility or Conscience which makes known to us and to others whether we or they approximate to or di-

verge from that standard. Now, if we look into this interesting and important part of our mental nature (that is to say, into the *conscience*), and consider the emotions which have their origin there, we shall have additional evidence of the truth of our doctrine. In every instance of moral conduct, there is abstractly a right or wrong pertaining to that conduct; it is the province of conscience, in the exercise of those emotions of approval and disapproval which are appropriate to it, to determine which of the two it is. In other words, there is applicable to every instance of moral conduct the immutable standard of rectitude; and it is the province of conscience to determine whether the action in question is conformable to that rule or not. Conformity to the standard of rectitude is approved, divergency from it is disapproved; and the intensity of the emotions of approval or disapproval, if the conscience be not perverted, as it sometimes is, will be in proportion to the greater or less degree of divergency from the immutable rule. Now here is a distinct class of emotions, the emotions of moral approval and disapproval, which, when we consult our consciousness in respect to them, we know to be essentially different from emotions of beauty, of sublimity, of the ludicrous, and from all other emotions; we know them to have a specific nature of their own, to be *sui generis*. Every person who is acquainted with the philosophy of the mind, knows that every class of emotions has its specific and appropriate objects. And what are the objects which are the basis of these emotions? in other words, what are the objects in connexion with which they are found to exist, and not otherwise? Undoubtedly human actions, in connexion with the great fact derived from the original and unalterable suggestions of the intellect, that they are placed under the surveillance and the requisitions of the immutable standard of rectitude. Actions thus circumstanced, and nothing else (neither beauty, nor interest, nor fame, nor any other possible object of contemplation and pursuit), are the appropriate ob-

jects of these emotions. They do not arise on any other occasions; they disdain to have anything to do with lower objects; they elevate themselves to a higher mark; they inquire not for the pleasure of actions nor for the emolument of actions, but for the right or wrong of actions. This is the true account of these emotions; and they therefore take for granted, in their very nature, the reality of Right in distinction from everything else, and the real and immutable separation of right from wrong.

But perhaps it will be said, that if mere personal interest, good, or happiness does not constitute right, that authority and law does. Is not human law, within the acknowledged sphere of its operation, the rule of duty? Does it not constitute the standard of right to those who come within its reach? And especially the Divine law, the express will of the Supreme Being, is not that the source of rectitude on the one hand and of crime on the other; of rectitude when it is obeyed, and of crime when it is disobeyed? These questions undoubtedly are worthy of consideration. We do not feel disposed to avoid an answer to them, even if it were practicable. Something has already been said having a bearing upon them; but we will let them have a distinct place, without, however, breaking the train of thought or altering the form of the argument.

§ 290. Shown, in the fifth place, from the deportment and conduct of individuals, and from the character of codes of law and civil institutions.

(V.) The doctrine of the permanent nature of Rectitude and of the Immutability of moral distinctions, finds support, in the *fifth* place, from what we notice of the moral judgments of mankind in respect to the deportment and conduct of individuals, and also in respect to the character of codes of law, civil institutions, and forms of government. If the human mind were so constituted as to receive the doctrine as a fundamental truth, that Law of itself, whether human or divine, necessarily within the sphere of its opera-

tion, constitutes whatever it ordains *right*, and whatever it prohibits *wrong*, then men would universally agree in the application of this standard of rectitude, and would not feel the least compunction or hesitation in justifying all actions whatever which might happen to be performed under the requisitions of law. But this is not the fact. In a multitude of cases, the conduct of men, acting under the forms and requisitions of law, is condemned by the general voice of mankind as utterly unjustifiable and wrong.

One or two instances (perhaps, however, less to the purpose than some others which might be adduced) will illustrate what we mean. In the year 1605, the Dutch Government, being then engaged in a fierce war with Spain, gave orders that Spanish prisoners, in retaliation of like severities alleged against the Spaniards, should be put to death. With these orders the Dutch Admiral Hautain set sail to intercept a re-enforcement of Spanish soldiers that were understood to be on their way to Flanders. Having succeeded in capturing them, as was expected, he ordered five companies, in obedience to the commands of the Dutch Government, to be tied together in pairs, and, at a given signal, to be thrown overboard into the sea. This diabolical transaction certainly finds no response in the human bosom. The heart and the conscience of mankind rise up against it as a great abomination, however it may have been sanctioned by law, and provoked by the severities of the opposing party.

The massacre of St. Bartholomew was perpetrated by public authority, and under the plausible forms of law; but it was a requisition on the very face of it so high-handed and atrocious, that a number of Roman Catholic officers, acting at the almost certain risk of the displeasure of the French Government, refused to lend their agency to carry it into effect. Did they, or does any one else suppose that the mere order of the French Government affected either the right or wrong of that massacre? Had it not in itself a character

heaven-daring, atrocious, black, even to the utmost limit of moral turpitude? But this could not be, if human law were in itself and necessarily a source of rectitude, and could spread the mantle of justice over all its requisitions. But it is not necessary to take up time with such instances. It is enough to observe, that men everywhere and in all ages of the world make a distinction between a legal enactment and the *justice* of that enactment, between the *form* and *matter* of a law and its *rectitude;* constantly pronouncing, with the utmost propriety of language and with the utmost truth in fact, one law to be right and another to be wrong, which would be abundantly absurd if the law itself were the source and the measure of right. In the same way men pronounce their opinions upon codes of law, taken as a whole, and upon systems of government. When the laws of Solon are pronounced to be wise and just, and, on the other hand, the code of Draco to be unjust, and in all similar cases, there is an obvious implication that justice is not necessarily identical with the mere requisition of government; that *right* is something above and beyond mere human law; revolving in a higher sphere; spreading abroad a light of its own, and holding all actions, all minds, all systems of government, and all laws amenable to itself.

It will be seen that we bring the subject here to the test of the common feeling and the common sense of mankind. Although sound philosophy clearly asserts and confirms the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions, and wholly denies the opposite doctrine that the distinction between right and wrong is a merely prescribed and arbitrary thing, dependant upon the enactment or will of some lawgiver, and, of course, subject to change with every change in such enactment, still it cannot be said with any justice that the doctrine in question rests solely upon abstract, philosophical inquiry. It is emphatically, as is evident from the remarks which have just been made, the doctrine of common sense. There is hardly a

day passes when we do not hear in common conversation, and from those who have not had the advantages of a philosophical education, remarks made and opinions expressed which obviously involve it. You may be able to perplex a plain and illiterate man with subtle distinctions, to such a degree, perhaps, that he will not be able to give a prompt and satisfactory answer; but you will as soon overthrow his belief in his own personal identity, as convince him that right is not right, or that wrong is not wrong, or that any power on earth, to say the least, can make right wrong or wrong right. This is one of those cases where philosophy may confirm the opinions of the great mass of mankind if she pleases; but to overthrow or even to unsettle them is not at her option.

§ 291. The doctrine further shown from the opinions which mankind entertain of the character and government of God.

(VI.) The doctrine under consideration is supported, in the *sixth* place, by the opinions which mankind generally entertain of the character and the administration of the Supreme Being.—Some persons may be disposed to admit that human laws are not in themselves the source of right and wrong, and, at the same time, be strongly inclined to maintain that it is otherwise with the laws which emanate from God. They hold that the will of God, and nothing but the will of God, constitutes whatever of a moral nature takes place throughout the universe, either right or wrong. But the doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions (in other words, that moral right and wrong always has its foundation ultimately in the nature and relations of things), if it be capable of being established at all, and has any real basis whatever, is of universal application; it reaches everywhere, and everywhere asserts the distinction between mere will and justice, between power and equity.—We proceed then to remark, that this doctrine, notwithstanding the exceptions now hinted at, is supported by the

opinions of the great mass of mankind in relation to the character and the administration of the Deity.

In the opinion which mankind generally form of the Supreme Being, we notice that they always include the idea of right, equity, or justice. They never think of him as a God possessed of knowledge or power merely, but as a God of righteousness. And they constantly speak of Him as a just, holy, or righteous Being. Whatever He does, they assert, is done rightly or justly. Now, unless we suppose, which we certainly are not at liberty to do, that they apply these epithets without any meaning, we are to regard these terms as expressing a distinct and important fact in their belief. But this is not true if the doctrine under consideration be false. For, if God's will or mere enactment constitutes of itself, and independently of everything else, all right and wrong, then the assertion that God is right or just, and does justly, is obviously an identical proposition; and is the same as to say that he is what he is, and does what he does. But we do not suppose any one will pretend to say that men use terms with such an absence of all meaning. They obviously have a clear perception of the distinction between power and equity, between the mere command and the justice of that command in their own case, and in the applications of human power and laws generally; and they apply the distinction without any hesitation to the character and doings of the Supreme Being. And they not only apply the distinction, but they obviously involve in it the same great ultimate fact which is implied when they apply it to men, viz., that Rectitude is a thing which is not dependant on mere power, enactment, or will in any case whatever.

For instance, a preacher asserts, in the presence of his congregation, that the law of God is holy, just, and good; everybody understands it; everybody assents to it. But if he should go on to state that the Law is just because it is a Law, and for that reason solely, and that, if it were directly the opposite, it

would be equally just for the same reason, they would undoubtedly reject the statement at once as utterly inconsistent with the common feelings and common sense of mankind. If they are not capable of making philosophical distinctions, they are so constituted, in the very elements of their moral nature, as to entertain a far higher notion of a *just* law than such a statement would imply. They may be asked what they mean by right; what they mean by the immutability of moral distinctions; what they mean by the nature of things; but although, as has already been remarked, they may be puzzled in giving an answer, they are not at all perplexed and darkened in their perceptions; and would as soon be brought to disbelieve in the truth of the simplest mathematical axioms, as to disbelieve in the distinction, the utter and immutable distinction, between right and wrong, justice and injustice.

§ 292. Further remarks on the subject of the last section.

It will, of course, be understood, that we would not be guilty of the impiety of suggesting that God ever does in fact otherwise than right, or that his Law ever is, or can be, otherwise than perfectly just. What we mean to say is, that God is not just in his acts simply because he has power to perform those acts, and that his Law is not just simply and solely because it is a Law; which, if we are not wrong in our views, would involve the annihilation of all justice whatever. The doctrine of the immutability of moral distinctions does not, as some might be led to suppose on a slight examination of it, set up an authority in opposition to that of God, but merely asserts a great fact in the nature of things, which, in whatever point of view it may be contemplated, is entirely, and in all cases whatever, consistent with his character and his acts. If it be true, as undoubtedly it is, that God cannot, by a mere volition, make right wrong or wrong right, it is not the less so that this does not in any respect militate with his essential attributes. It constitutes no

derogation from his perfections, and interposes no obstacle to the administration of his affairs. And we here take the liberty to inquire of those who hold that the doctrine under consideration is derogatory to the character of the Supreme Being, whether there are not other things, besides the distinction of right and wrong, which do not depend upon his mere arbitrary will. It certainly, so far as we can perceive, does not depend upon the mere enactment or will of God whether a thing shall exist or not exist at the same time. The mere supposition implies something which is inconceivable. It does not depend upon his mere choice or will (and we hope it may be said without incurring the suspicion of any want of due reverence for his exalted character) whether three and three shall make six, and four multiplied by four shall make sixteen; whether the whole shall be greater than a part, and things equal to the same shall be equal to one another; whether there shall be motion without change of place, or figure without extension; whether the three angles of a triangle shall be equal to two right angles; or whether a square, circle, and triangle shall be different figures. These are things which it seems to be universally conceded do not depend upon the will of God or of any other being; and it is impossible that they should. But if we are right in our supposition that no one regards this as derogatory to the character of the Supreme Being, why is it more so that there is an immutable distinction between right and wrong; that whatever is right or wrong to-day will be right or wrong (all the circumstances of the action remaining precisely the same) to-morrow, next day, next year, and forever?

§ 293. Further proof from a consideration of the relation which the doctrine bears to the original and permanent character of the Supreme Being.

(VII.) In the *seventh* place, if the distinction between right and wrong be not permanent and immutable, but depends wholly upon God's volition, then, antecedently to such volition, God himself could

not have possessed a moral character, but must have been destitute of all moral excellence.—Obviously the act of volition implies, whenever it takes place, the antecedent existence of the being who puts forth such volition. If there is anything self-evident, it certainly is so that there can be no volition unless there is a being already actually existent from whom the volition proceeds. But if moral distinctions be not involved in the nature of things, but are subsequent to a particular volition, which volition creates them, and brings them into entity and form, then moral rectitude was not predicable of God nor of any other being until he had put forth such volition. If morality, which of course involves the distinction between right and wrong, be a matter of *creation*, then the Divine character must necessarily have been a moral blank until the act of creation had taken place. It was necessarily, in a moral point of view, neither morally good nor evil; because, by the supposition, the distinction between moral good and evil was not yet established. The volition had not yet come to its birth; the resolve of the Most High was still dormant; the command had not been issued which was destined to call up virtue from its unexistent state, to dislodge it from the chaotic mixture of other elements, and give it an impress and character. The Supreme Being, therefore, antecedently to the origination of morality (whether that origination took place sooner or later, after the lapse of a million of years or of a single moment), was necessarily destitute of moral perfections.

And this is not all. If right and wrong are not immutable, but are liable to be abolished or to be interchanged with each other by a mere enactment or volition, then it cannot be said with propriety and truth that God is *immutably* a holy or just being. If he can, by a mere command, change virtue into vice or vice into virtue, he can certainly destroy all moral excellence whenever he pleases, and blot it out from the universe. If his Law can create the distinction of right and wrong, his Law can also annihilate

it. If morality depends upon his arbitrary and unrestricted volition, it of course depends upon it in the same way in which the creation or destruction of a world depends upon it. And whenever he issues his overwhelming fiat, the columns of the moral universe will crumble and fall to pieces as readily as those of the physical. On this system, the Being whom we worship and adore to-day as holy, just, righteous, may to-morrow undergo the erasure of his own volition, and not exhibit one trait of holiness, justice, righteousness.—It will perhaps be said that we have the authority of his own word for the permanency of his moral perfections; in other words, that he has promised he will continue to manifest and to do justice. Granted. But why is he bound to keep his word? Because there is a right and wrong in the case; because, as an incident to this right and wrong, there is a moral obligation, a duty, which is firm and immutable. Here, undoubtedly, is firm footing; but on the opposite system, which makes right and wrong depend on a mere enactment or volition, the obligation to keep his word may cease whenever he wills it to be so; and his word, his law, his moral excellences may all suddenly sink together, and the Being whom we worship as perfectly spotless and holy may become a Spirit of unmixed and unmitigated evil.

§ 294. Of the proofs of this doctrine from the appeals which are made in various parts of the Scriptures.

(VIII.) Finally, if we rightly understand the Revelation which God, in his great goodness, has made to the children of men, He has himself taken the ground, not only that the principles of rectitude are eternal and immutable, but that he himself, with all his transcendent excellences, is amenable, and desires to be considered as amenable, to them. He speaks of his throne not only as established, but as established in *righteousness*. He speaks of himself not merely as the Creator, not merely as a God of wisdom and power, but as a just, a holy, a righteous God. And these

expressions are employed so frequently and in such connexions as to place it beyond all doubt that they have a distinct and substantive meaning, and are not identical in their import with expressions which intimate his ascendency, power, or greatness. And not only this, he seems to have authorized the whole universe of moral and intelligent beings (the human race in particular, among others) to act as arbiters and judges in the case, whether his character and conduct are not in all respects in perfect accordance with the requisitions of that fixed and immutable rectitude, which exists interwoven and imbedded in the very nature and constitution of things. He does not, in moral things, impose mere arbitrary commands, but only such commands as he can support by an appeal to their own moral judgments. And such appeals are actually made in a number of instances, as in the following passages: "Oh, my people, what have I done unto thee? And wherein have I wearied thee? *testify against me!*" "Come, now, and let us *reason* together, saith the Lord." And again he says, in a tone of authority and rebuke: "Yet ye say, the way of the Lord is not equal. Hear now, oh house of Israel, is not my way equal? Are not your ways unequal?" He then goes on to state the great principles of his moral government, in their application to the wicked and the righteous, and appeals to them as judges whether he is not just. And again he says, "Ah now, oh inhabitants of Jerusalem, and men of Judah, *judge*, I pray you, betwixt me and my vineyard. What could have been done more to my vineyard that I have not done in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?" And in another passage, "Thus saith the Lord, what *iniquity* have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me, and have walked after vanity, and have become vain?"*

From these, among other passages of Scripture, it appears that God does not require his rational off-

* Ezek. xviii., 29. Micah vi., 8. Isaiah i., 18; v., 3, 4. Jerem. ii. 5.

spring to approve his enactments on the ground solely of their proceeding from himself, but is willing that they should exercise their own powers of examination, and judge for themselves whether they are right or not. But this implies that justice on the one hand, and command or law on the other, are different; and that, whenever the law is just, it is not so merely because it is commanded, but for other reasons. And we may here with propriety inquire, whether there is not much satisfaction in the thought that the foundations of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, are thus deeply and immutably laid. If it were true that God himself could overthrow or demolish them, would it not be a source and occasion of great perplexity and dismay? For such a supposition would necessarily involve the possibility of an utter change in his own character. If, in our contemplations of the Supreme Being, it should occur to us, as a thing merely possible, that those high perfections which we now reverence and adore could be transmuted into vices, it would certainly diminish our reverence, disturb our confidence, and fill us with unspeakable alarm. But this certainly is possible, if the distinction of right and wrong is not fixed and immutable, but depends wholly on the Divine Will.

§ 295. Remarks in conclusion of what has been said on this subject.

Such are some of the considerations which are commended to the attention of the reader. We leave the subject with this practical remark, namely, that uprightness or virtue is an object to be contemplated *in itself*, and to be loved and practised for its own sake. This is the natural and logical sequence of the doctrines which have been laid down. The doctrine, which is sometimes taught in books and in places of education, that a thing is virtuous or vicious, right or wrong, without regard to its intrinsic nature or relations, but merely because it proceeds from the command of another or because it has a close connexion with our personal interest, greatly lowers the standard

of moral excellence. Virtue is not secondary to something else, but is primary; it has an entity and a character of its own; of all moral objects and influences, it is highest in rank; it is the great illuminating point of mind, as the sun is the great illuminating centre of matter. And youth, instead of being permitted to gaze upon the IGNIS FATUUS of expediency or any other false fire of earth, should be taught to fix their eye upon that great and heavenly light, to contemplate it, to honor it, to love it. They should be so imbued with the love of virtue as to inquire, as it were by a sort of *instinct*, not whether an action is required by one high in power or promises to be of some personal benefit, not whether it will advance the interests of a particular sect or party, but, in all cases, whether it is RIGHT. With such a training of their moral dispositions, they will stand firm when everything is shaken and in commotion around them; they will have strength in themselves, a strength not of earth; they will go forth amid the darkness and perplexities of life, surrounded with a light emanating from their own bosoms, and under the smiles of an approving God.

CHAPTER V.

MORAL EDUCATION.

§ 296. Suggestions on the importance of moral education.

WE do not feel at liberty to leave the subject of the Moral Sensibilities without offering a few remarks, chiefly of a practical nature, on the subject of moral education in general. It is perhaps unnecessary to occupy time in attempting to show the importance of such education, since no one can be ignorant of the deplorable consequences which follow from an utter neglect of it. But, notwithstanding the general concession of its importance, it has ever held a subordinate rank compared with that purely intellectual education which deals wholly with the mere acquisition of knowledge.

While no one presumes to assert that moral education is unimportant, it must be acknowledged that it has been exceedingly neglected, in consequence of the greater value which has generally been attached to that training of the mind which has exclusive relation to its intellectual part. Children and youth have been taught with great zeal in everything where the head is concerned, in grammar, geography, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and the like; but with much less care in those things which concern the heart. No pains have been spared in favour of the intellect; while the sentimentive part of our nature, the moral emotions, the lower modifications of desire, and the affections, have been left, in too great a degree, to take care of themselves.

Supposing this to be nearly the real state of things, every reflecting mind must contemplate it with regret, and will look forward with great interest to the time when moral education shall at least be put on a footing with intellectual, if it do not take the precedence of it. Certain it is that a firm and ample foundation is laid for this species of mental training, if the doctrines which have been advanced in the course of this Work are correct: FIRST, that we have *intellectually* the power of forming the abstract conceptions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, which necessarily involves that there is an immutable standard of rectitude; and, SECOND, that, in the department of the Sensibilities, we have, in correspondence with the fact of such an immutable standard, the implanted principle of the Moral Sensibility or Conscience, which, in the Emotive form of its action, indicates our conformity to the standard of rectitude or divergency from it, and in its Obligatory action authoritatively requires conformity. We assert that we have here basis enough for a consistent and durable moral education, especially when we take into view the close connexion existing between the conscience and the intellect, particularly the reasoning power.

§ 297. The mind must be occupied at an early period either with good or bad principles.

It may perhaps be suggested here, admitting the general fact of the great importance of moral education, that it would be better to leave the subject of morals until persons are old enough to decide on all subjects of this nature for themselves. This suggestion would be entitled to more weight, if it were possible in the mean while for the mind to remain a moral blank. But this does not appear to be the case. As the mind is continually operative, it is almost a matter of course that it receives, and, as it were, incorporates into itself, moral principles either right or wrong. We are surrounded with such a variety of active influences, that he who is not imbued with good cannot reasonably expect to be uncontaminated with evil. In order, therefore, to prevent the contaminations of vice, it is necessary to preoccupy the mind by the careful introduction and the faithful cultivation of the elements of virtue. Let the young mind, therefore, the minds of children and youth, be made the subjects of assiduous moral culture.

The doctrine which was formerly advanced by Rousseau and others, that children and youth are incapable of receiving moral and religious ideas, and of sustaining a character on moral principles, is unsound in point of fact and most pernicious in its tendency. All experience goes against it. In France, where it has found its most numerous advocates, its evils have been very deeply felt. A recent French writer, who cannot be suspected of giving unfavourable representations of his countrymen without a cause, thinks that the widely-spread domestic corruption and miseries which he acknowledges to exist can be corrected only by a greater attention to early moral education. This remark implies that the origin of those evils is chiefly to be found in the abandonment (or, at least, great *neglect*) of such education, without which, it must be obvious to every judicious mind, that individual happiness will be exceedingly diminished, that the peace

of families will be put at hazard, and that the props and securities of the commonwealth will be dislocated and swept away.

§ 298. Of the time when moral instruction and discipline ought to commence.

We cannot but conclude, therefore, that a course of moral training ought to be commenced at an early period. It is a truth sufficiently established, that we begin to learn as soon as we begin to exist. The infant no sooner comes into the world than the mind expands itself for the reception of knowledge as naturally as the flower opens its rejoicing leaves to the rising sun. The earnestness which it discovers, as it turns its eye towards the light or any bright object, its expression of surprise on hearing sudden and loud sounds, its strong propensity to imitate the actions and words of its attendants, all show most clearly that the work of intellectual developement is begun.

While no one doubts this early developement of the intellect, it has not been so generally admitted to be true of the pathematic and moral part of our nature. But there is no sufficient ground, as we have already had occasion to intimate, for a distinction in this respect; the developement of the head and the heart, of the intellect and the sentient nature, begins essentially at one and the same time. It is true that the perceptive or intellectual action is necessarily antecedent in the order of nature; but the sentimentive action, both natural and moral, follows closely and perseveringly in its train. And this also may be added, viz., that the developement of the moral nature in its leading outlines appears to be sooner completed. Facts and the relations of facts, which are the subjects of the intellectual activity, are infinite. But the great principles of morals, however multiplied they may be in their applications, are in themselves few and simple. How few persons of the age of fourteen or sixteen years have completed their attainments in knowledge, and have fully unfolded and strengthened

all their intellectual powers! And yet how many of the same age have established such a decided moral character, either for good or evil, as almost to preclude the hope of a correction of its deformities in the one case, or the enhancement of its beauties in the other!

§ 299. Of the discouragements attending a process of moral instruction.

And here we would remark upon one discouragement which frequently attends the efforts of those who are so situated as to render it especially their duty to impart instruction to the young. We refer to the fact that it is sometimes, and but too frequently the case, that they see but little immediate good results from their labours. They can see distinctly the advancement of their pupils in that knowledge which is appropriate to the intellect, but are less able to measure their progress in what pertains to the moral culture. Indeed, they too often believe that their instruction is seed sown upon stony ground, which is not only unproductive at present, but is absolutely and forever lost.

This is a great mistake. The truth is, that nothing is lost. The moral and religious instruction which is communicated to the youthful memory, is deposited in the keeping of a power which may sometimes slumber, but can never die. It may long be unproductive; it may remain for years without giving signs of vivification and of an operative influence, and yet it may only be waiting for some more favourable and important moment, when it shall come forth suddenly and prominently to view. No one, therefore, ought to be discouraged in the discharge of this duty. In nothing is the Scriptural declaration more likely to be fulfilled in its richest import. "Cast thy bread upon the waters, and thou shalt find it after many days."

Multitudes of illustrations might be introduced to confirm the views of this section. How natural is the following incident! And how agreeable, therefore, to sound philosophy!—"When I was a little

child," said a religious man, "my mother used to bid me kneel beside her, and place her hand upon my head while she prayed. Ere I was old enough to know her worth, she died, and I was left much to my own guidance. Like others, I was inclined to evil passions, but often felt myself checked, and, as it were, drawn back by the soft hand upon my head. When I was a young man I travelled in foreign lands, and was exposed to many temptations; but when I would have yielded, *that same hand was upon my head*, and I was saved. I seemed to feel its pressure as in the days of my happy infancy, and sometimes there came with it a voice in my heart, a voice that must be obeyed: Oh, do not this wickedness, my son, nor sin against thy God."

§ 300. Of the importance, in a moral point of view, of adopting correct speculative opinions.

But while we assert that there is ample basis in the mental constitution for a moral education, that this education ought to be commenced at an early period, and that such a course of training has its due share of encouragements, we acknowledge that it is not an easy thing in a few words to point out the characteristics, and to indicate the outlines of a system of moral culture. Accordingly, we shall not attempt it any further than to add a few general suggestions. We proceed, therefore, to remark, that suitable pains ought to be taken to introduce into the young mind correct speculative opinions.

It was seen in a former Chapter that the conscience acts in view of the facts which are before it. It will follow, therefore, if we adopt wrong opinions, whatever they may be, they will have an effect upon the conscience. If these opinions be important, be fundamental, they will be likely to lead us in a course which, under other circumstances, we should regard as wrong in the very highest degree. Our beliefs have amazing power. The belief that men by nature possess equal rights, is in itself nothing more than

a speculative opinion; but this opinion, simple and harmless as it may seem in its enunciation, is at this moment shaking thrones, unbinding the chains of millions, and remodelling the vast fabric of society. The opinion that the rights of conscience are inalienable, and that no one can regulate by violent means the religion of another, is breaking the wheel of torture, and quenching the fire of persecution, and quickening into life the smothered worship of the world. The speculative opinion that Jesus Christ is the great teacher and redeemer of men, has already changed the face of domestic and civil society, and, like a little leaven which leaveneth the whole lump, is secretly regenerating the whole mass of human nature.

We infer, therefore, that it is highly important to consider well what truths we adopt. We think much of sincerity; nevertheless, the doctrine that it is no matter what we believe, if we are only sincere in it, is derogatory to the claims of human reason. What persecutor, what tyrant, what robber, what assassin may not put in his claim for a sort of sincerity, and, in many cases, justly too? It is a sincerity, a conscientiousness, based on all the wisdom which human intelligence in its best efforts can gather up, and nothing short of this, which stands approved in the sight of human reason and of a just Divinity.

§ 301. Further remarks on the same subject.

The important remark of the Saviour to his disciples, "and ye shall know the TRUTH, and the TRUTH shall make you free," seems to have a connexion with this subject. It indicates that the truth, in other words, substantial and well-balanced knowledge (whatever other aids and appliances may be requisite in the progress of the religious life), is naturally effective, in a very high degree, in the renovation of the character and the support of just morals. In that great day when all hearts are tried, our Conscience itself will frown upon us, as guilty of a great dereliction of duty, if we have not taken every possible means to enlighten it.

The false practices of heathen nations, as we have had occasion to see in a former chapter, are very many of them based on false speculative opinions. The effect of their reception of the truth, as it is revealed in the Christian system, is at once to do away these practices. Touched by the quickening influences of divine knowledge, the benumbed and torpid conscience starts into a newness of life, and exercises once more its long-abdicated authority. The whole heathen world, so far as it has come under the influence of the Gospel, is a proof of this remark. It is the Word of God, filled as it is with moral and religious truth, which is destined to be instrumental, under the superintendence of a beneficent Providence, of the rectification of the moral errors of the human race.

§ 302. Of the knowledge of the Supreme Being, and of the study of religious truth generally.

And, in connexion with what has been said in the preceding section, we proceed to remark further, that all morality must necessarily be defective, in a greater or less degree, which proceeds on the principle of excluding RELIGION. It is true that a man who is not religious (in other words, who has not a sincere regard for the character and institutions of the Supreme Being) may do many things which are right and are morally commendable, but he does not do *all* that is right; he comes short in the most essential part; and he thus throws doubt and perplexity, a sort of dimness and obscuration, over whatever lustre might otherwise have shown itself in his other acts. In fact, the amount in which such a person fails to do right is so very great, as compared with the amount in which he does not fail to do right, that it is almost a common remark, although not strictly true, that an irreligious person does *nothing* right. At the same time, although he may do some things right, yet his failure in infinitely the most essential point renders it impossible to speak of him, with any degree of propriety and truth, as a right, that is to say, as a just or holy person.

We assert, therefore, that moral education must include, as a leading element, some instruction in regard to the existence and character of God, and those religious duties which are involved in the fact of his existence and character. Our conscience, the office of which is to adjust our duties to our ability and the relations we sustain, imperatively requires this. In the eye of an enlightened intellectual perception, God stands forth, distinct from and pre-eminent above all others, as an object infinitely exalted; and a want of love to his character and of adherence to his law, is, in the view of conscience, a crime so grossly flagrant in itself as not to be atoned for by any other virtue. And not only this, a proper regard for the character of the Supreme Being has such a multiplicity of bearings and relations, in consequence of the diffusion of his presence, and the multiplicity of his acts and requirements, that the crime involved in the want of it seems to spread itself over the infinite number of transactions, which, taken together, constitute the sum of life. So that the doctrine of the existence of God, received into the intellect, and attended, as it should be, with perfect love in the heart, is beyond all question the great foundation and support of a truly consistent moral life.

§ 303. Of the application of the principle of habit in morals.

The law of HABIT, the nature of which, and some of its applications, have been explained in former chapters, has an important bearing here also. The more scrupulous and exact we are in the observance of the practical part of morals, the more easy it will become. Every repetition of morality, in whatever acts it may show itself, will strengthen the moral tendency. So that, at last, the whole life will run easily and vigorously in the path of rectitude.

The utterance of the truth is morally right; deviation from the truth, or utterance of falsehood, is morally wrong. And here, perhaps, we may find an illustration of the effects of the law of Habit, in its

connexion with morals. It probably has come within the reader's notice, that there are some men who, in practice as well as in principle, are exceedingly scrupulous in the utterance of the truth. When they repeat either what has come under their own observation or what they have learned from the narrations of others, they are strictly and seriously exact in their statement. They are conscientiously anxious not to admit the slightest deviation; and this anxiety extends not only to the statement itself, but to the manner in which it is received and understood by others. They thus form a HABIT of veracity; and those results, which might naturally be supposed to be involved in a case of habit, are witnessed. Such persons have so long and so steadily exhibited this trait of strict veracity, that it seems to be inherent in them, something incorporated in the constitution itself. No temptations, whether sudden or remote, are able to make them swerve from the truth; and their assertion, whenever and wherever made, instead of being met with misgivings and monitory cautions, is readily and fully received by those who hear it.

There is a second class of persons, who would esteem themselves injured in having their veracity suspected, but who have formed habits which render it necessary that their testimony should be carefully examined. We allude particularly to the habit which some have formed, of telling extraordinary stories, or anecdotes of whatever kind, which are intended and are calculated to interest. They consider themselves, in a measure, pledged to meet the interest which they know to be excited on the part of those present, and are, therefore, under an extraordinary temptation to enliven and embellish their narration. If any circumstances have escaped their memory which were essential to the unity of the story, their own invention is taxed to furnish them, since it is too late to search for, and of too much consequence to omit them. In this way they become in time not a little insensible to the false colouring which they give to their state-

ments, and convey erroneous impressions without being conscious of an intention to deceive.

The former habit, that of great and conscientious strictness in what we say, is not only favourable to truth, but is favourable to character; it raises a man in our estimation, and gives him a weight which he might not otherwise possess. The latter contributes, in a greater or less degree, to falsehood; and, by inevitably throwing some perplexity and doubt over his integrity, essentially lowers the subject of it in the general confidence.

§ 304. Further views on the influence of moral habits.

The effects of HABIT, in its connexion with moral character, may be seen frequently in the outward deportment; in simplicity and modesty, in a benevolent civility in the common intercourse of life, in strict propriety of demeanour and expression, and in many other things, which, taken by themselves, seem to be of small consequence, but which, in their collective influence, have unquestionably an important bearing on morals.

The effects of HABIT, both for good and evil, are constantly seen in the various exercises of the appetites and passions. Whatever is good and commendable in that part of our nature, may be strengthened by repetition and encouragement; and, on the other hand, whatever is evil may be weakened and gradually done away by an opposite system of repression. It is very desirable, in a moral point of view, to keep the angry or resentful passions entirely under control, which it is difficult to do without the aid of the law of habit. These passions, like all the other natural and implanted passions, reveal themselves outwardly by certain natural signs, such as a kindling eye, a flushed countenance, violent gesticulation, and a hurried and raised tone of voice. And it is an interesting fact, that the suppression of the outward signs, which, in general, is a thing entirely within our power, operates powerfully to suppress the internal passion.

While, on the other hand, the outward manifestation, whenever it exists, the fierce look, the angry tone, the violent action, generally imparts a renovated impulse to it. Accordingly, a habit of repressing the outward signs of Resentment will be found to give great power in properly regulating a state of mind which, whatever may be its character under other circumstances, cannot be otherwise than wrong, and deeply wrong, in its excess.

It would certainly not be difficult to point out other applications of the principle of habit where it may obviously be made auxiliary to moral improvement. Our moral principles, however correct they may be, will be of but little value to us, unless they are put into practice by being incorporated into the daily and hourly series of living acts. It is thus that habits are formed, which give strength for the present, and abundant encouragement for the future.—Nor is this all. If our habits are the opposite of conscientious; in other words, if we disregard the suggestions of the moral sense, and, in repeated and frequent instances, throw contempt upon its authority, the probability is, that the edge of its perception will be blunted, and that it will be partially paralyzed and weakened in its operation. It may be difficult, in some respects, to explain how this result takes place; but the result itself seems to be beyond doubt. In truth, it may be regarded as only one form or instance of what appears to be a general fact in our mental constitution, viz., that all the powers of the mind suffer under a system of inactivity and repression. Action, and action, too, in a given manner, is their natural food, their appropriate aliment; and when, in consequence of any obstacles that may be thrown in their way, they are deprived of this, they wither away, and become gradually more and more undiscriminating and powerless, although it cannot be said as a general thing, certainly not in the case of the conscience, that they suffer an absolute extinction.

§ 305. Of the importance of correct morals in connexion with our civil and political situation.

We bring what has been said to a conclusion, necessarily brief as it is, by the single remark more, that this subject, while it is exceedingly important to all persons, is particularly so to the citizens of this country. In this remark we have particular reference to the popular form of our government. A government which is based in power that is lodged somewhere else than in mere public sentiment, may by possibility sustain itself amid the prevalence of loose moral principles. But it is otherwise in a government which depends for its support upon the opinions of the people. If there be any truth which the history of all ages has clearly established, it is, that a republican form of government cannot be sustained for any length of time without purity in the public moral sentiment. In this country, everything of a civil and political nature depends upon public opinion. There is nothing in the whole length and breadth of our civil and political institutions, from the national Constitution down to the charters of the humblest municipal corporations, which is not susceptible of being changed, amended, and even abrogated by the power of the popular voice. So that it may be said with a great degree of truth, that the permanent law of the country, that which creates, regulates, and preserves the whole vast system of written and prescriptive law, is to be found in the intelligence and the virtue of the community. How deplorable, then, will be our situation, if the time shall ever come when the people of the United States shall permit themselves to disregard or to underrate the important subject of correct morals!—It is an easy matter to proclaim in the corners of the streets the excellence of republican institutions, but it is beyond all question that every man is to be set down as essentially indifferent to their welfare who is not willing to sustain the testimony of his declarations by the substantial verification of a virtuous life.

THE SENSIBILITIES, OR SENTIMENTIVE NATURE.

SENTIMENTIVE STATES OF THE MIND OR SENTIMENTS.

PART THIRD.

IMPERFECT OR DISORDERED SENTIMENTIVE ACTION.

CHAPTER I.

DISORDERED AND ALIENATED ACTION OF THE APPETITES AND PROPENSITIES.

§ 306. Introductory remarks on disordered sentimentve action.

With what has now been said on the subject of our moral nature, we bring the interesting and important department of the Sensibilities, in its two leading forms of the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities, and of the Moral Sensibilities, to a conclusion. In saying this, however, we have reference to its regular and ordinary action, or that action which takes place in accordance with the ordinary and permanent principles of the Sentimentive nature. But it remains to be added further, that there are instances here as well as in the Intellect, of marked and disastrous deviations from the salutary restraint which these principles impose. In other words, there is not unfrequently an action of the Sensibilities which is so far out of the ordinary or natural line of the precedents of the heart and the morals, that it may be properly described, sometimes as an imperfect or disordered, and sometimes as an alienated action.—It is to the examination of this subject, a knowledge of which is obviously necessary to a comprehensive and complete view of the Sensibilities, that we now propose to proceed.

§ 307. Of what is meant by a disordered and alienated state of the sensibilities.

It may be proper to remark here, that an imperfect or disordered action of the Sensibilities may express merely an irregularity of action, something out of the common and ordinary course of action; or, as the form of expression is obviously a somewhat general and indefinite one, it may indicate something more. When, for instance, this irregular and disordered state passes a certain limit, goes beyond a certain boundary, which

is more easily conceived than described, it becomes Insanity or Alienation. That is to say, the merely irregular action becomes an insane or alienated action when it becomes so great, so pervading, and so deeply rooted in the mind that the individual has no power of restoration in himself. So that it would seem to follow, in view of this remark, that there may be a disordered state of the mind which is insanity; and, under other circumstances, a disordered state of the mind which is not insanity, or, rather, which is less than insanity. But, in either case, this condition of mind is not to be regarded, nor is it, in point of fact, a sound mental state. Although we may not be able to say specifically in a given case that the disorder has reached the point of insanity, yet it is certain that the mind in this disordered state, whether the disorder be greater or less, is presented to our view in a new and important aspect.

Unquestionably a wide and interesting field of remark is opened here. Nevertheless, what we have to say will necessarily be brief, indicating rather the general trains of thought which naturally present themselves, than following them out into minuteness of detail. And, in executing this plan, imperfect as it can hardly fail to be, we shall conform, so far as may be practicable, to those classifications of our Sentimentive nature which have hitherto helped to aid our inquiries.

§ 308. Of the disordered and alienated action of the appetites.

Accordingly, we remark, in the first place, that there may be a disordered and alienated action of the Appetites.—It is well known that the appetites grow stronger and stronger by repeated indulgence. While the process of increased appetitive tendency is going on, there still remains, in the majority of cases, enough of remonstrance in the conscience, and of restrictive and aggressive energy in the Will, to ward off that state of thraldom which is rapidly approaching. But in some melancholy cases it is otherwise; the line of

demarcation, which separates the possibility and the impossibility of a restoration, is passed, and from that time onward there is nothing but interminable sinking. Such cases as these may undoubtedly be regarded as coming within the limits of some of the multiplied forms of mental alienation.

The most frequent instances of mental alienation, originating in a disordered and excessive energy of the appetites, are to be found in that numerous class of persons who habitually indulge in the use of intoxicating drugs, particularly ardent spirits. When the person who indulges in the use of intoxicating liquors has so increased the energy of this pernicious appetite as really to bring himself within the limits of mental alienation, there is no hope of a return by means of any effort which he himself is capable of making. He may have a clear perception of the misery of his situation; the desire of esteem may still arouse within him the recollection of what he once was and of what he still ought to be; the conscience may still speak out in remonstrance, though probably with a diminished voice; the will may continue to put forth some ineffectual struggles; but it is found to be all in vain. If left to himself, and not put under that restraint which is proper to persons in actual insanity, it may be regarded as a matter of moral certainty, that he will plunge deeper and deeper in the degrading vice of which he is the subject, so long as the remaining powers of life shall support him in the process.

The individuals who are in this situation seem themselves to have a consciousness of this. They see clearly that in their own strength there is no hope. In repeated instances, such persons have gone to keepers of penitentiaries and other prisons, and earnestly entreated for admission, on the ground that nothing short of strict seclusion within their massy walls would secure them against the ruinous indulgence of their appetite. —"The use of strong drink," says Dr. Rush (Diseases of the Mind, chap. x.), "is at first the effect of free

agency. From habit it takes place from necessity. That this is the case, I infer from persons who are inordinately devoted to the use of ardent spirits being irreclaimable by all the considerations which domestic obligations, friendship, reputation, property, and sometimes even by those which religion and the love of life can suggest to them. An instance of insensibility to the last, in an habitual drunkard, occurred some years ago in Philadelphia. When strongly urged by one of his friends to leave off drinking, he said, 'Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room, and were a cannon constantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from passing before that cannon in order to get at the rum.'" (See, in connexion with this subject, vol. i., § 100.)

§ 309. Disordered action of the principle of self-preservation.

As we advance upward from the Appetites to the region of the Propensities, such as the principle of self-preservation, the desire of knowledge, the desire of society, and the like, we shall find the latter as well as the former, probably without an exception, subject, in certain individuals, to a greater or less degree of what may be termed a diseased or disordered action. We begin with the propensive principle of Self-preservation, or what may be designated, in other terms, as the natural desire of a continuance of existence. This principle, like the others of the same class, although not generally in so marked a degree, will sometimes manifest itself under such circumstances and in such a manner as obviously to show that its action is not a natural, regular, or healthy action. Persons under the influence of the disordered action of the principle which is connected with the preservation of life, multiply, as they would be naturally supposed to do, images of danger and terror which have no existence, nor likeness of existence, except in their own disordered minds. They not only see perils which are invisible to others, but are led to take a multitude of precautions, which, in the estimation of those around

them, are altogether unnecessary, and even ridiculous.

Pinel, under the head of Melancholy, mentions a case which may be considered as illustrating this subject. "A distinguished military officer," he says, "after fifty years of active service in the cavalry, was attacked with disease. It commenced by his experiencing vivid emotions from the slightest causes; if, for example, he heard any disease spoken of, he immediately believed himself to be attacked by it; if any one was mentioned as deranged in intellect, he imagined himself insane, and retired into his chamber full of melancholy thoughts and inquietude. Everything became for him a subject of fear and alarm. If he entered into a house, he was afraid that the floor would fall, and precipitate him amid its ruins. He could not pass a bridge without terror, unless impelled by the sentiment of honour for the purpose of fighting."*

§ 310. Disordered and alienated action of the possessory principle.

There are instances, occurring with a considerable degree of frequency, of a disordered or alienated action of the desire of possession or the Possessory principle. Some of these are voluntary; that is to say, are brought about by a course of action, of which the responsibility rests upon the individual. Others appear to be congenital or natural.—Among the class of confirmed misers we shall be likely, from time to time, to find instances of the first class. There are individuals among this class of persons who have so increased the energy of the Possessory principle (Acquisitiveness, as it is sometimes conveniently termed) by a long voluntary course of repetition, that its action is no longer under the control of the Will, but has obviously passed over into the region of mental alienation. Such probably must have been the case with a certain individual mentioned by Valerius Maximus, who took advantage of a famine to sell a mouse for

* Pinel, as quoted in Combe's Phrenology, Boston ed., p. 241.

two hundred pence, and then famished himself with the money in his pocket.—It is difficult to tell, however, although a person may unquestionably become insane in his avarice, whether this is actually the case in any given instance, or whether, notwithstanding its intensity, it falls in some degree short of alienation.

The reader will be able, probably, by consulting the resources of his own recollection, to understand the applications of this subject. Nevertheless, we take the liberty to delay a moment upon the well known and somewhat singular case of Sir Harvey Elwes, of Stoke, in the county of Suffolk, England. Sir Harvey Elwes inherited from a miserly mother, and an uncle of the same parsimonious disposition, the large property of £350,000. This singular individual, as is sometimes the case with misers, is said to have punctually discharged his obligations towards others, and in some instances even to have conducted with liberality; but, in whatever concerned himself, his parsimony, notwithstanding his great riches, was extreme and unalterable. When travelling, he accustomed himself to great abstinence, that he might lessen the charge of his maintenance; and for the same reason, he supported his horse with the few blades of grass which he could gather by the sides of hedges and in the open commons. Like his predecessor Sir Harvey, from whom he seems to have derived his title, and who was hardly less miserly than his nephew, he wore the clothes of those who had gone before him; and when his best coat was beyond the ability of any further service, he refused to replace it at his own expense, but accepted one from a neighbour. He was so saving of fuel that he took advantage of the industry of the crows in pulling down their nests; and if any friend accidentally living with him were absent, he would carefully put out his fire and walk to a neighbour's house, in order that the same chimney might give out warmth to both. Although he never committed any of his transactions to writing, he could not

have been ignorant of his immense wealth; but this did not prevent his being exceedingly apprehensive that he should at last die with want. "Sometimes hiding his gold in small parcels in different parts of his house, he would anxiously visit the spot to ascertain whether each remained as he had left it: arising from bed, he would hasten to his bureau to examine if its contents were in safety. In later life no other sentiment occupied his mind: at midnight he has been heard as if struggling with assailants, and crying out in agitation, 'I will keep my money, I will; nobody shall rob me of my property!' though no one was near to disturb him in its possession. At length this remarkable person died, in the year 1789, aged nearly eighty, and worth nearly a million."*

§ 311. Instances of the second kind or form of disordered action of the possessory principle.

There are other instances of the disordered action of the principle of Acquisitiveness, which appear to be congenital or constitutional. In the case of the persons to whom we now have reference, the disposition to get possession of whatever can be regarded as property, whether of greater or less value, shows itself, not only in great strength, but at a very early period of life. There are a considerable number of cases of this kind to be found in the writings of Gall and Spurzheim; and there are some notices of similar cases in a few other writers. Dr. Rush, for instance, in his Medical Inquiries, mentions a woman who was entirely exemplary in her conduct except in one particular. "She could not refrain from *stealing*. What made this vice the more remarkable was, that she was in easy circumstances, and not addicted to extravagance in anything. Such was the propensity to this vice, that, when she could lay her hands on nothing more valuable, she would often, at the table of a friend, fill her pockets secretly with bread. She both confessed and lamented her crime;" which, however, a

* Origin and Progress of the Passions (Anonymous), vol. i., p. 310.

truer and better knowledge of the mind and its disorders would make us hesitate to call a crime.

Some of the facts which are given by Dr. Gall are as follows: "Victor Amadeus I., king of Sardinia, was in the constant habit of stealing trifles. Saurin, pastor at Geneva, though possessing the strongest principles of reason and religion, frequently yielded to the propensity to steal. Another individual was from early youth a victim to this inclination. He entered the military service on purpose that he might be restrained by the severity of the discipline; but, having continued his practices, he was on the point of being condemned to be hanged. Ever seeking to combat his ruling passion, he studied theology and became a Capuchin. But his propensity followed him even to the cloister. Here, however, as he found only trifles to tempt him, he indulged himself in his strange fancy with less scruple. He seized scissors, candlesticks, snuffers, cups, goblets, and conveyed them to his cell. An agent of the government at Vienna had the singular mania for stealing nothing but kitchen utensils. He hired two rooms as a place of deposite; he did not sell, and made no use of them. The wife of the famous physician Gaubius had such a propensity to pilfer, that when she made a purchase she always sought to take something. The Countesses M. at Wessel, and P. at Frankfort, had also this propensity. Madame de W. had been educated with peculiar care. Her wit and talents secured her a distinguished place in society. But neither her education nor her fortune saved her from the most decided propensity to theft. Lavater speaks of a physician who never left the room of his patients without robbing them of something, and who never thought of the matter afterward. In the evening his wife used to examine his pockets; she there found keys, scissors, thimbles, knives, spoons, buckles, cases, and sent them to their respective owners."*

* Gall's Works, vol. iv., Am. ed., p. 132.

§ 312. Disordered action of imitativeness, or the principle of imitation.

The proof that there is in man a principle of IMITATION, appropriately called by phrenological writers Imitativeness, which impels him to do as others do, is so abundant as probably to leave no reasonable doubt upon the candid mind. This principle, as compared with its ordinary operation and character, is found in some individuals to exhibit an irregular or diseased action. M. Pinel, as he is quoted by Dr. Gall, speaks of an idiot woman "who had an *irresistible* propensity to imitate all that she saw done in her presence. She repeats *instinctively* all she hears, and imitates the gestures and actions of others with the greatest fidelity, and without troubling herself with any regard to propriety."*—Under the form of Sympathetic Imitation, the disordered action of this principle becomes very important; so much so that we shall leave the subject here, for the purpose of considering it, more at length than we could otherwise do, in a separate chapter.

§ 313. Disordered action of the principle of sociality.

The principle of Sociality, obviously one of the implanted propensities of our nature, may exist with such a degree of intensity as justly to entitle its action to be called a disordered, and, in some cases, even an alienated action. In connexion with this remark, it may be proper to revert a moment to the precise idea which we attach to the term alienation, considered as expressive of a state or condition of the mind. There may be an imperfection of mental action, there may be a disorder of mental action, which is nevertheless not an alienation of mental action. The term alienation properly applies to those forms of mental action which are so much disordered as to set at defiance any efforts of the Will to control them; in a word, they are involuntary. So that, in accordance with this statement, there may be either a disordered state of the principle of sociality, or of any oth-

* Gall's Works, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 320.

er principle (that is to say, one which is irregular, but still is susceptible of correction under the efforts of the will), or there may be, when this disorder is found to exist beyond certain limits, an alienated, an insane state. But, although this distinction should be fully understood, it is not necessary, in the remarks which, for the most part, we have occasion to make, that we should always keep it distinctly in view.

But to return to our subject. An irregular action of the social principle, whether it be truly alienated or exist in some lighter form of disorder, may show itself in two aspects which are entirely diverse from each other, viz., either in a morbid aversion to society, or in a desire of society inordinately intense.—Persons to whom the first statement will apply are generally, and, for the most part, justly designated as Misanthropes. Under the influence of some sudden revulsion of the mind, of some great disappointment, of some ill treatment on the part of near relatives and supposed friends, or of some other powerful cause, the natural tie of brotherhood, which binds man to his fellow-man, is snapped asunder, and the soul flees to the rock and the desert never more to return. Such instances, the Timon of Athens of Shakspeare, the Black Dwarf of Walter Scott, and numerous others, are too frequently found, not only on the recorded annals of human nature, but in almost every one's personal experience, to require any minuteness of notice.

§ 314. Further remarks on the disordered action of the social propensity.

There is another class of cases, which in their character appear to be directly the reverse of those which have just been mentioned.—Individuals, when they are cut off from society, particularly the society of their friends, are sometimes the subjects of a misery inexpressibly intense. We have already had occasion to allude to the case of the young Foscari, who was banished from Venice, and who died apparently in

consequence of the mere mental anguish which he suffered. Cases were also mentioned of death resulting from solitary confinement in prison (§ 147). There is an exceedingly painful disease, founded, in a great degree, upon the disordered action of the social principle, which is termed by physicians Nostalgia, but which is more commonly known under the familiar designation of HOME-SICKNESS. This disease, which is sometimes fatal, is said to have frequently prevailed among the Swiss when absent from their native country. The beautiful sky which shone over them in their absence from their native land, the works of art, the allurements of the highest forms of civilization, could not erase from their hearts the image of their rugged mountains and their stormy heavens. They had society enough around them, it is true; but it was not the society which their hearts sought for, or in which, in existing circumstances, they could participate. They bowed their heads under the influence of a hidden and irrepressible sorrow; and in many cases not merely pined away, but died in the deep anguish of their separation.

In the year 1733, a Russian army, under the command of General Praxin, advanced to the banks of the Rhine. At this remote distance from their native country, this severe mental disease began to prevail among the Russians, so much so that five or six soldiers every day became unfit for duty; a state of things which threatened to affect the existence of the army. The progress of this home-sickness was terminated by a severe order from the commander (designed, probably, and which had the effect to produce a strong counteracting state of mind), that every one affected with the sickness should be buried alive.*

§ 315. Of the disordered action of the desire of esteem.

There may be a disordered action of Approbativeness or the desire of Esteem. This principle is not only an original one, but, as a general thing, it pos-

* Dr. Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 113.

sesses, as compared with some of the other Propensities, a greater and more available amount of strength. It is a regard for the opinions of others (a sense of character, as we sometimes term it), which, in the absence or the too great weakness of the higher principles, serves to restrict the conduct of multitudes within the bounds of decency and order. This principle is good and important in its place, and under due regulation; but it is exceedingly apt to become irregular, unrestrained, and inordinate in its exercise. This view throws light upon the character of many individuals. It is here, probably, that we may discover the leading defect in the character of Alcibiades, a name of distinguished celebrity in the history of Athens. His ruling passion seems to have been not so much the love of POWER as the love of APPLAUSE. In other words, his great desire was, as has been well remarked of him, "to make a noise, and to furnish matter of conversation to the Athenians."

Pope, in the First of his Moral Essays, illustrates this subject, in his usual powerful manner, in what he says of the Duke of Wharton, the key to whose character he finds in the excessive desire of human applause.

> "Search then the ruling passion. There alone
> The wild are constant, and the cunning known;
> This clew, once found, unravels all the rest,
> The prospect clears, and Wharton stands confess'd.
> Wharton, the scorn and wonder of our days,
> Whose ruling passion was the LUST OF PRAISE.
> Born with whate'er could win it from the wise,
> Women and fools must like him, or he dies."

The inordinate exercise of this propensity, as is correctly intimated by Mr. Stewart, tends to *disorganize* the mind. The man who is under the influence of such an excessive appetite for the world's smiles and flatteries, has no fixed rule of conduct; but the action of his mind, his opinions, desires, hopes, and outward conduct, are constantly fluctuating with the changing tide of popular sentiment. It is nearly impossible that the pillars of the mind should remain firm, and

without more or less of undermining and dislocation, under the operations of such a system of uncertainty and vicissitude.—Nor is this all. When persons who are under the influence of this excessive desire are disappointed in the possession of that approbation and applause which is its natural food, they are apt to become melancholy, misanthropic, and unhappy in a very high degree. In fact, numerous cases of actual Insanity, if we look carefully at the statements of writers on the subject of Mental Alienation, may probably be traced to this source.

And, where insanity does not supervene, there are sometimes consequences scarcely less unfavourable. It is well known, that within a few years a number of gifted individuals have been hurried to an early grave, in consequence of being held up to public contempt and ridicule in anonymous Reviews. The case of Henry Kirk White, too keenly alive to the frowns and favours of popular sentiment, notwithstanding his great and unquestionable excellences, will illustrate what we mean.* The circumstance that the inordinate exercise of this desire is sometimes connected with distinguished vigour of intellect and purity of moral sentiment, does not necessarily secure the disappointed and calumniated individual who is the subject of it against great anguish of mind; so great, in some instances, as not only to destroy happiness, but life itself.

§ 316. Disordered action of the desire of power.

Men become disordered in mind, and sometimes actually insane, not only by the inordinate indulgence of the desire of esteem and the desire of possession, but also, perhaps with no less frequency, under the influence of the exaggerated and intense desire of POWER. They are looking onward and upward, with an excited heart and constrained eye, to some form of authority, honour, and dominion, till this desire,

* Keats, the author of Endymion, may probably be regarded as another recent instance.

strengthened by constant repetition, becomes the predominant feeling. Instances where the disorder of the mind arises in this way and exists to this extent are innumerable. But it is not always that it stops here. If the desire is suddenly and greatly disappointed, as it is very likely to be, the reaction upon the whole mind may be such as to produce disorder in all its functions, and leave it a wide mass of ruins.

The history of those who are confined in Insane Hospitals furnishes a strong presumption that such results are not unfrequent. Although the mind is deranged, the predominant feeling which led to the derangement seems still to remain. One individual challenges for himself the honours of a Chancellor, another of a King; one is a member of Parliament, another is the Lord Mayor of London; one, under the name of the Duke of Wellington or Bonaparte, claims to be the commander of mighty armies, another announces himself with the tone and attitude of a Prophet of the Most High. Pinel informs us that there were at one time no less than three maniacs in one of the French Insane Hospitals, each of whom assumed to be Louis XIV. On one occasion these individuals were found disputing with each other, with a great degree of energy, their respective rights to the throne. The dispute was terminated by the sagacity of the superintendent, who, approaching one of them, gave him, with a serious look, to understand that he ought not to dispute on the subject with the others, since they were obviously mad. "Is it not well known," said the superintendent, "that you alone ought to be acknowledged as Louis XIV.?" The insane person, flattered with this homage, cast upon his companions a look of the most marked disdain, and immediately retired.

§ 317. Disordered action of the principle of veracity.

The principle of veracity, or the tendency of mind which leads men to utter the truth, appears to be an original or implanted one. This principle, either

through habit or by natural defect, sometimes exhibits itself in strangely perverted forms.—Dr. Rush speaks of a LYING disease. "It differs from exculpating, fraudulent, and malicious lying in being influenced by none of the motives of any of them. Persons thus diseased cannot speak the truth on any subject, nor tell the same story twice in the same way, nor describe anything as it has appeared to other people. Their falsehoods are seldom calculated to injure anybody but themselves, being for the most part of a hyperbolical or boasting nature; but now and then they are of a mischievous nature, and injurious to the characters and property of others. That it is a corporeal disease [that is to say, in some way connected with a diseased state of the body], I infer from its sometimes appearing in mad people, who are remarkable for veracity in the healthy states of their minds, several instances of which I have known in the Pennsylvania Hospital. Persons affected with this disease are often amiable in their tempers and manners, and sometimes benevolent and charitable in their dispositions."*

Enough perhaps has been said on this part of our subject to give at least a general idea of it. The same train of thought, and with scarcely any modification, will apply to all the original appetites and propensities. They are all implanted by the Creator of the mind; they are all good in their place and under proper regulation; they are all not only morally evil in their exaggerated and inordinate form, but are attended with more or less of mental disorder, from the slightest shades of disorganization to the deep and terrible miseries of permanent insanity.

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, 2d ed., p. 265.

CHAPTER II.

SYMPATHETIC IMITATION.

§ 318. Of sympathetic imitation, and what is involved in it.

We endeavoured, in its proper place, to illustrate the natural origin and the prevalence of the propensity to IMITATION. In connexion with the general truth of the existence of such a propensity, it is proper to observe here that there is a subordinate and peculiar form of imitation, which is deserving of a separate notice, and particularly so on account of its practical results. We speak now of what has been appropriately termed Sympathetic Imitation.

It is implied, in all cases of Sympathetic Imitation, that there is more than one person concerned in them; and it exists, in general, in the highest degree, when the number of persons is considerable. Some one or more of these individuals is strongly agitated by some internal emotion, desire, or passion; and this inward agitation is expressed by the countenance, gestures, or other external signs. There is also a communication of such agitation of the mind to others; they experience similar emotions, desires, and passions. And these new exercises of soul are expressed, on the part of the sympathetic person, by similar outward signs. In a single word, when we are under the influence of this form of imitation, we both act and feel as others. And this happens, not only in consequence of what we witness in them, and apparently for no other reason, but it happens *naturally;* that is to say, in virtue of an implanted or natural principle. The view which we are inclined to take of this principle is, that, although we may properly speak of it, on account of its close resemblance, as a modification of the more ordinary form of Imitativeness, yet, on the whole, it is so far distinct and specific in its character as to en-

title it to be regarded as a separate part of our sentimentive nature. As such it might have been treated of in another place; but in its ordinary action it is generally well understood; and we have delayed the consideration of it till the present time, because it is our principal object to give some account of its disordered or alienated action.

§ 319. Familiar instances of sympathetic imitation.

Abundance of instances (many of them frequent and familiar) show the existence of SYMPATHETIC IMITATION; in other words, that there is in human feelings, and in the signs of those feelings, a power of contagious communication, by which they often spread themselves rapidly from one to another.

"In general it may be remarked," says Mr. Stewart, "that whenever we see in the countenance of another individual any sudden change of features, more especially such a change as is expressive of any particular passion or emotion, our own countenance has a tendency to assimilate itself to his. Every man is sensible of this when he looks at a person under the influence of laughter or in a deep melancholy. Something, too, of the same kind takes place in that spasm of the muscles of the jaw which we experience in yawning; an action which is well known to be frequently excited by the contagious power of example. Even when we *conceive*, in solitude, the external expression of any passion, the effect of the conception is visible in our own appearance. This is a fact of which every person must be conscious, who attends, in his own case, to the result of the experiment; and it is a circumstance which has been often remarked with respect to historical painters, when in the act of transferring to the canvass the glowing pictures of a creative imagination."*

To these statements, illustrative of sympathetic imitation, may be added the fact, that if there are a number of children together, and one of them suddenly

* Stewart's Elements, vol. iii., chap. ii.

gives way to tears and sobs, it is generally the case that all the rest are more or less affected in the same manner. Another case, illustrative of the same natural principle, is that of a mob when they gaze at a dancer on the slack rope. They seem not only to be filled with the same anxiety which we may suppose to exist in the rope-dancer himself, but they naturally writhe, and twist, and balance their own bodies as they see him do. It has also been frequently remarked, that when we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink, and slightly draw back our own leg or arm, with a sort of prophetic or anticipative imitation of the person on whom the blow is about to be inflicted. Hysterical paroxysms are said to have been sometimes produced at witnessing the exhibition of the pathetic parts of a drama. And even the convulsions of epilepsy have been excited by the mere sight of a person afflicted with them.

§ 320. Of sympathetic imitation in large multitudes.

It has been often noticed, that the power of sympathetic imitation has been rendered intense nearly in proportion to the numbers assembled together.—In a large army, if the voice of triumph and joy be raised in a single column, it immediately extends through the whole. On the other hand, if a single column be struck with panic, and exhibit external signs of terror by flight or otherwise, the whole army is likely to become rapidly infected. The tremendous power of the mobs which are often collected in large cities may be explained, in part, on the same principle. The dark cloud that is standing upon the brow of one is seen soon to gather in darkness upon the brow of his neighbour, and thus to propagate itself rapidly in every direction, till one universal gloom of vengeance settles broadly and blackly upon the moving sea of the multitude.

Similar results are sometimes witnessed in large deliberative assemblies. The art of the orator intro-

duces a common feeling, which glows simultaneously in their bosoms. Soon some one, either sustained by weaker nerves, or under the influence of stronger internal impulses, gives signs of bodily agitation. Those who sit nearest will probably next imbibe the contagion, which spreads and increases until the whole assembly is in a tumult. The spread of this sympathetic communication will be particularly rapid if the first instances of emotion and action are of a decided and strong character.—The statements which have been made are matters of common observation, and can hardly be supposed to have escaped the notice of any. But there are various other facts on record of a less common character, although involving essentially the same principles.

§ 321. Of the animal magnetism of M. Mesner in connexion with this subject.

About the year 1784, M. Mesner, of Vienna, professed to perform various and important cures by what he called animal magnetism. As this new mode of healing was introduced into France, and much interest was felt on the subject, Louis the Sixteenth appointed a number of persons to examine into it, among whom were Lavoisier, Bailly, and Dr. Franklin, at that time American minister at Paris. On inquiry, it appeared that it was common in the process to assemble a considerable number of patients together. The patients were placed round a circular box or bucket of oak, the lid of which was pierced with a number of holes, through which there issued moveable and curved branches of iron. These branches were to be applied by the patient to the diseased part. The commissioners, who were witnesses to these proceedings, found that no effect was produced at first. The patients usually sat an hour, and sometimes two, before the crisis came on, being connected with each other, meanwhile, by means of a cord passed round their bodies. At length some one, wearied and nervous, and with feelings evidently much excited, was

thrown into extraordinary convulsions. And, in a short time, the whole body of patients became similarly affected, in a greater or less degree. But the commissioners themselves, after having witnessed these singular results, consented to become the subjects of these experiments in their own persons. But they testify that no effect was produced upon them. They also aver, when the process was gone through on persons alone, the same effects were not produced as when a number were together, provided the attempt were made for the first time. In the following extract they seem to attribute the results partly to imagination and partly to sympathy, that is to say, to Sympathetic Imitation.

"The magnetism, then," the commissioners remark, "or, rather, the operations of the imagination, are equally discoverable at the theatre, in the camp, and in all numerous assemblies, as at the bucket; acting, indeed, by different means, but producing similar effects. The bucket is surrounded with a crowd of patients; the sensations are continually communicated and recommunicated; the nerves are at last worn out with this exercise, and the woman of most sensibility in the company gives the signal. In the mean time, the men, who are witnesses of these emotions, partake of them in proportion to their nervous sensibility; and those with whom this sensibility is greatest and most easily excited, become themselves the subjects of a crisis.

"This irritable disposition, partly natural and partly acquired, becomes in each sex habitual. The sensations having been felt once or oftener, nothing is now necessary but to recall the memory of them, and to exalt the imagination to the same degree in order to operate the same effects. The public process is no longer necessary. You have only to conduct the finger and the rod of iron before the countenance, and to repeat the accustomed ceremonies. In many cases the experiment succeeds, even when the patient is blindfolded, and, without any actual exhibition of the

signs, is made to believe that they are repeated as formerly. The ideas are re-excited; the sensations are reproduced; while the imagination, employing its accustomed instruments and resuming its former routes, gives birth to the same phenomena."*

§ 322. Instance of sympathetic imitation at the poorhouse at Haerlem.

Multitudes of other facts, equally well attested, show the sympathetic connexion between mind and mind, and the sympathy between the mind and the nervous and muscular system. Few are more interesting or decisive than what is stated to have occurred at Haerlem under the inspection of Boerhaave.—"In the house of charity at Haerlem," says the account, "a girl, under the impression of terror, fell into a convulsive disease, which returned in regular paroxysms. One of the by-standers, intent upon assisting her, was seized with a similar fit, which also recurred at intervals; and on the day following another was attacked; then a third, and a fourth; in short, almost the whole of the children, both girls and boys, were afflicted with these convulsions. No sooner was one seized, than the sight brought on the paroxysm in almost all the rest at the same time. Under these distressing circumstances, the physicians exhibited all the powerful anti-epileptic medicines with which their art furnished them, but in vain. They then applied to Boerhaave, who, compassionating the wretched condition of the poor children, repaired to Haerlem; and, while he was inquiring into the matter, one of them was seized with a fit, and immediately he saw several others attacked with a species of epileptic convulsion. It presently occurred to this sagacious physician, that, as the best medicines had been skilfully administered, and as the propagation of the disease from one to another appeared to depend on the imagination [the sympathy of imagination], by preventing this impression upon the mind, the disease might be cured; and his sug-

* Rapports des Commissaires chargés par le Roi, de l'Examen du Magnetisme Animal (as quoted by Stewart).

gestion was successfully adopted. Having previously apprized the magistrates of his views, he ordered, in the presence of all the children, that several portable furnaces should be placed in different parts of the chamber, containing burning coals, and that iron, bent to a certain form, should be placed in the furnaces; and then he gave these further commands: that all medicines would be totally useless, and the only remedy with which he was acquainted was, that the first who should be seized with a fit, whether boy or girl, must be burned in the arm to the very bone by a red-hot iron. He spoke this with uncommon dignity and gravity; and the children, terrified at the thoughts of this cruel remedy, when they perceived any tendency to the recurrence of the paroxysm, immediately exerted all their strength of mind, and called up the horrible idea of the burning; and were thus enabled, by the stronger mental impression, to resist the influence of the morbid propensity."

§ 323. Other instances of this species of imitation.

It would not be difficult to multiply cases similar to those which have been mentioned. A few years since, there was a man in Chelmsford, Massachusetts, who had a family of six children, one of whom became affected with the CHOREA, or St. Vitus's dance. The others, in the indulgence of that thoughtless gayety which is natural to children, amused themselves with imitating his odd gestures, until, after a time, they were irresistibly affected in the same way. At this state of things, which seems to be susceptible of an explanation in no other way than on the principles of sympathetic imitation, the family, as may be naturally supposed, were in great affliction. The father, a man of some sagacity as well as singularity of humour, brought into the house a block and axe, and solemnly threatened to take off the head of the first child who should hereafter exhibit any involuntary bodily movements, except the child originally diseased. By this measure, which proceeded on the same

view of the human mind as the experiment of Boerhaave just mentioned, a new train of feeling was excited, and the spell was broken.*

It may be added, that not only those in the same family and in the same building have been seized, but the contagion has sometimes spread from one to another (by the mere imitation of sympathy as we suppose) over whole towns, and even large districts of country. This was the case in a part of the Island Anglesey, in 1796; and still later in this country, in some parts of Tennessee.†

§ 324. Application of these views to the witchcraft delusion in New England.

The doctrines of this chapter furnish, in part at least, an explanation of the witchcraft delusion which prevailed in New England about the year 1690. In the first place, it is to be recollected, that the existence of witches and wizards, possessing a powerful but invisible agency, was a part of the popular creed, and was generally and fully believed. It makes no difference, in our explanation of the subject, so far as we attempt to explain it, whether there was or is a foundation for such belief or not. It is further to be recollected, that the people were, as a general thing, very ignorant at that time, a state of mind exceedingly favourable to any superstition or delusion of that sort; and also that their minds were kept in a state of constant and high excitation, not only in consequence of living scattered abroad and remote from each other, but by residing, in many cases, in the midst of dense and dark forests.

Under these circumstances, certain individuals, probably under the influence of some form of nervous disease, became affected with pains in certain parts of the body resembling the pain occasioned by the pricking of pins, or by sudden and heavy blows; and in some cases became subject to certain involuntary motions

* Powers's Essay on the Influence of the Imagination, p. 32.
† See Edinburgh Med. and Surg. Journal, vol. iii., p. 446.

of the body, similar to those of the CHOREA, or St. Vitus's dance. Of course, in accordance with the common belief, those mysterious personages, popularly denominated Witches, were at their work, and the whole country was at once thrown into a ferment. It is not easy to conceive a more favourable basis than this for the operations of the powerful principle of Sympathetic Imitation. The few cases of nervous and muscular disease which existed at first, were rapidly propagated and multiplied on every side; and as the popular belief ascribed them to the agency of Satan, manifested in the subordinate agency of witchcraft, the infatuation soon arose to the highest point. The accusations of innocent individuals as exercising the art of witchery, and the scenes of blood which followed, were the natural consequence. — Similar views will probably apply to the witchcraft delusions which, to the ruin of thousands of individuals, have prevailed in other periods and countries.

§ 325. Practical results connected with the foregoing views.

As sympathetic imitation, if it be correctly considered as a distinct and specific modification of the more ordinary form of Imitativeness, is to be regarded as an original part of our mental constitution, we may well suppose it has its beneficial ends. But it is evident, from the facts which have been given, that it may also be attended, and, under certain circumstances, is very likely to be attended, with results of a different kind. Hence the direction has sometimes been given by physicians, that a free intercourse with persons subject to convulsive attacks ought not to be unnecessarily indulged in, especially by such as are inclined to nervous affections. And this precautionary rule might be extended to other cases; for instance, of madness. "It is a question," says Mr. Stewart, in the chapter already referred to, "worthy of more attention than has yet been bestowed upon it by physicians, whether certain kinds of insanity have not a contagious tendency, somewhat analogous to that

which has just been remarked. That the incoherent ravings and frantic gestures of a madman have a singularly painful effect in unsettling and deranging the thoughts of others, I have more than once experienced in myself; nor have I ever looked upon this most afflicting of all spectacles without a strong impression of the danger to which I should be exposed if I were to witness it daily. In consequence of this impression, I have always read, with peculiar admiration, the scene in the Tragedy of Lear, which forms the transition from the old king's beautiful and pathetic reflections on the storm, to the violent madness in which, without any change whatever in his external circumstances, he is immediately after represented. In order to make this transition more gradual, the poet introduces Edgar, who, with a view of concealing himself from Lear, assumes the dress and behaviour of a madman. At every sentence he utters, the mind of the king, '*whose wits*' (as we are told in the preceding scene) were '*beginning to turn*,' becomes more and more deranged, till at length every vestige of reason vanishes completely."

§ 326. Application of these views to legislative and other assemblies.

We have already had occasion to intimate, that the effects of sympathetic imitation have been strikingly experienced in public assemblies; and we may here add, when those effects have been strongly marked, they have seldom been beneficial. In all political deliberative assemblies, external signs of approbation and disapprobation should be in a great degree suppressed. There is generally enough in the subjects which are discussed to excite the members, without the additional excitement (to use a phrase of Buffon) of "*body speaking to body*." It is said of the famous Athenian tribunal of the Areopagus, that they held their deliberations in the night, in order that their attention might not be diverted by external objects. And, without expressing an opinion on this practice, it is certainly not unwise to guard against the terrible

influences under consideration; otherwise truth, honour, and justice will often be sacrificed to feeling. Every public deliberative assembly has probably furnished facts illustrative of the propriety of this caution.

Similar remarks will apply to religious assemblies, and, perhaps, with still more force, as religious subjects are more important, and, in general, more exciting than any other. If, in such an assembly, the feelings of a few individuals become so strong as to show themselves very decidedly in the countenance, and the movements of the body, and particularly by sobs and loud outcries, it will not be surprising if this state of things should quickly spread itself through the whole body. In this way it is probable that serious evils have sometimes been experienced, and that true and false religious feelings have been confounded. It is true that people may sometimes be led, by the mere power of sympathy, to attend to religious things; and so far, if there are no collateral evils, the result may be regarded as favourable; but, at the same time, it should be kept in recollection, that the feelings which are really propagated from one to another by mere sympathy are not in themselves religious feelings in any proper sense of the terms, though they are often confounded with them.

CHAPTER III.

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE AFFECTIONS.

§ 327. Of the states of mind denominated presentiments.

We now proceed to remark, that there may be a disordered action of the Affections or Passions, as well as of the lower principles of the Sentimentive nature; and this remark is designed to apply to both classes of the affections, the benevolent and those of an opposite kind. We do not propose, however, in this Chapter to confine ourselves very strictly to the Affections properly so called, but shall introduce some

collateral or connected subjects, which may be regarded as too interesting to be omitted, and, at the same time, as too unimportant to require a distinct place. They may be expected, moreover, to throw indirectly some light upon the leading topic of the chapter. We begin with the subject of PRESENTIMENTS.

Many individuals have had, at certain times, strong and distinct impressions in relation to something future; so much so that not the least doubt has remained in their own minds of its being something out of the common course of nature. It is related, for instance, of the nonconformist writer, Isaac Ambrose, whose religious works formerly had some celebrity, that he had such a striking internal intimation of his approaching death, that he went round to all his friends to bid them farewell. When the day arrived which his presentiments indicated as the day of his dissolution, he shut himself up in his room and died. Mozart, the great musical composer, had a strong presentiment that the celebrated Requiem which bears his name would be his last Work. Nothing could remove this impression from his mind. He expressly said, "It is certain I am writing this requiem for myself; it will serve for my funeral service." The foreboding was realized. It is stated of Pendergrast, an officer in the Duke of Marlborough's army, that he had a strong foreboding that he would be killed on a certain day. He mentioned his conviction to others, and even made a written memorandum in relation to it. And the event was such as he had foretold it would be.* Henry IV. of France, for some weeks previous to his being assassinated by Ravaillac, had a distinct presentiment, which he mentioned to Sully and other men of his time, that some great calamity was about to befall him.

Some cases of Presentiments can undoubtedly be explained on natural principles. Some accidental circumstance, a mere word, the vagaries of a dream, any trifling event, which happens, in the popular belief of

* Boswell's Life of Johnson, vol. ii., p. 48.

the time and country, to be regarded as a sinister omen, may have been enough in some cases to have laid the foundation for them, and the subsequent fulfilment may have been purely accidental. Nor is it necessary, so far as we are able to perceive, to suppose that, in any cases whatever, there is any supernatural or miraculous interposition. But, if this is not the case, it is difficult to account for the deep conviction which sometimes fastens upon the mind, a conviction upon which arguments and persuasions are found to make no impression, except upon the ground that the action of the Sensibilities is in some degree disordered. But of the specific nature of that disorder, the trait or circumstance which distinguishes it from other forms of disordered mental action, it is difficult to give any account.

§ 328. Of sudden and strong impulses of mind.

There is another disordered condition of the mind, different from that which has just been mentioned, and yet, in some respects, closely allied to it. Some persons, whose soundness of mind on all ordinary occasions is beyond question, find in themselves at certain times a sudden and strange propensity to do things which, if done, would clearly prove them, to some extent at least, deranged. As an illustration, a person of a perfectly sane mind, according to the common estimate of insanity, once acknowledged that, whenever he passed a particular bridge, he felt a slight inclination to throw himself over, accompanied with some dread that his inclination might hurry him away. Such slight alienated impulses are probably more frequent than is commonly supposed. And they exist in every variety of degree, sometimes scarcely attracting notice, at others bearing the broad and fatal stamp of dangerous insanity.

Dr. Gall mentions the case of a woman in Germany, who, having on a certain occasion witnessed a building on fire, was ever afterward, at intervals, subject to strong impulses prompting her to fire build-

ings. Under the influence of these impulses she set fire to twelve buildings in the borough where she lived. Having been arrested on the thirteenth attempt, she was tried, condemned, and executed. "She could give no other reason, nor show any other motive, for firing so many houses, than this impulse which drove her to it. Notwithstanding the fear, the terror, and the repentance she felt in every instance after committing the crime, she went and did it afresh."* Would not sound philosophy, to say nothing of the requisitions of religion, have assigned such a person to an insane hospital rather than to the block of the executioner?

The same writer, who has collected numerous valuable facts in relation to the operations of the human mind, mentions the case of a German soldier, who was subject every month to a violent convulsive attack. "He was sensible," he proceeds to remark, "of their approach; and as he felt, by degrees, a violent propensity to kill, in proportion as the paroxysm was on the point of commencing, he was earnest in his entreaties to be loaded with chains. At the end of some days the paroxysm and the fatal propensity diminished, and he himself fixed the period at which they might without danger set him at liberty. At Haina we saw a man who, at certain periods, felt an irresistible desire to injure others. He knew this unhappy propensity, and had himself kept in chains till he perceived that it was safe to liberate him. An individual of melancholic temperament was present at the execution of a criminal. The sight caused him such violent emotion, that he at once felt himself seized with an irresistible desire to kill, while, at the same time, he entertained the utmost horror at the commission of the crime. He depicted his deplorable state, weeping bitterly, and in extreme perplexity. He beat his head, wrung his hands, remonstrated with himself, begged his friends to save themselves, and thanked them for the resistance they made to him."†

* Gall's Work's, vol. iv., Am. ed., p. 105. † Ibid., vol. i., p. 329.

§ 329. Insanity of the affections or passions.

From the instances which have been given, it will be seen that sudden and strong impulses, indicating a disordered state of the mind, may exist in reference to very different things, and also in very various degrees. The cases last mentioned were of such an aggravated nature, that they may properly be regarded as instances (and perhaps the same view will apply to some other cases of a less marked character) of actual alienation or insanity. And, as such, they may be correctly described as instances of the insanity of the Affections or Passions.

The insanity of the passions is a state of mind somewhat peculiar, even as compared with other forms of insanity. The powers of perception in cases of insanity of the passions are often in full and just exercise. The mind may possess, in a very considerable degree, its usual ability in comparing ideas and in deducing conclusions. The seat of the difficulty is not to be sought for in what are usually designated as the intellectual powers, in distinction from the sentimentive nature, but in the passions alone. The victim of this mental disease does not stop to reason, reflect, and compare, but is borne forward to his purpose with a blind and often an irresistible impulse.

Pinel mentions a mechanic in the asylum Bicetre who was subject to this form of insanity. It was, as is frequently the case, intermittent. He knew when the paroxysms of passion were coming on, and even gave warning to those who were exposed to its effects to make their escape. His powers of correctly judging remained unshaken, not only at other times, but even in the commission of the most violent and outrageous acts. He saw clearly their impropriety, but was unable to restrain himself; and, after the cessation of the paroxysms, was often filled with the deepest grief.

It will suggest itself to the reader that these views on Affectional or Moral insanity, as this department of insanity is sometimes called, as well as those for-

merly expressed on the insanity of the intellect, have important relations to the administration of legal justice. The law, as administered in courts of adjudication, primarily takes cognizance of actions; but as it has justice for its object, it cannot separate actions from motives. But the philosophy of motives, involving as it does not only the powers of perception and comparison, but the emotions, desires, and affections, goes deep into the philosophy of the mind; so that a perfect administration of justice implies a knowledge of insanity, not only in the intellect, but in the affections and the moral nature; a view which is much later in its origin, dating back hardly beyond the writings of Pinel, but which is closely connected with the best interests of society and individuals.

§ 330. Of the mental disease termed hypochondriasis.

The seat of the well-known mental disease termed Hypochondriasis is to be sought for in a disordered state of the Sensibilities. It is, in fact, nothing more nor less than a state of deep depression, gloom, or melancholy. This is the fact; and we never apply the term hypochondriasis to a state of mind where such gloom or melancholy does not exist; but it is nevertheless true, that the occasion or basis of the fact may sometimes be found in a disordered condition of some other part of the mind. One or two concise statements will illustrate what we mean.

One of the slighter forms of hypochondriasis can perhaps be traced to inordinate workings of the Imagination. The mind of the sufferer is fixed upon some unpromising and gloomy subject; probably one which has particular relation either to his present or future prospects. He gives it an undue place in his thoughts, dwelling upon it continually. His imagination hovers over it, throwing a deeper shade on what is already dark. Thus the mind becomes disordered; it is broken off from its ordinary and rightful mode of action, and is no longer what it was, nor what nature designed it should be.

There is another and still more striking form of hypochondriasis, which is connected in its origin with an alienation of the power of belief. As in all other cases of hypochondriasis, the subject of it suffers much mental distress. He is beset with the most gloomy and distressing apprehensions, occasioned, not by exaggerated and erroneous notions in general, but by some fixed and inevitable false belief.—One imagines that he has no soul; another, that his body is gradually but rapidly perishing; and a third, that he is converted into some other animal, or that he has been transformed into a plant. We are told in the Memoirs of Count Maurepas that this last idea once took possession of one of the princes of Bourbon. So deeply was he infected with this notion, that he often went into his garden, and insisted on being watered in common with the plants around him. Some have imagined themselves to be transformed into glass, and others have fallen into the still stranger folly of imagining themselves dead.—What has been said confirms our remark, that, although hypochondriasis is, in itself considered, seated in the sensibilities, yet its origin may sometimes be found in a disordered state of some other part of the mind.

It is also sometimes the case that this disease originates in a violation of some form of sentimentive action. It is not only, as its appropriate position, seated in the sensibilities, but it sometimes has its origin there. It is related of a certain Englishman, a man of generous and excellent character, that his life was once attempted by his brother with a pistol. He succeeded, however, in wresting the pistol from his brother's hand, and, on examination, found it to be double charged with bullets. This transaction, as might be expected in the case of a person of just and generous sentiments, filled him with such horror, and with such disgust for the character of man, that he secluded himself ever after from human society. He never allowed the visits even of his own children. It is certainly easy to see, that, under such circumstances,

the sensibilities may receive such a shock as to leave the subject of it in a state of permanent dissatisfaction and gloom. In other words, he may in this way and for such reason become a confirmed hypochondriac.

§ 331. Of intermissions of hypochondriasis, and of its remedies.

The mental disease of hypochondriasis is always understood to imply the existence of a feeling of gloom and depression; but this depressed feeling does not exist in all cases in the same degree. In all instances it is a source of no small unhappiness, but in some the wretchedness is extreme. The greatest bodily pains are light in the comparison. It is worthy of remark, however, that the mental distress of hypochondriasis is in some persons characterized by occasional intermissions. An accidental remark, some sudden combination of ideas, a pleasant day, and various other causes, are found to dissipate the gloom of the mind. At such times there is not unfrequently a high flow of the spirits, corresponding to the previous extreme depression.—As this disease, even when mitigated by occasional intermissions, is prodigal in evil results, it becomes proper to allude to certain remedies which have sometimes been resorted to.

(1.) The first step towards remedying the evil is to infuse health and vigour into the bodily action, especially that of the nervous system. The nerves, it will be recollected, are the great medium of sensation, inasmuch as they constitute, under different modifications, the external senses. Now the senses are prominent sources of belief and knowledge. Consequently, when the nervous system (including, of course, the senses) is in a disordered state, it is not surprising that persons should have wrong sensations and external perceptions, and, therefore, a wrong belief. If a man's nerves are in such a state that he feels precisely as he supposes a man made of glass would feel, it is no great wonder, when we consider the constitution of the mind, that he should actually believe himself

to be composed of that substance. But one of the forms of the disease in question is essentially founded on an erroneous but fixed belief of this kind. Hence, in restoring the bodily system to a right action, we shall correct the wrong belief if it be founded in the senses; and, in removing this, we may anticipate the removal of that deep-seated gloom which is characteristic of hypochondriasis.—(2.) As all the old associations of the hypochondriac have been more or less visited and tinctured by his peculiar malady, efforts should be made to break them up and remove them from the mind, by changes in the objects with which he is most conversant, by introducing him into new society, or by travelling. By these means his thoughts are likely to be diverted, not only from the particular subject which has chiefly interested him, but a new impulse is given to the whole mind, which promises to interrupt and banish that fatal fixedness and inertness which had previously encumbered and prostrated it.—(3.) Whenever the malady appears to be founded on considerations of a moral nature, the hypochondriasis may sometimes be removed, or at least alleviated, by the suggestion of counteracting moral motives. If, for instance, the despondency of mind has arisen from some supposed injury, it is desirable to suggest all well-founded considerations which may tend to lessen the sufferer's estimate of the amount of the injury received. When the injury is very great and apparent, suggestions on the nature and duty of forgiveness may not be without effect.—But, whatever course may be taken, it is desirable that the attention of the sufferer should be directed as little as possible to his disease, by any direct remarks upon it. It was a remark of Dr. Johnson, whose sad experience enabled him to judge, that conversation upon melancholy feeds it. Accordingly, he advised Boswell, who, as well as himself, was subject to melancholy of mind, "never to speak of it to his friends nor in company."

§ 332. Disordered action of the passion of fear.

The passion of FEAR, inasmuch as there are various objects around us which are or may be dangerous, is obviously implanted in us for wise purposes. But it not unfrequently exhibits an irregular or disordered action. This disordered state of the affection may discover itself, when considered either in reference to the occasion on which it exists, or in reference to the degree in which it exists. In some cases, for instance, it is connected with objects which, in the view of reason and common sense, ought not to excite it. Some persons are afraid to be alone in the dark; it is exceedingly distressing to them. Others are afraid (so much so, perhaps, as to be thrown into convulsions by their presence) of a mouse, or a squirrel, or an insect. It will be necessary to refer to, and to give some explanation of, cases of this kind, under the head of Casual Associations.

Again: fear may exist with such intensity as essentially to affect the mind, and even cause insanity. Probably the power of this passion is not well understood. Certain it is, that terrible results have often followed from the attempts of persons, particularly of children, to excite it in others, even in sport. Many instances are on record of individuals who have been permanently and most seriously injured, either in mind or body, or both, by a sudden fright.

Sometimes, especially when connected with permanent causes, it gradually expands and strengthens itself, till it is changed into DESPAIR. The distinctive trait of Despair, in distinction from all other modifications of fear, is, that it excludes entirely the feeling of hope, which exists in connexion with fear in other cases. Despair may exist, therefore, in a greater or less degree, and with a greater or less amount of mental anguish, in accordance with the nature of the thing, whatever it is, which occasions it. When great present or future interests are at stake, and the mind, in relation to those interests, is in a state of despair, the wretchedness which is experienced is necessarily extreme.

§ 333. Perversions of the benevolent affections.

There are some singular perversions of the benevolent affections which are worthy of notice here. It is not unfrequently the case that persons in a state of mental alienation are entirely indifferent to, and sometimes they even hate, those whom at other times they love most sincerely and deeply. It is, perhaps, difficult to explain this, although it is practically important to know the fact.—Dr. Rush, in speaking of a singular apathy or torpor of the passions, which is sometimes found to exist, says, "I was once consulted by a citizen of Philadelphia, who was remarkable for his strong affection for his wife and children when his mind was in a sound state, who was occasionally afflicted with this apathy, and, when under its influence, lost his affection for them all so entirely, that he said he could see them butchered before his eyes without feeling any distress, or even inclination to rise from his chair to protect them."—(2.) There are other cases where there seems to be not merely an extinction of the benevolent affection, but its positive conversion into hatred. The same philosophic physician mentions the case of a young lady who was confined as a lunatic in the Pennsylvania Hospital in the year 1802. One of the characteristics of her insanity was hatred for her father. She was gradually restored; and, for several weeks before she was discharged from the Hospital, discovered all the marks of a sound mind, excepting the continuance of this unnatural feeling of hatred. On a certain day she acknowledged with pleasure a return of her filial attachment and affection, and soon afterward was discharged as cured.*—(3.) There are other cases where insanity is the indirect result of the mere intensity of the benevolent affections. In cases of this kind the affections are so strong, so intense, that they are unable to withstand the shock of sudden and great opposition and disappointments.—"A peasant woman," says Dr. Gall, "became insane three times; the first

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, p. 255, 345.

at the death of her brother, the second at the death of her father, and the third at that of her mother. After she had recovered the third time she came to consult me. As she was very religious, she complained to me of her unfortunate disposition to be afflicted, at the loss of persons who were dear to her, more than religion permits; an evident proof that she had yielded to grief, although she had combated it by motives which were within her reach." Pinel also mentions the case of a young man who became a violent maniac a short time after losing a father and mother whom he tenderly loved. It is true that in these cases the proximate cause of the insanity is sorrow or grief; but the remote cause, and that without which the unfortunate result would not have existed, is an unrestrained and excessive position of the benevolent affections.—It may be proper to add here, that sudden and strong feelings of joy have, in repeated instances, caused a permanent mental disorganization, and even death itself.—"The son of the famous Leibnitz died from this cause, upon his opening an old chest and unexpectedly finding in it a large quantity of gold. Joy, from the successful issue of political schemes or wishes, has often produced the same effect. Pope Leo X. died of joy in consequence of hearing of a great calamity that had befallen the French nation. Several persons died from the same cause, Mr. Hume tells us, upon witnessing the restoration of Charles II. to the British throne; and it is well known the doorkeeper of Congress died of an apoplexy, from joy, upon hearing the news of the capture of Lord Cornwallis and his army during the American Revolutionary war."*

* Rush on the Diseases of the Mind, p. 339.

CHAPTER IV.

DISORDERED ACTION OF THE MORAL SENSIBILITIES.

§ 334. Nature of voluntary moral derangement.

THE moral, as well as the natural or pathematic Sensibilities, the Conscience as well as the Heart, may be the subject of a greater or less degree of disorder and alienation. There are probably two leading forms, at least, of moral derangement, viz., VOLUNTARY, and NATURAL or CONGENITAL.—In regard to voluntary moral derangement, we may remark, as an interesting and practically important fact, that man may virtually destroy his conscience. There is sound philosophy in the well-known passage of Juvenal, "NEMO REPENTE FUIT TURPISSIMUS." The truth implied in this passage is unquestionably applicable to all persons, with the exception of those few cases where the moral derangement is natural or congenital. A man is not in the first instance *turpissimus*, or a villain, because his conscience makes resistance, and will not let him be so. But if the energies of the will are exercised in opposition to the conscience; if, on a systematic plan and by a permanent effort, the remonstrances of conscience are unheeded and its action repressed, its energies will be found to diminish, and its very existence will be put at hazard. There is no doubt that in this way the conscience may be so far seared as to be virtually annihilated. Multitudes have prepared themselves for the greatest wickedness, and have become, in fact, morally insane, by their own voluntary doing. There is a passage in Beaumont, in his "King and no King," which strikingly indicates the progress of the mind in such cases:

> "There is a method in man's wickedness;
> It grows up by degrees. I am not come
> So high as killing of myself; there are

A hundred thousand sins 'twixt it and me,
Which I must do. *I shall come to't at last.*"

We say in such cases the conscience is virtually annihilated. And by this remark we mean, that it is inert, inefficient, dormant, paralyzed. We do not mean that it is dead. The conscience never dies. Its apparent death is impregnated with the elements of a real and terrible resurrection. It seems to gather vivification and strength in the period of its inactivity; and, at the appointed time of its reappearance, inflicts a stern and fearful retribution, not only for the crimes which are committed against others, but for the iniquity which has been perpetrated against itself.

§ 335. Of accountability in connexion with this form of disordered conscience.

If the moral sensibility, under the system of repression which has been mentioned, refuses to act, the question arises whether, at such a time, a person is morally accountable for his conduct. As his conscience does not condemn him in what he does, is the transaction, whatever its nature, a criminal one? There can be but one answer to this question. If the individual is not condemned by his conscience, it is the result of his own evil course. We may illustrate the subject by a case which is unhappily too frequent. A man who commits a crime in a state of drunkenness may plead that he was not, at the time, aware of the guilt of his conduct. And this may be true. But he was guilty for placing himself in a situation where he knew he would be likely to injure others, or in some other way commit unlawful acts. His crime, instead of being diminished, is in fact increased. It is twofold. He is guilty of drunkenness, and he is guilty of everything evil, which he knew, or might have known, would result from his drunkenness.

In like manner, a man is not at liberty to plead that he was not, in the commission of his crimes, condemned by conscience, if it be the fact that he has, by a previous process, voluntarily perverted or hardened

the conscience. On the contrary, it would be fair to say, as in the case of drunkenness, that he has increased his guilt; for he has added to the guilt of the thing done the antecedent and still greater crime of aiming a blow at the mind, of striking at the very life of the soul. Practically he is not self-condemned, for the mere reason that he has paralyzed the principle by which the sentence of self-condemnation is pronounced. But in the eye of immutable justice there is not only no diminution of his guilt, but it is inexpressibly enhanced by the attempts to *murder*, if we may so express it, the principle which, more than anything else, constitutes the dignity and glory of man's nature. (See § 236, 237.)

§ 336. Of natural or congenital moral derangement.

The other form of moral derangement is NATURAL or CONGENITAL. We do not know that we are authorized to say that men are by nature, in any case whatever, absolutely destitute of a conscience; nor, on the other hand, have we positive grounds for asserting that this is not the case. There is no more inconsistency or impossibility in a man's coming into the world destitute of a conscience, than there is in his being born without the powers of memory, comparison, and reasoning, which we find to be the case in some idiots. But certain it is, that there are some men who appear to have naturally a very enfeebled conscience; a conscience which but very imperfectly fulfils its office; and who, in this respect at least, appear to be constituted very differently from the great body of their fellow-men. They exhibit an imbecility, or, if the expression may be allowed, an *idiocy* of conscience, which unquestionably diminishes, in a very considerable degree, their moral accountability. A number of those writers who have examined the subject of Insanity have taken this view, and have given instances in support of it.

"In the course of my life," says Dr. Rush, "I have been consulted in three cases of the total perversion

of the moral faculties. One of them was in a young man, the second in a young woman, both of Virginia, and the third was in the daughter of a citizen of Philadelphia. The last was addicted to every kind of mischief. Her wickedness had no intervals while she was awake, except when she was kept busy in some steady and difficult employment." He refers also to instances in other writers.

Dr. Haslam, in his Observations on Madness, has given two decided cases of moral derangement. One of these was a lad about ten years of age. Some of the traits which he exhibited were as follows. He early showed an impatience and irritability of temper, and became so mischievous and uncontrollable that it was necessary to appoint a person to watch over him. He gave answers only to such questions as pleased him, and acted in opposition to every direction. "On the first interview I had with him," says Dr. Haslam, "he contrived, after two or three minutes' acquaintance, to break a window and tear the frill of my shirt. He was an unrelenting foe to all china, glass, and crockery-ware. Whenever they came within his reach, he shivered them instantly. In walking the street, the keeper was compelled to take the wall, as he uniformly broke the windows if he could get near them; and this operation he performed so dexterously, and with such safety to himself, that he never cut his fingers. To tear lace and destroy the finer textures of female ornament seemed to gratify him exceedingly, and he seldom walked out without finding an occasion of indulging this propensity. He never became attached to any inferior animal, a benevolence so common to the generality of children. To these creatures his conduct was that of the brute. He oppressed the feeble, and avoided the society of those more powerful than himself. Considerable practice had taught him that he was the cat's master; and, whenever this luckless animal approached him, he plucked out its whiskers with wonderful rapidity; to use his own language, '*I must*

have her beard off.' After this operation he commonly threw the creature on the fire or through the window. If a little dog came near him, he kicked it; if a large one, he would not notice it. When he was spoken to, he usually said, 'I do not choose to answer.' When he perceived any one who appeared to observe him attentively, he always said, 'Now I will look unpleasant.' The usual games of children afforded him no amusement; whenever boys were at play he never joined them: indeed, the most singular part of his character was, that he appeared incapable of forming a friendship with any one; he felt no considerations for sex, and would as readily kick or bite a girl as a boy. Of any kindness shown him he was equally insensible; he would receive an orange as a present, and afterward throw it in the face of the donor."

This unfortunate lad seems sometimes to have been sensible of his melancholy condition. When, on a certain occasion, he was conducted through an insane hospital, and a mischievous maniac was pointed out to him who was more strictly confined than the rest, he said to his attendant, "This would be the right place for me." He often expressed a wish to die, and gave as a reason "that God had not made him like other children."

§ 337. Of moral accountability in cases of natural or congenital moral derangement.

The question recurs here, also, whether persons who are the subjects of a natural or congenital moral derangement are morally accountable, and in what degree. If there is naturally an entire extinction of the moral sense, as in some cases of Idiocy there is an entire extinction of the reasoning power, which, although it may not frequently happen, is at least a supposable case, there is no moral accountability. A person in that situation can have no distinct perception of what right and wrong are, nor can he be conscious of doing either right or wrong in any given case;

and, consequently, being without either merit or demerit in the moral sense of the terms, he is not the proper subject of reward and punishment. He is to be treated on the principles that are applicable to idiots and insane persons generally.

In other cases where the mental disorder is not so great, but there are some lingering rays of moral light, some feeble capability of moral vision, the person is to be judged, if it is possible to ascertain what it is, according to what is given him. If he has but one moral talent, it is not to be presumed that the same amount of moral responsibility rests upon him as upon another who possesses ten. The doctrine which requires men, considered as subjects of reward and punishment, to be treated alike, without regard to those original diversities of structure which may exist in all the departments of the mind, not only tends to confound right and wrong, but is abhorrent to the dictates of benevolence. Many individuals, through a misunderstanding of this important subject, have suffered under the hands of the executioner, who, on principles of religion and strict justice, should have been encircled only in the arms of compassion, long-suffering, and charity.

CHAPTER V.

CASUAL ASSOCIATIONS IN CONNEXION WITH THE SENSIBILITIES.

§ 338. Frequency of casual associations, and some instances of them.

In the first volume of this Work, which had especial relation to the INTELLECT, we gave some instances of Casual Association, directing our attention to those that were of great strength, and were wholly caused by accidental circumstances. Reference was made to the casual associations in respect to the place of sensation, the ideas of extension and time, of extension and colour, &c. It is necessary, however, to resume the consideration of the subject in this place, and to

illustrate the vast power which the laws of ASSOCIATION possess over the Sentimentive as well as over the Intellectual part of our nature.

By a thousand circumstances and in thousands of instances, the feelings are wrenched from their natural position, and shoot forth and show themselves in misplaced and disproportionate forms. Casual associations, in the shape of antipathies, fears, aversions, prepossessions, remorse, &c., are found seated in many a mind, which is otherwise unembarrassed and unexceptionable in its action; they have established their empire there on immoveable foundations, and are incorporated with the whole mental nature.

If it were otherwise, how could a man that would willingly face a thousand men in battle, tremble at a mouse, a squirrel, a thunder-shower, at the trivial circumstance of placing the left slipper on the right foot, or any other very trifling thing! And yet such instances are without number.—It may be considered singular enough, but so it is, that some men cannot endure the sight of a fish, eel, or lobster; another person is disgusted at the sight of cheese, honey, eggs, milk, or apples; another is exceedingly distressed and even convulsed at the sight of a toad or a cat, a grasshopper or a beetle.

§ 339. Of association in connexion with the appetites.

We now proceed to give a few illustrations of this interesting subject, which has hitherto received so little attention. In doing this, it may be incidentally remarked, that the instinctive tendencies in man, which are but few in number, are in their own nature of such a fixed and decided character, as apparently to be placed, in a great measure, beyond the reach of association. But it is not so with the Appetites. On the contrary, they are subject to very strong influences from that source, as will appear by some statements.

(I.) Almost every article which is capable of being masticated and digested, is made, in one country or another, an article of food. It is the case, at the same

time, that there are many articles used as food in one country which are not used as food in another. This difference in the manner of living is to be ascribed, in many cases, to some early and fixed association. In some countries the people eat rats, mice, frogs, lizards, horse-flesh, dogs, locusts, caterpillars, &c.* In other countries, in our own for instance, the associations adverse to the use of such kinds of food are so strong, that it is next to impossible to overcome them.

(II.) There are appetitive associations of a different kind. It is well known, for instance, that the appetite for drink may be inflamed by a mere name, or the sight of a particular building or place, or the return of a certain hour of the day. This unquestionably is the result of a casual association. And the association may have become so strong, that the appetite is rendered wholly irrepressible whenever such objects recur.—This is particularly true when the liquor itself, the rum, gin, wine, or brandy, is placed directly before the thorough-going drunkard. The appetite in a moment becomes so strong as to convulse the whole soul. He is agitated and rent with a sort of madness, and rushes upon the object before him much as the furious lion seizes and rends his keeper when he has accidentally seen and tasted his blood.

§ 340. Of casual associations in connexion with the propensities.

As we pass on from the Appetites to the consideration of that part of our Sentient nature which was examined under the head of the Propensities, we find some instances of the power of association, both in strengthening and in annulling them.—Among other Propensities which have a distinct and natural origin is the desire of society; but it is undoubtedly the case, that peculiar circumstances may operate either to increase this desire or to annul it altogether. All cases of decided and permanent Misanthropy, for in-

* Lander's Niger, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 170, 179.—Lives of Celebrated Travellers, vol. i., Am. ed., p. 102, 215.

stance, are the work, with perhaps a few exceptions of congenital alienation, not of nature, but of circumstances. If a man of kind and benevolent feelings is exceedingly ill treated by one whom he has often favoured, it is possible, at least, that it will result in a fixed aversion to that person, which nothing can afterward overcome.

If a deep and permanent injury were inflicted, not merely by a friend, but a brother, the effect on the mind might be so great as not only to break up the original principle of sociability, but implant a decided and unchangeable hostility to the whole human race. Such treatment would be so contrary from what the injured person had a right to expect, that the mind would be thrown entirely out of its original position, and with such force as to be unable to recover it.

§ 341. Other instances of casual association in connexion with the propensities.

The desire of power, in the remarks which were formerly made upon that subject, was regarded as an original propensity. This principle may become disordered in its action by becoming inordinately intense, and also in connexion with some casual association. Mr. Locke, in his Letters on Toleration, mentions the case of an individual, whose mind was so long and intently fixed upon some high object that he became partially insane. He was, for the most part, rational at other times; but, whenever the object he had so earnestly pursued was mentioned, it brought into exercise so many intense associations, that he immediately became deranged.

Although we might find it difficult to illustrate this subject from the ordinary forms of the propensity to Imitation, the power of casual associations may distinctly be shown in *sympathetic* imitation. If a person's feelings be from any cause so strongly excited as to show themselves in involuntary bodily action, subsequently the mere sight of the person, place, or instrument that was prominently concerned in the

original excitement of the mind, will generally be attended with a recurrence of the sympathetic bodily action. After such results have followed a number of times, the association will become so strong, that it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for the sympathetic person to repress the outward bodily signs in all cases coming within the reach of the association.

§ 342. Inordinate fear from casual associations.

The same views may undoubtedly be carried into the higher department of the Affections or Passions. It is sufficiently evident, for instance, that the passion of FEAR is an attribute of man's nature; and, in ordinary cases, it is susceptible of being subjected to the control of reason and the sentiments of duty. But this is not always the case. Casual associations are sometimes formed which no effort of reason and no calls of duty can rend asunder.—We will endeavour to illustrate this subject by some familiar instances.

Some persons have been exceedingly frightened by thunder and lightning at early periods of life. The fright may have been occasioned either directly, or by the actual terrific power and nearness of the explosion, or by merely seeing an exhibition of great fear in parents or others more advanced in years. And from that hour to the end of life, they have never been able, with all possible care and anxiety, to free themselves from the most distressing fear on such occasions.

Casual associations, occasioned by some unfortunate circumstances in early life, have been the source of very great and irresistible fears in respect to death. The fear of death is natural, and perhaps, we may say, is instinctive; but it does not ordinarily exist in such intensity as essentially to interrupt one's happiness. And yet, from time to time, we find unhappy exceptions to this statement. Miss Hamilton, in her Letters on Education, gives an interesting account of a lady who suffered exceedingly from such fears. She was a person of an original and inventive genius, of a

sound judgment, and her powers of mind had received a careful cultivation. But all this availed nothing against the impressions which had been wrought into her mind from infancy. The first view which she had of death in her infancy was accompanied with peculiar circumstances of terror, and the dreadful impression which was then made was heightened by the injudicious language of the nursery. Ever afterward, the mere mention or idea of death was attended with great suffering; so much so, that it was necessary, by means of every possible precaution, to keep her in ignorance of her actual danger when she was sick; nor was it permitted at any time to mention instances of death in her presence. So that the estimable writer of this statement asserts, that she often suffered more from the apprehension than she could have suffered from the most agonizing torture that ever attended the hour of dissolution.*

§ 343. Casual associations in respect to persons.

That the Affections may be more or less disordered by means of casual associations, is further evident from what we notice in the intercourse of individuals with each other. Men sometimes form such an aversion to others, or associate with them such sentiments of dread, that the connexion of the persons and the feelings becomes permanent and unconquerable.—It has sometimes been the case, that a man of distinguished talents has been defeated and prostrated by another, in an argument perhaps, on some public occasion; and, although he harbours no resentment against his opponent, and has no sense of inferiority, yet he never afterward meets him in company without experiencing a very sensible degree of uneasiness and suffering.

Persons have sometimes been ill treated by others; and this occasionally forms the basis of an invincible association either of aversion or dread. The poet Cowper, in early life, suffered in this way. A boy of cruel

* Elementary Principles of Education, Letter iii.

temper, his superior in age, made him the object of long-continued ill treatment and persecution. "This boy," he remarks, "had impressed such a dread of his figure upon my mind, that I well remember being afraid to lift up my eyes upon him higher than his knees; and that I knew him by his shoe-buckles better than by any other part of his dress."

An individual was once perfectly cured of madness by a very harsh and offensive operation. During all his life after, he acknowledged, with the most sincere gratitude, that he could not have received a greater benefit; and still he was utterly unable to bear the sight of the operator, it suggested so strongly the dreadful suffering which he underwent.*

Some men have an exceeding and unaccountable aversion to the mere features and countenance of another, and cannot bear to be looked upon by them. A statement is somewhere given of a person of a noble family, who was not able to bear that an old woman should look upon him. Certain persons, in a season of merriment which is not always wisely directed towards these humbling infirmities of our nature, succeeded in suddenly and unexpectedly introducing him into the presence of one such, but the shock to his feelings was so great as to terminate in his death.

§ 344. Casual association in connexion with objects and places.

The mental operations, in consequence of strong casual associations, may be perplexed in their action in connexion with particular places and objects. "Some persons," says Dr. Conolly, in reference to this subject, "are mad and unmanageable at home, and sane abroad. We read in Aretæus of a carpenter, who was very rational in his workshop, but who could not turn his steps towards the Forum without beginning to groan, to shrug his shoulders, and to bemoan himself. Dr. Rush relates an instance of a preacher in America, who was mad among his parishioners except in the pulpit, where he conducted himself with great

* Locke's Essay, bk. ii., chap. xxxii.

ability; and he also speaks of a judge who was very lunatic in mixed society, but sagacious on the bench."

"I have known patients," says the same writer in another place, "in whom there was a tendency to mania, complain of the difficulty they found in guarding against dislike, not only of particular individuals, but of particular parts of a room or of the house, or of particular articles of furniture or dress; those momentary feelings of uneasiness or antipathy to which all are subject, becoming in them aggravated or prolonged."* In connexion with the facts just stated, he mentions the case of an individual who could not bear the sight of white stockings; and of a certain Russian general, who entertained a singular antipathy to mirrors; so much so that the Empress Catharine always took care to give him audience in a room without any.

In connexion with this class of facts, it may be proper to refer a moment to a singular practice which is related of Dr. Johnson, and which is unquestionably to be ascribed to some early and unfortunate association. His biographer has given an account of it in the following terms: "He had another particularity, of which none of his friends ever ventured to ask an explanation. It appeared to me some superstitious habit, which he had contracted early, and from which he had never called upon his reason to disentangle him. This was his anxious care to go out or in at a door or passage, by a certain number of steps from a certain point, or at least so that as either his right or left foot (I am not certain which) should constantly make the first movement when he came close to the door or passage. Thus I conjecture; for I have, upon innumerable occasions, observed him suddenly stop, and then seem to count his steps with a deep earnestness; and, when he had neglected or gone wrong in this sort of magical movement, I have seen him go back again, put himself into a proper posture to begin the ceremony, and, having gone through it, break

* Conolly on Insanity, Lond. ed., p. 98, 218.

from his abstraction, walk briskly on, and join his company."

§ 345. Of casual association in connexion with particular days.

The same marked tendencies of mind may sometimes be discovered in connexion with particular days or other periods of time. Pinel mentions a lady who fancied that Friday was a day of ill omen and ill luck. "She at length carried this notion so far that she would not leave her room on that day. If the month began on a Friday, it rendered her extremely fearful and miserable for several days. By degrees, Thursday, being the eve of Friday, excited similar alarms. If ever she heard either of those days named in company, she immediately turned pale, and was confused in her manner and conversation, as if she had been visited by some fatal misfortune."*

Statements, much to the same effect, have been made of an individual no less distinguished than Lord Byron. From some circumstance or other, he became deeply impressed with the belief that Friday was destined to be, in relation to himself, an unlucky or ill-omened day. This was not a mere transitory feeling, which was under the control of his philosophy, but was deeply seated and operative. And, with his characteristic frankness, he did not hesitate to declare, or, rather, he took no pains to conceal, that his mind was actually under the despotism of this strange influence.†

We will subjoin here, as bearing some affinity to the cases which might properly be arranged under this head, an instance mentioned in the Encyclopedia Americana by the author of the article on Memory. The statement is as follows: "How strange are the associations of ideas which often take place in spite of us. Every one must have experienced such. The writer recollects a melancholy instance in the case of an insane boy in a hospital, whose derangement was referred to an irreverent association with the name of

* Treatise on Insanity, Davis's translation, p. 140.
† Moore's Life of Byron, vol. ii., p. 458.

God, which occurred to him while singing a hymn in church, and of which he could not divest himself, the painfulness of the impression making it occur to him more forcibly every time he sung in church, till his reason became unsettled."

§ 346. Antipathies to animals.

Nothing but the fact of the existence and great power of casual associations can explain the circumstance that individuals have, from time to time, discovered a very great antipathy to certain animals. Tasso, according to his biographers, would fall into convulsions at the sight of a carp. Henry III. of England could not be persuaded to sit in the room with a cat. Admiral Coligni, a name justly renowned in the history of France, was so afraid of a mouse, that he could not be induced to admit one to his presence unless he had his sword in his hand.

No man ever gave more decided proofs of courage than the celebrated Marquis de la Roche Jacquelin; but it is a singular fact (although no account is given of the origin of this strange association), that he could not look in the face of a squirrel without trembling and turning pale. He himself ridiculed his weakness in this respect, but with all his efforts he could not prevent the physical effects which have been referred to, whenever he was in the presence of that harmless animal.

But we have an incident nearer home, which appears the less surprising, because we know the origin of it. The late Governor Sullivan, of Massachusetts, when a boy, fell asleep under a tree, and was awaked by a serpent crawling over him. He arose in great terror, ran towards the house, and fell down in a convulsive fit. Afterward, through life, he retained such aversion for everything of the serpent kind, that he could not see one, or even the picture of one, without falling into convulsions.

Peter the Great, of Russia, who certainly was not wanting in expansion and force of mind, was subject

to a strong and invincible aversion of this kind. His biographer, without giving any explanation of it, merely mentions the fact as follows: "Nothing was so much the object of the Czar's antipathy as a black insect of the scarabeus or beetle kind, which breeds in houses that are not kept clean, and especially in places where meal and other provisions are deposited. In the country, the walls and ceilings of the peasants' houses are covered with them, particularly in Russia, where they abound more than in any other part of the world. They are there called *taracan;* but our naturalists give them the name of *dermeste,* or dissecting scarabeus.

"Although the Russian monarch was far from being subject to childish fears or womanish fancies, one of these insects sufficed to drive him out of an apartment, nay, even out of the house. In his frequent journeys in his own dominions, he never went into a house without having his apartment carefully swept by one of his own servants, and being assured that there were no taracans to fear. One day he paid a visit to an officer who stood pretty high in his esteem, at his country house, which was built of wood, at a little distance from Moscow. The Czar expressed his satisfaction with what was offered him, and with the order he observed in the house. The company sat down to table, and dinner was already begun, when he asked his landlord if there were taracans in his house.

"'Not many,' replied the officer, without reflecting; 'and, the better to get rid of them, I have pinned a living one to the wall.' At the same time he pointed to the place where the insect was pinned, and still continued to palpitate. Unfortunately, it was just beside the Czar, in whom the unexpected sight of this object of his aversion produced so much emotion, that he arose instantly from the table, gave the officer a violent blow, and left his house with all his attendants."*

* Staehlin's Original Anecdotes of Peter the Great.

DIVISION THIRD.

THE WILL.

VOLITIONAL STATES OF MIND OR VOLITIONS.

PART I.

GENERAL NATURE AND RELATIONS OF THE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

RELATION OF THE INTELLECT TO THE WILL.

§ 1. General relation of the will to the other departments of the mind.

HAVING completed our proposed outline of the Intellect and the Sensibilities, we now enter upon the last division of this great subject, the Will — a subject difficult in itself, and the occasion in past times of more controversy than any other, and yet placed in its true position, and rendered comparatively easy, by means of the analysis, which we have just gone through, of the other mental departments. The Will comes last, and may be regarded, in certain respects, as sustaining to the Intellect and the Sensibilities a higher and more authoritative position; not so diversified in its action, not presenting so many points of interest, but laying the basis of personality and responsibility; completing the unity of the mental action by giving it an authoritative centre, and thus bringing the mind to a completeness and effectiveness of developement which could not be possessed without it. So that, in considering the position, in its relations and effects, which the Will sustains to what has gone before, we are reminded of the passage which Horne Tooke has made so celebrated,

> "'Tis the last keystone
> That makes the arch; the rest that there were put
> Are nothing, till that comes to bind and shut."

§ 2. All the great mental departments connected together.

The three great departments of the mind, the recognition of which alone furnishes the satisfactory basis of a true mental philosophy, are connected with each other by most intimate and important relations. So much so that they are worthy, in consequence of the

light they throw upon the mind's action, of a careful attention. Relational affiliations and influences exist not only in the great departments, but are found more or less in all the subordinate powers and susceptibilities, both cognitive and sentimentive. For instance, as we have had occasion to remark and to illustrate in other places of this Work, there is no perception without the antecedent sensation; there is no memory without attention; no reasoning without both memory and association; and neither reasoning nor imagination without the power of perceiving relations or relative suggestion. And if such be the state of things in these and other instances, then we are supported by analogy in affirming that there are connecting relations and influences running through the more general departments.

§ 3. The intellectual part the foundation or basis of the action of the other parts of the mind.

Of the Understanding or intellect in particular, it may be said with great appearance of truth and reason, that we find in it the foundation, the basis of the existence and of the action both of the Sentimentive and of the Volitional nature. Let us examine this point, in the first place, in reference to the Sensibilities. When that part of our nature is in action, we find ourselves, according to the circumstances of the case, pleased or displeased; we are filled with admiration or disgust; we love or hate; we approve or disapprove, and exercise other emotions, desires, and passions. But the slightest examination will teach us that this could not be the case; that these states of mind could not exist without the acquisition of knowledge, which of course implies the exercise of the intellect. If we approve or disapprove a thing, it is very evident that we must have a knowledge of some object of approval or disapproval; that there must be something upon which these emotions can fasten. And again, if we exercise love or hatred, the intellect must have been previously employed in making known

the existence and qualities of those objects towards which the passions of love and hatred are directed.

§ 4. The connexion of the intellect with the will.

And these views will be found equally applicable to the Will. There can no more be an act of the will without some object of knowledge before the mind, than there can be remembrance without a thing remembered, or association without an object, to which the principle of association attaches itself. Hence, if we could find a man in whom the intellect is entirely destroyed in fact, or is virtually destroyed by being entirely dormant, we should find at the same time an extinction both of the passions and the will.

Happily the records of the human race, with the exception of cases of idiocy and mental malformation, furnish but a solitary instance of that extreme extinction of the intellect which we now have in view; we refer to the case which has already come under notice, that of the unfortunate Caspar Hauser. As the intellect cannot be brought into action and made to develope itself except by first coming into contact with the material world, the result of this young man's confinement from childhood in one place, and of his entire seclusion from everything external to his horrid prison, was, as would naturally be expected, the utter prostration of his Understanding. Scarcely a ray of knowledge illuminated the intellective region. The feeble perceptions of early infancy, such as we find in those that have scarcely explored the boundaries of the cradle that rocks them, were in his case combined with a body that had nearly expanded itself to the fulness of manhood. Such imbecility and vacuity of the Intellect of course furnished no foundation for the developement of the Sensibilities. If we may rely upon the accounts that are given of him, there was in general an unruffled and placid surface, a great calm of the mind. And as there was no excitement, no tossing to and fro of the sensibilities, but everything there was wrapped up in slumber and inactivity, so there

was no developement of self-determination, no firmness of resolve, no inward vigour and promptness of the volitional power. The slightest impulse from the minds of others was followed by the consentaneous and unresisting movement of his own; and his Will, so far from indicating any elements of decision and stability, could be likened only to the flexible reed of the desert, which, without knowing the power that presses it, is shaken and bent by every changing breeze.

§ 5. The connexion of the understanding with the will shown from its connection with action.

As it is the object of this chapter to consider particularly the connexion existing between the Intellect and the Will, and the relation they sustain to each other, we may remark further, that the connexion of the intellectual with the volitional department is apapparent from the connexion of the intellectual part or understanding with *action*.—Whatever difference of opinion there may be in other respects, there is a general agreement in this, that the mind, both in its internal constitution and in its adaptation to outward objects, is evidently framed for movement. It was never meant to be essentially dormant, either in a state of unconsciousness or of mere contemplation and emotion; but was rather, when we consider its connexion with other states and modes of existence, designed to be an attendant and ministering angel to the great Being who made it, performing His errands of observation and mercy, in whatever sphere of activity He might see fit to designate.—And it seems to be further assented to on the grounds both of consciousness and of observation, not only that the various parts of man's nature conspire to action, but also that the immediate and proximate seat and source of action is in the Will; in other words, that the Will emphatically sustains the part of the directing, controlling, and executive power of the mind. The Will, in particular, leads to *outward* action. It must be obvious to every one that there can be no bodily ac-

tion, excepting what is termed involuntary, without a concurrent act of the will; and it is equally obvious that action, in its various forms, embraces the multiplied duties, and is the foundation of the usefulness of man.

Now if these views be correct, and if we wholly dissever the understanding from action, where is its utility? If the highest exertions of the intellect can lead to no possible results, except the mere accumulation of an inoperative and lifeless mass of knowledge, what are the benefits connected with it? But if we are not prepared to admit that the intellect, which is so important a part of man's nature, is without practical worth, it necessarily follows that its value depends in a great degree upon its connexion with the Will, inasmuch as the Understanding can have no connexion with action exterior to itself, and independently of its own accumulative processes, except in the direction and with the concurrent movement of the volitional power. And on these grounds, among others, we may assert the relationship and the intimate connexion of these two great departments of the mind.

§ 6. Further proof from an observation of the conduct of men.

In addition to the considerations which have already been brought forward, we may find further proofs of the connexion which is alleged to exist, in our manner of addressing men when we wish them to pursue a certain course. We do not address the Will directly and alone, nor do we directly address ourselves to the emotions and passions of men; but we commonly lay the basis of our efforts in a movement on the intellect. We make this statement with a great degree of confidence, and we appeal to every one's recollection whether it be not true.

A person, for instance, wishes another person to join with him in some enterprise; and perhaps it is one of an exciting and difficult nature. But where does he begin? Does he immediately lay a requisition upon

the will, commanding and requiring the individual to enter upon the proposed course at once? Every one must see that this, except in cases where a person has deliberately surrendered his will to another, as in that of the soldier, would certainly defeat his own purpose. If, therefore, he would indulge the hope of succeeding, he must act upon the Will, by taking advantage of the relations which it sustains to other parts of our mental nature. Accordingly, he commences his attempts by an appeal to the understanding, endeavouring to show, by plain and incontrovertible statements, the practicability, propriety, and benefits of his propositions; and he knows perfectly well, that, unless he succeeds in convincing the understanding, he has no prospect of rousing the will to action, and that the probability of a favourable movement on the part of the volitional power will be in proportion, or nearly so, to the favourable position of the intellect.

§ 7. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section.

On the death of Julius Cæsar, Antony is represented by Shakspeare, who well knew what process was requisite in effecting such an object, as endeavouring to stir up a "sudden flood of mutiny." But he does not command the multitude, who, in their state of want and ignorance, are ready for almost any purpose, whether good or evil, to go forth at once, and consummate his projects of fire and slaughter. Too shrewd an observer of human nature for this, it is worthy of notice, that he addresses neither the will nor the passions till he had first made a lodgment in the understanding. After saying, in excuse of his coming to speak at Cæsar's funeral, that Cæsar was a just and faithful friend to himself, he goes on to state (what probably were the plain and undoubted facts in the case), that Cæsar had brought to Rome many captives; that by their ransom-money he had filled the public coffers; that he had wept over the sufferings of the poor; and that he had refused a kingly crown at the Lupercal. These statements, which were mere

facts addressed to the understanding, and some of them at least, and probably all of them, were incontrovertible, of course laid the foundation for a change in the passions, as they were designed to do. And the people, who just before had called Cæsar a tyrant, and were glad that Rome was rid of him, now began to admit, under the influence of a nascent leniency of feeling, that there was much reason in Antony's sayings, and that Cæsar had suffered wrong.

Having thus prepared the way by removing the hostile feelings that antecedently existed, he now began to ply them in another direction. He told them of the greatness of Cæsar; of the power which he had once exercised; of his ability to stand against not one nation merely, but the whole world, though now so low that none would do him reverence. And when, still continuing to approach the feelings by facts first addressed to the perceptive powers, he further proceeded to show them the bloody mantle, and to speak of the Testament which bequeathed to them his bountiful legacies, the passions, which had already begun to quicken in Cæsar's favour, were kindled to a flame. It was then that the object of the speaker was accomplished, as he foresaw it would be. There was no want of motives, no hesitancy of the will. The multitude, with this new basis of action thus adroitly laid in their intellectual natures, were no longer the friends of Brutus; nor were they indifferent and idle spectators. But rushing from street to street, and seizing such weapons as their purposes required, they called for revenge, slaughters, and burnings.

§ 8. Nature of the connexion between the intellect and will.

Presuming enough has been said, at least for the present, in support of the actual existence of the connexion we are inquiring into, we are now prepared to say something of its nature. Although the connexion really exists, and is of very prominent importance, it is not meant to be said that it is a *direct* one. In other words, the Intellect, whatever opinions may have

formerly prevailed on the subject, is, in no case, in direct contact with the Will. When, therefore, we speak of the operation of the intellect upon the will, we mean an indirect or circuitous operation; that is to say, one which is carried on through the mediation of the *sensibilities*, under which term we include the various forms of the natural or pathematic emotions and of the desires, together with moral emotions and feelings of obligation.

The appropriate and distinctive object of the Intellect is knowledge. But knowledge alone has no tendency to control volition. It is possible for a person in the exercise of his intellectual powers to possess unlimited knowledge, to explore and exhaust every field of inquiry; and yet, if his knowledge be unattended with feeling, if it be followed by no form of emotion or desire, or obligatory sentiment, it will leave the Will perfectly indifferent and motionless. Any other supposition is at variance with every day's experience.

A certain person, for example, comes to the conclusion, after a long train of reasoning, that the possession of a definite amount of property would be beneficial to himself and family. This conclusion is of course the result of a purely intellectual process. But if it be not followed by sentimentive action; in other words, if it be unattended with emotions, desires, and feelings of obligation, it will altogether fail to arouse the will to activity or to secure a single effort. In the constitution of the human mind, everywhere so full of wisdom, the Sensibilities, which are as different from the will as from the intellect, are located between the two. They form the connecting link which binds them together. To strike out the sensibilities, therefore, is necessarily to excavate a gulf of separation between the intellect and the will, which is forever impassable. There is from that moment no medium of communication, no bond of union, no reciprocal action.

§ 9. Opinions of Locke and Mackintosh on this point.

Here is one point, as those who are acquainted with the history of philosophical opinions will probably recollect, on which writers on the Will have sometimes fallen into great error, viz., in placing the intellectual in juxtaposition with the voluntary or volitional power, and supposing the latter to be under the direct operation of the former. Mr. Locke himself seems to have been of this opinion at first, and to have published to the world his belief, that the understanding, forming an estimate of what is the greatest good, is the direct and immediate means of controlling the Will. But he afterward, on more mature examination, announced, with the honesty and love of truth for which he is so celebrated, his decided change of opinion.—"It seems," says he, "so established and settled a maxim, by the general consent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder that, when I first published my thoughts on this subject, I took it for granted; and I imagine that by a great many I shall be thought more excusable for having done so, than that now I have ventured *to recede from so received an opinion.* But yet, upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, *though apprehended and acknowledged to be so*, does not determine the will, until our *desire*, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the want of it. Convince a man ever so much that plenty has its advantages over poverty; make him see and own that the handsome conveniences of life are better than nasty penury; yet, as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneasiness in it, he moves not; *his will is never determined to any action* that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever so well persuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life; yet, till he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in

pursuit of this greater good."—"For good," he says in another passage, "though appearing and allowed ever so great, yet, till it has raised desires in our mind, and thereby made us uneasy in its want, *reaches not our wills.*"*

He was satisfied, on repeated examination, and on the most mature reflection which he could give to the subject, that the mere intellectual conviction of what might tend to the greatest good has no effect upon the Will till it has first excited within us desires after that good. And we find the same view taken by other writers on the mind. The following expressions of Sir James Mackintosh show what were his convictions on the subject.—"Through whatever length of *reasoning* the mind may pass in its advances towards action, there is placed at the end of any avenue, through which it can advance, some principle wholly unlike mere reason, some *emotion* or *sentiment* which must be touched before the *springs of will and action* can be set in motion."†

§ 10. Power of will and intellect not perfectly correspondent to each other.

But, although the Intellect thus lays the original foundation of the acts of the Will, we are not necessarily to infer that there is an exact correspondence and proportion between them. In other words, we are not to infer that the vigour of the WILL is always in exact proportion to the expansion and vigour of the INTELLECT. It was a sagacious remark of the distinguished painter Fuseli, which we venture to assert a careful observation will fully confirm, that nature does not always "*proportion the will to our powers;*" meaning by the last expression our perceptive or intellective powers. "It sometimes," he adds, "assigns a copious proportion of will to minds, whose faculties are very contracted, and frequently associates with the greatest faculties a will feeble and impotent."‡ The

* Essay concerning the Human Understanding, book ii., ch. xxi., § 35, 46. † View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, sect. v.
‡ Cunningham's Lives of Painters, art. Fuseli.

Will appears to require, as the basis of its action in any given case, only a certain sphere of knowledge; and any amount of knowledge beyond that sphere will not necessarily affect the energy of the volitional action either one way or the other. Some instances will explain more clearly what we mean.

In Dr. Goldsmith, so justly celebrated for his various literary productions, we may notice no inconsiderable grasp of Intellect, combined with a Will not fully proportioned to it. Distinguished as a poet, a comic writer, and a novelist, his conduct through life was marked with an exceeding infirmity of purpose. With a perfect understanding of the impositions of which he was made the subject, he still had not promptness and decision enough to counteract them. His biographer asserts *that he could not give a refusal;* and, being thus cheated with his eyes open, no man could be a surer and easier dupe to the impostors, whose arts he could so well describe.*

May we not also adduce the mental traits of a man still more distinguished? The intellect of Sir Isaac Newton seemed capacious enough to embrace the whole circle of knowledge; nothing among men could well exceed the grasp of his understanding; but, if we carefully compare the statement given by his biographers, we shall probably be convinced that there was not a perfect correspondence and proportion between his intellectual power and his power of will; that in the course of his life he often exhibited no small infirmity and indecision of purpose; uniting, in remarkable contrast, a gigantic strength of thought with a childlike uncertainty and flexibility of action. After he had completed his great work, the PRINCIPIA, and had placed the new philosophical creed on an immoveable basis, we are told he was unwilling to give it to the world, probably through fear of the controversies it might occasion, and that he was induced to do so through the urgent importunity of some of his

* Scott's Lives of the Novelists, art. Goldsmith.

intimate friends.*—In the case of Newton, however, it may not be necessary to assert positively, as in that of Goldsmith and many others, that there was a natural deficiency or weakness of the will, since we are at liberty to attempt another explanation. The Will, like the other mental powers, strengthens by exercise, and grows languid and weak by disuse. But this great philosopher was almost constantly employed in inquiries beyond the ordinary sphere of the world's motives and actions; and as he consequently had but little occasion for calling the voluntary power into exercise, we may well suppose that it lost in some degree its natural vigour.

§ 11. An energetic will sometimes found in connexion with limited powers of intellect.

And if, on the one hand, a great grasp of intellect is not always attended with a voluntary energy corresponding to it, we find, on the other, that inferiority of intellect (we do not speak now of extreme cases, but of such as are of every day's occurrence) is not necessarily accompanied with diminished power of the Will. The sphere of the will's action is of course diminished in such instances; but it is possible for it to exhibit great vigour within that limited sphere. It has but a small field to work in (not an empire, but a small enclosure which a man can cast his eye over), but it does its duty faithfully, promptly, and sternly in the restricted limits allotted it.

It has been remarked of the renowned Marshal Ney, that he was scarcely capable of putting two ideas together. Although this is an exaggeration, it is very certain that his great celebrity does not rest upon his comprehensive views and powers of reasoning, but almost solely on his surprising promptness and resolution in action; in other words, on the promptness and force of the will. And it is well known that the Emperor Napoleon was accustomed to speak of some of

* Brewster's Life of Newton, chap. xi.—Cumberland's Memoirs, p. 9.—D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, vol. ii., p. 165.

his generals (Murat, as well as Ney, was an instance) as men of limited intellect but of great energy; as weak and microscopic, if we may be allowed the expressions, in all matters of perceptivity and reflection, but great and terrible in their volition.—But it will be necessary to resume this subject again. All that we wish to say now is, that, although there is a connexion between the understanding and the will, and the one is the basis of the life and activity of the other, there is not a perfect correspondence between the two, and that the mere power and activity of the one, since there are other things to be taken into consideration, does not furnish a perfect measure of the ability and promptness of the other.

CHAPTER II.

RELATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES TO THE WILL.

§ 12. Introductory statement.

Proceeding now a step further into the interior of the mental nature, we next consider the relation which the Sensibilities hold to the Will. We have already had occasion to remark, that the doctrine formerly prevalent of the Will's being controlled by the last dictate of the Understanding is untenable, and that the Understanding or Intellect is in no case in direct contact with the volitional power. They are entirely separated from each other. The space between them, however, if we may be allowed that form of expression, is not left vacant, but is occupied by the sentient or sentimentive states. It is this portion of the mind, and not the percipient or intellective, which sustains a direct connexion with the Will. And in approaching the termination of our inquiries, and in coming nearer to that Department, to which is assigned the high office, not only of a general control of the mental action, but of realizing and sustaining the mind's unity, so that we can truly speak of ourselves as one mind or as one person, we enter as briefly as possible

into the consideration of this important and fundamental connexion.

§ 13. Of the division or classification of the sensibilities.

Recalling, therefore, what has formerly been said, we remark once more, in reference to the great subject directly before us, that the states of mind coming under the general head of the Sensibilities may be arranged under the two great departments of the Natural and the Moral Sensibilities. Of these the Natural or Pathematic Sensibilities first present themselves to notice under two subordinate but important divisions, namely, Emotions, distinctively known as the natural or pathematic Emotions, and the Desires or Desiring states.

(I.) Pathematic Emotions.—These feelings are very various in kind, such as the emotions of cheerfulness and joy, of melancholy and sorrow, of surprise, astonishment, and wonder; the emotions of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity; the emotions of the ludicrous, and many others. As already remarked in a former chapter, the emotions are simple states of the mind, and it would be of no avail to attempt to define them; but the knowledge of them, like that of other mental states, must be left to the testimony of each one's consciousness. But it is to be presumed that no one is ignorant of what is meant, when, in the presence of the objects which are fitted to originate them, we speak of emotions of cheerfulness, of wonder, of melancholy, of beauty, grandeur, and the like.

(II.) Desires, or desiring states of mind.—Originating in the Natural or pathematic emotions, without which they could not exist, we have also the subordinate class of Desires included under the general head of the sentient states of the mind or the Sensibilities. The knowledge of the desires, as well as of the emotions, must be had chiefly from that source of internal affirmation which we call consciousness. No mere form of words can illustrate their nature as distinguished from that of emotions, independently of that

internal experience which is implied in an act of that great source of knowledge. There are, however, some accessory or incidental circumstances, which are in some degree characteristic of them, and which have been enumerated in the analysis of the Sensibilities already gone through. For instance, the circumstance that emotions are generally evanescent, while there is a greater fixedness and permanency in the desires. Under the class of Desires may be included (1), the INSTINCTS in their various forms; (2), the APPETITES, which, as well as the instincts, have been noticed and examined in their appropriate place, such as hunger and thirst; (3), the PROPENSITIES, such as curiosity or the desire of knowledge, approbativeness or the desire of esteem, imitation, sociality, acquisitiveness, and the like; and (4), under this head, viz., the Desires, may be classed also, since desire is the leading element which characterizes them, the AFFECTIONS, both the Malevolent and the Benevolent, with the general nature of all of which the reader is now supposed to have an acquaintance.

But man has a Moral nature as well as a purely Pathematic nature; in other words, a nature which estimates the justness and right, as well as the mere natural good of things; and which has this important peculiarity in the mental arrangement, that it does not come after the natural or pathematic sensibilities, but stands side by side, collateral rather than subsequent. The moral sensibilities, in distinction from the natural or pathematic sensibilities, give rise to two distinct classes of mental states, the first in order known as Moral Emotions, the second as feelings of Moral Obligation. There are various points of difference between these two classes of mental states, which are particularly pointed out in the explanations which have already been given on the Sentimentive part of our nature. The emotions, for instance, of approval and disapproval have reference to the character of objects and actions that are either past or present; to things that have existed in time

past, or that have an actual existence at the present time, or are *conceived* to exist at the present time. The states of mind, on the contrary, which involve *obligation* and *duty*, have reference to the future; to something which is either to be performed or the performance of which is to be avoided. They bind us entirely to what is to come.—There is also this additional ground of distinction between the two, that the feelings of obligation are always subsequent in point of time to the approving or disapproving emotions, and cannot possibly exist unless preceded by them. Accordingly, it is a common thing for a person to say that he feels no moral obligation to do a thing, because he does not approve it, or, on the contrary, that, approving any proposed course, he feels under obligation to pursue it; language which undoubtedly means something, and which implies a distinction between the mere moral emotion and the feeling of obligation; and which tends to prove the prevalence of the common belief, that the feeling of obligation is subsequent to and dependent on that of approval or disapproval.

§ 14. Acts of the intellect in immediate proximity with emotions.

In thus briefly recalling those states of mind which are termed SENTIENT or SENTIMENTIVE, in distinction from the INTELLECTIVE, we have to remark further, that of the various classes of feeling named in the preceding section, the Emotions come first in order. That is to say, in proceeding from the Intellect to the Will through the Sensibilities, which is the great and magnificent pathway that nature has laid out and established, we find the intellections in contact, or, more properly speaking, in immediate proximity, with the emotions. The first step taken from the understanding to the heart is into the region of the Emotions, and not into that of the Desires, or of the feelings of Obligation. This may be regarded as an ultimate fact or principle in our mental constitution. Whenever an object of knowledge is presented before us,

of whatever kind, we are so constituted that we necessarily have a correspondent emotion, either pleasing or displeasing; though in some cases, it must be acknowledged, the emotion is so very slight as to give the object the appearance of being perfectly indifferent. And even if we should admit that there may be some objects of knowledge (or, in other words, some intellectual perceptions, which amounts to the same thing) that are perfectly indifferent, being wholly unattended with emotions, it will still remain true, on the other hand, that there can be no emotions without some object of knowledge, without some preceding intellectual act. *The natural progress of the mind, therefore, in bringing the Will into action, is from intellections to emotions.*

Furthermore, whenever there is a clear and just perception of an object, the corresponding emotion will not only necessarily arise, but there will generally be an entire correspondence between the two. That is to say, the emotion will be the true and precise measure of the natural and moral beauty of objects, and of their deformity, and the true measure of all other qualities which are fitted to excite emotions. We say, where there is a *clear* and *just* perception, for it is undeniable that the perception is often perplexed and clouded by inexcusable carelessness, by inordinate passion, by strong casual associations, and for other reasons; and that, in consequence of this, the correspondence which ought to exist between the emotion and the true nature of the object before the mind frequently fails. But in all those cases where there is no erroneous and unnatural influence operating on the understanding, we may reasonably expect to find a due adaptation and harmony between these two parts of our nature.

§ 15. Emotions not in proximity with volitions.

Acts of the understanding or intellections are, by the constitution of our nature, antecedent to EMOTIONS. But while it is thus obvious that emotions

stand between intellections and volitions, we are not to suppose that emotions, although they are one step nearer the Will than the mere acts of the Understanding, are in direct contact with it, or have of themselves alone any power over it. It may be asserted with perfect confidence, if we had these feelings alone, the Will would never be brought into action. They have no more natural tendency to cause volition than mere thought, than the most unimpassioned and abstract speculations of the intellect.

Let us take some illustration. A person contemplates some picture of excellent workmanship, which appears to him beautiful or sublime, and excites within him emotions of that character; but the existence of these emotions *merely* never calls forth any act of volition. He stands, and gazes, and the tide of emotion swells in upon him, and he is overwhelmed with it. But while this portion of his Sensibilities alone is awakened and called into exercise he will remain as inactive as if he had been formed of intellect merely. He will take no measures to possess the painting, or to do anything else in respect to it, until he is under the influence of another portion of the Sensibilities entirely distinct from emotions.

§ 16. Emotions followed by desires and obligations.

We behold here the admirable economy of the mind; a decisive and striking proof of that wisdom which pervades its wonderful structure. Intellectual perceptions lay the foundation of emotions. But with emotions alone, activity, at least activity having a unity of purpose, would not follow. But if emotions, restricted by the sphere which nature has allotted them, cannot reach and influence the higher and more authoritative power of the Will (as a thorough analysis of the mind shows they cannot), it is so ordered in the mental constitution that they lay the foundation of other mental states which can. The classes of feelings, of which the emotions may be regarded as the basis, appear to be two in number, namely, the *desires*,

founded on the various natural or pathematic emotions, or those which give pleasure or pain; and *feelings of obligation*, founded on the moral *emotions*, viz., emotions of approval and disapproval.

§ 17. Desires in proximity with the will.

And, in the first place, a word or two may be said on the position and relations of the Desires. It has been seen that intellections are not in direct connexion with the desires, but that emotions intervene. The acts of the understanding alone can never raise a single desire. In no case whatever does a man assert his desire of a thing unless he is pleased with it either in itself, or in its relations and applications. But if there be no desire without the intervention of some emotion, then it is evident that the mere knowledge of the thing, towards which the desire is directed, is not sufficient to excite it; but, on the contrary, without something more than the mere acts of the understanding, it could never exist. *The process of the mind, therefore, is, in the first place, from intellections to emotions, and then from emotions to desires.* The intellectual perceptions lay the foundation for the various emotions both pleasant and painful; and the desires are attendant upon these. We desire a house and its furniture; we desire a picture or a statue, or other objects of convenience, utility, and beauty, because they excite emotions and give us pleasure, but not otherwise.

And if we are here asked why the emotions should lay the foundation of desires, we can only say (as also in respect to the general fact that intellections lay the foundation of emotions), IT IS THE CONSTITUTION OF OUR NATURE. The same creative power that requires emotions to follow the perceptions of the understanding, has instituted the succession of the desires to emotions. It will be remembered, that, for reasons already given, we include under the general head of Desires the important modifications known as the appetites and propensities, and also the affections, of

which desire is a characteristic and controlling element. And it is in Desires, thus understood and thus comprehensive in their extent, that we find a class of immediate antecedents to the acts of the Will. They present to it a powerful motive. They furnish to it one of its broadest grounds of action.

§ 18. Obligatory feelings also in proximity with the will.

And here, considered relatively to its freedom, comes the important fact, that we may also approach the Will in another direction. The class of mental states, which are termed emotions, existing in the two distinct forms of pathematic emotions and moral emotions, are followed not merely by Desires, but also by another class of mental states, distinct from Desires, and yet sustaining the same relation of proximity to the will, variously denominated *feelings of obligation*, or more simply and not inappropriately *obligations*. Desires are founded on the Natural emotions, or those which involve what is pleasurable or painful, while Obligatory feelings or obligations are exclusively based on emotions of a different kind, viz., Moral emotions, or emotions of moral approval and disapproval. The Obligative states of mind, although they are easily distinguished by our consciousness from Desires or the Desirive states of mind, agree with the latter in being in direct contact with the volitional power, and not unfrequently these two classes of mental states stand before the Will in direct and strong opposition to each other. A state of things which could not exist if desires and obligations held the relations of antecedence and sequence, and were not collateral, and placed side by side in their position.

We are aware that the representation has sometimes been given by writers, that the moral emotions of approval and disapproval are in direct proximity with the Will, and exert a direct control over it. But internal examination shows that this is not true of any emotions whatever. They all stop short of the Will, and require the intervention of some other state

of the mind. We put forth emotions in approval or disapproval of a certain action or of a certain course of conduct, but they will never lead us to exert any effort of our own until they are followed by the distinct feelings of obligation. Hence the common remark, that we feel an obligation to pursue a certain course, *because we approve it;* which implies that, while the feeling of approval is the antecedent to that of obligation, the latter or obligative feeling is the direct and effective antecedent to volition. A view of this portion of the mind which is of great importance, and which, we are persuaded, will bear the strictest internal scrutiny, and will not fail to be found true.

§ 19. Further remarks and illustrations on this subject.

We are now able, looking at the mind in its great outlines, to understand the precise relation which its prominent parts hold to the Will. Volition is the great result, to which they all, in their appropriate position, contribute, and with which they all, therefore, sustain an established connexion, though not with the same degree of nearness. The immediate antecedents and psychical grounds of volition are not intellections, are not emotions, and are not *exclusively* either desires or obligations; but are both desires and obligations standing side by side in equal proximity, and with equal psychical or mental possibilities and rights. They furnish, therefore, a basis for the operations of the Will sufficiently extensive not only for the purposes of action, but of moral accountability.

And hence it follows, in accordance with what is constantly presented to our notice, that, in the exercise of volition, men are not shut up to one form of action, but are enabled and required, in all cases where such a distinction actually exists, to discriminate between the UTILE and the HONESTUM, between the desirable and the just, between what is merely profitable or prudential, and what is virtuous. And it is of great importance that these views should be carefully borne in mind, for they have a direct and

close bearing upon man's accountability; and also upon that which is the basis of his accountability, viz., his volitional freedom.

§ 20. Of the strength of the desires.

While we are upon this part of the general subject, we may properly remark, as it may be found to have some connexion with what will be said hereafter, on the strength of the desires. The intensity of the desires, and also of the emotions on which they are founded, will not unfrequently vary in different individuals, even when they are acting together in reference to the same object, and nearly under the same circumstances.—The cause of this variation may be found, in the first place, in the Intellect or Understanding. The relation existing between the understanding and the sensibilities has already been, in some measure, explained. And those explanations will throw a ready and clear light upon the present topic. We are so constituted, as it would seem from the remarks now referred to, that the emotions we have, whether pleasant or painful, will vary, as a general thing, with our knowledge. If we happen on some occasion to be pleased with any natural or artificial object, we shall find that the pleasurable emotion will be increased or diminished by our further knowledge, either of its excellences or its defects. And as the natural progress of the mind is from the emotions to the desires, it will also happen that the strength of the desires will vary in accordance with the variation in the intensity of the emotions.

§ 21. Illustrations of the strength of desires.

We will illustrate this by a single instance. We may assume (and, indeed, have abundant reason to believe it to be the fact) that the celebrated Clarkson, who was the instrument of effecting so much for suffering Africa, was naturally a person of a kindly and amiable disposition, and easily moved by exhibitions of human wo. But how did it happen that this in-

dividual felt and effected so much in opposition to the Slave Trade, while others of equal amiability neither felt nor acted? The explanation is an easy one, and it throws light upon the operations of the human mind. In the year 1785, the vice-chancellor of the English University of Cambridge, with which Mr. Clarkson was at that time connected, gave out as the subject of a prize essay, "*Anne liceat invitos in servitutem dare?* Is it right to enslave others against their will?" He wrote upon this subject, and gained the prize. And it was the knowledge which he acquired in writing this Essay that affected his heart; he became acquainted with facts which were before unknown to him, and his sensibilities were moved; he knew, and then he felt; he wept over the mass of human suffering that was displayed before him, not because he was actually of a more benevolent disposition than he was the year before, or of a more benevolent temperament than a hundred others in Great Britain, but because he had become acquainted with it. And when he had known, and when he had felt new desires and new feelings of obligation enkindling within him, he saw there was nothing remaining for him but to will and to do, to resolve and to act. And from that time he devoted his useful life to Africa.

(2.) But it is necessary to add, that the mere amount of knowledge does not seem sufficient of itself to explain fully the differences of sensibility which we notice in different persons. Whatever may have sometimes been said to the contrary, there can hardly be a doubt, that the minds of men, though compacted of the same essential elements, differ from each other in the modification and exhibition of those elements, as much as the general form of their bodies and their looks differ. And if we find that there is a constitutional difference in the powers of perception, memory, reasoning, and the like, we may expect to find that there is naturally and constitutionally a greater quickness and strength of emotions and of consequent desires in some than in others. And this is confirmed

by constant observation. It would certainly be deemed a very reasonable assertion, and fully confirmed by the whole course of his life, that the benevolent Howard was possessed of greater quickness and power of sensibility than many others. We do not mean to say that all he did was owing solely to the natural quickness of his sensibilities. It was undoubtedly the fact, that the food which he furnished to the understanding nourished the sensibilities also; but it was equally true, that the sensibilities were naturally and strongly predisposed to receive such nourishment.

If these views be correct, then in endeavouring to influence a person to pursue a certain course of conduct, we must consider not only the character and value of the object which is presented before him, but the temperament of the man. The object that will bring one promptly into action, may approach heavily and weakly the more sluggish and indurated heart of another.

§ 22. Of the strength of feelings of obligation.

Essentially the same views will apply to the feelings of Obligation. Like the desires, their degree of strength will vary, in the first place, with the amount of knowledge. In other words, the more fully and completely we understand a moral action in itself and in its relations, the stronger, we may reasonably expect, will be our feelings of approval or disapproval. But it has been seen that the mere feelings of approval and disapproval never of themselves excite the Will, and lead us to action. They must be followed by Obligative states of mind or feelings of Obligation; and the strength of these last will correspond very nearly with that of the antecedent moral emotions. If the emotions be strong, and there is an opening in the matter for any personal action, the feelings of obligation, which necessarily follow them, will be proportionately strong.

But here also, as in the case of the desires, there may be a constitutional difference in individuals. As

some persons appear to inherit from nature a quicker sensibility to the beauty or deformity of natural objects than others, so in regard to things of a moral character, the emotions of some persons are found to be faint, while those of others, though there is precisely the same amount of knowledge in both cases, are distinct and vivid. And if nature may thus lay a foundation for a difference in the emotions, it necessarily lays a foundation for a difference in those feelings of obligation, of which moral emotions are the basis. Did not nature do more for the moral constitution of Aristides than for that of Alcibiades? Was he not morally of a higher type? And was Regulus, who sacrificed his life to preserve his honour, on an equality in this respect with Cæsar, who, if history has not failed to do him justice, sacrificed both his honour and his country to his ambition?

CHAPTER III.

VOLITIONS, OR VOLITIONAL STATES OF MIND.

§ 23. Necessity of the controlling power existing in the will.

In the remarks hitherto made, although enough has perhaps been said to evince clearly the distinct existence of the Will, and also to explain its relation to other mental departments, very little has been said in illustration of its own specific and appropriate nature. This will now be made a distinct subject of consideration. But, before entering directly upon its examination, we take this opportunity to say something further of the great necessity of that regulative and controlling Power, of which the will is justly deemed to be the depository.

Destitute of the power of willing, is it not evident, in any view we are capable of taking of the subject, that man would be an inefficient and useless being? He would indeed be possessed of the Intellect and the Sensibilities; but it is well understood, and has already been remarked in respect to the intellect, that

the value of these depends, in a great degree, upon action; in other words, upon the practical results to which they lead. But the doctrine, that man can bring himself into action without the power of willing, can realize activity without the appropriate instrument of activity, seems incomprehensible. And if we could suppose it to be otherwise, and if it were possible to try the experiment of basing human action directly upon the emotions and passions instead of the Will, it would soon show itself to be a species of action of the most perplexed and desultory kind. Like the passions themselves, it would be addicted to unforeseen obliquities, and would everywhere be characterized by indications of violence and change. No language could fully express its unfixedness, its versatility, its movements hither and thither, in various and contradictory directions. It follows, therefore, that there must be somewhere in the mind a power, which, amid the complicated variety of mental impulses, exerts a regulative and controlling sway.

The question then arises, what the internal regulative power is. And we point at once to the mental principle under consideration. In other words, it is the authoritative voice of the Will, which, holding a central position in relation to the conflicting claims of interest and passion on the one hand, and of conscience on the other, pronounces the decisive and final arbitrament.

The Will, therefore, may be spoken of with some degree of propriety as the culminating point in man's spiritual nature. It sits in some sense as the witness and arbitress over all the rest; holding a position which is essential alike to action and accountability, to freedom, and order, and virtue. It is in reference to this that all other susceptibilities keep their station and perform their functions. They revolve around it as a common centre; and while they prescribe the sphere and lay the foundations of its activity, they are attracted and harmonized by its power, and controlled by its ascendency.

§ 24. Remarks on the nature of the will.

Having seen, in the first place, that the mind is to be contemplated under the threefold aspect of INTELLECTUAL, SENTIMENTIVE, and VOLITIONAL, and having considered the relation which the Intellect and the Sensibilities bear to the Will, in the specific statements and analyses which have hitherto been given, we are now prepared to pass to the consideration of the precise nature of the last-named power.

And here let us interpose a word of caution. It is not to be inferred, when we speak of one part of the mind in distinction from another, and of passing from one part or power to another, that the mind is a congeries of distinct existences, or that it is, in any literal and material sense of the terms, susceptible of division. Varieties of action do not necessarily imply a want of unity in the principle from which they originate. The mental principle, therefore, is indivisible. In itself it is truly and essentially a unity, though multiplied, in a manner calculated to excite the greatest astonishment, in its modes of application. It is merely one of these modes of its application, or, rather, one of these modes of its exercise, which is indicated by the term Will. Accordingly, the term Will is not meant to express anything separate from the mind, but nevertheless embodies and expresses the great fact, founded upon psychical existence developing itself through fixed psychical relations, of the mind's ability to operate in a new and specific way.

And hence the Will, considered as a distinct susceptibility of the mind and as sustaining a causative relation to its appropriate results, may be defined, or at least may be described, as the MENTAL POWER or SUSCEPTIBILITY BY MEANS OF WHICH WE PUT FORTH VOLITIONS.—And in accordance with this descriptive definition, justified alike by its simplicity and its truth, if we wish to understand more fully what the nature of the volitional power is, a sound philosophy requires us to look at its results, and examine the nature of those states of mind which it gives rise to.—

"It is necessary," says Mr. Stewart very justly, "to form a distinct notion of what is meant by the word *volition*, in order to understand the import of the word *will;* for this last word properly expresses that *power* of the mind, of which volition is the *act*, and it is only by attending to what we experience while we are conscious of the act, that we can understand anything concerning the nature of the power."*

§ 25. Of the nature of the acts of the will or volitions.

Of volitions, which are the results of the existence and exercise of the voluntary power, we are unable to give any definition in words, which will of itself make them clearly understood. They are simple states of the mind, and that circumstance alone precludes the possibility of a definition, in any strict and proper sense of the term. It is true, we may call them determinations or decisions of the mind, or resolutions of the mind, or acts of choice, and the like, but this is only the substitution of other terms, which themselves need explanation, and, of course, it throws no light upon the subject of inquiry. And hence we are thrown back upon our consciousness, as we are in all cases where the nature of the simple states of mind is the matter of investigation. And whenever we have made this appeal to the internal experience, and have received its testimony, we are then placed in the possession of all that knowledge which the nature of the case seems to admit of. And we must suppose that every one has, in some degree, done this. It is not presumable, at least it is not at all probable, that men who are constantly in action, pursuing one course and avoiding another, adopting one plan and rejecting another, accepting and refusing, befriending and opposing, all which things, and many others, imply volitional action, are still ignorant of what an act of the Will is.†

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., § i.

† It will be noticed by the reader that we have employed as a designative epithet in this department of the mind the term "volitional,"

§ 26. Volition never exists without some object.

Although we are obliged to depend chiefly upon consciousness for a knowledge of the nature of volitions, it is still true that we can make some statements in respect to them which may aid us in forming our opinions. Among other things, it is an obvious remark, *that every act of the will must have an object.* A very slight reflection on the subject will evince this. It is the same here as in respect to the act of thought, of memory, and of association, all of which imply some object, in reference to which the mental act is called forth.

"Every act of the will," says Dr. Reid, "must have an object. He that wills must will something; and that which he wills is called the object of his volition. As a man cannot think without thinking of something, nor remember without remembering something, so neither can he will without willing something. Every act of will, therefore, must have an object; and the person who wills must have some conception, more or less distinct, of what he wills."*

§ 27. It exists only in reference to what we believe to be in our power.

Another circumstance may be pointed out in illustration of volitions, viz., *that they never exist in respect to those things which we believe to be wholly beyond our reach.* As no man believes that it is in his power to fly in the air like a bird, so we never find a person putting forth a volition to do so. As no man believes that he can originate what never had a being before; in other words, that he can create a new existence out of nothing, so we never find a man de-

which is analogous in its formation to the terms intellectual and emotional, and which, although not very frequently used, is not without good authority. It is obvious that it is rather more definite, in its application to the acts of the Will, than the epithet voluntary. A *volitional* act is simply an act of the Will, and nothing more. A voluntary act may mean, according to the connexion in which it is found, either an act of the Will, or some act which is performed in consequence of an act of the Will.

* Reid's Essays on the Active Powers, Essay ii., ch. i.

termining, resolving, or willing to that effect. Indeed, we are obviously so constituted, that, whenever we believe an object to be wholly and absolutely beyond our power, volition does not and cannot exist in respect to it. The farmer, for instance, in a time of severe drought, desires rain, but he does not will it. He is conscious of a desire, but he is not conscious of a volition. The very nature of the mind interposes in such a case, and effectually obstructs the origination of the volitional act. And this is so promptly and decisively done, and done too in all cases without exception, that we find it very difficult even to *conceive* of anything which we are certain is wholly beyond our power, as being an object of the will's action. There may be a desire in such cases, but there is no volition.

And the usage of language will be found to throw light on this distinction, making the term DESIRE applicable both to what is within our reach and what is not; and the term VOLITION applicable only to the former. In some cases we speak of willing or determining to do a thing, while in others we invariably limit ourselves to the mere expression of a wish or desire. Accordingly, it would comport with and be required by the usage of language, if our thoughts and conversation were directed to those matters, to say, that we determine or *will* to walk, but *desire* to fly; that we *will* to build a house, but *desire* to create a world. As has already been intimated, the structure of the mind itself seems to require the application of terms in this way. While nothing is more common than to speak of determining or willing to sail from New York, New Orleans, or some other mercantile place to London, no one is ever heard to speak of *willing*, but of only desiring or wishing, if such a fancy should enter his mind, to sail from those places to the Peak of Chimborazo, or to some remote planet.

§ 28. Volition relates to our own action and to whatever else may be dependent upon us.

Although the statements thus far made tend to throw some light upon the nature of the Will's acts, something further remains to be remarked. It does not seem definite enough merely to assert that volitions relate solely to those things which are in our power, or are believed to be so. We may inquire further what is meant by being in our power, and how far the import of the phrase may justly extend itself. —And hence it is necessary to add, that volitions relate, in the first place, to our own action, either some bodily movement or some act of the mind. In saying this, however, we do not mean to say that volition is necessarily limited to the *present* action. We may will to perform something of the simplest kind, which will exact, in its execution, merely the present moment, or something of a more complicated nature, which will require no inconsiderable time. Any series of actions, intellectual or bodily, capable of being performed by us, which the understanding can embrace as one, and by means of any relations existing among them can consolidate into one, the will can resolve upon as one. So that the action, dependent upon volition, may be the mere movement of the foot or finger; or it may be the continuous labours of a day, a week, or a year, or some long and perilous expedition by land or sea. It is just as proper to say that a man wills to take a voyage to England, as to say that he wills to put one foot before the other in stepping from his door to the street.

Volition may exist, in the second place, in respect to anything and everything which is truly dependent upon us, however circuitous and remote that dependence may be. It is proper to say that a merchant has determined or willed to fit a vessel or a number of vessels for sea, and to send them to different parts of the world, although his own direct and personal agency in the thing is hardly known. The effect of his volition, extending far beyond his own direct and per-

sonal capabilities, controls the acts of a multitude of individuals who are dependent on him. Previous to the commencement of his celebrated expedition into Russia, the Emperor Napoleon undoubtedly brought all the objects relative to the intended expedition distinctly before his understanding; the number and the kinds of troops, the arms and ammunition with which they were to be furnished, the means of subsistence in the various countries through which they were to pass, and the expenses incident to the arming and support of a body so numerous. The action of the intellect enabled him to assimilate and combine this vast complexity of objects into one. Although numberless in its parts and details, it assumed, as it passed before the rapid glances of his understanding, an identity and oneness, which, for all the purposes of volition and action, constituted it one thing. And, accordingly, it is altogether proper to say, that Napoleon purposed, determined, or *willed* the expedition into Russia, although the agencies requisite to carry it into effect were not lodged directly in himself, but in millions of subordinate instruments, that were more or less remotely dependent upon him. Certain it is, if he had not put forth his volition, the subordinate instrumentalities, however numerous and powerful in themselves, would never have united in and secured the result in question.

"It is not necessary," says a recent writer in remarking upon this very subject, "to consider volition as directing merely our own physical powers. Any power, of which wealth, rank, or character gives us the command, is as truly the instrument of our will as a hand or a foot. The despot, who leads forth his army of obsequious slaves to overthrow cities and desolate empires, as truly *wills* these events as to move a finger or change an attitude."*

§ 29. Volitions involve a prospective element.

Another mark or characteristic of volitions, by

* Essay on Moral Freedom, by Thomas T. Crybbace, sect. ii.

which they are distinguished from some, though not from all states of the mind, is, that they have exclusive relation to the future, to something which is to be done.—A volition is "futuritive" in its very nature; it involves in itself, and as a part of its own essentiality, a prospective element; it has no capacity of turning its eye backward, but always looks forward.

An intellective or perceptive act rests in itself. As soon as it assumes the form of a cognition or knowledge, it accomplishes, so far as its own nature is concerned, the mission for which it was sent. It takes its position, and there it stands; furnishing an occasion, it is true, for other feelings to exist and to operate, but in itself remaining not only complete, but satisfied and quiescent.

But it is not so with a volition, which, from its very nature, cannot rest satisfied with the mere fact of its own existence. If we may be allowed the expressions, it continually reaches forth its hand to grasp objects which have not as yet a being. In other words, it always has in view something which is to take place hereafter; something which is to be done, the completion of which is, therefore, necessarily future. This trait is an element of its nature, or, rather, is naturally and necessarily involved in its nature, and may be regarded as one of the characteristics which help to distinguish it from the perceptive and emotive states of the mind at least, if not from others.

§ 30. Volitions may exist with various degrees of strength.

There is one additional characteristic of volitions worthy of some notice, viz., that the volition does not always exist with the same degree of force. Undoubtedly every one must have been conscious in his own case that the exercise of the voluntary power is more prompt and energetic at some times than others. We are aware that it is liable to be objected to this statement, that if we will to do a thing, there can be nothing less than the volition; and that it is nec-

essarily the same under all circumstances. And it is undoubtedly true, that we never will to do an act with anything less than a volition; and that, if there be any act of the will at all, it is one truly and fully so. That is to say, the act is in all cases the same, as far as its intrinsic nature is concerned. And yet we may confidently urge, there is no inconsistency in saying that it may exist with different degrees of force.

The existence of a mental state, which is always the same in its nature, in different degrees, is not peculiar to volition. The same trait is characteristic of the mental acts in many other cases. It is not only true of perceptions and emotions, but of the propensities and affections, that they exist with such variations. We speak as often, perhaps, of indistinct or feeble perceptions as we do of clear perceptions; we speak of weak emotions and of strong emotions; and of propensities and affections more or less intense; forms of expression, which indicate that differences of degree are consistent with the fact of identity of nature. And what is true in these cases is true also of acts of the will. We put forth the volitional act with much greater strength at some times than others. Sometimes it is so feeble as hardly to be distinguished from a mere desire or wish, and is scarcely recognised as a volition, while under other circumstances it is exceedingly marked and energetic.

§ 31. Causes of the variation of strength in volitions.

It may tend to throw some light on the nature of the varieties or degrees in the energy of the volitional act, if we make a remark or two in explanation of the causes of them. We do not, however, intend to say anything here of original or constitutional differences of the voluntary or volitional *power*. We set that topic aside for the present, because we shall find hereafter a more suitable opportunity, where we can pursue it at length. The degree of strength in the volitional *act*, considered independently of any constitutional differences which may perhaps exist in the

will itself, will be found to depend on various causes, two of which are particularly worthy of notice.—In the first place, as volitions cannot exist except in respect to those things which we believe to be in our power, the strength of the volition will naturally be in proportion to the strength of such belief. It has already been seen, that, where there is no belief of an object's being attainable, there can be no volition; and we should, therefore, conclude à priori, that the natural tendency of a diminution of belief would be to operate a correspondent diminution of the volitional energy. Accordingly, we find it to be generally the fact, that, whenever the possibility of securing any object in view is decidedly doubtful, the volitional act, imbibing a sort of contagious hesitancy, becomes wavering and weak. We may, accordingly, lay it down as a general truth, that the strength of volitions will depend, in part at least, on the probability of securing the object placed before us. We do not mean to say that there is necessarily no energy of volition where one's path is hedged up with doubts and difficulties, for it is not unfrequently otherwise; but merely to assert, that the *tendency* of such doubts and difficulties is, all other things being equal, to infuse into such energy a mixture of vacillancy and lassitude. And hence it is a common artifice, if a man wishes to shake another's resolution, to represent to him the difficulties in the way of his success, and to insist on the improbability of his securing the object before him. And if we notice carefully, we shall find it to be generally true, although it may not always be the case, that a person's efforts will become enfeebled and less energetic in proportion as he yields credence to such discouraging statements. And a diminution of active efforts, of course, implies a diminution of volitional power.

§ 32. Further illustrations of the same subject.

(2.) The strength of the volition will depend, furthermore, upon the state of the Sensibilities. If, for

instance, our desires are strongly directed towards a particular object, and if there be no antagonist feeling arising up to obstruct and counteract them, it may be expected that the volition will be proportionably strong. And if it happen in any given case that these strong desires are approved and aided by the feelings of obligation, the motive to action will thus be greatly increased, and the force of the volitional determination or resolve will be likely to be increased in proportion. And if it be the case that there is not only a concurrence of the Obligatory feelings with the Desires, but that the feelings of obligation as well as the desires are intense and energetic, it may reasonably be anticipated that the energy of the volitional act will still further be augmented. And there is ground for saying even farther than this, that it is in the combination of the proximate and side-by-side states of desires and obligations, existing at the same time in the highest degree and in reference to the same object, that the very highest energy of the volitional act is attained.

CHAPTER IV.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESIRES AND VOLITIONS.

§ 33. Of an objection sometimes made to the general arrangement.

In making the general classification of intellective, sentimentive, and volitional states of the mind, it is necessarily involved that we separate Volitions, which constitute the third class, from Desires, which are included in and make a part of the second. Of the correctness of this general arrangement, in its great features, we cannot permit ourselves to doubt, with the various proofs in its support which present themselves from all sides. But it cannot be denied, that, in one respect, which we now proceed to notice, it has not been perfectly satisfactory. We refer to the objection sometimes made and urged with some confidence, that, although volitions may clearly be distinguished

from intellections and also from emotions, they are not so easily distinguished from that portion of the Sensibilities which are denominated the DESIRES. Indeed, by some writers, and writers too of no small note and influence, they have been considered the *same* as desires, and their claim to a distinct and independent nature has been wholly rejected.

As the general arrangement of the mind into three great departments is a fundamental one, and is absolutely essential and indispensable to a true knowledge of the Will, it is proper to attempt, not only to establish it by direct proofs in its favour, which was done in one of the introductory chapters, but to meet and obviate any objections which may have been made against it, whether those objections relate to the arrangement as a whole or to any of its parts. The objection which has been referred to is one of special importance, and we shall proceed to bestow that notice upon it which its prominence claims for it. We speak of it as important, because it is undoubtedly true, that much of the obscurity which has rested upon the whole subject of our Volitional nature has been owing to a mistake here. And obscurity will exist as long as the mistake continues. We may even assert with confidence that the greatest minds will fail of bringing the important inquiries involved in this discussion to a satisfactory conclusion, without first fully and correctly settling this point, viz., *that the state of mind which we term* VOLITION, *though the two are closely connected in the relation of antecedence and sequence, is entirely distinct in its nature from that which we term* DESIRE.

§ 34. Probable cause of confounding desires and volitions.

Before proceeding to propose our comments on the subject before us, we may properly make the remark, that it is, on the whole, not extraordinary that this tendency to confound Volitions with the Desires should exist. We always find it difficult to separate and discriminate those things which have been long

and strongly associated. Now it is well known that volitions and desires are in fact very closely united together, as antecedences and sequences. By the very constitution of our minds they go together, and are the sequents and precursors of each other. We do not mean to say or to intimate that the acts of the Will are based upon the desires alone, exclusive of every other possible motive or ground of its exercise. But it is undoubtedly true, that the desires constitute the sole antecedent causes of volition (by which we mean the sole grounds or occasions of volition), in a multitude and perhaps a considerable majority of cases. In the discharge of the common duties of life, in those every-day matters which concern what we shall eat and with what we shall be clothed, it is undeniable that we generally choose those things and pursue that course of conduct which are most pleasing and which most strongly excite our desires. In other words, our desires and our volitions go together. The one precedes, and the other follows. And, in consequence of this regular consecution, which is also, for the most part, very quick or rapid (so much so, in fact, as hardly to furnish any basis for remembrance), we gradually fall into the habit of confounding the two together, and at last come to believe that there is, in truth, no difference between them.

§ 35. Desires and volitions discriminated in our consciousness.

With the single further remark that the tendency mentioned in the preceding section to confound together these two states of mind, ought to be carefully guarded against, we proceed to the consideration of some things, clearly evincing the distinction between them which we maintain to exist. And the inquiry naturally presents itself here, as in respect to every other mental state, How do we obtain a knowledge of either of them? If we consult our consciousness, which we are obliged to regard as an original and authoritative source of knowledge, notwithstanding the unphilosophical attempts which have been made to re-

move it from that important position, we find it decisively ascribing to the desires a distinct existence, and a distinct and specific character. If we consult it again, we find it returning an answer with equal decision and clearness, that volitions too have an existence and a character equally distinct and specific. But if consciousness asserts, in both cases, the reality of an existence stamped with a specific and distinctive character, it does not and cannot, in those same cases, assert a oneness or identity. On the contrary, it must be considered as decisively pronouncing an entire separation of the two things, as far as their *nature* is concerned, however nearly they may sometimes approach each other in their consecutive relations.

And it seems proper, when we consider the difficulties that have attended these inquiries, to insist upon this testimony from within. It is exceedingly desirable that every one should reflect carefully and patiently upon the nature of Desire and the nature of Volition, as they present themselves to our internal notice in those various circumstances of enticement, and temptation, and action in which we daily find ourselves placed. Those cases, in particular, deserve notice, which not unfrequently occur where the volitions exist, and where we resolve to carry our plans into effect, in disregard of certain opposing desires which have been overruled and baffled. Has not every man had this experience? When under the influence of high moral sentiments, has he not sometimes determined to pursue a course to the disappointment of many fond wishes, of many lingering and cherished desires? Now let him recall the mental feelings and acts at such times; let him carefully reflect upon them, and will not consciousness not only clearly indicate a distinction, but even assert the impossibility of an identity in the case under consideration? We cannot entertain a doubt that it will.

§ 36. Desires differ from volitions in permanency.

There is one particular on which our consciousness

gives its testimony, which it is thought may be easily and clearly pointed out. Every one must have felt, what we have already noticed in the chapter on the general nature of desires, that our desires possess a very considerable degree of fixedness or permanency. Our volitions, on the contrary, change with great rapidity, exhibiting within their allotted sphere of operation a remarkable quickness and variety of movement. It is not equally so with the desires. We may, indeed, change them after a time, and ultimately secure a greater or less degree of conformity to what we conceive they ought to be. But they are so slow in movement, so heavy and refractory in the mutations they undergo, that they remind us rather of a burden to be borne than of a living and self-operating principle.

We believe that this statement will be easily and clearly understood. Can the man who is in prison suppress in a moment and without an effort his desires to see his beloved family? Can he who is an exile and a wanderer in a distant land easily cease to remember, and to long for the woods, and the green fields, and the mountain airs of his childhood? Every one must know, when a desire is once deeply implanted in the heart, how long it lingers, how hard it is to be overcome. But a fixedness of the desires in a particular direction does not necessarily imply a fixedness of the volition in the same direction. The will may be active when certain desires are immoveable, because there may be other objects of desire laying the foundation of its various decisions, or there may be objects of a moral nature presenting a still higher and nobler motive. When the heart is sick, and heavy, and burdened, the purpose and high resolve may be elastic and full of energy. We feel at liberty, therefore, to assert, as a general statement, that we are not conscious of that immoveableness of the volitional power, and that want of elasticity, which often attend the desires. But these statements, which, we presume to say, are founded on the common ex-

perience, cannot be true, if desires and volitions are identical.

§ 37. Further proof of this distinction from language.

May it not also be said with a good degree of confidence, that, in the use of language, we have a further proof of the distinction between Desire and Volition? It is certainly the fact, that men commonly utter themselves, both in their ordinary conversation and in writing, in such a manner as to imply their conviction of a distinction between mere desires or wishes on the one hand, and purposes, resolves, or determinations on the other. As this distinction, so easily and frequently observed, may be found prevalent, not in one only, but in all languages, it may well be regarded as a strong evidence of the universal consciousness on the subject. This fact has been noticed, and set in a strong light by Dr. Reid.—"Desire and Will agree in this, that both must have an object of which we must have some conception; and, therefore, both must be accompanied with some degree of understanding. But they differ in several things. The object of desire may be anything which appetite, passion, or affection leads us to pursue; it may be any event which we think good for us, or for those to whom we are well affected. I may desire meat, or drink, or ease from pain; but to say that I *will* meat, or will drink, or will ease from pain, is *not English*. There is, therefore, a distinction in common language between desire and will."

§ 38. Sentiments of esteem and honour often imply this distinction.

It will further be seen, on a little reflection, that the distinction under consideration is implied in the sentiments of esteem and honour which, on various occasions, we entertain in respect to others. It seems to be the fact, that we often bestow esteem and honour on a person because he has resisted and withstood the obvious tendency of his own inclinations or desires. We will take a very common instance, that of

the confirmed drunkard. The wine sparkles before him; his tongue and throat are parched, and the strongest desires arise. But conscience at the same time urges upon him the claims of his family, his country, and his God. After enduring this inward conflict for a season, he resolves, he wills, he acts, and dashes the alluring bowl to the ground. Every one rejoices at, and honours the deed. But it cannot be because the desire has been gratified, but because the person has willed and acted against desire; because, in the opposing array and contest of the powers of his inferior nature, desire has been beaten, and the sense of obligation and duty has triumphed by the award of the only possible umpire, viz., the Will. We evidently make a distinction, in all such cases, between the cravings of a man's appetite, which necessarily involve desire, and the act of volition, by which the tendency of such desire is counteracted.

This illustration reminds us of an additional statement of Dr. Reid on this subject.—"With regard to our actions," he remarks, "we may desire what we do not will, and will what we do not desire; nay, what we have a great aversion to. A man athirst has a strong desire to drink, but, for some particular reason, he determines not to gratify his desire. A judge, from regard to justice and the duty of his office, dooms a criminal to die, while from humanity or particular affection, he desires that he should live. A man for health may take a nauseous draught, for which he has no desire, but a great aversion. Desire, therefore, even when its object is some action of our own, is only an excitement to the will, but *is not volition.* The determination of the mind may be *not* to do what we desire to."*

§ 39. Strictures on the foregoing remarks of Reid.

We are not ignorant that this very passage of Dr. Reid has called forth some strictures, the object of which is to show that its statements are in some re-

* Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay ii., chap. i.

spects defective. It has been contended, that, in the instances above adduced by Dr. Reid, the volition has reference to the muscular motion, and to that alone. In respect to the judge who pronounces the doom of his prisoner, it is maintained by the objector that the judicial announcement is the result of *volition*, so far, and so far *only*, as volition puts certain muscles in motion; and that all such acts of volition are identical in their nature with desires. And a like view is maintained to hold good of all similar cases, viz., that no volition exists except in respect to the muscular action which immediately follows, and that such volition is not different from desire. Upon views of this kind we have two remarks to make.

In the first place, if we were to admit the correctness of limiting the application of volition to the production of mere muscular motion, still it would not follow that volition and desire are identical. But, on the contrary, in regard to muscular motion, as in all other cases, we may confidently assert that they are entirely distinct from each other, although we are ready to admit, as a general thing, that they do not stand in opposition. It is undoubtedly true that we are sometimes liable to confound with the desires those volitions which have no higher office than the mere regulation of the muscles, in consequence of their generally being in the same direction, and the volition being in immediate succession to the desire, and both existing perhaps in a very slight degree. Still we may safely appeal to every one's consciousness, whenever he bestows a suitable examination on the subject, whether he is not able, even in very slight instances of muscular movement, to draw a distinction between the desire and the volition. The desire to move the muscles of the foot, or hand, or throat, may have existed for minutes or hours; but, till the volition came, there was no motion; nor had the desire the least possible tendency to secure the motion, except through the medium of volition. A man goes from his house to his counting-room; and it is readily admitted that

he puts forth various acts of volition, that he *wills* to arise from his chair, that he *wills* to open the door of his house, to set one foot before another, and that all his muscular movements are preceded by volitions. And we may admit also that he had a *desire* to put forth these successive acts; but it does not at all follow that the volitions were *identical* with the desires, any more than that they were identical with the various sensations and perceptions which existed at the same time. On the contrary, in all instances whatever, the distinction between the two exists, although it may be less obvious at some times than others. The desire (the same as in other analogous cases of a higher kind) is merely the forerunner and preparative of whatever is to be done; the distinct act of volition is necessary to the execution of it.

§ 40. Volition may exist in respect to those complex acts which the mind can embrace as one.

But we remark, in the second place, as we had occasion to show in the preceding chapter, that there may be volition in respect to combined action and plans of action, as well as in respect to single acts. He who supposes that volition is exercised solely and exclusively in reference to the motion of the muscles, must have a very inadequate notion of the sphere in which this part of the mind is called to operate. This view will seem the more admissible when we consider that we have it in our power to give a mental unity to actions, which, as they are successively brought to their fulfilment, are many, and are distinct from each other. It is presumed that the existence of this ability will not be denied. Dr. Brown himself, in whose writings the strictures on the views of Dr. Reid are found, acknowledges that we can give a unity in our conception to things which are complex. "In considering," he remarks, "the physical changes which come under our view, it is impossible for us, in many cases, not to give a sort of *unity*, in our conception, to phenomena which are in their nature complex.

We consider them as in some measure *one;* because, however complex they may truly be, they exhibit to us one great general character."* And we may add, that we are capable of giving a unity to mental and moral objects of whatever kind, as well as to physical, if there be any possible relation of time, or place, or resemblance, or effect, or cause, which the mind can detect and employ as a ligament for this purpose. We repeat, that this capability of combining, by a mere mental act, many into one, of converting multiplicity into unity, is not less true of mental and moral objects and facts than of physical; and in many cases both are included.

A man, for instance, contemplates going a journey; he examines all the circumstances which may have a bearing on his proposed expedition; and combines, by the various operations of the intellect, the whole into one view. This complex object is addressed, not in its parts, but as a whole, to the sensibilities. It excites the various forms of desire, and the feelings of obligation; and these are followed by volition. In all cases of this kind the mind is capable of acting, and, in point of fact, it generally does act, in reference to the whole object. The volition may be in accordance with the desire or not; it may be in accordance with the moral feelings, and wholly at variance with the desires; but in both alike the desires and volitions are distinct. And these views hold good not only in the case just now remarked upon, of the man who dashes from him the intoxicating bowl, but of the judge who is called, in the discharge of his duties, to pass sentence of death on an accused person. He undoubtedly takes into view the action in its whole extent, in all its results. As it exists in the view of his intellect, it is *one* action, though made up of various subordinate parts; and the question, placed distinctly before him and subject to his own dispensation, is one of life and death. And we may assert with confidence, the true state of his mind in ordinary

* Relation of Cause and Effect, part i., § 3; pt. ii., § 3.

cases is, that he *desires* the accused person to live, but *wills* him to die; and that the desire and volition are not only distinct from each other, but are opposed to each other; a doctrine which is sometimes perplexed by the analytic incisions of a one-sided logic, but which is more than vindicated and sustained by the imperative voice, coming up in another direction, of the great synthesis of humanity. The fact is, there are two conflicting principles within him; the desires on the one hand, having their place and their influence; and the feelings of moral obligation on the other, having also their place and their influence. These both are in immediate contact with the will; that is to say, have a direct motive influence upon it. In acting in conformity with the moral motive, he acts against the desire; and an act which is against desire, whether that action be mental or bodily, cannot with any propriety of terms be said to be identical with it.

§ 41. If the distinction in question do not exist, the foundation of morals becomes unsettled.

There is another and important point of view in which this subject may be considered.—It is presumed that the reader will be disposed to admit the existence and the great practical utility of that department of our nature which we variously denominate either the moral sense or the conscience. But if conscience is of any value, it is because the feelings of obligation resulting from it furnish a motive to volition, and become, at times, its antecedent and necessary, or, rather, its pre-requisite condition; and because the motive thus furnished is different from that presented by the appetites, propensities, and passions. But if volition is always and invariably identical with some form of desire, then it is obvious that conscience is excluded, and that nothing can be more unmeaning, and useless, and delusory than the apparatus of moral emotions and of feelings of obligation, which so evidently exists. They furnish, on that supposition, a mere show of authority, without any actual good results. So

that we have great reason to assert, that the doctrine, which makes volition always and necessarily identical with the highest desire, tends to annihilate our moral nature. If we are not erroneous in our construction of it, it places man, in a moral point of view, on the same footing with brute animals.

We never condemn a brute that yields to its desires as guilty of a crime. And why not? Because it has no conscience, no moral sense; and, of course, there is no basis of its actions except in its desires; and therefore, in acting in accordance with its desires, it acts in conformity with its nature, and fulfils the destiny allotted it. But certainly it is not so with man, however it may be with the lower animals. Man has within him not only desires, but feelings of moral obligation; he appreciates not only what is good, but what is right; and if ever, in any assignable case, he wills and acts in accordance with his moral feelings, and in opposition to his desires, then his volitions and desires are not the same.

§ 42. Instances in illustration of the distinction in question.

We think we might bring many instances of a practical kind to illustrate the distinction under consideration, and which not only illustrate, but tend to prove its existence. The parental relation will furnish to those, at least, who have experienced the strength of affection incident to it, an illustration of the matter before us. The tenderly beloved child commits some fault or crime, under such circumstances as to render him inexcusable, and the father punishes him. Every father knows that the infliction of punishment in such cases is attended with a war in his own bosom; the strong feeling of obligation, which an enlightened conscience has laid the foundation of, drawing him one way, and the yearnings of parental affection enticing him another; and it does not appear that anything can still this commotion, and secure the supremacy of his moral nature, but the energetic and authoritative effort of the will.

Let us apply these views to the case of the patriarch Abraham, when he was called, in the administration of the Divine Providence, to offer up his son Isaac amid the forests of Mount Moriah. Will any one presume to say that, when the aged father stood with his knife extended over the bared bosom of his only son, there was no contest within him, no earnest and almost overpowering longing for his rescue? Did not his affection kindle with tenfold ardour when his beloved boy asked him, with the simplicity of untaught and confiding childhood, Where is the lamb for the burnt offering? While desire for the child's safety existed at the highest point of intensity, existing as strongly as human nature was capable of enduring, there were other high and sacred principles, which laid the foundation of volitional action in opposition to his desires, and which in their result secured the imperative and mighty ascendency of the will.

§ 43. Illustration from Roman history.

Such instances abound in all periods of history, profane as well as sacred, and particularly in Roman history. The reader of Roman history will recollect, that when the sons of Lucius Junius Brutus conspired against the Roman republic, and the conspiracy was discovered, they were condemned to die. It became the duty of the father, who was at that time at the head of the Commonwealth, to see the punishment enforced. Can any one doubt that there was a strife, a contest, in the soul of the patriotic Roman? The historian informs us that this struggle was visible in his countenance (*eminente animo patrio inter publicæ pœnæ ministerium*) as he stood at the dreadful scene of the execution. But if desire and volition are the same thing, where was the foundation for such inward contest? If the desire was coincident with the volition; if the latter was lost and absorbed in the former; and if his conscience approved of the transaction as it did, then there must necessarily have been a calm within and without; there could not pos-

sibly have been an agitation, dissidence, and rending asunder of the interior nature.

§ 44. Proofs from some facts in the mental constitution.

At this point in the argument we proceed to remark, that there is one interesting psychological or mental fact, which has probably never been brought into the discussion, but which seems to me decisive of the point at issue. We refer to the fact that, whenever the object of a morally obligative feeling on the one hand, or of a desire on the other, is secured, there is always, by the very constitution of our nature, an attendant emotion of pleasure; in other words, an internal realization of happiness. When, in any given case, one of these impulsive mental elements, viz., desires and obligative sentiments, is gratified, and the other is not gratified, it is true, that the accompanying sense of pain on the disappointed part may counterbalance, and more than counterbalance, the attendant pleasure on the other. So much so, that we may not always have a distinct perception of the pleasure. Nevertheless, the great psychological fact, which is involved in the very constitution of our nature, will be found, on examination, to remain sure.

Now let us apply this view to some of the cases which have been introduced; to the judge who has sentenced a prisoner to death; to Abraham when he was about to offer up Isaac; to Brutus when he presided at the execution of his children. We are to notice, in the first place, that the moral sentiment or conscience approved what they did. So far all was right; and they undoubtedly had the satisfaction which always and necessarily attends the doing of a conscientious action. Now, if you make desire and volition the same thing, it will follow that they not only did what they felt they *ought* to do, but that they did *also* what they *desired* to do. The desirive feeling, as well as the moral or obligative feeling, was gratified.

Consequently, you must add to the degree of happiness already existing that additional degree of hap-

piness which naturally arises from the gratification of desires. Not only this; every source of sorrow (for obviously there can be no sorrow where the doing of right coincides with our desires) must have been shut up, so far as these particular transactions were concerned, and entirely excluded. These persons, therefore, instead of being bowed down with grief, and the objects of the deepest compassion, must have been not only entirely calm, but happy in the very highest degree. To have inflicted the heaviest suffering upon a beloved child must have been, under these circumstances, a sort of holyday amusement. No tear could have started from their eyes, no shade of sorrow could have dimmed their brows; but, on the contrary, they must have been as happy as virtue, combined with the fulfilment of their own desires, could have made them.

But it is unnecessary to say that this view is wholly at variance with the facts. And this is not all. Human nature revolts at the mere statement. And we do not hesitate to assert, in view of the facts which have been given and others like them, that the philosophy which makes desire and volition identical never has explained and never can explain the exhibitions which human nature constantly presents.

§ 45. Of the chastisements of God inflicted on those he loves.

There is one consideration more.—May we not draw light upon this subject from an observation of the course which our adorable Creator takes in his dealings with his creatures? Throughout the Holy Scriptures we find expressions which indicate the strongest love towards them, when, at the same time, he is compelled to inflict his chastisements. The Old Testament is full of expressions of kindness and tenderness towards his ancient people. "He nourished and brought them up as children;" "he led them about, instructed them, and kept them as the apple of his eye." In their rebellions he calls after them with unspeakable affection: "How shall I give thee up,

Ephraim? How shall I deliver thee, Israel? How shall I make thee as Admah? How shall I set thee as Zeboim? Mine heart is turned within me, my repentings are kindled together!" But, although he loved them with all the intensity of a father's affection, still the eternal principles of his nature compelled him to exercise his benevolence in subordination to the sentiments of justice. When his people rebelled, and did not listen to his warnings, he gave them over to disastrous punishments. He brought upon Israel the strength and violence of battle, and set him on fire round about. But, although he *willed* the wasting, and desolation, and sufferings of his people (for he says, "who gave Jacob for a spoil, and Israel to the robbers? Did not the Lord?"), we do not feel at liberty to say that he *desired* it, for everything in the Old Testament shows that it greatly grieved him.

And who does not recollect the affecting language of the Saviour, uttered over the Holy City? "Oh Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent unto thee!" And yet soon afterward the sign of the Son of man appeared in heaven; the sun and the moon were darkened; the earth mourned; there was famine, pestilence, and earthquake; of the beloved and beautiful Temple not one stone was left upon another; and all Jerusalem, that delight of the whole earth, was bathed in blood and wrapped in fire.—Not because the Saviour, now acting in a higher sphere and from a celestial standpoint, had ceased to love it, and to desire its good; but because the measure of its iniquity was full, and the dictates of eternal justice compelled him to *will* and to inflict a punishment which a being so infinitely benevolent could never have *desired* to see.—And does he not, at this moment, truly desire the return and salvation of every sinner? Does he not, in the warnings and teachings he has left behind him, earnestly entreat them? And when he shall inflict on these same sinners the chastisements which follow in

the track of their obduracy, will it be because he ceases to love, or because immutable justice requires it?

§ 46. The scriptural teachings to be understood in their obvious import.

On this subject we cannot refrain from adding, in unfeigned sincerity, that sound philosophy requires the Bible to be understood as it stands, in its obvious import, and as it would be interpreted by an unlettered reader. In the great outlines of his mental constitution, it is strictly and emphatically true, as Scripture informs us, that man is formed in the image of his Maker. And it is as true of God as of man, that there are elements in his nature which lead him to determine or will that which He does not desire. It neither is nor can be true of God, that he ever *desires* the infliction of punishment, or rather the misery and suffering involved in punishment, though the obduracy of transgressors often leads him to *will* it. To desire the infliction of misery in any way whatever, in the strict and true sense of the word *desire*, and with misery as its appropriate object, is the characteristic of an evil, and not of a good being. If sorrow, in itself considered, did not give him pain, where would be the possibility of his benevolence? And therefore it is great impiety, as well as injustice to the truth, to attempt to pervert the often repeated and earnest expressions of the Supreme Being on this subject. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but my pleasure or desire is (for that is the implication involved in the Hebrew form of the expression), that the wicked turn from his ways and live."

PART II.

LAWS OF THE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE UNIVERSALITY OF LAW.

§ 47. The preceding chapters preparatory to what follows.

THE remarks that have thus been made in the First Part of the doctrine of the Will have had relation to its general nature. It seemed important to take this general view. It was obviously necessary, before entering into the examination of the long-contested topics that are to follow, to review concisely the outlines of the mind in its three great departments, and to indicate their relations to each other. It seemed especially necessary, when we consider the mistakes that have prevailed upon that point, to assert and maintain the distinction existing between Desire and Volition. Nor was it enough to inquire into those things which distinguish the Will from the other mental departments, and to point out their relations. It seemed to be requisite also to indicate briefly some particulars which are especially characteristic of the Will, in itself considered, and which contribute to constitute its essential and distinctive nature. And in looking back upon what has been brought forward, we indulge the hope that some doubts have been cleared up, and some important principles established.

And it seems to come in place to add here, that in everything which has been said there has been an object. Every part of this discussion of the will is more or less connected with all other parts, and, perhaps, more closely than would at first seem probable. And accordingly, the doctrines and principles which have been brought forward, and more or less elucidated and established, are introductory to three distinct series of views of great interest in themselves, as well as of great practical importance, having relation respective-

ly to the Laws, the Freedom, and the Power of the Will. These leading topics will be successively considered.

§ 48. Of the importance of the topics now entered upon.

In examining the matters of inquiry which are to follow, particularly the Laws and the Freedom of the will, we presume to say that we have a claim on the strict and candid attention of the reader. While few questions present themselves to one's notice of greater interest than these, a regard to historical truth requires it to be added, that on few has there been a greater difference of opinion. These inquiries, moreover, which lie so closely at the root of human accountability, are as important as they are interesting, not only in a speculative point of view, and as presenting complicated and difficult problems for solution, but also on account of their practical results. If a man, for instance, adopts the opinion that there is no such thing as freedom of the will, and that men are the subjects of an irresistible fatality, it will generally follow that his practice will be correspondent to such a belief. Placing an erroneous interpretation on the words of Solomon, that "time and chance happen to all men," such persons throw themselves upon the wave of their destiny, and are floated onward with an utter disregard of the issue, whether it be good or evil, shameful or glorious. No matter what takes place, say they; it is all from a higher power; and it would be wholly ineffectual and presumptuous in mere insects to prescribe plans for the Deity. The greatest circumspection, the most arduous labours, the most invincible determination, will effect nothing against the allotted and predestined course of events. Philosophers may speculate, and political cabinets may lay their plans; but, after all, the fate of Europe may depend, as it has once depended, upon a dispute about a pair of gloves, or some other trivial circumstance which happens to form a link in the unalterable chain of destiny."*

* See the Prince of Machiavel, ch. xxv., and Examen du Prince.

On the other hand, if a person fully believes that all things are in his own power, in the sense of excluding a wise and efficient superintendency, it leads to a presumptuous self-confidence altogether unsuitable and dangerous. Puffed up with an unwarrantable self-conceit, he does not feel the need of asking aid from on high; he does not conform his conduct to the indications of Divine Providence, but lays his plans, and attempts their execution, wholly in his own strength.

These respective systems, when adopted to the exclusion of other views which might control and modify them, may justly be pronounced false and dangerous, and as inconsistent with sound philosophy as they are with private duty and the general good. We are authorized, therefore, in saying, that the particular subjects on which we now propose to enter are very important in a practical point of view. It will be our desire and purpose to examine them with that care and candour which their practical importance demands.

§ 49. The inquiry, whether the will has its laws, preliminary to that of its freedom.

In order to approximate the true notion of the Freedom of the WILL, an inquiry which will receive particular attention in its place, it seems proper to attempt the settlement of a preliminary question, viz., *whether the will is subject to laws, or more accurately, perhaps, whether it acts in harmony with laws.* If it be true, as we shall introduce some considerations to show, that the Will, in acting in harmony with law, may be said to have its laws of action, then the freedom of the Will, whatever may be its nature, must accommodate itself to this preliminary fact. We will assume here that the Will is free. Undoubtedly its freedom is susceptible of ample demonstration; and it is equally evident that the fact of its freedom is one of the highest importance; but if there be other mental facts equally demonstrable, then it follows from

the nature and relations of things that the freedom of the Will must exist in accommodation to such other facts, and can be such a freedom, and such only, as is consistent with them. This, it would seem, is a very obvious view, and hence it is exceedingly important that this point should be settled first. It will, accordingly, now be our object to propose certain considerations to show that THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS.

§ 50. Analogical argument from the fact that everything throughout nature has its laws.

In entering upon the question whether the Will has its laws, may we not reason, in the first place, from the general analogy of nature? If the outward universe is everywhere legibly inscribed and written over with the great truth that all things are subject to law, and if the human mind in other departments and powers exhibits evidence of the same great truth, are we not furnished with a strong presumption that we shall not discover an exception in man's volitional nature? As to the alleged fact on which we base this analogical presumption, there can hardly be a doubt of it.— Let us look, in the first place, at material things. The parts of the earth are kept in their relative position by the operation of some fixed law; the various immense bodies, composing the system to which the earth belongs, are made to revolve in obedience to some unalterable principle; there is not even a plant, or a stone, or a falling leaf, or a grain of sand, which can claim an exemption from regulation and control. And what is true in these few instances is true in all. No certain and undoubted exception can be found.

And this great truth holds good also of things which have life and intelligence. We have had abundant evidence of this in the discussions in relation to the mind which have been gone through. Objects of a spiritual or mental nature (if not in precisely the same sense in which the assertion is applicable to matter, yet in some true and important meaning of the expressions) have their appropriate and determinate

principles of being and action. There may, indeed, be some things which are as yet unexplainable by man; there may be some objects of knowledge, to the full understanding of whose nature limited human reason cannot as yet reach; but still the vast majority of objects, both inward and outward, mental and material, coming within the ordinary range of our inspection, obviously tend to found and to foster the general conviction that there are laws wherever there are existences, whatever the kind or nature of the existence. —There is, therefore, a sublime truth in the remark of Montesquieu, with which he introduces his great work on the Spirit of Laws, where he says, after some suggestions on the meaning of the term, "all beings have their laws, the Deity his laws, the material world its laws, the intelligences superior to man their laws, the beasts their laws, man his laws."

§ 51. Remarks of Cicero on the universality of law.

The mention of Montesquieu, a name equally dear to literature and to the claims of rational liberty, naturally suggests the recollection of some men of a kindred genius. The idea of the universality of law, operating in all spheres of existence, has ever been familiar to minds that were particularly distinguished for expansiveness of thought and for philosophical sagacity. They seem to have seized upon this great truth at once and intuitively; not by the slow inductions of reasoning, but by a sort of instinct of intellect, which appropriately bears the name of intuition. The illustrious orator of Rome, among others, asserts the existence of a law which has its foundation in nature, and which is universal, uniform, and eternal. He declares God to be the author of it; and adds, that no man can exempt himself from its control without fleeing from himself, and without putting off and alienating his own nature. It is of this law and in connexion with these statements that he employs those celebrated expressions, "nec erit alia lex Romæ, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et omnes gentes

et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immortalis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium Deus."* No person who examines the whole of this remarkable passage with care will fail to perceive that its author had in his conceptions the idea of a great central Power, possessed of perfect wisdom and justice, from whom emanates a paramount and controlling influence, which is binding upon nations as well as individuals, which extends to all parts of his dominions, making one of many, and harmonizing them all by requiring them to act in subjection to himself.

§ 52. Remarks of Hooker on the same subject.

We cannot forbear introducing here, as in accordance with the sentiments of this chapter, the memorable expressions of Hooker, although at the risk of repeating what may already be familiar to the reader. "Of law, no less can be said than that her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both angels and men, and creatures of what condition soever, though each in different spheres and manner, yet all with uniform consent admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy."†

We cannot agree with those, if such there are, who may be disposed to set down this sublime passage as a species of rhetorical exaggeration, an instance of well-selected and sounding language rather than of well-adjusted thought; but would rather regard it as the expression of a reality, uttered on the most sober consideration; a reality perhaps not perfectly obvious to minds of limited expansion, but of which undoubtedly the learned and eloquent writer, whose mind seems to have been open to the entrance of divine intuitions, had a clear and impressive perception. The train of thought which pervades the passage is

* Cicero, De Repub., lib. iii. † Hooker's Eccles. Polity, bk. i.

essentially identical with that of Cicero. It involves and indicates the sublime truth, that law, the great bond of the Universe, finds its origin and support in the bosom of the Deity, and is, in its basis or elements, co-substantial with his nature; and going forth from that primitive and prolific centre in every possible direction, like rays from the sun, embraces, harmonizes, and controls every form and modification of being, whether intelligent or unintelligent.

We have a strong presumptive argument, therefore, from the general analogies of nature, both mental and material, that the will has not, and cannot have an exemption from law.

§ 53. The universality of law, including laws of the will, necessarily implied in the idea of God.

And let us look a little further. Is it too much to say that the idea of a God, an idea accepted by the people of all nations and in all ages, necessarily embraces and implies the notion of the universality of law? It will be conceded, I suppose, that the idea which men form of God involves the fact of his supremacy. He is regarded, in the just analysis of this great conception, as not only unlimited in power and boundless in knowledge, but as supreme in the administration of his government. To deny either the one or the other, either his omniscience, or his almightiness, or the supremacy of his administration, would be nothing less than to dethrone Him from his place in the universe, and virtually to deny his existence as Deity. Can that power properly be called omnipotent, within the sphere of whose operations there are objects which are entirely exempt from its supervision and control? Can that wisdom properly be called omniscient, which knows not what will be the determinations and acts of men in all assignable circumstances, in all time and place? Can that government be, with any propriety of language, denominated a Supreme government, within whose limits there are agents who are not reached and bound by

any of those ties, even the feeblest of them, which operate to unite the circumference to the centre, and to combine and assimilate the multiplied parts under one common head? We must repeat it, therefore, if there is a God, there must be a law, in other words some pervading and effective bond of connexion between himself and his creatures, which is, in the strict sense of the word, UNIVERSAL.

§ 54. An argument thus furnished in favour of laws of the will.

And what, then, shall we say of the Will? Does not the position, that the Will is not subject to laws, imply an anomaly in the universe? Whatever is not under some sort of control, but is entirely irregular, contingent, and exempt from all conditions, is necessarily irresponsible to the supervision of anything, even God himself. We have, then, a strong À PRIORI argument, drawn from the being of God, in addition to that drawn from the general analogies of nature, in support of the proposition that the Will has its laws. Especially when we consider the relation which the Will sustains to the other mental powers; that its action constitutes the great result to which the operation of the other parts of our nature tends; in other words, that, in all cases of movement or exertion, the volition is the consummation of all the other mental acts, and, in effect, represents the whole mind. If the Will acts accidentally or contingently, by which is meant out of and beyond the sphere of law, then the *man* acts contingently; and while he retains this alleged specific character of acting in this way, he is not only independent of all law, thus destroying that peace and joy of which Hooker asserts her to be the mother, but he stands in a position in which he cannot be controlled even by the Deity himself. He has suffered a revulsion from the parent stock; he has gone off and set up for himself; he has established an empire of his own, where even the Most High must not enter; a state of things which certainly finds no parallel among the other existences powers, and

intelligences of the universe, and which is rebuked alike by the conclusions of reason and by the suggestions of virtue.

CHAPTER II.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MORAL GOVERNMENT.

§ 55. Of the existence of a moral government.

The argument at the close of the last chapter, an argument involved in the generally accepted idea of the being and relations of God, naturally leads us to a brief consideration of moral government in general. The doctrine of a moral government, in distinction from the facts and philosophy of mere physical control, is well worthy the attention of the student. Perhaps there is no subject more important. But in introducing this subject as we do, in connexion with the doctrines of the Will, our special object is to show that the will's subjection to law, or more exactly, perhaps, its action in harmony with law, is necessarily implied in the fact of moral government.

We, of course, assume in the argument that we are reasoning with those who fully believe and admit that Moral Government exists, and that men are subjects of it. Certainly there is ample evidence that such is the case, independently of what is taught on the subject in Revelation. The light of nature clearly and strikingly indicates that a moral government, extending its authority over the human race in particular, has an existence. "Mankind," says Bishop Butler, who has investigated this subject with his acknowledged ability and candour, "find themselves placed by God in such circumstances that they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and are often punished, and sometimes rewarded under his government, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently beneficial to society."* Revelation, whatever

* Butler's Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature, pt. i., ch. iii.

may be the clearness or obscurity of the indications of unaided nature, places the existence of such a moral government beyond all doubt. We suppose, therefore, the fact of such a government to be admitted.

§ 56. Laws of the will deducible from the first principles of moral government.

If a moral government exists, as is assumed to be the fact, and is known to be so, then it has its first principles or elements. It must, of course, have its predominant traits, its distinctive characteristics, some admitted and essential truths. If these traits or principles are assented to, they must obviously be assented to with such consequences as may fairly attach to them, whatever those consequences may be. And hence the mode of our reasoning.

In conducting the argument drawn from this source, we shall attempt to point out some of those things which are universally understood to be implied in, and to be essential to, a moral government; and as these elementary principles are successively pointed out, shall briefly examine their application to the subject under inquiry. And in this way we propose to make it appear, that the doctrine of the subjection of the volitional power to laws is implied in the existence of moral government. And if such a government exists, which is conceded to be the fact, then the doctrine in question is true.

§ 57. Laws of the will inferred from that supremacy or paramount authority which is implied in a moral government.

Every moral government implies, in the first place, a ruler, a governor, some species of supreme authority. The term government itself, separate from any qualifying epithet, obviously expresses the fact that there are some beings governed, which is inconveivable without the correlative of a higher and governing power. And what is true of all other government, is certainly not less so of that species of government which is denominated moral government. In all mor-

al government, therefore, there must undoubtedly be some supreme authority, to which those who are governed are amenable.

Now if men are under government, they are under law. To be governed is obviously to be regulated, guided, or controlled, in a greater or less degree. To say that men are governed, and are, at the same time, exempt from law, is but little short of a verbal contradiction, and is certainly a real one. But when we speak of men as being under laws, we do not mean to assert a mere abstraction. We mean to express something actually existing; in other words, we intend to assert the *fact*, that the actions of men, whatever may be true of their freedom, are in some way or other reached by an effective (that is to say, by a true or real) supervision. But when we consider the undenied and undoubted dependence of the outward act on the inward volition, we very naturally and properly conclude that the supervision of the outward act is the result of the antecedent supervision of the inward principle of the Will; in other words, the WILL HAS ITS LAWS.

§ 58. Inferred also from the fact that the subjects of a moral government must be endued with adequate powers of obedience.

Moral government implies, in the second place, that there is not only a higher or ruling power, but an inferior one, which may be held accountable to such higher power. And consequently, as all moral government has the right, within certain limits, of exacting obedience from those that are properly under its control, it follows necessarily that the inferiors or subjects of such government must possess the requisite powers of obedience; not a mere *transitory* obedience yielded for a moment, but one which is accordant to a prescribed course, and yielded for a length of time. But if the Will, which is the governing power over men's actions, be not subject to laws, it is self-evident that such a continued or protracted course of obedience cannot be rendered, even with the most fa-

vourable dispositions on the part of those from whom it is due. Man is, in this case, not under the control of himself; he can never tell at one moment what he may do or be the next; and it is altogether inadmissible, therefore, to suppose that he can, by his own act, conform himself to the control of another. There may indeed be an occasional and momentary coincidence between his actions and the requisitions laid upon him; but, whenever this is the case, it is merely a matter of accident, and neither in fact nor in spirit comes up to the idea of that obedience which is due to a moral governor. In a word, if the acts of the Will are not based, as the occasions, at least, of their being called forth, upon any conditions whatever, and are truly contingent, man has no power to obey. And if he has no power of obedience (using the term to mean a continued or protracted, as well as momentary obedience), then he is under no obligation so to do. And moral government under such circumstances can never exist in respect to the human race.

§ 59. Laws of the will inferred from that rationality which is essential to the subjects of a moral government.

In the third place, if we look further into the elementary principles of moral government, we shall find that this sort of administration differs from all natural or physical government in this respect, that its subjects are not only agents, but are necessarily *rational* agents. The attribute of rationality is absolutely essential to them, as accountable and moral beings. That is to say, their actions, so far as they are of a moral nature, are ultimately based upon the perceptions of our intellectual part or understanding.

We can undoubtedly conceive of a purely sentient being, formed wholly of instincts, appetites, desires, and passions, without the intellectual endowments (at least to any extent worthy of especial notice) of perceiving, comparing, abstracting, and reasoning. Nor is the possibility of such a being left wholly to imagination, since we have abundant instances in the brute

creation around us. But such beings, wherever they may be found, and whatever purposes, more or less important, they may answer in the arrangements of the universe, are not the subjects of moral emotions and of feelings of obligation, nor are they morally accountable. A sort of instinctive perception at once adjudges them incapable of that higher destiny. Rationality, therefore, is an incident, or, rather, prerequisite of a moral nature.

If man, therefore, is a rational being, which must be conceded as indispensable to the fact of his being in subjection to a moral government, then his actions, as has been stated, are ultimately based upon the perceptions of the understanding. And if his actions are susceptible of being thus based and regulated, then the operations of the Will may be regulated (and *must* be regulated to the extent that the outward actions are) in the same way, since the outward actions have their origin in the decisions of the voluntary or volitional power. But if it be true that the operations of the Will are in this way connected, indirectly and ultimately at least, with the antecedent perceptions of the intellect, then they are subject to laws. There may indeed be, and there certainly are, emotions in their various kinds, and also desires and feelings of obligation, intervening between the perceptions of the intellect and the acts of the Will. But still the latter, which stand in immediate proximity with the acts of the will, in all cases strike their roots, if we may be allowed the expression, through the intervening mental elements, and thrust themselves into the intellect as their original basis and support. Without *this*, man could not, with propriety, be denominated a rational being; and *with* this, he cannot, with propriety, be deemed a being, the acts of whose Will are in any real sense accidental or contingent.

§ 60. Laws of the will inferred from the fact that in the administration of a moral government motives are employed.

Let it further be remembered, as a fixed principle

in moral government, that it is sustained in its character of a moral government, not by the application of physical power, but by the presentation of motives. The fact that men are influenced and directed by the motives set before them is an encouragement in the making of moral efforts, and in the use of such means as are adapted to reclaim the vicious, or to strengthen habits of virtue. When men go astray, what can we do more in our attempts at reclaiming them than apply promises, threatenings, and exhortations? We address these to them as *motives*, expecting that they will be received and have their influence as such. These are the means which we employ, and we find that they meet with success. But liberate the Will from all particular tendencies and law; show that we are utterly unable to predict the nature of its acts, under all circumstances whatever, and then there is no encouragement to apply means for the attainment of moral ends; there is no encouragement to moral efforts of any kind. When this is the case, we can never tell what is suitable to be addressed to men, in order to induce them to change their course of conduct. And moral government, under such circumstances, cannot exist.

§ 61. Inferred also from the application of rewards and punishments.

There is another point of view in which the subject may be contemplated.—Accountability, it will of course be admitted, is essentially and fundamentally involved in the idea of a moral government. But accountability implies that the person or persons who are subject to it may be called to an account; and this, of course, implies that the being who has the right of calling them to such account may inflict punishment in case of delinquency. In other words, wherever there is accountability on the one part, there is the correlative right of enforcing it on the other; that is to say, of punishing, if necessary. But if volitions are independent of motives, and are entirely contingent, no man can tell, as has already been inti-

mated, at one hour or one moment what he will do the next; he cannot possibly have any foresight, even of his own actions, and cannot take measures to prevent those which are evil. In the estimation of a right conscience, there would be no more propriety in punishing such a man's actions, than in punishing a stone or a billet of wood which may have accidentally been the occasion of some injury to us. As his Will is beyond the reach of all laws, there are no principles by means of which its exercises can be subjected (we do not say to the power of *others* merely, but) even to his own power. He is the sport of an unfathomable fortuity, a sort of football, impelled in every possible contrariety of direction; the ceaseless but imbecile plaything of inexplicable chance. Such a man certainly is not the proper subject of punishment. And, for like reasons, he is not the proper subject of rewards.

§ 62. The same inferred from the fact that the moral government of the present life is in its nature disciplinary.

And there is yet another and distinct view of that moral government under which men are placed, which is especially worthy of notice in connexion with the subject under consideration. The moral administration to which men are subject in the present life is in its nature disciplinary. As far as man is concerned, it is not to be denied that the present state of being is incipient and preparatory to another and ampler field of existence. It is here, on the field of action where we are now placed in the present life, that it is proposed to train up men for glory, honour, and immortality.

The present is a state of probation preparatory to this end. And it will be kept in mind, that it is proposed to secure this result by trial, exposure, exercise, training, discipline. But a moral regimen of this kind implies that there are evils to be encountered; that there are duties to be performed; that there are obstacles to be overcome; that there are temptations to

be resisted; and that men are not only to sustain their souls in patience, meekness, and fortitude, but to purify them in the prospect of an ultimate triumph.

But if the Will be not subject to laws, all this is words without meaning. It must be obvious that there can be no moral trial or discipline of man without temptation. And it is no less clear that temptations must be ultimately addressed to the Will, or they are nothing. My understanding, for instance, tells me that the attainment of a certain object will be promotive of my present good; my desires are strongly enkindled in view of that object; my conscience condemns it; and here undoubtedly is the basis, the preparatory conditions of the temptation. But still there must be some internal object upon which the temptation presses; some principle of the mental nature upon which it is brought to bear. And where is this principle or power to be discovered, around which the strength of the temptation thus gathers and enters into contest, if it be not the Will?—But if moral discipline (at least that of the present life) implies temptation; and if temptation, as it obviously does, implies a pressure upon the Will, then the Will must be subject to laws. For if it be not subject to laws, there seems to be no possible way in which the temptation can approach it or exert any influence upon it. That which is without law either in mind or matter, is necessarily unapproachable except by mere accident.

§ 63. That the will has laws implied in the existence of virtue and vice.

Finally, if the Will is truly contingent in its action and entirely without laws, it cannot fail to follow that there is no tenable foundation of VIRTUE and VICE.—It is a common maxim, founded on the general experience, and universally held to be true, that actions are reprehensible or otherwise according to the designs, intentions, or motives with which they originated. But if the acts of the Will are perfectly contingent (that is to say, are put forth without a regard

to anything else whatever), then it is obvious that designs or motives, considered in reference to such acts, are entirely excluded, and have no existence. It is evident that a man in that case can justly say of any action he performs, which is deemed by the community either virtuous or vicious, that it happened merely because it did happen; that it came to pass without any forethought, or intention, or design on his part; that he knows of no rational cause of its origin; and, in a word, that it is truly and wholly *accidental.* And is such a man, of whose actions these statements are undeniably true, to be either blamed or commended? Where is the basis, in his actions or his character, of either morality or immorality? Is he not beyond the reach, in every respect, of virtue and vice?

No one can be ignorant that, when a man is arraigned on any accusation, one of the first inquiries is in respect to his designs or motives in perpetrating the alleged criminal act. By the law of the land, if a man has put another to death with malice aforethought (that is, with an evil design, or intention of so doing), it is murder; if the deed is committed in the violence of momentary passion, without any premeditated purpose, it becomes the diminished crime of manslaughter; if it be what is called accidental, or, in other words, without any hostile feeling, and without in the least intending or expecting the result which followed, then it is no crime at all. And so, on the other hand, if a man performs a highly beneficial action, with the view and the intention of doing good, all men agree in pronouncing it virtuous and praiseworthy; but if they discover the action to be wholly accidental, they equally agree in denying to its author any claims to moral merit and commendation. In a word, the circumstance of an action's being accidental is understood to destroy its moral character. But what is the true idea or characteristic of an *accident?* It is evidently that which has no cause, no reason, no reference to any fixed principle. And every volitional act, on the supposition of the Will's

not being subjected to law, is precisely conformed to this view. Every such volition is truly an accident. And, as such, the common consent of mankind would deny to it, both in itself and its results, the possession of any moral character whatever.

It would not be difficult to point out passages in writers of acknowledged value, going to confirm the various views of this chapter. On the subject of the present section, President Edwards expresses himself in the following decided language: "If it should be allowed that there are some instances wherein the soul chooses without any motive, what virtue can there be in such a choice? I am sure there is no prudence or wisdom in it. Such a choice is made for no good end; for it is for no end at all. If it were for any end, the view of the end would be the motive exciting to the act; and if the act be for no good end, and so from no good aim, then there is no good intention in it; and therefore, according to all our natural notions of virtue, no more virtue in it than in the motion of the smoke which is driven to and fro by the wind, without any aim or end in the thing moved, and which knows not whither, nor why and wherefore, it is moved."*

CHAPTER III.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF THE DEITY.

§ 64. The notion which men naturally form of the Deity implies foreknowledge.

In proof of the general proposition that the Will has its laws, we now enter upon a distinct train of thought. In the present chapter we propose to bring forward in its support the Prescience of the Deity. And, accordingly, it will be necessary to say something in support of the fact that there is such prescience, or, in other words, that God foreknows what-

* Edwards's Inquiry into the Will, part iii., § 7.

ever comes to pass. We do not, however, propose to enter at length into the specific topic; for the general acquiescence in the proposition of God's foreknowledge renders it unnecessary; but merely to suggest in relation to it one or two considerations.

And we naturally remark, in the first place, that the idea which all men agree in forming of the Deity implies foreknowledge. We say nothing here of the light which Revelation throws upon this subject, but refer merely to the notion of the Deity which men form themselves. The basis of this paramount idea is abundantly laid in man's mental constitution. Without insisting that it is *innate*, in the sense in which that term has been sometimes understood, we have good grounds for asserting that the human mind is so constituted, and is operated upon by such influences, that the idea of God arises in it naturally and certainly, and at an early period, unless there are some peculiar circumstances counteracting this tendency. Hence we find it existing, in a greater or less degree of clearness, in all countries and among all classes of men; in the cheerless hut of the Esquimaux and in the rude dwellings of the uncivilized tribes inhabiting the islands of the Pacific, as well as among those who are refined by the arts and enlightened by science. The conception may indeed be a feeble and imperfect one, compared with that developed by the aid of the Scriptures; but, feeble and imperfect as it is, it is always complex enough and affirmative enough to include and affirm the element of unlimited prescience or foresight. The very heathen would scoff at the idea of a God whose knowledge is limited to the present moment.

§ 65. The prescience of God implied in his omniscience.

But we are not left, in the consideration of this subject, to the suggestions which are furnished by an examination of the opinions of men, however naturally they may have arisen, or however widely prevailed. God has seen fit, in the exercise of his great goodness,

to speak by his Revealed Word, and to pour the light of inspiration on the weakness and uncertainties of human reason. He has declared himself to possess *all knowledge.* He who is familiar with the Bible cannot fail to recollect many passages where this great truth appears. The hundred and thirty-ninth Psalm, one of the most striking and beautiful in that exceedingly interesting collection of sacred poetry, turns almost exclusively upon the great and wonderful knowledge of God. "Thou knowest my downsitting and mine uprising; thou understandest my thoughts afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways." The Psalmist in another place, after asserting the greatness of the Lord and of his power, immediately adds, that "*his understanding is infinite.*" In another passage of the Psalms of great sublimity, God is introduced as saying, "I know all the fowls of the mountains, and the wild beasts of the field are mine;" expressions which convey a sentiment parallel to that of the New Testament, in the passages where it is asserted that not a sparrow falls without the notice of God, and that the hairs of our head are numbered. "Neither is there any creature," says the Apostle, "that is not manifest in His sight; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of Him with whom we have to do." The beloved disciple says, "God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things."* But if God is omniscient, which is clearly implied or asserted in these and many other passages, it follows, of course, that he is able to foresee events, whatever they may be, which shall come to pass in future times.

And let it be remembered here that God does not have a knowledge of things in precisely the same way as men have, viz., in *succession,* or as they arise before the mind's eye one after another; but, on the contrary, it seems rather to be the fact, at least we cannot well take any other view, that all the knowledge He possesses, whether more or less, exists in the per-

* Ps. cxlvii., 5; l., 10. Heb. iv., 13. First Epis. of John, iii., 20.

ception of his mind simultaneously; it is all taken in and contemplated at once in the necessary omnipresence of his thought. And hence, if we strike off from the great circle of his knowledge that part or section which we, in consequence of our limited views, denominate the future, his omniscience is at once shorn of the attribute of perfection, and is presented before us in a state of deformity and mutilation. And, accordingly, we assert that the omniscience of God, a truth taught by human reason, and more clearly and fully in the Scriptures, implies the doctrine of prescience (or, at least, what men, adapting their language to their own modes of perception, call PRESCIENCE), and that he has a clear knowledge of all future events.

§ 66. The prescience of God taught in the Scriptures.

The divine prescience or foresight is not only implied in the omniscience of God, as that attribute is made known by reason and in the Scriptures, but is itself separately and distinctly made known in a multitude of passages. The Supreme Being himself, in the language ascribed to Him by the prophet Isaiah, asserts, "I am God, and there is none like me, *declaring the end from the beginning*, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done." "Known unto God," says the Apostle James, "are all his works, *from the beginning of the world.*"*

Nor does the doctrine of God's foreknowledge rest upon general statements alone; but we have instances, again and again, of predictions, uttered long before the events came to pass, which were strictly fulfilled. The deluge was predicted one hundred and twenty years before it came on the face of the earth. It was foretold that the children of Israel should be in bondage four hundred years. The cruel conduct of the Syrian Hazael, and the deliverance wrought out by the hand of the Persian Cyrus, are matters of precise and specific prediction. The destruction of Babylon and of Nineveh, with many of the circumstances at-

* Isaiah xlvi., 9, 10. Acts xv., 18.

tending their overthrow, was predicted also. The coming and the preaching of Jesus Christ, and particularly his humiliation, trials, and death, were foretold by the mouths of holy men many years, and even ages, before the events themselves took place. The destruction of Jerusalem (not to mention other instances equally decisive in their bearing on this subject) was depicted long before it happened, and with a wonderful particularity and vividness.—In view of these facts, and others like them, we have only to make the remark, and with great confidence in its correctness, that predictions so numerous and specific, and so exactly fulfilled, could not have been uttered without the possession, on the part of their author, of that attribute of mind which men, speaking from the human stand-point, call foreknowledge or prescience.

§ 67. The foreknowledge of events implies foreknowledge of volitions.

And it is further to be noticed, in regard to many, if not all, the events which have taken place in accordance with such predictions as those referred to in the last section, that they were dependent on the volitions of men. The voluntary actions of men necessarily imply the antecedent exercise of volitions; they are inseparably connected together in the relation of cause and effect; and such is the intimacy of this relation, that it is impossible that any being whatever should foresee the actions without a foresight, at the same time, of their volitions. As an illustration, it was foretold to Abraham that his descendants should go into Egypt, and should take up their residence there; but such a prediction evidently implies a knowledge of all the circumstances under which this event should take place, including, in particular, every motive and every volition connected with it. Such a prediction implies a knowledge, not only of the volitions and acts of the immediate agents in the events foretold, but of those persons also who were concerned in them incidentally and collaterally. In the present case, it implies a knowledge of the jealousies of Jo-

seph's brethren, and of their perverse and wicked conduct in selling him to the Ishmaelites; it implies a knowledge of the wants, interests, and motives of the Ishmaelites themselves, not to mention the situation and motives of other individuals and bodies of men, which were undoubtedly among the preparatory steps and means to the wonderful events which followed.

Every one knows that events of the greatest magnitude are dependent upon circumstances apparently the most trivial. It is a remark of Dr. Dwight, that the "motions of a fly are capable of terminating the most important human life, or of changing all the future designs of a man, and altering the character, circumstances, and destiny of his descendants throughout time and eternity."* Now, if these things are so, it cannot for a moment be conceded that God foreknows and predicts events without a knowledge of all those circumstances, even the most trivial, upon which those events may, by any possibility, be dependent. In particular, and above all, He must be minutely and fully acquainted with the volitional acts of the immediate agents in them. In foreseeing events in which men are concerned, He must, of course, foresee what men will do; but it is inconceivable that he should know this without knowing what volitions they will put forth.

§ 68. Application of these views to the will.

But if it thus appears that God, in the exercise of his great attributes, foreknows all things, particularly the volitions of men, then it seems clearly to follow that the volitional power or Will has its laws. The opposite of a subjection to law, as has already been remarked, is perfect *contingency;* and the very idea of contingency or of contingent action, which we understand to be the same with that of accidentalness, implies that it is something which cannot possibly be foreknown. Whatever is foreknown must be foreknown to exist at a particular time or place, or under

* Dwight's Theology, Sermon vi.

some particular circumstances; but that action or event, which it is ascertained and certain will exist at a particular time or place, or under any particular and definite circumstances, cannot, with any propriety of language, be deemed a contingent one. Since, therefore, nothing which is foreknown is contingent, in the sense of being independent of law, and since the volitions of men are obviously the subjects of foreknowledge, it follows that there must be some definite laws or principles by which the action of the will is regulated.

§ 69. The views of this chapter in harmony with the great doctrine of divine spiritual influences.

As in some respects closely connected with the views of this chapter, we may here, with propriety, refer to the doctrine, which is supported alike by the Scriptures and a sound philosophy, that the Supreme Being has the power, and, when in his providence he sees fit, exerts the power, of enlightening, purifying, and guiding the minds of men. The reader of the Bible will naturally be reminded here of the Saviour's interesting expressions on this subject, which are found in the concluding chapters of the Gospel of John: "I will pray the Father, and he shall give you another Comforter, that he may abide with you for ever." "And the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you." John xiv., 16, 26. There are many other passages, which imply the fact of divine teaching and divine guidance: "So they, being sent forth by the Holy Ghost, departed unto Seleucia."—"Then Saul, who is also called Paul, filled with the Holy Ghost, set his eyes upon him, and said, Oh full of all subtlety," &c.—"And were forbidden of the Holy Ghost to preach the word in Asia." Acts xiii., 4, 9; xvi., 6.—"Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." 1 Cor. ii., 13.—"Holy

men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." 2 Pet. i., 21.

All these passages, and others like them, necessarily and clearly imply, although there is no doubt, as we shall see hereafter, of the fact of man's freedom and of the possibility of moral disobedience, that the human mind, nevertheless, is circumscribed and overruled in its operations to some extent; that it is susceptible of divine influences and guidance; and that it is held, by means of relational forces and adjustments consistent with freedom, in subordination to the all-pervading and transcendent control of the Supreme Intelligence.

CHAPTER IV.

LAWS OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN THE PRESCIENCE OR FORESIGHT OF MEN.

§ 70. Man as well as Deity susceptible of foresight.

It may, perhaps, be objected by some, that the argument drawn from the prescience of the Deity is less satisfactory than it would otherwise be, in consequence of the unspeakable elevation and incomprehensibleness of the Divine Mind. That the divine mind is, in some respects, incomprehensible by man, is true; but it does not follow that an argument, founded upon what we know and can understand of the divine nature, is therefore incomprehensible or even obscure. But whatever weight, whether more or less, may be conceded to this objection, we come to another view of the subject, analogous indeed to that of the last chapter, but drawn from a different source, and level to every one's comprehension. Man himself, restricted and dimmed as his conceptions undoubtedly are, has a prescience of the future, a foresight of what is to come to pass, as well as the adorable Being who made him. Not in an equal degree indeed, but still in some degree. And this fact also goes to confirm

the position which we are now examining in regard to the Will.

§ 71. Prescience or foresight of men in respect to their own situation and conduct.

In the first place, man can foretell (we do not say with perfect certainty, nor is that at all essential to our argument) his own situation, actions, and success at some future time.

Take a very simple illustration. A man proposes to go to Boston or New York, or to some place of common resort, no matter where it is, for the purpose of transacting business there. The execution of a design of this nature, although it is difficult to mention one more common and simple, implies the putting forth of hundreds and thousands of volitions. And it is undoubtedly the fact, that the object in view cannot be effected without this great number of volitions. And yet we perceive that this person goes forward with confidence, and that he makes his calculations without fear, and with a feeling of certainty that he will be able to execute them. He evidently proceeds upon the supposition (although he may not be fully conscious of it at the time, and may never have made it a matter of distinct reflection) that the operations of the Will exist in reference to some fixed principles, and particularly in connexion with motives in their various kinds and degrees. And looking at his proposed undertaking with care, and understanding well the claims, both of interest and duty, which are involved in it, he determines or wills in reference to the general plan before him, whatever it may be, without even doubting that all the future acts of the volitional power will be accordant with its requisite details, and that, in due season, it will be brought to a fulfilment in all its parts. But we may assert with confidence, that this could never be done if volitions were entirely contingent; in other words, if they were without laws. For if this last were the case, he would be just as likely to go to Providence as Boston, to Al-

bany as New York, or to any other place whatever, as to that where he first determined to go, and would be just as likely to do the direct opposite as that particular business which he designed to accomplish at his first setting out.—And the views, applicable in this particular case, will apply to the multiplied occurrences and duties of every week and day. And they furnish of themselves, and independently of every other argument which may be brought up, but little short of a demonstration of what we are attempting to establish.

§ 72. Foresight of men in respect to the conduct of others.

In the second place, men are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation, actions, and success of others at some future time. This is so notorious as not unfrequently to have elicited the remark, that there is a certain regular order in the conduct of men, in some degree analogous to the regular course of things, which we never fail to observe in the physical world. Men may everywhere be found who would no more hesitate to predict the precise conduct of their neighbours in certain assignable circumstances, than they would to predict that trees of a certain kind will grow in a given situation.

Some instances will illustrate what we mean.—A poor man goes to a rich man in the same neighbourhood, who is a confirmed and inexorable miser, for the purpose of borrowing a sum of money, but without being willing to give the large interest which he has been in the habit of receiving, and unable at the same time to furnish adequate security for the principal. Everybody knows that the miser will refuse his money at once. They expect and predict it with hardly less confidence than they predict that a stone thrown into the air will immediately fall to the earth's surface. "A prisoner," says Mr. Hume, "who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of his guards as the walls and bars with which he is sur-

rounded; and in all his attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other." This remark of Mr. Hume is an important one, and, without question, is essentially correct. Undoubtedly it is sometimes the case that prisoners endeavour to effect their escape by working upon the passions and will of their guards, but in a vast majority of cases they consider their chance of escape much better by means of attempts made upon the stone and iron that enclose them. They understand so well the connexion between motive and volition, between interest and duty on the one hand and the resolves of the will on the other, that, with the knowledge they possess of the character and situation of those who are appointed to act as their guards, they consider their escape by means of any collusion with them, or any assistance from that source, as an utter impossibility.*

§ 73. Other familiar instances of this foresight.

But we will now proceed to give some instances which are less remote from common observation. The reader may perhaps recollect some remarks of Dr. Paley relative to our constant dependence on our fellow-men. "Every hour of our lives we trust and depend upon others; and it is impossible to stir a step, or, what is worse, to sit still a moment, without such trust and dependence. I am now writing at my ease, not doubting (or, rather, never distrusting, and, therefore, never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat which I ordered; that his servant will bring it; that my cook will dress it; that my footman will serve it up; and that I shall

* Expressions very similar to those of Mr. Hume, and certainly not less strong in their import, are found in a Treatise of Lord Kames (Principles of Morality, pt. i., Essay iii.), and also in the work of Dr. Abercrombie on the Moral Feelings, part ii.—"We can foretell," says the last-mentioned writer, "the respective effects which a tale of distress will have upon a cold-hearted miser and a man of active benevolence with the same confidence with which we can predict the different actions of acid upon an alkali and upon a metal."

find it on the table at one o'clock."*—And this is a state of things which is constantly occurring, not only in the matter of the daily food necessary for the support of our lives, but in a thousand other instances. The merchant depends upon his clerks; the manufacturer upon his numerous operatives of all classes and conditions; the farmer, who works upon a large scale, depends upon the hands of others as much as he does upon the labour of his own hands; the commander of a vessel constantly reckons upon the efficient co-operation of his sailors; the leader of armies relies upon the movements of vast bodies of men made with the utmost precision in the most trying circumstances. And it is the same in all situations, and among all classes of men, as any one, who will in the least trouble himself to exercise his recollection, will be abundantly satisfied. But if all these persons operated by mere accident, and without regard to any fixed principles; if it were a matter of entire contingency whether they should perform their engagements or not, it is easy to see that all the sources of enjoyment and even of existence would be destroyed, and the foundations of society speedily broken up.

§ 74. The fact of laws of the will shown from the regularity of voluntary contributions and of deposites.

In connexion with the topic now before us, viz., that we are able to foretell, with a considerable degree of certainty, the situation and actions of others at some future time, we request the attention of the reader to a class of facts which are somewhat peculiar. It cannot have escaped the notice of any one as in some degree a characteristic of modern times, that there are a multitude of benevolent associations, whose receipts depend wholly upon *voluntary* contributions. But, notwithstanding the fact of their income being wholly voluntary, which, if experience had not shown to the contrary, would be exceedingly discouraging, they proceed in their affairs with near-

* Moral Philosophy, book iii., chap. v.

ly or quite the same confidence as if they had a fixed capital to operate with. They send out missionaries, establish schools, translate the Scriptures, explore unknown and barbarous countries, plant colonies, erect churches, and engage in other important and expensive undertakings, without a cent of money except what comes from voluntary gifts. They make their calculations beforehand as to what they can accomplish in a given time, and not unfrequently incur heavy expenses in anticipation of their receipts. Their true capital is a knowledge of the operations of the human mind under certain assignable circumstances. These circumstances they are in a good degree acquainted with, and hence are enabled to anticipate the amount of their receipts for a given time with almost as much accuracy as the merchant or farmer, who has an actual capital already in his possession to operate with. Does not this circumstance go, with others, to show that the Will has its laws?

Without enlarging further upon this topic, we merely observe, that it reminds us of another interesting fact somewhat analogous to this. It is, that banks issue bills and lend money upon their deposites, and often to a great amount. They take this course, as they believe, and as they have undoubted reason to believe, with almost entire safety. By observation, they ascertain that their customers (although the ability of their customers to do it evidently depends on a thousand *apparent* contingencies) deposite a certain amount, or nearly so, within a given time. They find, as a general thing, that the variation in the amount received in specified times is not greater than the variation of the receipts of an individual who is largely engaged in business; and they consider this state of things basis enough for very extended transactions. But could this, or anything else of the same kind, possibly be, if the Will were wholly exempt from everything having the nature of well defined and permanent principles of action?

§ 75. Of sagacity in the estimate of individual character.

We now proceed to introduce to the consideration of the reader another view of the subject of this chapter, which is exceedingly interesting in itself, besides furnishing an argument deserving of some attention. It is not uncommon to find men who exhibit a sort of quickness or sagacity in the estimate of individual character, which is sometimes described by the phrase, *a knowledge of the world, or of human nature.* This knowledge is undoubtedly possessed by all persons to some extent, but not unfrequently individuals are found who possess it in a remarkably high degree. In some men it may be said not only to assume the appearance, but even to approximate the nature of a *prophetic* anticipation or foresight; and when this is the case, it is an acquisition, as no one can be ignorant, of great power and value. The late Mr. Dumont, of Geneva, in his Recollections of Mirabeau, has noticed this ability in one of its more striking forms.—Speaking of the political life of that celebrated man, especially in its connexion with his knowledge of men and his political foresight, he goes on to say, "It was by the same instinctive penetration that Mirabeau so easily detected the feelings of the Assembly, and so often embarrassed his opponents by revealing their secret motives, and laying open that which they were most anxious to conceal. There seemed to exist no political enigma which he could not solve. He came at once to the most intimate secrets, and his sagacity alone was of more use to him than a multitude of spies in the enemy's camp. I used sometimes to attribute the severity of his judgments to hatred or jealousy, but it has been justified by succeeding events, and there was not a man of any consequence in the Assembly, the sum of whose conduct did not correspond with the opinion which Mirabeau had formed of him.

"Independently of this natural gift, this intellect of penetration, his life had been so agitated, he had been so tossed upon the sea of human existence, as he

used to say, that he had acquired vast experience of the world and of men. He detected, in a moment, every shade of character; and, to express the result of his observations, he had invented a language scarcely intelligible to any but himself; had terms to indicate fractions of talents, qualities, virtues, or vices—halves and quarters—and, at a glance, he could perceive every real or apparent contradiction. No form of vanity, disguised ambition, or tortuous proceedings could escape his penetration; but he could also perceive good qualities, and no man had a higher esteem for energetic and virtuous characters."*

It cannot be necessary to add anything to show how this instance, and others like it (for the political history of every age brings to light some men of this stamp), connects itself with and illustrates our subject.

§ 76. Foresight of the conduct of masses of men and nations.

It is not too much to say that we are able not only to predict with a considerable degree of certainty the conduct of individuals in any given circumstances, but we may do the same of whole classes of men, and even nations. Hence the remark which Lord Bacon has somewhere made, and which is strikingly characterized by its poetical as well as its philosophical spirit. "The shepherds of the people," he says, "should understand the *prognostics of state tempests;* hollow blasts of wind seemingly at a distance, and secret swellings of the sea, often precede a storm."

But we may carry this view into some particulars which are deserving of notice. The results, for instance, of a popular election, if certain data are ascertained, are often considered as settled, even before the day of voting has arrived, although the conclusions thus formed are based in part upon opinions relative to whole classes of men, who differ from each other in their callings, interests, and prejudices.

Again, the speculations in the public or national stocks are very frequently prompted by the opinions

* Dumont's Recollections of Mirabeau, chap. xiv.

which those who are engaged in such speculations are able to form of the course which states and nations will take in some future time.

One of the most striking facts, involving the foresight or prescience of the conduct of large masses of men, is the financial estimate which is annually made by governments. It is well known that the amount of property invested in commerce, with the annual returns of revenue to the government, is every year estimated in advance, and with very considerable accuracy, by the treasury departments of all civilized nations.

Reasoning from what has taken place in times past, we may predict, with a good degree of accuracy, what number of letters will be written and circulated through a nation at any future time. The number of letters is indicated by the amount of postage, and this is a matter which the governments of nations have thought it important to them to ascertain. If a person will take the pains to examine the total receipts of the Post-office Department of the United States, in the successive years from 1790 to 1830, he will notice, with but few exceptions, and those easily explained, a gradual and very regular increase in the amount; the increase being such as would naturally be expected from the augmentation of the wealth and population of the country.

It would seem, in looking at the statistical tables for this purpose, that in the year 1815 there was an increase decidedly greater than would be naturally expected in ordinary circumstances. But this was probably owing (and equally satisfactory reasons will be found for other equally marked variations) to the recent return of peace with Great Britain, which at once gave a new and expanded impulse to the business transactions of the country.

We presume it will be found also on inquiry, that the number of letters not taken from the subordinate offices, and returned from time to time to the General Post-office, or DEAD LETTERS so called, is nearly the

same from year to year, or varying so as to correspond to the variation in the number of letters received. It is stated by Laplace, that the number of dead letters remaining at and returned from other offices to the Post-office at Paris is, in ordinary times, nearly the same from one year to another. The same thing has been stated of the Dead Letter Office, as it is called, in London.*—All these things conclusively evince that the actions of men, whether considered individually or in masses, are not placed beyond the reach of some forms of law, and are not left to mere chance or accident.

§ 77. Proof from the regularity observable in the commission of crime.

The Statistics of crime (a painful but very interesting and important view of human nature), as well as all other statistical views which are based upon the occupations and conduct of men, throw light upon this subject. The reader will find valuable information on this matter, besides other sources of information which are constantly multiplying, in the Annual Reports of the American Discipline Society, in the article on the Statistics of Crime in the Encyclopædia Americana, in the Report of Messrs. Beaumont and Toqueville on the Penitentiary System in the United States, and particularly in the valuable work of M. Guerry, entitled *Essai sur la Statistique Morale de la France.*

It appears from the class of works which have now been specified, that, under certain circumstances, there is in human nature an unquestionable disposition or tendency to crime, to a certain extent. And this tendency is found, by a comparison of the facts which are furnished us in the statistical tables of crime, to be so definite and certain in its results, that one may predict at the beginning of each year what number will be brought before the criminal tribunals; what number will be acquitted; what number will be condemned to death; the number condemned to hard la-

* Edinburgh Review, vol. xxiii.

bour for life or for a term of years; the number condemned to solitary imprisonment; and many things of this kind. For instance, it appears from the statistical tables of crime in France that about one in every four thousand and four hundred of the inhabitants is arraigned at a criminal tribunal. Of the persons thus arraigned, one out of every four, or very nearly in that proportion, is accused of a crime against persons; the others, of crimes against property. Out of one hundred accused, about sixty-one will be regularly found guilty.

If statistical tables should be made of every art, department, and calling in life, of farmers, shoemakers, tailors, merchants, blacksmiths, students, preachers, and all other classes, similar results would be exhibited. That is to say, we could very nearly tell, many years beforehand, in a given place and under certain given circumstances, what number would till the ground, or smite the anvil, or practise the arts of commerce, or pursue other occupations.—It will be noticed that this view of the subject in particular cannot be charged with being merely speculative or conjectural. Statistical tables have already multiplied to such an extent, and in such a variety of forms, that we can speak with great confidence. And the bearing of the argument drawn from this source upon the structure of the human mind, particularly upon that department of the mind which is now under consideration, will readily suggest itself to the reader.

CHAPTER V.

LAWS OF THE WILL INVOLVED IN ITS OWN NATURE.

§ 78. The doctrine of laws of the will confirmed by consciousness.

We now proceed to other views of this interesting subject, which place it in a new and somewhat more definite and specific aspect. If we examine with suitable caution, we shall find that laws of the Will are clearly involved in its own nature.—But, before pro-

ceeding to explain the import and to show the truth of this proposition, we have one remark to make here, viz., that the doctrine of the will's being subject to law is, as seems to us, confirmed by our Consciousness. Certain it is, we all of us have the testimony of our inward experience, that there is a relation, whatever may be its nature, and however difficult of explanation, between volition and motives. As a general statement (for we do not here speak of those actions which, in consequence of being frequently repeated, have become almost mechanical, nor of those which are entirely trifling and insignificant), no man is conscious of a volition who is not also conscious of a knowledge of some antecedent which constitutes the occasion, motive, or cause of the subsequent volition. And if so, then the testimony of consciousness may properly be adduced in support of the general position which we are endeavouring to maintain.

§ 79. The same confirmed by the fact of the will's not being a subject, but an attribute.

But returning to the specific subject of this chapter, viz., that laws of the will are involved in its own nature, we proceed to remark, that the faculty of the Will is not a distinct entity by itself, but rather an incident to, or an appurtenance of, something else; in other words, it is not the *subject*, which might more reasonably put forth claims of independence, but sustains the subordinate relation of an *attribute*. As the Will is evidently only one of the many attributes of that distinct and organized existence which we denominate the soul or mind, it is necessarily subjected to all the conditions implied in that relation. If the Will, in its ordinary conditions, is not only free (a truth which is readily and fully conceded), but is capable also of a perfectly contingent action; if it be not only independent of compulsion, but independent also of all regulative oversight and control; if no principles whatever pervade its varieties of action, and secure to them something like symmetry and or-

der; then, so far as we have an understanding in the matter, it is obviously not merely an attribute or part of that whole which we variously denominate the MIND or SOUL, but must be regarded as a distinct existence by itself. But if it be otherwise, and the Will is truly an attribute, as it undoubtedly is, then, like every other attribute, it is necessarily subordinate to the fundamental conditions of that existence or entity to which it belongs; and, from the nature of the case, cannot sustain the claims which have sometimes been set up for it, to a wholly irresponsible and independent action.

§ 80. The same confirmed by the fact that every exercise of the Will implies an object.

We may further argue the matter under consideration by a reference to the nature of the exercises of the will or volitions. If we rightly understand the subject, the very idea of volition implies some antecedent object. In other words, it is a condition or law of the Will's action, *that it cannot put forth a volition except in reference to some object.* It is perfectly obvious, in any given case, that there can be no determining upon it without something which is determined; no resolving without something resolved on; but as these are only other names for willing or volition, it is equally obvious that there can be no volition without an object towards which the act of the Will is directed. It is the same here as it is with the memory, desire, association, and the like. There can be no act of the memory without something which is remembered; no act of the desire without something which is desired; no act of association without some subject or object to which the principle of association attaches itself. But if, by universal admission, it would be altogether absurd to speak of remembrance, desire, and association without some object towards which they are directed or upon which they can operate, it would seem clearly to follow that volition without an object is no less an absurdity. It is

something impossible; something not admitted by the nature of the mind itself.

But if volition has in all cases an object, it cannot well be denied that its action is in all cases subjected to some law. This object, without which volition cannot exist, is, of course, a *condition* of its existence. And it is evident that everything which is a condition of action, is in some sense (and, we may add, in a true and very important sense) a *law* to that being or power which puts forth such action. The will, therefore, is, in its very nature, subject to law.

§ 81. Confirmed also by the fact that every exercise of the will implies a motive.

Furthermore, such is the nature of the will, that it must in its exercise not only have an object, in reference to which it acts, but, what is not less important, it must have a *motive* to action. Sometimes the outward object is called a motive. But we speak now of the internal or subjective, in distinction from the external or objective motive. In this sense, we say, there must be a motive as well as an object. Both of these conditions of volitional action are indispensable. In the absence of either of them, it does not appear how any movement of the Will can possibly take place.

Place any object whatever before the mind; make it a distinct inquiry whether such object shall be obtained; reflect upon it for any length of time, and in view of any multitude of considerations; and, unless there exists in the mind that peculiar mental state which we denominate a motive, viz., some form of Desire or some sentiment of Obligation, the voluntary power will remain immutably and forever motionless. It is, therefore, another law of the Will, resulting from its own constitution or nature, THAT IT ACTS, AND ACTS ONLY, IN CONNEXION WITH MOTIVES.

The subject of Motives, in connexion with the doctrine of the Will, is a very interesting and important one. But we make scarcely more than a mere allu-

sion to it here, because it will be necessary hereafter to resume it, and to examine it more particularly. We cannot forbear saying, however, that the outward or objective motive (more simply and precisely the OBJECT) is presented before the Will by the Intellect. The internal or subjective motive, which, in philosophic strictness, is the *true* motive, is presented before the Will by the Sensibilities. The former indicates the direction in which the movement of the Will is to be made; the latter furnishes the proximate cause or ground of the movement. Both, as has been stated, are indispensable to the Will's action; but the circumstance, that the one is Intellective and the other Sentimentive in its origin, forever distinguishes them from each other.

§ 82. Confirmed also by the fact that every exercise of the will implies belief.

In introducing those considerations which are now presented to the reader's notice, we are aware that we are repeating, to some extent, what has already been said in a former chapter. We shall, therefore, state them much more concisely than we might otherwise feel at liberty to do.

Another law of the Will involved in its own nature, and which we have already had occasion to notice, is, that FAITH is a condition of volition. In other words, we cannot put forth an exercise of the Will or volition in respect to any given thing, *without some degree of faith or belief in the practicability or attainableness of that thing.*

We do not suppose that this law of the Will's action can be a matter of dispute. Whoever will make the experiment; whoever will endeavour to put forth a volition in reference to any object which he fully believes and knows to be beyond his power (for instance, in reference to flying in the air, or the creation of a tree or stone), will assuredly satisfy himself of the impracticability of the attempt. In every case of this kind, there is an utter destitution or negation

of belief. The person does not believe, even in the slightest degree, in the practicability of the thing. And, therefore, he not only does not, but he cannot will it. Such is his nature.

Furthermore, it seems to be a subordinate law of the Will, allied to, and growing out of, that which has just been mentioned, although there is perhaps a little more uncertainty attending it, that the degree of the volitional energy, in cases where belief actually exists, will be in proportion, or nearly so, to the intensity or measure of belief. In other words, if our belief in the practicability of a thing is full and strong, the voluntary effort which we shall make will be likely, if other things do not concur to prevent this result, to partake of the energy of our faith. And, on the other hand, if our belief be vacillating and weak, the natural result will be, that the volition, the effort of the voluntary faculty, will be proportionately vacillating and powerless.—(See, on this subject, part i., chap. iii.)

§ 83. Statement of other laws that are involved in the constitution or nature of the will itself.

Another law of the Will, involved in its own nature as that nature is ascertained by consciousness and general observation, is, that in its exercise *it has exclusive relation to our own actions, and to whatever may be truly dependent upon us, but not to anything beyond this limit.*—This law of the Will's action has been already (part i., chap. iii.) so fully explained and illustrated by examples, that it is unnecessary to delay upon it here.

We may refer here also to the law of the Will, that its action *is always prospective; always looks forward to the future.* It is not like the feelings of regret and remorse, for instance, that are always looking backward; it is not like the memory, which is continually diving after and bringing up images from the abyss of things that are gone by; but, although present in itself, it continually contemplates results

that are in futurity. And such is its nature, that it cannot act otherwise.—We may add to this enumeration of the ascertained and determinate principles of the Will's action the fact that the degree or strength of the volition will depend not only upon our belief in the practicability of the thing before us, but also upon the particular state of the sensibilities at the time. If, for instance, our desires are strong, the volitions to which they give rise will possess a corresponding degree of strength, unless there is a counteracting cause in the opposition of the moral feelings. And if both the Natural and the Moral sensibility, the feelings of moral obligation as well as the desires, happen to be in the same direction, the volitional energy will be proportionately increased.—The reader will, without difficulty, apply these statements to the general subject under consideration.

§ 84. Proof on the subject before us from instances of predominant emotion and passion.

There is another train of thought, which naturally presents itself to notice in the present chapter. We refer to instances of predominant emotion and passion, and the effect of such predominance in its relation to the acts of the Will. He who has made human nature a study, either in the past annals of the human race or within the range of his own personal observation, must have frequently noticed individuals in whom the passions have become so strong as to encroach upon the domain of the voluntary power, and to bring it into subjection. No matter what the passion is (whether attachment to one's intimate friends, or attachment to one's country and the place of his birth, or the love of pleasure, or the desire of acquiring property, or jealousy, or party zeal, or hatred, or ambition), instances are everywhere found in society of the existence of the particular passion, whatever it may be, in such overwhelming strength as to make the man a slave to it.

We might bring forward instances, and show more

distinctly what we mean, were it not that they will find a more appropriate place in another chapter in a subsequent part of the work, where we shall endeavour to explain what we understand by Enthralment or Slavery of the Will. But we may probably assume here, without hesitation, as a fact well known and readily admitted, that such instances exist; that men, submitting to the influence of a predominant passion, lose in a great degree that voluntary power which characterizes and ennobles human nature. In respect to certain persons, places, and objects, the Will, which, in its connexion with other persons, and places, and objects, was operative and effective, has lost its power, is entirely quiescent and subdued; and if it makes at times what may be called an appreciable effort, it certainly fails to make an available one, and oftentimes this is a permanent state of things. It is frequently the case that no lapse of time, no completeness of seclusion, no advice and consolation of friends, can weaken the controlling and inordinate influence, whatever it is, and thus, by liberating the Will, restore the parts of the mind to their true and appropriate position. But it certainly seems very obvious, if the Will is thus sometimes made captive to the passions, that there must be a real and operative connexion between the Will and the passions. In other words, there must be some fixed relations existing between the different parts of the mind, and a reciprocal influence propagated from one part to another. And it seems to be a natural consequence of this, that the Will must be regarded as being, in some true and real sense, subject to laws.

§ 85. Of the sense in which the proposition under consideration is to be understood.

We wish to pause here in the discussion for the purpose of making a single remark. We have laid down and endeavoured to prove, by what may be called a cumulative process of argument, the general proposition, THAT THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS. And, in doing

this, we have had occasion to point out some of them. But what we wish to remark now is this.—In predicating laws of the Will, we do not mean to assert (and perhaps the reader sufficiently understands this already) that the Will has laws in the same sense in which a piece of wood, or a tree, or a pendulum, or a clock, or a watch, or any other purely material object, has laws. When we assert that the Will is subject to law (or, more properly, acts in harmony with law, and, in thus acting, has laws of its own), the terms of the proposition must of course be modified by the nature of the subject, and be explained in conformity with that nature.

Nor are we to suppose that any practical mystery or difficulty necessarily attends this modification. We speak, for instance, of the POWER of the human mind; and we also speak of the POWER of the steam-engine; but there is evidently no difficulty in making the requisite modification of the import of the term power in these two cases. And so in the case before us. We apply the term laws to the mind as well as to matter, but obviously with some modification of meaning, resulting from the nature of the subject. Nor does the necessity of this modification perplex the proper apprehension or understanding of the terms which we thus use. Numberless propositions, having a relation to mind, and which, in their mental application, are somewhat modified in meaning, are as well understood as other propositions which have exclusive relation to material things.

Furthermore, it is well understood and acknowledged, that we can very properly, and with a clear apprehension of the import of the terms, predicate laws of the other parts of the mind, of the perceptive power, of memory, of reasoning, of imagination, and other powers. And if we can predicate laws of spiritual existence, or spiritual attributes, or spiritual action in any case whatever, we do not see why we cannot equally well predicate them, with the modification which has just been mentioned, of the human Will.

The proposition, therefore, which we have been considering, has a distinct and substantive meaning. And, as such, it admits of the application of inquiry and argument, and is susceptible of being either affirmed or denied; and we leave it to the reader to determine whether the facts and circumstances which have been brought up in reference to it admit of any possible explanation, except on the ground of its undoubted truth.

CHAPTER VI.

NATURE AND KINDS OF MOTIVES.

§ 86. Division of motives into external and internal.

It is with such considerations and arguments, saying nothing of the strong argument which might be drawn from the great and generally recognized principles of Causality and Uniformity, that we have endeavoured to establish the doctrine that the Will has its laws. And in the enumeration of these laws, there is one to this effect, that the Will never acts, and volitions never exist, except in connexion with motives. This well-defined and well-understood relation of the action of the Will and the existence of antecedent motives constitutes what may be called the law of motives.

The subject of motives, closely connected as it is with the doctrine of the will's freedom, is one of interest and importance. And it is necessary, in order to have a suitable knowledge of them, to contemplate them in various points of view. Considered, in the first place, in reference to their origin, they are susceptible of being divided into the two classes of Internal and External.—By the INTERNAL we mean motives as they exist in the mind itself, the various forms of the appetites, those higher sentient principles which may be denominated the propensities, and the various kinds and degrees of the affections, together with all motives within us of a moral nature. It is certain

that, in some important sense of the expressions, all motives, at least before they can reach and affect the Will, must exist in the *mind*, although there are grounds for speaking of their antecedent and separate existence in outward objects.—(2.) By EXTERNAL motives we mean all those which are placed external to the mind, and are *located*, if the expression may be allowed, in outward things. All external objects, which excite within us either approbation or disapprobation, joy or sorrow; all such outward objects as are supposed to have a connexion either with our worldly prosperity or our duty, operate upon us as motives.* It is true, they influence us through the medium of our mental nature, the emotions, passions, and moral powers; but as the influence exercised may be traced to them as the ultimate sources or occasions, there is a degree of propriety in designating them as motives. Outward motives, in the sense of the term as just explained, are innumerable, presenting themselves to our notice on all sides, in all the various aspects of creation, and in all the endless forms of human enterprise.

§ 87. External motives derive their efficacy from the mind.

Although all objects without us, and all external actions may, under different circumstances and in different degrees, exist as motives, still it is impossible for us to regard such external objects or actions as having a value to ourselves or a character of any kind, except it be in reference to those feelings which the contemplation of them excites in our own minds. Abstracted from the internal feelings, of which they are the antecedents and cause, they are all equally indif-

* NOTE.—External motives may also properly be called Objective motives; as, on the other hand, the Internal might perhaps be called Subjective. Objective motives are what we have in other places described as the OBJECTS of volition. And such is their precise nature. That is to say, they are in themselves mere objects, intellectually perceived, and nothing more. And it is only in connexion with, and in accommodation to certain subsequent mental facts, that they are called motives.

ferent. It is our own emotions and desires, therefore, reflected back upon all external objects and actions of whatever kind, which infuse into them their qualities of beauty or deformity, of unworthiness or excellence, and give them their power, whatever it may be, in relation to the will.

It would not be a difficult task, it is presumed, to adduce instances illustrating and confirming these views. As an example, a war is announced in Europe, and the merchant winds up his accounts and detains his vessels at home. The war is his motive for so doing. Subsequently there is a false report of war in Europe, which he believes to be true, and he pursues the same course as before. In both these cases, the internal belief, combined with his fears, gives to the motive, as the war would be considered, its whole effect. In the latter case, it constitutes it entirely, as the reported war is only a fiction.

Again, RICHES, whether in the form of lands or of gold and silver, or in any other form, constitute a powerful motive. But it is vain to presume that the common dust on which we tread, or even the brightest masses of ore it contains, inherit and possess in themselves a power to keep men constantly in action, to carry them from land to land, and from sea to sea. It is the mind itself which invests them with attributes that render them so effective. Men see in them the means of the enjoyments they covet; the means of influence among their fellows; the source of honour and power. So that if riches are one of the most efficient motives that can be presented to the human Will, it is the heart, the soul, which makes them so. Since you have only to place the man, who desired them so much, on his death-bed; you have only to show him that his treasures can no longer purchase honour, influence, enjoyment, not even an hour of life, not even exemption from a single pain, and then they are no longer a motive. They no longer have power to excite the will. He turns away from them with feelings of indifference, and possibly of disgust.

§ 88. The character of motives depends in part on the constitutional traits of the individual.

Although all objects which are presented to the mind in the shape and relation of External motives undergo a modification in their progress towards the region of the Will, it may not be unimportant to remark, that this modification will be very various in different individuals, according to their predominant mental traits. We will suppose, as an example, that the same object is presented to the notice of two individuals; the one possessed of dull and restricted, the other of quick and comprehensive powers of perception and reasoning. The object may appear diminutive and unimportant to the former, and probably *will* appear so, because his powers of reasoning are not expansive enough to embrace it in all its relations and consequences; while the same object will appear, for an opposite reason, exceedingly magnified and important to the latter.

And again, select two other persons, whose perceptive and reasoning powers closely resemble each other, and are, in fact, entirely the same, but whose SENSIBILITIES are constitutionally different; the one, a person intensely susceptible of vivid and strong emotions and desires; the other, on the contrary, possessed of a sluggish and phlegmatic temperament. Now we will suppose that the exciting object or motive, whatever it is, comes from the reasoning or intellectual part of their constitution to the sentient or sentimentive part with the same dimensions; in other words, as it exists in the *understanding*, and as it passes from the understanding to the heart, it appears to both of these persons precisely alike; but in the former case, that of the man of vivid sensibilities, it at once becomes heated and expanded, as if placed in the focus of a powerful lens; while in the latter it remains cold, and withered, and torpid, as if under the blighting influence of a wintry frost.

And this is not all. Every one knows that we are subject to temporary influences, sometimes not easily

explicable. At one time we are animated by encouraging aspirations and joyous hopes, and everything is clothed in brightness; and shortly after we are sad and depressed, and all objects appear to be invested with gloom. The motives which call upon us to resolve and to act, appear very variously under such circumstances. In the season of our joyousness, the light of our minds attaches itself to the various outward objects that are presented before them, and they shine like illuminated points, like guiding stars. In the season of our despondency and sorrow, they fall from the zenith with dimmed or extinguished beams, and we no longer heed them.

§ 89. Further division of motives into Natural or Personal, and Moral.

Motives may not only be divided into the two classes of External and Internal, but are susceptible of the yet farther division into the Natural and Moral. NATURAL motives (or Personal motives, as they might perhaps properly be termed) are such, and such only, as are found in the natural or pathematic sensibilities; that portion of the mind which we have especial reference to when we use the term Heart. Moral motives are such as are found, and found only, in the moral Sensibilities; that portion of the mind which we have especial reference to when we use the term Conscience. Natural motives, therefore, as will be better understood by referring to the distinctions which were made in the examination of the Sensibilities, appear in the general forms of the various Appetites, Propensities, and Affections. They involve, as an essential characteristic, the feeling of DESIRE; and aim exclusively, even in their widest and most generous tendencies, at some form of natural or self-interested good. Moral motives, on the contrary, always involve, as their characteristic, the feeling of moral obligation; and the object at which they aim (irrespective of the claims of interest, either our own or that of others) is moral good or Rectitude. So that, if we thought it necessary to be very specific in our nomenclature,

indicating by the terms the precise part or portion of the natural or moral sensibilities to which we have reference, we might call them respectively the Desirive and the Obligative motives.

§ 90. Their relation to and influence on the will.

The sphere of one class of these motives is man himself, bounded by his personal interests in distinction from the equal interests and rights of others; and with all those interests, whatever their forms, and varieties, and directions, coming back and uniting in himself as their centre. The sphere of the other class is God, bounded only by the universe of God, and which includes the equal good, and rights, and happiness of all possible existences. We agree, therefore, with the opinion which has sometimes been expressed, that these two classes of motives, differing so essentially as they do, cannot be brought into direct comparison on the basis of a commonness of nature, but are incommensurable; and for the same reason that the finite and the infinite, that God and man, are incommensurable.

And yet the motives, thus discriminated from each other, and existing in the human mind in the form of desires on the one hand, and of moral obligations on the other, stand side by side in the presence of the Will, and in immediate antecedent proximity, and thus lay the foundation of its acts. They are often said to be the causes of volitions; but they are not what are distinctively known as *efficient* causes, which would perplex the doctrine of the will's freedom, but as *preparative* causes; in other words, as the prerequisite antecedents, which furnish the occasions and lay the foundation of acts of the will, in the sense that such acts could not otherwise exist, but which, at the same time, do not necessitate or compel their existence. And it is here, in the relative position and strength of these two classes of motives, which sometimes unite in their influence, but are very often antagonistical, that we find the basis of that inward

spiritual conflict, upon the right settlement of which depends our harmony with God, and the conscious knowledge that "the kingdom of God is within us."

PART III.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF MENTAL FREEDOM.

§ 91. Of bodily in distinction from mental freedom.

HAVING thus, in the second Part of this discussion of the Will, assigned our reasons in support of the proposition THAT THE WILL HAS ITS LAWS, and having, in connexion with the main topic, indicated what some of these laws are, we next naturally proceed to consider the subject of its Freedom; a subject of perhaps equal importance and difficulty, and resting upon its own appropriate and specific grounds. — It has sometimes been the method of writers on the Freedom of the will to introduce the subject with remarks in illustration of what may be termed *bodily*, in distinction from *mental* freedom. Although there is no such analogy between mental and bodily freedom as to enable us to diffuse much light from one to the other, it may not be lost time to offer a few remarks in explanation of what is meant by freedom of the latter kind.—Bodily freedom appears to consist in an exemption from any restraint on the corporeal action. So far as we are capable of putting forth any outward action at all, in accordance with some antecedent volition, so far are we in the actual possession and enjoyment of corporeal liberty.—And, on the other hand, inability of corporeal action, where the volition prompts us to make the attempt, may be regarded as a sort of slavery of the body. Accordingly, he who is shut up within the massy walls and doors of a prison, which he cannot possibly pass; he who is the subject of a weakening and paralyzing disease, which confines him to his chamber and his bed; he who is thrown from a precipice, and, in his descent, is obviously incapable of a contrary or upward motion; and all others in a like situation, whether it be from an abstraction of their personal power or the presence of

some outward impediment, may with propriety be described, to the extent of their inability to conform their outward actions to the requisitions of the Will, as destitute of freedom; or, what is the same thing, as the subjects of necessity or enthralment, in the bodily or corporeal sense of enthralment or freedom.

And this is all we have to say on the subject, because, according to the views we entertain in relation to it, bodily freedom or enthralment, which is a matter perfectly well understood and beyond all reach of controversy, throws no light at all, or, at least, but a feeble ray, upon the nature of the enthralment or liberty of the mind.

§ 92. Unsuccessful attempts to explain the nature of freedom.

Accordingly, for the reason above intimated, it will be understood, that in what we have to say of Freedom, we mean freedom or liberty of the mind. Mental freedom has a nature appropriate to itself; it possesses an identity and a character of its own; it stands apart in the position and the fact of its own essentiality; and is not only an entirely distinct thing, but is as much more important than any mere corporeal liberty as the mind is more important than the body.

In discussing the subject of the freedom of the mind (a phrase which we employ as interchangeable and synonymous with liberty of the mind), the inquiry first presenting itself is, what are we to understand by the term FREEDOM? This is a question which seems to have been asked, and to have elicited more or less attention in almost every age of the world. It is probably no exaggeration to say that many volumes have been written in illustration of the import of this single term. And if, to a considerable degree, these repeated efforts have proved unsuccessful, may we not suppose that it is owing, in part at least, to mistaken methods of inquiry? Or, perhaps, if right methods have been pursued, may not this ill success be attributable to the fact that the limits, which in the nature of things sometimes intercept and restrict

their successful application, may not have been fully perceived? The history of philosophical opinions, which embraces the errors as well as the truths of human thought, sufficiently suggests the answer.

§ 93. Freedom, considered as an element of thought rather than as a thing in actual realization, is the name of a simple abstract idea.

In attempting to throw some light upon the subject of freedom, we naturally call to mind the well-established doctrine of mental philosophy, that the mental states may properly be discriminated from each other, and arranged, in accordance with the facts in the case, under the heads of Simple and Complex. Accordingly, when we have fixed our attention upon any distinct subject of contemplation, which is complex in its character, and have resolved it into its parts, and have distinctly traced those parts to a position where there is no longer a possibility of a separation of them, we have then reached a boundary of analysis which it is not within the capacity of the human mind to go beyond. The elements of thought, which are disclosed in the issue of such a process, are entirely SIMPLE. Truly elementary and ultimate, they are deposited as deeply and strongly in the foundations of the intellectual edifice as it is possible for them to be. They are to be regarded, therefore, as constituting knowledge, and that, too, of the highest kind, although it is equally true that they are not susceptible of explanation, and that the person who does not know them of himself and by virtue of his own mental action can never know them from any other source.

And, in accordance with these views, our first remark in illustration of the nature of FREEDOM or liberty is, that the term, when it is used abstractly, and as expressive of an intellectual perception rather than of a thing in actual realization, is the name of a *simple thought or idea*, the knowledge of which we can derive from the mind itself alone. This remark we consider of no small importance, since it has a direct bearing on all attempts at a verbal explanation of the

term, and indicates the possibility of such attempts being utterly futile. In taking this view, which proposes itself as the only correct one, we are sustained by the concurrence and authority of many writers in our own and other languages. "*La liberté* (says Théry, in a Treatise in the French language on this subject), *est indeterminé même. Comme tout ce qui est simple, elle ne peut se definer.*" The purport of which is, that the term liberty or freedom is indefinable, for the reason that it is the name of a simple idea; and that, in all cases, simplicity, when it actually exists, precludes the possibility of definition.

§ 94. Occasions of origin of the abstract idea of liberty.

But in respect to all abstract notions or thoughts (and the mere idea or conception of liberty is one of this kind), there are two questions naturally presenting themselves; the one just now remarked upon, whether the notion is simple or complex; the other, what is the occasion on which it arises? The *occasion* on which the abstract idea of Freedom is suggested to the intellect, and becomes a part of our knowledge, is nothing else than the mind's action itself, in those favoured moments when its operations are *in fact* free. At such times we of course have a consciousness of what is in reality the fact, viz., of the mind's operating in the prescribed sphere of its action, without impediment or hinderance. And it is then that the abstract idea or notion of freedom arises or is *evolved* (if we may be so allowed to speak) by means of the Intuitional or Suggestional power in the same manner as the abstract ideas of existence, identity, duration, space, intelligence, power, right, wrong, and a considerable number of others.

The fact and realization of our existence is the *occasion* on which the abstract idea of existence or being in general is brought up, or (to employ what may be called the technical term in the case), is SUGGESTED or INTUITIONED to the mind. The fact and the realization of power in ourselves is the occasion on which

the abstract notion of power, which every one distinctly possesses, is suggested. And, in like manner, whenever there is liberty of the mind in fact and in actual realization, we are so constituted that we are always, and without any effort on our own part, put in distinct possession of the abstract idea of liberty.

§ 95. Of the undefinableness of the term freedom.

Now if such be the origin of the abstract notion of freedom, and if it be the name of a simple and not a complex idea (as certainly there is every reason to believe it to be so), then every one who speaks of freedom, or enters into a discussion upon it, must be supposed to know of himself what freedom is. It is quite certain, if he pleads ignorance of the import of the term, we shall find ourselves wholly unable to make it known to him by any statements in language. It being the name of a simple idea, if we attempt to define it, we must necessarily employ synonymous terms, and which require an explanation no less than the one in question. Every definition of the name of a simple idea, which is not a synonym of the word itself or a synonymous phrase, is necessarily erroneous. Nature and truth never contradict themselves. And if it be true that the idea is simple, then any attempted analysis of it, which goes upon the supposition of its being complex, which is the case with all real or logical in distinction from synonymous definitions, must evidently lead us into some mistake. And as to a synonym or synonymous phrase, it is entirely clear that it cannot give us any new light in the matter; and, accordingly, we are necessarily thrown back upon our own internal experience for a knowledge of the thing under inquiry.

§ 96. Supposed definitions of freedom are either mere synonyms, or embrace some element requiring explanations.

It may perhaps be useful to introduce one or two instances of definitions, which have been given by leading writers on the subject, in illustration and

proof of our remark that the term in question cannot be defined. Mr. Hobbes defines it as follows: "Liberty is the *absence of all impediments* to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent." But the phrase *absence of all impediments* is obviously synonymous with liberty, and conveys no new idea. So that the definition, substituting other terms, amounts to this, and this only, that freedom is that *liberty* of action which is contained in or permitted by the nature and intrinsic quality of the agent.

Buffier gives the following definition: "Liberty is the disposition a man feels within himself of his *capacity* to act or not to act, to choose or not to choose a thing, at the same moment." Here the term CAPACITY appears to be the synonymous expression. So that if we carefully reflect upon this definition, we shall probably find it amounting to merely this: Liberty is the consciousness a man has of his *freedom* to act or not to act, to choose or not to choose. And if we suppose the term CAPACITY is not synonymous with liberty, it still remains a matter of doubt what precise idea it conveys. And the mind, consequently, remains unsatisfied.

The definition given by Dr. Reid is this: "By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a POWER over the determinations of his own Will." It is difficult to make anything of this definition, because it seems to imply the existence of a Volitional power or Will back of that, whose decisions are the immediate precursors of our actions. If it do not imply this, then all that is meant is, that the liberty of a moral agent is his POWER to put forth voluntary determinations or acts of the will. And in that case, POWER is the synonymous expression, and, of course, gives us no new light in the case. And if it be not so, the difficulty is not at all removed; for, if we suppose the term power to have a distinct meaning from liberty, that idea or meaning, whatever it may be, is simple and undefinable.

But it is unnecessary to remark further. According to the best reflections we have been able to bestow, it is altogether useless to give a definition of freedom or liberty, because it is, in the nature of the case, impossible to do it; and is unadvisable also, because every supposed definition, so far from settling the subject, has been generally found to leave it open to long controversies and disputes.

§ 97. Distinction between the idea and reality of liberty.

But a distinction is to be made, which has already been hinted at, between the mere notion, the abstract idea of freedom, and freedom itself; between the conception of it as an object of thought, and the possession of it as a reality and a matter of personal experience. We may have the abstract idea of freedom just as we have the abstract conception of power; and we may reason upon the abstraction of freedom just as we reason upon the abstract idea or abstraction of power, without possessing either freedom or power in ourselves.

The idea of liberty in the abstract is the result, the suggestion, or the creature even, of what is sometimes called the *pure* intellect; that is to say, it is the result or suggestion of intellectual operations, which, coming subsequently and independently, may be regarded as disconnected and removed from external material impressions. And as such, it is truly an intellectual entity; a real and distinct object of contemplation, of knowledge, of reasoning. But, after all, it is to be noticed that this is merely the *idea* of the thing, and not the thing itself; it is the intellectual representative of liberty, but not the experience and the reality of liberty; it is that which the veriest mental slave may conceive of and may speculate upon, as an object nakedly and coldly suspended in the distance; but which is very different from that which the person who actually possesses freedom, realizes as a thing near at hand, and enjoys as his own valued and personal possession.

§ 98. Of the source of our knowledge of liberty itself in distinction from the abstract idea of liberty.

Of liberty in itself, in distinction from the *abstract idea of liberty;* in other words, of freedom in the actual state of *realization*, we can have a knowledge by Consciousness, and by that alone. If a man (we speak now of the *mind* of man, and not of his body, and of the mind in a condition of mental soundness, and not in a state of either total or partial insanity) truly feels himself to be free, we seem to have no alternative but to take it for granted that he is so. This is something ultimate; we cannot go beyond nor around it; being based upon an original and ultimate feeling, it is, of course, founded in one of the deepest and surest sources of knowledge; and we are under a sort of necessity, therefore, of admitting that the consciousness and the realization, the knowledge and the fact, go together.

And, in connexion with this view, we shall not hesitate to assume, that each one is not only disposed to consult his consciousness, but to rely confidently on its intimations. We make this assumption, because we know of no other way in which it is possible for him, on a subject of this nature, to arrive at distinct and satisfactory conclusions for himself, or to understand the statements of others. If freedom, in its essence and realization, is what it is known to be in our consciousness, and that, too, without the possibility of its being anything else, then surely, however difficult it may be to give a definition of the abstract idea of freedom, we may enter on the examination of the subject-matter before us with entire confidence, since it is one, according to the view now given, which necessarily comes within the range of each one's personal knowledge.

§ 99. Of the precise import of the phrase moral liberty.

We close the suggestions of this chapter with a single remark more.—It is not uncommon to hear persons using the phrase *moral liberty*, and particularly

in its applications to man. But the thought naturally arises, What is the distinction between moral liberty and any other liberty? To this inquiry it may be answered, that the phrase moral liberty indicates not so much a difference in the essence of liberty, or in the liberty itself, which we have reason to believe is essentially the same, so far as it exists at all, in all beings whatever, from the highest to the lowest, as it does certain natural and necessary modifications of liberty, resulting from the capacity or sphere of the mind, of which moral liberty is predicable. The freedom of the lower orders of existence may perhaps be regarded as perfect *in its sphere* as that of men or angels. As they roam in forests and mountain wildernesses, or swim in the depths of the ocean, or fly and sing in the radiant fields of the summer's sky, they are truly free in fact, and they have great joy in their freedom. But we never think of ascribing to them *moral* liberty, simply because, so far as we are able to learn, they have not a moral nature as man has. The sphere of man's liberty is enlarged so as to embrace moral considerations, those feelings of approval, disapproval, and moral obligation which are implied in moral accountability. Accordingly, when we speak of man's moral liberty, or of man as morally free, we mean to express the fact, in the first place, that man is a free being, the sphere of whose liberty and action is so enlarged as to embrace moral considerations or moral principles of action; and also that his liberty, manifesting in the elements of its being the same essential nature, exists nevertheless, in a wider and higher degree, and possesses a higher value than mere natural liberty, in consequence of this higher nature which he possesses.

CHAPTER II.

MENTAL HARMONY THE BASIS OR OCCASION OF MENTAL FREEDOM.

§ 100. Statement of the inquiry in this chapter.

WHAT has been said so far, on the general subject of Liberty, relates to the abstract idea of liberty, the origin and nature of that idea, the realization or actual existence of liberty in ourselves in distinction from the mere abstract notion, and the manner in which we have a knowledge of liberty thus existing in ourselves, viz., by Consciousness. It is a distinct inquiry (and undoubtedly one worthy of some attention) what that precise state of mind is, in connexion with which liberty exists. In other words, what are the precise conditions or prerequisites of mind essential to mental liberty? If we are at liberty to suppose, as undoubtedly we are, that there are or may be certain circumstances or conditions of the mind which are inconsistent with its freedom, it seems natural to follow that there are other circumstances or conditions upon which its freedom, whenever it exists, is based, or which are essential to it. What are these precise circumstances? What is this precise situation of the mind?

In entering upon this inquiry, we wish to make the remark, which naturally suggests itself as incidental to the main topic, that freedom may exist IN VARIOUS DEGREES. It is well known that there may be various degrees in the distinctness of a perception and in the strength of an emotion or desire, while the nature of such perception, emotion, or desire remains the same. And, in like manner, there may be different degrees of freedom, while the nature of freedom is the same. The intemperate man, in respect to whom we feel at liberty to say that he is partially enslaved to his cups,

is obviously less free than one whose appetites have never been vitiated. Nevertheless, in common parlance, we speak of him without any qualification as a free man, so long as he is not absolutely beyond the possibility of self-recovery. Up to this point we consider him both free and accountable. At the same time, it is unquestionably true, that he is less free than others.

This is undoubtedly an important view in the philosophy of the Will. We wish it to be understood, however, that, in the remarks on the subject now before us, viz., the precise circumstances under which Freedom exists, we are speaking of freedom *in the highest degree*, or *the perfection of freedom.* This will be found the easiest and most satisfactory way to obtain precise ideas in relation to it.

§ 101. Occasions on which liberty exists.

Returning, therefore, to the main topic of the chapter, we proceed to make a remark which has a close connexion with it. It is this: If men will but carefully inquire and consider, they will not fail to perceive that all things are in harmony, or were designed to be so. There is a harmony of the various parts of the external world; there is a harmony of the parts of the human body; there is also a harmony of the mind; by which we mean, there is a perfect symmetry and adaptation of the parts of the mind, each part being appointed to operate in its appropriate sphere; and, so far as it fulfils the intentions of nature, never infringing upon another part whose sphere of operation is different. Now, when each part operates in this way; when there is truly a harmony of movement, everything being equable, proportionate, and in its proper place; when each power performs its functions without any unavoidable perplexity existing in itself, or any infringement originating from some other source, we are then conscious of liberty in the highest sense of the term.

He who has no knowledge of liberty at such a time,

never will have, and it is wholly useless to reason with such a person on this subject. The consciousness of liberty, which naturally exists under such circumstances, is the only source of our knowledge in relation to it. A thousand mere speculations could never furnish the information which we have from that source; nor could they ever have weight in opposition to the authority of that ultimate tribunal.

§ 102. Of the circumstances under which this mental harmony may be expected to exist.

But perhaps it may be objected that these views, however plausible they may be in theory, are useless and nugatory in their application, because there is no rule or measure upon which the internal harmony depends, and to which it may be referred. And certainly there would be something in such a suggestion, if it were well founded. But we think we may venture to say it is not so. It must, however, be admitted, if there is harmony in the mind, there must be more or less of subordination in the parts; and that, if there is subordination in some parts, there must be ascendency and control somewhere else. And this leads to the further remark, that it seems to be a proposition, satisfactorily established by writers on mental philosophy, that Conscience is, in some sense of the term, a governing and controlling power of the mind. Harmony, as it is capable of existing and is required to exist in the human mind, is by the appointment of God; and CONSCIENCE, as the vicegerent of God in the human breast, indicates and rewards the fulfilment of this benevolent purpose.—Conscience, however, is not so much a governing power in the executive as in the legislative sense of the term; not so much in the capacity of actually carrying into effect, as in the office of guiding, prescribing, and regulating. In the executive sense of the term, the WILL is the presiding and controlling power, while the functions of conscience are more of an advisory and consultative kind. Accordingly, when all the appetites, propensities, and

passions are kept within their due bounds, we are reminded of this desirable state of things, and are encouraged to secure its permanency by an internal approbation; and, on the other hand, if they exceed those limits, we feel an internal reproof and condemnation. So that, when we assert the harmony of the mental acts to be the true and undoubted occasion on which we are conscious of the existence of mental freedom in the highest degree, it is essentially the same as to say that the occasion of this consciousness is to be found in a condition of the mental acts or operations, conformed to the requirements of conscience. And as conscience is a principle instituted by God himself, and is designed to intimate his will, we may go further and say, that the occasion on which we are conscious of mental freedom in the highest degree is to be found in a condition of the mental acts, conformed to the requirements of the Supreme Being.

It is conscience (of course we mean an enlightened and right, and not a perverted conscience) which, acting in the name of the great Author of the mind, marks out their respective boundaries to its various powers and tendencies; which says to this appetite and that desire, to this propensity and that passion, thus far must thou go and no farther; within these limits your operations are innocent, beyond them are criminal; within them there is freedom, beyond them there is enthralment.

§ 103. Objected that perfect harmony of the mind is not realized in the present life.

It may be objected, perhaps, that, in view of what has just been said, there is no mental freedom at all in the present state of existence; at least, that there is not the highest degree or perfection of mental freedom, since it is evident, and is generally admitted, that the harmony of the human mind is, in a great degree, destroyed. It is maintained by the objector that there is a want of mental harmony in the most moral man in society, or even the man who, together

with mere outward morality, is the most deeply imbued with the spirit of the Gospel. His love to God does not always possess that intensity and uniformity which ought to be characteristic of it; his love to his fellow-creatures, although he may be in the main anxious for their good, is subject to variations discreditable to the fervour of his benevolence and offensive to God; his evil passions are not always suitably rebuked and repressed, but sometimes obtain a control which is wholly adverse to inward peace.

To the general truth of this statement of man's condition we are obliged to assent. It is too obvious to admit of a denial. And it follows, of course, that the perfection of liberty is but too seldom realized in the present life. If we wish, therefore, to contemplate liberty in its perfection, let us look at God. In that glorious Being all is harmony. In him wisdom, and benevolence, and justice, and volitional authority are all blended in due proportions; are all active in their appropriate spheres without any interference, forming a constellation and inseparable cluster of light, without any shades crossing their path, or any darkness at all. And in Him, more than in any other Being, there is perfect liberty. And let us look, moreover, at angels and seraphim, and any other higher orders of being which may be supposed to exist, and it will be found to be the same. Their souls, although infinitely removed from Him in point of capacity, are yet, in their moral nature and in their more limited sphere, the perfect mirror and reflex of His. Such are the ideas which men commonly attach to these higher orders of existence. And with them also, in that sphere, whatever it may be, which God has been pleased to assign them, there is undoubtedly the brightness and the perfection of liberty.

§ 104. Perfection of mental harmony and consequent mental liberty illustrated from the character of the Saviour.

But is there not perfect liberty of the mind on earth? Adam, as he came from the hands of his

Creator and in the innocency of his first creation, may be supposed to have enjoyed this perfection of freedom. In the second Adam too, the man Christ Jesus, who was tempted in all points as we are, and yet without sin, it existed in the highest possible degree. Follow him in the vicissitudes of his life; mark him in the various situations of temptation, trial, suffering. See him the son of a carpenter, and himself employed in the calling of his fathers; see him at a little later period, with his whip of thongs, expelling with righteous indignation the money-changers from the Temple; see him in the synagogue and in the wilderness, in preaching and in prayer, smitten with the midday sun, and chilled with the drops of the night; behold him with the sorrowful and the rejoicing, at the marriage-feast of Cana and at the tomb of Lazarus; behold him mingling with all classes, and anxious for the good of all, seeking to benefit alike the high and the low, the priest in his robes, and the publican sitting at the receipt of customs, the young man of great possessions, as well as such as were halt and blind; behold him praying and agonizing in Gethsemane, and agonizing, and supplicating, and dying on the Cross. It is difficult to conceive of any one who was placed in a greater diversity of situations, and exposed to a greater mixture and contrariety of influences. But in that mind there was entire and perfect harmony. The appetites, the propensities, the affections (for he had them all, and not only that, he was tried or tempted in them all), never violated their due boundaries, but always acted in complete uniformity with the law of rectitude in the soul. As there was perfect harmony, there was perfect liberty; and as there was liberty, there was peace—even that peace "which passeth understanding."

As Christ is set before us as an example, that we should follow him, we are certainly not to consider it as an impossibility for us to realize in our own souls the same completeness of mental harmony and the same perfection of inward liberty. It is the duty of

all to strive to free themselves from the bondage under which they labour, and to secure, with the blessing of God, a restoration to that state from which they have gone astray. And who will undertake to say that there may not be a restoration to that state of inward harmony, purity, and peace in the present life; if not through the whole course of a life or even a year, yet in some favoured moments, when the earnest strivings of the creature are blessed by the presence and the aids of the Creator? "Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty;" not merely a prospective liberty to be enjoyed in heaven, but liberty on earth; not merely an exemption from ceremonial thraldom, but from the inward and greater load of spiritual thraldom; and we may add, as we are not authorized to limit the operations of that "Spirit of the Lord," so we are not authorized or permitted to deny the possibility, however seldom it may be the case in fact, of the completeness or perfection of liberty.

§ 105. Objected that the foregoing views are necessarily, and in their very terms, inconsistent with liberty.

But it may, perhaps, be further objected, that the subordination of the various parts of the mind to the authority of conscience, which, inasmuch as it constitutes the true harmony of the mind, is the occasion and basis of the actual realization of perfect liberty, is, even in its very terms, a statement of restraint and enthralment. But can we with propriety, when we carefully examine the subject, concede any weight to such an objection? Everything which exists must have its appropriate nature, and, consequently, its prescribed sphere of action. Subordination, if there be indeed a Supreme Power to whom everything else is amenable, must necessarily be the very condition of existence. It is a very erroneous notion which supposes that mental liberty necessarily implies insubordination, as much as to suppose that there can be no civil freedom without popular licentiousness. Without subordination, secured by some ascendant and per-

manent principle, each inferior principle and power of human nature would leave its appropriate sphere, and commence an invasion on that of its neighbour. Such a state of things would necessarily be an infringement upon, and a destruction of, all liberty.

We hold it to be self-evident, that no being, attribute, or faculty can be considered as free, in the highest sense of that term, whenever there is a violation of the elements of its nature; or, what is the same thing, when there is an interruption or hinderance from another source of the natural tendencies of those elements. Now the mind, though it is one and indivisible in its nature, is exceedingly multiplied and complex in its modes of operation; in other words, in its various perceptive, sentimentive, and volitional powers. And each of these powers, it will be recollected, has its definite limits, and its specific and unalienable character; that is to say, a nature of ITS OWN. But if it be true that they have a nature of their own, it seems to follow that they can be free, and free only, at least in the highest and most ennobling sense of that term, when they are permitted to act in accordance with that nature. Now as every faculty of the mind exists and operates in connexion with other faculties, there must be in the mind some ascendant and authorized power, which can indicate to each its appropriate limits or sphere. And as these spheres of action are adapted to each other with perfect symmetry, there cannot be a transgression or passing over of one sphere without an invasion of another; there cannot be an excess of liberty in one without a diminution of liberty in another. Hence we see, that, from the nature of the case, a due subordination in the powers of the mind is not inconsistent with the liberty of each power in itself, and is absolutely essential to the liberty of every other power. And this view seems to us fully to answer the objection last referred to.

CHAPTER III.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

§ 106. Remarks on the nature of the freedom of the will.

The remarks which have been made in the two preceding chapters are, to some extent, of a general nature, being applicable to the mind as a whole, as well as in its parts; and susceptible of an application not only to the human mind, but to all minds. The whole subject of the nature of Freedom is one of great importance, and it is also one of no inconsiderable difficulty; and it seemed, therefore, to require those general illustrations. We hope, from what has been said on the nature of freedom in general, that it will be easy to understand what is meant by *that specific form of it known as the Freedom of the will.* We do not suppose (and we have already suggested reasons for the remark) that the freedom of the will, when contemplated directly and in itself, either is, or ever will be, a matter of verbal explanation; no mere form of words can, of itself, fully explain what Freedom is, either when predicated of the Will, or of any other form or action of the mind. But still we trust, that, with the help of the general statements which have been made, it will be found a matter of clear intellectual perception; and that, if it should elude and baffle the powers of language to express it, it will still be found fully within the comprehension of thought.

It does not follow, because the element of freedom is, in some respects, of too subtile a nature to be embodied in the massive forms of speech, that it is therefore too subtile and ethereal to be approached and apprehended by the mind. There are many things which are known and are understood, at least enough so for all practical purposes, but which cannot be explained by any statements in language so as to make

them clearer. It may be impossible for me to explain, by a mere form of words, what is meant by my *existence;* but I fully know, as everybody else does in respect to himself, what my existence is in experience and in fact. In like manner, it is impossible for me to explain what the Freedom of the Will is in words, but I know what it is in experience and in fact, and have never been destitute of that knowledge, and it is impossible that I should be destitute of it. If the Will were some material object, I could probably explain by words what is meant by its freedom; but as it is immaterial and mental, we are obliged to leave it to each one's internal examination and consciousness.

§ 107. Of the relation of the freedom of the will to the fact of its subjection to law.

But the inquiry may arise in the minds of some, How can it be possible that the Will should be free, and, at the same time, subject to law? No doubt some persons fully entertain the idea that the doctrine of the Will's subjection to law, or, rather, of being required to act in harmony with law, which is susceptible of accumulated and irresistible proof, necessarily involves that the volitional faculty is destitute of liberty. But, if we rightly understand the matter, the fact is entirely the reverse of what is here supposed to be the case. The true doctrine, sustained by the most thorough philosophical examination, is, that, without laws of the mind, including the will as a part of the mind, and extending the doctrine of laws to the whole, there is no liberty of the mind as a whole, nor of the will in particular; neither liberty in fact, nor even a possibility of it. True liberty does not require that we should trample on another's rights, but simply that we should enjoy our own; and, in order that our own rights and those of others should be enjoyed, it is necessary that both should be placed under some regulation. Law and liberty, therefore, necessarily go together. In the order of their existence,

law precedes liberty; and it is in that order they are most naturally contemplated. Where there is perfect liberty, as we have already had occasion to notice, there is perfect harmony; but there cannot be perfect harmony, nor harmony in any degree, without law. But it is not necessary to dwell here. The Creator has obviously constituted the human mind on the basis of permanent principles. And in doing this, he has at the same time laid the broad and deep foundations of control and of subordination, of harmony and of freedom.

But, looking at the subject in a less general way, and coming more closely to the matter which is directly before us, we may safely take the position that the Will could not enjoy freedom, either in a higher or less degree, if it were not in *itself*, and considered separately from all other powers, subject to law. If the acts of the Will were guided by no principles whatever, if they were beyond the reach of all superintendence and regulative control, they would necessarily be thrown into the arms of a blind and inflexible destiny.

If it could be shown that the Will is not subject to law, or, perhaps more strictly and truly, does not harmonize with law, it would of course follow, that it is the subject of mere contingency and accident, which entirely and fully comes up to the utmost idea of fatality. And it would be found to be a fatalism of the worst kind, an unintelligent fatalism.—But having proved that the Will, as well as the other mental powers, has its laws, we secure in that single fact the possibility of liberty, which we could not have without it. We are, accordingly, in a situation in which the liberty of the Will, that important and noble attribute of a morally accountable nature, is not necessarily excluded, which would certainly be the case if the will were driven about hither and thither, without any possible foresight of what is liable to take place, and without any regularity of action.

§ 108. Circumstances or occasions under which freedom of the will exists.

Although, in entering into the subject of the freedom of the Will in particular, in distinction from the general nature of freedom, we do not profess to go into verbal explanations and definitions, something may nevertheless be said in relation to the occasions or circumstances under which it exists.—In respect to the occasions on which the freedom of the Will exists, but little more remains to be done than apply the remarks made on the general subject of freedom in the preceding chapter. If there is perfect harmony in other parts of the mind, there will be perfect freedom in the Will; if every appetite, and propensity, and passion is precisely what it should be, the volitional power cannot possibly experience any pressure which will interrupt or diminish that degree of liberty which is essential to, or compatible with its nature.

This topic may perhaps be susceptible of illustration by a reference to the Supreme Being. If freedom can, with propriety and justice, be predicated of any being whatever, it is certainly predicable of the Supreme Being; and predicable not only in general terms, *but of the Will in particular.* We hazard nothing in saying that liberty of the Will is possessed by Him in the highest possible degree. And we cannot conceive how it should be otherwise, when we consider that the elements, both moral and intellectual, by which it is surrounded, are in perfect harmony with each other.—And if we turn our attention to any other high and holy beings, such as are nearest in glory to the Supreme Author of all things, it is the same. The will of angels, and of any and all other orders of holy beings, formed as they are in the image of their Maker, possesses, within the appropriate sphere of its action, the highest degree of freedom. All the various elements which go to constitute them intelligent and moral beings are restricted to their proper place, and operate in their due proportion. Their perceptions, so far as they go, are in perfect accordance

with the truth of things. Their emotions are such as God, who takes supreme delight in perfect rectitude, can entirely approve. Every desire which they exercise is in its right place; their love to God is just such as it should be; their love to other holy beings corresponds precisely to the nature of the object towards which it is directed; their aversion to sin and sinful beings is just such, and fully and entirely such, as is appropriate and right; and it is precisely the same in respect to every other emotion and desire. And the consequence is, there is no disturbing force in the neighbourhood of the Will; there is no possible motive to sway it from the line of perfect rectitude; and hence it is true, that their Will, although it always operates in the direction of the highest rectitude and good, is always at liberty; and this liberty exists, too, in the highest possible degree. And hence we assert, in respect to all minds, whether they are higher or lower in the scale. of being, that perfect harmony is the appropriate element of perfect freedom; and that every diminution of harmony will be attended with a corresponding diminution of liberty. And this is as true of the separate parts or powers of the mind as of the whole; *and is as true of the Will as of any other part.*

§ 109. Evidence of the freedom of the Will from consciousness.

Having made the foregoing remarks in explanation of the nature of the freedom of the will, and of the occasions on which it exists, we are now prepared to proceed to a consideration of the proofs in support of the position that there is such a freedom. And we accordingly remark, that the doctrine of the freedom of the will is sustained, in the first place, by CONSCIOUSNESS. In other words, every man consciously knows himself, in the exercise of volition, to be volitionally free. It is a knowledge which we possess, not by laboured processes of deduction, but by a species of intuitive affirmation; not by inference, but by an original authoritative feeling.

It may be said, perhaps, that Consciousness has relation, properly speaking, to the mental acts *alone;* and, therefore, not to Freedom, which is not so much an act of the mind, as an incident to or qualification of an act. In answer to this, it may be said, that Consciousness takes notice of mental acts in their SPECIFIC as well as their general form; that is, of their distinctive traits, their peculiar aspects, their modifications. And Freedom, considered as a direct subject of consciousness, involves, at least, a peculiar aspect or modification of the mental act.

We will only add, that the argument from Consciousness is as decisive as it is plain and simple. Some writers, indeed, have even been disposed to rely upon this argument alone. They consider it (and perhaps it may be admitted with entire justice and correctness) as conclusive against any considerations which may be adduced adverse to it. "Our own free will," says Mr. Stewart, "we know by consciousness; and we can have no evidence of any truth so irresistible as this."

§ 110. Of an objection to the argument from consciousness.

It ought to be noticed, however, that from time to time, a few individuals have been found who have asserted the opposite, viz., a consciousness of internal compulsion or slavery. Surprising as such a declaration is, we are bound in candour to receive it as truly indicating the internal experience of those who make it, although it may be in opposition to the testimony of thousands and even hundreds of thousands to one. But these exceptions do not at all overthrow our argument. If there truly be such exceptions, they can undoubtedly be explained in entire consistency with the general truth, that the Freedom of the will is ascertained and proved by the consciousness of mankind. Is it not true, is it not accordant with common experience and with the Scriptures even, that any man and every man may enslave himself? And, when that is the case, what could we expect but that conscious-

ness, the true index of what takes place within, should bear its testimony to a state of thraldom? If, then, these persons are not conscious of Freedom of the will, may we not safely say, it is not the work of their Creator, but their own?

Certain it is, if we permit any one of the appetites, propensities, or passions continually to extend and strengthen itself by being continually repeated, it will eventually gain the ascendency over and subdue all the rest of the mind. If, for instance, a man indulges, year after year, the consuming propensity of AMBITION, it ultimately so disorders the proper action of the mental powers, and acquires such immense strength, that he feels himself driven by a sort of compulsion; he undoubtedly recognises in himself, as he asserts to be the case, the impulse of a species of destiny, which, however, is of his own creation. By his own criminal improvidence, and not by any inward and irresistible fatality, he has lost control of the helm, and is driven forward amid billows and tempests to his destruction.

Such cases undoubtedly exist, but they cannot with propriety be regarded in any other light than that of exceptions to the general rule, and which are susceptible of an explanation in consistency with the general experience of mankind. That experience (the inward testimony or consciousness which the great mass of mankind has) most decidedly testifies to the liberty of the will.

§ 111. Illustration of the will's freedom, drawn from the nature of motives.

In order to meet the doubts and perplexities which may arise from time to time in the reader's mind in relation to these difficult and interesting subjects, we wish to recur a moment to some of the laws of the Will which have been enumerated.

FIRST. One of these laws is, that the Will never puts forth a volition, except in reference to an object, which object is sometimes called the Objective or out-

ward motive, but more properly the OBJECT merely; that is to say, the object of volition. We remark here, that no one will suppose that this condition or law of the Will's action perplexes, in the least, the doctrine of its freedom.

SECOND. Another condition or law of the Will's action is, that volition cannot exist where there is no belief in the practicability or attainableness of the object, and that, other things being equal, the strength of the volition will be in proportion to the degree of belief. We do not suppose that the admission of this view will be considered as in any degree at variance with the doctrine of the Will's freedom.—And the remark will apply equally well to the additional fact, that the action of the Will does, by its very constitution, always have a prospective tendency.

THIRD. And, further, the law of Motives, in some sense the most important of all, instead of being adverse to the freedom of the will, furnishes, more than anything else, the basis without which it could not exist.

The law of Motives is this. The Will acts in view of motives, and never acts independently of them. In other words, although its acts are truly its *own*, and are to be regarded and spoken of as its *own*, yet Motives furnish the condition or occasion (and, we may add, the *indispensable* occasion) on which the ability to put forth those acts is exerted.

This is no obstruction to liberty. But, on the contrary, remove the law of motives and base volitional acts upon accidentalness or absolute contingency, and the freedom of the will becomes at once an inconceivable thing. From that moment fatalism, and not freedom, becomes the true doctrine.

§ 112. Objected that the will is necessarily governed by the strongest motive.

But it will perhaps be said by way of objection, that, admitting that the volitional acts must have a foundation in motives, they nevertheless are governed

by the highest motive, and that this state of things is inconsistent with freedom. In respect to this objection, it is conceded that it would be entitled to some degree of weight if the motives, which immediately precede the volitional act, were all of the same kind; but being different in kind, they exclude the possibility of being brought into *direct* comparison. In other words, the one class of motives, the self-interested or personal, having its centre in the finite, and the other, which consults the rights and happiness of all existences, having its centre in God, they are generically distinct, and therefore *incommensurable.*

CHAPTER IV.

FREEDOM OF THE WILL IMPLIED IN MAN'S MORAL NATURE.

§ 113. Remarks on the nature or mode of the argument.

THERE are various other considerations connected with the general subject now before us, all of which have more or less weight, although they may not be closely connected with each other. Hence the argument on the subject of the freedom of the will, as well as on that of its subjection to laws, has a sort of miscellaneous appearance, which may be less pleasing than it would otherwise be to those who have been accustomed to the invariable consecution of parts and the strictness of mathematical demonstration. But it will be perceived that the nature of the subject renders this in some degree unavoidable, and it is to be hoped that suitable allowance will be made for it. If the question before us were whether the Romans occupied the island of Great Britain at some period previous to the Saxon conquest, we probably should not rest the conclusion on one circumstance or fact alone, but employ all which might have a bearing on the inquiry, however diverse they might be from each other in themselves. We should refer to the testimony of the Roman historians, to the remains of encampments

and roads indicating a Roman origin, to the coins and urns which have been discovered; and although each of these circumstances would be different from and independent of the others, they would all obviously bear upon the same conclusion; and even if they were separately weak and somewhat unsatisfactory, might yet, in their combination, furnish an argument of irresistible strength. The form of argument is what is sometimes called cumulative. It is so with the subject now under consideration.—We shall, therefore, go on to mention one view of the subject after another, in the expectation that each distinct part of the argument will be kept in mind, and that the influence of each will be so united with that of others as to render the conclusion not only satisfactory, but unanswerable.

§ 114. Of the elements of man's moral nature.

We proceed, therefore, in the present chapter, to draw an argument in support of the will's freedom from man's moral nature. That man possesses a moral nature we cannot, for a moment, suppose to be a matter of doubt. Without such a nature he could not be the subject of a moral government; and although he might possess all knowledge, he would necessarily be without virtue and vice; and neither praise nor blame, neither rewards nor punishment, could ever attach to his conduct.

There is nothing inconceivable or inconsistent in the supposition of a being so constituted as to be possessed of intellect, propensities, passions, and will, and yet to be incapable, by his very constitution, of framing those notions and of exercising those feelings which are implied in a moral nature. But such is not the constitution of man. While he is endowed with intellect, and appetites, and propensities, and passions, and will, God has seen fit to elevate and ennoble him, by constituting him a moral and religious being. The elements of his moral nature (in accordance with that striking wisdom ever manifested in God's works,

which accomplishes great results by simple means) are few in number, and are to be found chiefly in his ability to frame the abstract notions of right and wrong, in the feelings of moral approval and disapproval, including feelings of remorse, and in feelings of moral obligation.—All these states of mind, which, taken together, constitute man a moral being, and without which he could not sustain or possess that character, have an important bearing upon the subject before us. It is a most interesting circumstance, and one of great significancy, that the same moral nature, *which implies and necessitates the doctrine of the laws of the will, with equal force implies and necessitates its freedom.*

§ 115. Evidence of freedom of the will from feelings of approval and disapproval.

In stating the argument which may be deduced on this subject from our moral nature, we proceed to remark, in the first place, that the freedom of the will is implied in, and is shown by, the moral feelings of approval and disapproval. We are so constituted that, whenever we behold a person performing a virtuous action, demeaning himself with entire kindness, good faith, and justice, we at once feel a sentiment of approval. On the other hand, if we see a person pursuing a different course, one which is obviously characterized by falsehood, ingratitude, and injustice, we at once feel an emotion of disapproval. But if it should be suddenly disclosed to us that the agent, whom we thus, according to the circumstances of the case, either approve or condemn, was not in the possession of freedom of will, it is undeniable that all such approval or disapproval would at once cease. We should no more think of approving an action, however beneficial it might be, which was known to be performed without freedom of will, than of pronouncing a man worthy of moral approbation for a purely natural gift, such as symmetry of form, a musical voice, or striking outlines of the countenance. More properly, we should

think nothing about it. To approve under such circumstances would, by the very constitution of our nature, be an impossibility. The existence of liberty, therefore, is, in this respect, and so far as these feelings are concerned, fundamental to our moral nature.

§ 116. Proof of freedom from feelings of remorse.

There is another class of mental states, constituting a part of man's moral nature, to which similar remarks will apply; we refer to feelings of remorse. These feelings are modifications of feelings of disapproval, but are so distinctly characterized as to require a separate notice. We are capable of approving or disapproving when our attention is directed solely to the conduct of others; but we never feel *remorse* for what others do, and it is impossible that we should. Feelings of remorse have relation to ourselves alone. We experience them when our own conduct, and not that of others, is the subject of moral disapproval. They are painful feelings, but the suffering is of a peculiar kind, altogether different from mere sadness or grief. The existence of these states of mind implies, on the part of the person who is the subject of them, a conviction of the freedom of the will.

It can hardly be thought necessary to adduce facts and arguments in support of what has been said. If a person feels an internal condemnation or remorse for what he has done, it certainly must be on the ground that he was at liberty to will and to do otherwise. It cannot be doubted that this position is fully and universally admitted.—There may be fears and sorrows, undoubtedly; there may be regrets and sufferings, in cases which are not dependent on any determinations of our own; but there cannot possibly be REMORSE, which implies a sense of guilt as well as the experience of sorrow, without a conviction, deep as the basis of the mind itself, that, in doing the criminal action, we willed and acted freely, and not by compulsion. If, therefore, feelings of remorse exist,

as they not unfrequently do, they furnish a strong proof in support of the liberty of the will.

§ 117. Without the possession of liberty of will man could never have framed the abstract notions of right and wrong.

Among other things having a relation to man's situation and character as a moral being, it is to be noticed that he is so constituted as to be able to form the abstract notions of right and wrong, or of virtue and vice, which are only other and synonymous expressions for right and wrong. These conceptions (which are thoughts, and not emotions; the creations of the Intellect, and not the exercises of the Sensibilities or heart) are truly great and ennobling; and it may perhaps be said of them, more than of any other part of our moral nature, that they are the basis of moral reasoning, and the foundation of moral anticipation and hope. They disclose to the mind, like light comig from heaven and shining vividly into its depths, the great fact that there is a real, permanent, and immutable distinction between good and evil. Strike out and annihilate these primary conceptions, and you at the same moment obscure and destroy the glory of man's mental nature, and blot out, at least as far as all human perception is concerned, the brightest feature in the character of all other mental existences.

But these leading ideas, so fundamental to everything of a moral and religious nature, could never have been formed without a conviction of the liberty of the will. The occasions undoubtedly, on which they are suggested and exist in the mind, are instances of voluntary conduct, either our own or that of others, where we either approve or disapprove. Without such occasions offered to our notice, and without such attendant emotions of moral approval or disapproval, it may be asserted without any hesitation, that men would never have formed any conception in the abstract of right and wrong, of rectitude and the opposite; and, consequently, could never have beheld, as they now clearly do, as if inscribed by the radiant

finger of God, a great line of demarcation, remaining always and immutably the same, between good and evil, between holiness and sin. But, as has already been stated, it is always implied in the feelings of approval and disapproval, that the person, whose conduct is either approved or disapproved, possessed liberty of the will. Without a firm conviction that such was the case, the emotions could never have existed; and, consequently, there could never have occurred, in the history of the human mind, that state of things which is the basis of the origin of the abstract notions of right and wrong, of rectitude and want of rectitude, of virtue and vice, which are only different expressions for the same thing. We have, therefore, in this view of the subject, a new proof that the liberty of the will is positively and necessarily involved in the fact of our possessing a moral nature.

§ 118. Proof from feelings of moral obligation.

There is a distinct class of mental states, entitled, in every point of view, to an important place in man's moral constiution, which may be termed Obligatory feelings, or feelings of moral obligation. Of these states of mind we do not profess to give a definition. As they are elementary and simple, they are necessarily undefinable. But we cannot doubt that every one must have more or less frequently experienced them, and that every one knows what their nature is. And this class of feelings also furnishes an argument on the subject before us.—We deem the assertion within the bounds of truth and of the common opinion of mankind, when we say that no man ever does or ever can experience in himself the feeling of moral obligation to do a thing, so long as he feels himself to be actually destitute of liberty to do it. And this is equally true, whether the destitution of liberty relates to the outward and bodily action or to the action of the will. Does a man feel himself morally accountable for the performance of an action to which he is driven by some bodily compulsion? Or does

he feel himself accountable for a failure to perform an action, from the performance of which he is kept by actual bodily restraint? And if the mind is constrained and driven by a compression and violence, corresponding, as far as the different nature of the two things will permit, to such compulsion of the body, can there be any more conviction of accountability, or of any form of moral obligation in the one case than in the other? But if the existence of feelings of obligation be undeniable, and if the existence of such feelings be incompatible with the absence of freedom, and if both these truths are based on the consciousness and confirmed by the universal acknowledgments of mankind, then it follows, of course, that men do in fact feel and recognise, and that they fully and assuredly know their freedom.

§ 119. Evidence from men's views of crimes and punishments.

Again, the freedom of the will is clearly implied in the views which we find to be generally adopted by men in respect to crimes and punishments. This view of our subject is closely connected with that which has just been given, and essentially the same illustrations as were introduced in the last section will apply here.

If a man is laid under bodily constraint, and, in that situation, is the agent or rather instrument in the performance of an action involving great loss and suffering to others, such action is never considered a crime and deserving of punishment, in whatever light it might be regarded under other circumstances. This is undeniable. And we always take the same view when the mind is actually laid under constraint as when the body is; with this difference merely, that constraint of the body is a matter easily ascertainable, while that of the mind can be learned only with a greater or less degree of probability. The power of the will is a gift or trust, as much so as the power of perception, and is a definite thing; in some persons it is greater, in others less; but in all cases it has its

limits. Whenever, therefore, there is an utter disproportion between the strength of the motive and the power of the will (so much so, perhaps, as to render it essentially the same as if the will were wholly destitute of power), the will is universally understood to be, at such times, under a greater or less degree of constraint. And if, under such circumstances, a crime be charged upon a person, we graduate the degree of it (looking upon it as higher in some cases and lower in others) in precise conformity with the degree of constraint, so far as we can judge what it is.

"There are cases," says Dr. Reid, "in which a man's voluntary actions are thought to be very little, if at all, in his power, on account of the violence of the motive that impels him. The magnanimity of a hero or a martyr is not expected in every man and on all occasions.—If a man, trusted by the government with a secret which it is high treason to disclose, be prevailed upon by a bribe, we have no mercy for him, and hardly allow the greatest bribe to be any alleviation of his crime. But, on the other hand, if the secret be extorted by the rack or the dread of present death, we pity him more than we blame him, and would think it severe and unequitable to condemn him as a traitor."—And he afterward gives the reason of these different judgments, viz., that while the mere love of money leaves to a man the entire power over himself, the torment of the rack or the dread of present death are so violent motives, that men who have not uncommon strength of mind are not masters of themselves in such a situation, and, therefore, what they do is not imputed to them as a crime at all, or is thought less criminal than it would otherwise be.

§ 120. Prevalent opinions of mankind on this subject.

The argument under this general head, so far as it has now been gone into, has been stated in particulars; and it is probably more satisfactory, when stated in this way, than in any other. But something may be said on the subject of the freedom of the will, as con-

nected with our moral nature, when it is considered, as it were, in the *mass*. The body of mankind undoubtedly look upon this subject, in its great outlines and as a whole, without attempting to penetrate and seize its elements. And, without unduly yielding to popular prejudices or abating from the dignity of philosophy, we may safely assert, that this is an inquiry on which an appeal may with propriety be made to the common experience, and the common convictions and expressions of the great body of men. And we no sooner make the appeal than we find that the testimony from that source is unanimous and unequivocal.

There are some truths which are so deeply based in the human constitution, that all men of all classes receive them and act upon them. They are planted deeply and immutably in the soul, and no reasoning, however plausible, can shake them. And, if we are not mistaken, the doctrine of the freedom of the will, as a condition of even the possibility of a moral nature, is one of these first truths. It seems to be regarded by all persons, without any exception, as a dictate of common sense and as a first principle of our nature, that men are morally accountable, and are the subjects of a moral responsibility in any respect whatever, only so far as they possess freedom, both of the outward action and of the will. They hold to this position as an elementary truth, and would no sooner think of letting it go, than of abandoning the conviction of their personal existence and identity. They do not profess to go into particulars, but they assert it in the mass, that man is a moral being only so far as he is free. And such a unanimous and decided testimony, bearing, as it obviously does, the seal and superscription of nature herself, is entitled to serious consideration.

In view of the various suggestions of this chapter (and further illustrations to the same effect might be given if time would allow), we are abundantly authorized in the assertion, that the liberty of the will

is implied, and fully and clearly implied, in the fact of man's possessing a moral nature; and that, if he possesses such a nature, he possesses freedom.

CHAPTER V.

OTHER PROOFS OF FREEDOM OF THE WILL.

§ 121. Evidence of the freedom of the will from languages.

In bringing forward the various considerations which, however disconnected with each other in themselves, have yet a bearing on the subject before us, we proceed to remark further, that the existence of the freedom of the will may be argued with some degree of force from the structure of all languages.—We have already had occasion to make the remark, that every language is, in some important sense of the terms, a mirror of the mind; and that something may be learned of the tendencies of the mind, not only from the form or structure of languages in general, but even from the import of particular terms.—Now it is undeniable, that the terms LIBERTY and FREEDOM, and other terms of equivalent import, are found in all languages; and that they are not only found in application to nations, but to individuals; and not only in application to outward actions, but to the acts of the Will. But if men are in fact and by their very constitution destitute of liberty of the will, it seems impossible to give any explanation of this state of things. So that it is a natural and irresistible inference, if we can infer the convictions and belief of men at all from the forms of speech, that they universally have a conviction and belief of their liberty in that respect. And we can give no explanation of the existence of such conviction or belief, except on the ground of the actual existence of that freedom to which the belief relates.

§ 122. Evidence from the occasional suspension of the will's acts.

Another circumstance which may be adduced as an

indication and evidence of the FREEDOM of the Will, is the fact of the occasional suspension or delay of its operations, when its action is solicited by the pressure of motives which happen to be various and conflicting in their kind, though all of them are alike powerful and urgent. Without attempting to explain how this suspension takes place, it is enough for our present purpose simply to state the fact, as it constantly presents itself to observation and notice, viz., that at times, when motives are thronging around the will in various directions, and are each and all of them clamorous for an action of the will favourable to themselves, the will nevertheless does not act. It is true, some persons will say, and probably with correctness, that this negation or suspension of action is itself to be regarded as a species of resolve or volitional determination; that while the will reserves itself, so to speak, for a movement based upon more mature inquiry, this very reservation of its action is itself an action. Without stopping to comment on this suggestion, it will be perceived that the essential idea still holds good and indisputable, viz., that the will not unfrequently, for some reason or other, whatever it may be, withholds its decision in respect to claims that are urged by motives of no small efficacy. And this suspension of the will's action in respect to such claims (on whatever grounds it may happen, and whatever other course may be subsequently taken by the will) is undoubtedly to be regarded, in a candid view of the subject, as a characteristic and a proof of its freedom.

§ 123. Evidence of the freedom of the will from the control which every man has over his own motives of action.

There are various other considerations, which are entitled to more or less weight.—We have already seen that the will has its laws; and one of these laws is that it never acts, and is not capable of acting, except in connexion with antecedent motives. But it is a striking fact, and one worthy of special notice

in connexion with the will's freedom, that we ourselves have no inconsiderable degree of control over these motives. If the reader has in memory the remarks already made in the chapters in the First Part on the connexion among all the great departments of the mind, particularly on the relation of the Intellect to the Will and of the Sensibilities to the Will, he will be prepared to understand and receive the truth of this remark. Those motives which come in immediate contact with the will, and are most closely connected with its action, are deposited, not in the Understanding, but in the Sensibilities, are not mere perceptions of the intellect, but are impregnated with an infusion of desire and obligative feeling. Still they undoubtedly have a close connexion with the antecedent acts of the intellect. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that we should have the feeling of desire or the feeling of obligation, without an antecedent act of the intellect or understanding making known and identifying to us the particular object of desire, and the particular object to which the feeling of moral obligation relates. Hence, as the sensibilities act upon the will, and the understanding or intellect acts upon the sensibilities, we may in some degree control the will by enlightening the understanding. But it is the will which, more than anything else, is the counterpart, or the synonym perhaps, of the personal pronoun, of the I and We, which are so conspicuously introduced as agents; and it is the will, therefore, which, by adopting this process, controls itself. The volitional power, operating through the intellect, and requiring and compelling the intellect to investigate the subject before it, may contract or expand the horizon of motives by which it is surrounded, and in this way regulate by anticipation the possibilities and probabilities, if not the absolute certainty of its own ulterior action. We are presented, therefore, in this view of the subject, with an instance of self-regulation, obviously carried on under the control and within the limits of law, which is not only liber-

ty in essence, but liberty in its most interesting and perfect form.

§ 124. The freedom of the will further shown from the attempts of men to influence the conduct of their fellow-men.

The freedom of the will seems to be evinced and proved, furthermore, from the manner in which we address our fellow-men when we wish them to pursue a certain course of conduct. When we request or require them to do a certain thing, we certainly act on the supposition that they have both the power and the liberty to do it. It would evidently be a very fruitless thing to attempt, by means of persuasion and argument, to move them in a certain direction, if they were the subjects of an inflexible destiny, and destitute of the power and liberty of acting in accordance with what is proposed. The view which men obviously take of their fellow-men is, that they are rational beings; that the considerations addressed to them will have their due weight; and that their acting or not acting in conformity with those considerations is a matter wholly within their own power, and in respect to which they are entirely and completely free.

§ 125. Further evidence from the observation of men's conduct.

Among other sources of evidence in support of the proposition of the Will's freedom, we may confidently appeal to the observation of what is constantly taking place among men, as we behold them engaged in the pursuits and duties of life. Even a slight notice of their conduct fully justifies the assertion that men act universally as if they felt and knew themselves to be free. In making this statement, however, we may properly claim to be understood in the natural import of the terms. We speak of men in general, as we see them in the discharge of the common duties of life and under the influence of ordinary motives, and not of those whose liberty of outward action is restrained by chains and dungeons; nor of those whose inward liberty has been perplexed and compromised by inor-

dinate indulgences, which inevitably tend to bring the mind more or less within the verge of insanity. Within the limitation implied in this remark, a very slight observation discovers to us that men are constantly in action; that the causes of action exist in themselves; and that, in all the numberless varieties of their conduct, they act freely. One is in pursuit of honour, another of pleasure, another of wealth; one acts from motives of interest, and another from sentiments of duty; one has solely in view the promotion of his own personal welfare, another that of mankind; but in each and all of these cases, and in all others, there is no declaration and no evidence of compulsion. And we feel the force of this statement the more when we further notice that men are frequently changing those pursuits to which their attention was directed in the first instance; transferring themselves from one neighbourhood to another, from one sphere of life to another, and from one climate to another, and adapting their feelings and conduct to situations never before experienced. Everywhere there is life, activity, movement, energy; plans never before started; new methods of executing them; the motives and conduct of one individual conflicting with those of another, and varying constantly to meet conflicting exigencies. And does all this bear the impress of fatality? Are we not to receive these facts as decisive indications of liberty, even if it be true that we are unable to define what liberty is? Can we even *conceive* of a freedom which shall result in opening a wider sphere, or in securing a greater variety of action?

§ 126. Argued further from the view taken in the Scriptures.

We conclude this enumeration of circumstances, which tend to illustrate and prove the existence of liberty of the will, with the single fact further, which no one can regard otherwise than as entitled to our serious consideration, that the Scriptures clearly recognise man as possessing such liberty. If the Scriptures everywhere assert the omniscience and superin-

tendence of God, and announce his superintendence as extending to the minutest things and events, both material and immaterial, as seems to be abundantly evident and to be universally admitted, still it must be confessed, at the same time, that they are no less explicit in the announcement, both expressly and by implication, that man has power, freedom, and accountability. All those passages which call upon men to consider of their ways, obviously imply that there is no obstruction in the way of their considering, and that they are free either to do or not to do it. All those passages which exhort and require men to repent of their deeds, obviously imply that they are in the possession of liberty, and that there is no obstacle in the way of their repentance which is inconsistent with liberty. All those passages which enjoin upon men the performance of moral and religious duties, go upon the supposition that obedience and disobedience are alike within the sphere of their choice. "Turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die, oh house of Israel," is the beautiful and affecting language which God utters to his ancient covenant people, and to all his impenitent children of all nations.

§ 127. Practical importance of the doctrine of liberty.

If we have not stated the argument on the side of freedom so clearly and forcibly, and so much at length, as might have been done, the deficiency occasions the less solicitude when we consider that, in all ages of the world, the doctrine in question, with few exceptions, has been fully and universally admitted. Still there have been found some persons, from time to time, who have maintained and have apparently believed the opposite, and have strenuously endeavoured to give a currency to their opinions. And hence, in closing these remarks on the subject of the freedom of the will, it seems a suitable opportunity to say something on its practical importance. If we are destitute of freedom, we certainly cannot feel moral accounta-

bility; and whatever course we may take in life, even if it be entirely injurious and sinful, we shall yet feel that we are not properly the subjects of blame. Before, therefore, we adopt the notion of man's destitution of liberty (if, indeed, it be possible, after a due consideration of what has been said on the subject), we should carefully and seriously consider the consequences.

For the purpose of showing that these intimations are not based upon unfounded or exaggerated fears, and in order more clearly to illustrate the pernicious consequences to which erroneous notions on this subject are apt to lead, we take the liberty to introduce here an extract from the writings of the celebrated M. Diderot.—"Examine it narrowly," says M. Diderot, "and you will see that the word *liberty* is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and that there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive of a being acting without a motive, than we can of one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit, which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they *will* and act freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. What, then, is the distinction among men? The doing of good and the doing of ill? The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed or punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. But, though neither the doer of good or of ill be free, man is nevertheless a being to be modified; it is for this reason the doer

of ill should be destroyed upon the scaffold. From thence the good effects of education, of pleasure, of grief, of grandeur, of poverty, &c.; from thence a philosophy full of pity, strongly attached to the good, nor more angry with the wicked than the whirlwind which fills one's eyes with dust."

It seems to be unnecessary to spend time in commenting on this passage, which is as much at variance with sound philosophy as it is with good morals and the existence of society. Wherever such erroneous principles have gained a footing, it is not surprising that the intellect should be obscured; that the sensibilities should be blunted; that crimes, dreadfully revolting to human nature, should be multiplied; and that even whole kingdoms should be convulsed, and clothed in mourning and blood.

Let us, then, take that true position, which is clearly pointed out both by reason and the Scriptures, of humble dependence on God on the one hand, and of solemn responsibility for our conduct on the other. It is impossible for us to form too high notions of the power, wisdom, and superintendence of the Deity; nothing is more favourable to virtue than the conviction of his constant presence and oversight; but, at the same time, we ought ever to remember that he has seen fit to impart to us a moral nature, embracing the elements both of power and liberty; and, whether we account this gift as ten talents, or five, or only one, he holds us responsible for its use, and will punish the slothful servant who hides it in the earth. "*For whosoever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance; but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that he hath.*"

CHAPTER VI.

CONSISTENCY OF LAW AND FREEDOM.

§ 128. Objected that the views maintained are contradictory.

We are now so far advanced in our inquiries as to find ourselves in a position where we may be permitted to delay a little upon the objection, expressed with some variety of phraseology, but in all cases to this effect, that there is an utter inconsistency and contradiction between the two doctrines of the freedom of the will and the subjection of the will to laws. If the Will is free, it is said, it cannot be subject to laws; and if it is subject to laws, or must act in harmony with laws, it cannot be free; and, at any rate, there is something utterly incomprehensible in this state of things.—The consideration of this objection, thus broadly and emphatically stated as it often is, will occupy our attention in this chapter, and, at the same time, will incidentally furnish an opportunity for some remarks, which may not be unimportant in their practical applications.

§ 129. Answered that they result necessarily from the evidence.

In remarking upon the objection which has just been stated, and which undoubtedly exists in the minds of some candid inquirers, we wish it to be noticed, in the first place, that each of these two propositions, viz., that the will has its laws, and that the will is free, rests upon its appropriate evidence. We take it for granted that they are propositions which have a meaning and which can be understood; and that, as such, they admit of the application of reasoning, and are susceptible either of affirmation or denial. In reasoning upon them, they have been made separate subjects of contemplation. The arguments by which they are respectively supported are entirely

distinct, and are, at the same time, so appropriate to the nature of the subject to be proved, and, considered as a whole, bear upon it with so much force, that it is difficult to conceive how a well-balanced mind, which is open to the reception of truth, can resist the conclusions to which they lead.—And in making this assertion, we do not wish to be understood as offering a remark which is to be taken with some modification and diminution of its obvious import. The remark is based upon the constitution of the mind itself; particularly so far as the nature and laws of belief are concerned in, and make a part of, that constitution. Every one knows that our belief is not a matter which is under our control in such a sense, that we can believe or not believe, as we happen to choose. The mind is so constituted that we exercise belief, not in accordance with a mere and direct act of volition, but in accordance with the nature and amount of the evidence which happens to be before the mind at the precise moment of belief.

And, with this view of things in memory, we feel fully authorized in saying, that the evidence which has been brought forward in support of the proposition of the will's subjection to laws is such as, in ordinary cases, to remove all doubt. We look upon the proposition as *proved;* not merely as probable, but as *certain.* It is not a matter, the reception and credence of which is left to our own choice; but, on the contrary, such is the constitution of the human mind, we cannot possibly do otherwise than believe.—And these statements will apply equally well to both propositions. The proposition of the will's freedom is attended with such an amount of evidence, appropriate to the point to be established, as to be equally beyond doubt, equally certain. We receive both with a full and unwavering conviction; and such are the nature and fundamental principles of belief, that we are unable to withhold such conviction.

If, then, our belief involves what appears to us at present an inconsistency or even a contradiction (we

do not say what we *know* to be a contradiction, but what *appears* to be such), it is a matter which we cannot help, and in respect to which, although we might wish it to be otherwise, we should give ourselves no unnecessary trouble. We are in the same situation (certainly not a less favourable one) as the sincere inquirer in other things. Does the natural philosopher, in pursuing the investigation of facts, stop to inquire what doctrines formerly received it will either favour or conflict with, what system it will build up or put down, what new and inexplicable mysteries it will involve? Is he not obliged to adhere to the testimony that is fairly presented to him, wherever it may go, even if it should lead into a world not of pure light, but of mingled darkness and light? And in like manner, in respect to the question before us, let us go firmly and frankly wherever the evidence conducts, even if it should be found to lead us, as perhaps it will, to a great mystery in the facts and relations of things, where the human mind stops and stands in silence, appalled on the one hand by the sense of its own feebleness, and on the other overwhelmed by the greatness of the divine wisdom.

§ 130. Denial of the alleged contradiction.

In answer, therefore, to the objection which has been referred to, we say in the first place that we are bound by the evidence, whatever difficulties may attend the relative adjustment of the results. If the objection were to some extent a valid and admissible one (that is to say, if there were truly an *appearance*, a degree of probability, of inconsistency and contradiction), this answer would be sufficient.

But it is proper to say further, that there is no satisfactory evidence, either in a higher or lower degree, of the inconsistency and contradiction which has been alleged to exist. A true philosophy of the mind, as I think we have already seen, does not allow of such evidence. A true philosophy affirms and establishes their correlation and harmony, and not their contra-

diction. And yet it has undoubtedly sometimes happened, either by design or from mere carelessness, that men have so framed their speech, have so selected and constructed their formulary of words, as to make a contradiction, when there is none in the nature of things, and none in fact. If we define freedom to be an exemption from law, then no doubt the proposition of the will's subjection to law implies the exclusion of liberty. But, although bodily freedom can be defined, mental freedom, as we have already had occasion to remark, is not susceptible of definition; it is something, indeed, which is a matter of experience, and is known by consciousness, but, like the simple and elementary emotions and desires, and any other subjects of mental realization which are truly elementary, it cannot be described by words. And if it were otherwise, the definition of liberty above mentioned would be wholly inadmissible; for exemption from law is so far from constituting liberty, that it might be shown, upon grounds entirely satisfactory, that there can be no liberty, not even a possibility of it, where law has no place. So that we feel fully authorized in saying, although we are under the necessity of leaving the inquiry with these few words, that there is no evidence of contradiction in the case.

§ 131. Admission of inexplicableness or mystery.

But if it be merely said that there is something inexplicable or incomprehensible, something mysterious in the relation of the two propositions which have been considered, it is not easy to deny that there is some degree of truth in the remark. We cannot imagine that there is any undue humiliation, anything discreditable in the acknowledgment that such is the fact. Nothing is more certain than that there are many things, into the full measure of whose length and breadth, and height and depth, the human mind, in the present state of existence and under the present economy of things, has never been able to penetrate. And it is undoubtedly the mark of true wisdom frank-

ly to acknowledge our ignorance in those cases where it must infallibly exist, and not to indulge either in pretensions which are unfounded, or in complaints which are useless. Such advice, indeed, may not be entirely acceptable to men of a captious or flippant temper, or of an intellect imperfectly disciplined; but it is fully warranted by correct views of our own powers, and of the relations we sustain to other beings. "The most enlightened of men," says Robert Hall, "have always been the first to perceive and acknowledge the remaining obscurity which hung around them; just as, in the night, the further a light extends, the wider the surrounding sphere of darkness appears. Hence it has always been observed, that the most profound inquirers into nature have been the most modest and humble." These remarks of a writer so distinguished, not only for refinement of taste and fervour of piety, but for philosophical acuteness, naturally reminds us of some sayings of Mr. Locke, which indicate at the same time his characteristic modesty and candour, and his views of the very difficulty which we are now examining. "I own freely to you the weakness of my understanding, that, though it be unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience in God our Maker, and though I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than that I am free, yet I cannot make [meaning undoubtedly that he could not explain and clear up in all respects how it should be so] freedom in man consistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, *though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to;* and therefore I have long since given off the consideration of that question, resolving all into this short conclusion, that if it be possible for God to make a free agent, then man is free, though I see not the way of it."

And I must myself be permitted to say, in harmony with these impressive remarks, that, in the midst of a universe under the government of God, where the minutest things are under his superintendence and

control, it seems to me not only a thing possible to be done, but that it is one of his greatest works, that He has created a being who is formed and sustained with law as the basis of his existence, and at the same time with the birthright and the glorious inheritance of liberty.

§ 132. Of the limited powers of the human mind.

In this connexion, and as tending to support the views of this chapter, we think it proper to make a few general suggestions in respect to the limited powers of the human mind. We may regard it as a well-established principle, that the mind of man, although it may be indefinitely progressive in some directions, is subject to the restriction of impassable barriers in others. How many objects of knowledge, in the sphere of material as well as mental nature, have altogether set at nought the inquiries of men! Beyond the boundaries, whatever they may be, which God has assigned as the barriers of our faculties, is the land of darkness, the region of hieroglyphics, the habitation of mysteries. We use these expressions not in lightness of spirit, but merely to convey the fact as it exists, and with profound veneration; for if those dark and mysterious places are not reached, and occupied, and understood by the human mind, it is certain that they are within the reach and knowledge of another mind infinitely greater. The existence of mysteries, beyond its allotted sphere of action and inquiry, is necessarily an incident to every created mind; for the mere fact of being created necessarily implies inferiority, and that, too, in perception as well as in power. In one sense, indeed, it may be admitted, that man is great, and the honoured possessor of great and wonderful faculties. Certainly this is the case when we compare him with the lower animals, that have no moral nature, and seem destined soon to perish. But let him never forget, that, under other circumstances, the view presented is entirely the reverse, and that he is as blind in intellect as he is poor in power, in com-

parison with God. He who suitably realizes the relation which he sustains to the all-wise Jehovah, will not presume to compare his feeble intellect with the infinite Godhead; his understanding of yesterday, just kindling into light and life, with the everlasting Sun of knowledge, ever effulgent and inexhaustible. Let this modesty of true wisdom, so suitable on every subject, have its due place in the matter under examination. If we cannot see how the subjection of the will to law is consistent with its freedom, while irresistible evidence compels us to believe both the liberty and the law, let us arraign our incapacity rather than the proof before us.

§ 133. We find things which cannot be explained everywhere.

If there were no other mysteries in the universe but the one in question, it might be thought less reasonable to submit quietly to our inability to explain it. But they are found all around us; they exist everywhere, and everywhere baffle our curiosity. We generally suppose it to be otherwise, because it may happen that we are unable to point them out; but our inability to do this is owing to the fact of our not having given attention to the subject. We do indeed sometimes direct our attention to the mysteries which are placed at a distance from us, but it is seldom that we look at those which are near at hand. In the time of the Apostle Paul, the opposers of Christianity objected particularly to the doctrine of the resurrection from the dead on account of its being so mysterious, inexplicable, and wonderful; but they did not consider, till the Apostle reminded them of the fact, that the conversion of the seed sown in the ground into the stalk or plant is no less wonderful, no less mysterious. Perhaps we might be justified in going so far as to say there is nothing, however familiar it may be, which is not in some of its aspects replete with mystery.

Can we explain how the soul and body exist and act together? Can we understand how God, who is a spirit, can fill all places with his presence? Can we

comprehend how, under any circumstances, mind, which is so entirely distinct, can operate upon matter and put it in motion, as is the fact in our ordinary acts of volition? Can we explain the operations of matter itself, even the growth of a blade of grass? Do not the most familiar appearances of nature, though easily explainable in some things, present in others insuperable difficulties? And why then should we account it particularly unlooked for and strange, that, in the two distinct doctrines of the will's freedom and the will's subjection to law, we should find something which withstands our penetration and baffles our sagacity?

§ 134. Illustrated from the influence of men over each other.

We would furthermore propose to such as are disposed to insist upon the difficulty under consideration, that the same difficulty, or, at least, one closely analogous, is constantly occurring in common life. We refer to the fact, which is too obvious to admit of any denial, that one man is capable of controlling, and does in fact control, the will of another. By his wealth, or personal address, or persuasive language, or powers of reasoning, he bends his neighbour to his own purposes. This is seen particularly in the case of the orator who addresses the public assembly; and who sometimes not only sways the individuals composing it to his own purposes, but does it against the views and the determinations which they had previously formed. Now here is a case where, according to the common understanding of it, the Will of one man or of many men is under the control of another, and yet it is not the common understanding or the common feeling that the Will of the former is not free. Here is a case in which law and liberty are, by our own admission, united together; subjecton and freedom are found in a state of combination. And why should we say that what is possible with men is impossible with God?

§ 135. Opposite supposition attended with equal difficulty.

But there is another consideration which is worthy of the attention of the objector.—Before we arraign the views which have been given, it seems proper to look at the results of the opposite scheme. If we exonerate the action of the will from the influence of all law, and leave it to the irregular control of what may be variously termed accident, indifferency, or contingency, we do not thereby secure its freedom. Can that mind be free which knows not at one moment, nor can even conjecture, what may be its position, its acts, or its destiny at the next moment? It is very much in the position of that people who are under the direction of an irresponsible despotism, compared with which, a despotism, which is in any degree subject to law, is quite tolerable. A will without law is necessarily subjected to the highest despotism. At one moment the volition may be in one direction; the next in a direction altogether opposite, without the ability to secure any fixed result. And it seems to be impossible in the nature of things that man should be conscious (and its existence and nature are learned from consciousness alone) of freedom under such circumstances. It is wholly inconceivable. So that, let the question be argued as it may, it will always be found in the human mind, as in civil government, that law is the basis of liberty.

§ 136. Both views are to be fully received.

In respect, then, to the two distinct doctrines of the will's freedom and its harmony with law, there remains nothing to be done but the cheerful, ready, and complete reception of both. And, with the views which we entertain, the outlines of which have been imperfectly laid before the reader, we are constrained earnestly to insist upon this, as the only correct and satisfactory position. The doctrine that the will has its laws, is very important, considered in connexion with the relation which men sustain to the Supreme Being. This view places the will in subordination

to that higher and more glorious Intelligence, from whom the laws, to which it is amenable, proceed. By adopting this doctrine, we are enabled to understand how his full and perfect superintendence can be maintained. He has himself assured us that he is intimately acquainted with the outward actions of men; that he knoweth their downsitting and uprising; and it is a pleasing and consoling thought, that his care and exact scrutiny may be extended even to the mind itself. Who will not rejoice to be, in soul as well as in body, in the hands of God? Who will feel that there could be any better provision for his security than is thus furnished by the constancy and nearness of the Divine presence? Who will attach any value even to independence itself, when purchased at the measureless expense of an exemption from the superintendence of the Deity?

§ 137. The doctrine of the will's freedom equally important with that of its subjection to law.

On the other hand, the doctrine that the will is free, in any correct and intelligible sense of that term, is of equal practical importance, since it is obviously essential to man's moral character and accountableness. It is a great truth, which demands to be received with entire and unwavering confidence, that God has made man in his own image; and that, in doing this, he has seen fit to constitute him with the attributes of freedom and power, as well as with the other attributes which are requisite to a rational and morally accountable nature. In the sphere which is given him (whether more or less limited in extent), he has not only the ability, but is under the requisition of acting for himself. No plea of inability can ever be admitted as an excuse for negligence, still less for utter inaction. There are claims, therefore, binding upon every man, which he cannot resist. So that the truest and highest philosophy is to be found in that passage of Scripture, "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God which worketh

in you both to will and to do, of his own good pleasure." It expresses the great truth, and we may add, the great *mystery*, of the harmonious combination of power and dependence. And it is the same in other things as in religion, that, if we will act for ourselves under the impulse of right feelings, our Maker will take compassion upon us, and act in our behalf; that, if we faithfully do our duty, God will be as faithful to help us. Not an hour is spent in effort of any kind, in conformity with the directions of an enlightened conscience, and, to use the expressions which Milton's genius has made so familiar,

"As ever in our great Taskmaster's eye,"

which is not attended with a divine blessing. The doctrine of a combination of power on the part of men, with complete superintendence on the part of God, brings God and men into harmony with each other; it fully makes men co-workers with God, and yet under the twofold condition, without which God can neither be a sovereign nor man a moral agent, of responsibility and dependence.

CHAPTER VII.

ENTHRALMENT OR SLAVERY OF THE WILL.

§ 138. Of the occasions of mental enthralment.

It here seems to come in course to offer some explanations on what may be termed the Enthralment or SLAVERY of the will. The explanation of this subject, however difficult it might prove when undertaken separate from and independent of other views of the Will, seems to follow easily, and, we may add, almost necessarily, from the views which have been taken of the FREEDOM of the voluntary power. It has appeared from various remarks made in preceding chapters, that a knowledge of freedom, as actually existing in the mind in general or in any part of the mind, can be possessed only by means of our own personal

Consciousness. And it has furthermore appeared, that the circumstances or *occasion* on which mental freedom actually exists in the highest degree, is to be found in the harmony of the mind's action. In other words, freedom exists in fact, and exists in the highest degree, when all the mental powers are in the precise place which their Creator designed for them, and when their operations are conducted without their coming into conflict with each other. This is a position of the mental powers which, by the very nature of the mind, is incidental and prerequisite to the highest degree of freedom, and every deviation from it is attended with an interruption and diminution of that perfection of inward liberty which men would otherwise possess.

But if this view in respect to freedom be a correct one, then we are naturally led to suppose and to believe that the precise opposite will be found to furnish the prerequisite circumstance, or the *occasion* of mental enthralment. And such is undoubtedly the fact. In other words, whenever we find an internal jarring and conflict, whenever one power overleaps its bounds and another is jostled from its place, we are conscious of want of freedom in a greater or less degree, or, what is the same thing, of enthralment or slavery. And especially we have a sense of this internal enthralment whenever, in consequence of some inordinate appetite or some victorious propensity or passion, that presiding authority, which is lodged in the Will, fails to execute what it obviously ought to, and what the conscience pronounces to be right and requires to be done.

§ 139. Inability to define enthralment or slavery.

But what is meant by enthralment or slavery? What verbal definition can we give?—If the question related to the enthralment or slavery of the body, we could probably give a statement, or definition perhaps, that would fully and precisely meet the question. But we have already had occasion distinctly to inti-

mate, that the nature of corporeal enthralment and liberty throws no light, or, at most, but a feeble and doubtful ray, upon that of the mind. We are not more able, by any mere form of words, to explain what is meant by slavery, when that term is applied to the mind, than we are to define mental freedom. In both cases we are obliged to refer each one to his own internal experience, but with a full conviction, at the same time, that this reference will fully answer the purpose, and cannot leave him in doubt.

On the supposition, therefore, that each one as fully understands what is meant by enthralment as by freedom, and that there is no mistake or doubt in either case, we repeat again, that, whenever there is a want of harmony in the mind, there is always a greater or less degree of enthralment. This want of harmony, this internal jarring and conflict, this aggression and resistance of the mental powers, will always exist whenever any appetite, propensity, or passion, of whatever character, swells over its allotted limits, and becomes unduly and inordinately powerful. If we may be allowed to use such expressions, every part of the mind instinctively knows its appropriate place, and will not suffer itself to be thrust from it without much remonstrance and resistance. If such resistance is not successful, and if some inward principle, without regard to the original constitution of the mind and the equitable admonitions of conscience, usurps an undue control over others, we are conscious of what we may properly term mental slavery, at least in respect to that particular part or faculty which especially suffers under this usurpation.

§ 140. The nature of mental enthralment illustrated by a reference to extorted promises.

It may possibly be found difficult for the reader at first to apprehend the view here given (and the same may be said, perhaps, of various other topics which have come under our notice), in consequence of such apprehension depending so much on his own internal

reflection. That he must look within, and consult what takes place there, is true. And as it is undoubtedly desirable that such internal reflection should be called into exercise as much as possible, we will endeavour to aid it by some instances.—We will take the case of a man who is travelling through an extensive forest, and unexpectedly meets with robbers. They suddenly present their pistols to him, and threaten him with immediate death unless he promises to deposite a certain sum in a specified place on a certain day. He promises that he will do it. And it is an obvious question here, what is the view which men of plain common sense and the community generally take of such a transaction? They evidently do not consider it on the same footing with a promise made under other circumstances; they do not regard it, in the full sense of the terms, as a BONA FIDE promise and morally binding, even when they judge it expedient, in view of some incidental circumstances, that it should be fulfilled. They always make a distinction (and it is a distinction which is fully recognised in law both Municipal and International) between an extorted promise and a free promise. And if an extorted promise is actually different from a free one, it must be because extortion implies a degree of enthralment. And this is the fact.

When the question of life and death is placed before a man at once, and without giving him time for reflection and for strengthening his resolves, the fear becomes so excessive that there is no sort of proportion between the strength of the motive and that of other principles within him which might furnish the elements of resistance. Those supports, upon which the Will is wont to rely in seasons of trying assault and great emergency, are suddenly overthrown; and it is prostrated and carried away captive almost without a conflict. The person himself, if the circumstances are of a nature so decisive as has been stated, experiences no convictions of guilt for subsequently violating a promise made under such a mental pres-

sure, nor is he condemned by the moral sense of the community at large. They perceive almost instinctively, that, by a sudden conjuncture of circumstances, for which the individual is not himself responsible, the due balance and harmony of the powers of the mind has been destroyed; and that it is unreasonable, in such a state of things, to expect results which can properly be the subjects either of praise or blame.

§ 141. Illustration of the same subject from cases of torture.

We may propose another illustration, which will help to make the subject more fully and clearly understood. In former ages it was no uncommon practice to put persons to the torture, in order to obtain their testimony. They were first subjected to the darkness and privations of a dungeon; and after being worn down by this gradual form of suffering, their feet were applied to heated plates of iron; their flesh was burned and torn by pincers; their limbs were wrenched and almost forced asunder; and in these, and in various other ways, they were compelled to endure almost every possible degree of misery. And it was not unfrequently the case, that persons under this extremity of suffering uttered what was untrue. But no one thinks of condemning the moral delinquency, if it existed at all under such circumstances, as equalling the aggravation of a falsehood uttered in ordinary cases. In all such cases, everybody perceives and feels that the due balance and harmony of the mind is destroyed. Such an extreme pressure is brought to bear upon the mind in a particular direction, that its parts become, for the time being, dislocated, and utterly incapable of any just and accountable action. In other words, there is an utter slavery of the volitional power; and as the individual is not the cause of putting himself in this situation, we often only sympathize and pity, when we should otherwise condemn. It is indeed possible for us to condemn, in some degree, when the suffering does not appear to be extreme; but the condemnation is always mitigated, and in many cases does not exist at all.

"The common sense of mankind," says Mr. Stewart, "pronounces men to be accountable for their conduct only in so far as they are understood to be morally free. Whence is it that we consider the pain of the rack as an alleviation of the falsehoods extorted from the criminal? Plainly because the motives presented to him are supposed to be such as no ordinary degree of self-command is able to resist. And if we were only satisfied that these motives are *perfectly* irresistible, we would not ascribe to him any guilt at all."*—This is undoubtedly the true philosophy in this matter.

§ 142. Historical illustrations of the subject.

And here, with the permission of the reader, we will introduce a piece of literary history, which we find in D'Israeli, who, in his attempts to interest the curiosity and to give pleasure, has, in various passages, thrown much light upon the human mind. In the reign of Charles I. of England, a man by the name of Felton, the assassinator of the Duke of Buckingham, was menaced with torture for the purpose and with the expectation of extracting from him the names of his accomplices. The communication, that it was the king's pleasure that he should be put to the torture, was made to him by Lord Dorset, who accordingly gave him notice to prepare for the rack. Felton, after solemnly affirming that his purpose to commit the crime was not known to any man living, said, "But if it be his majesty's pleasure, I am ready to suffer whatever his majesty will have inflicted upon me. Yet this I must tell you by the way, *that if I be put upon the rack, I will accuse you, my Lord Dorset, and none but yourself.*"† Here is a text in ethical casuistry, affording abundant food for meditation. Felton foresaw that it would probably be impossible for him to endure the suffering which would be inflicted; that he would be under a *mental necessity* of accusing

* Philosophy of the Moral and Active Powers, Appendix i., § iii.
† D'Israeli's Curiosities of Literature, vol. iii.

somebody; and he considered it of but little consequence whom he should name under such circumstances, inasmuch as it could not rightfully be regarded either as a proof of falsehood in himself or of guilt in others. And was he not essentially right? Can a man be considered as justly accountable for what is extracted from him under the pressure of the intense sufferings of the torture?

In Fox's well-known History of Christian Martyrdoms, a book where terrible cruelty is arrayed side by side with transcendent virtue, there is an account of a Portuguese young lady, resident in the city of Lisbon, who was taken up by the inquisitors and ordered to be put to the rack. Unable to endure the torments that were inflicted, she confessed the charges brought against her. "The cords were then slackened," says the historian, "and she was reconducted to her cell, where she remained till she had recovered the use of her limbs; she was then brought again before the tribunal, and ordered to ratify her confession. This she absolutely refused to do, telling them that what she had said was forced from her by the excessive pain she underwent. The inquisitors, incensed at this reply, ordered her again to be put to the rack, when the weakness of nature once more prevailed, and she repeated her former confession. She was immediately remanded to her cell; and being a third time brought before the inquisitors, they ordered her to sign her first and second confessions. She answered as before, but added, 'I have twice given way to the frailty of the flesh, and perhaps may, while on the rack, be weak enough to do so again; but depend upon it, if you torture me a hundred times, as soon as I am released from the rack, I shall deny what was extorted from me by pain.'"*

Such illustrations and facts show clearly and decisively that there is such a thing as mental enthralment; that it is not a mere fiction, but exists as truly and undeniably as enthralment of the body. And

* Universal History of Christian Martyrdoms, book v., § ii.

such being the fact, it becomes an important subject both of philosophical and ethical inquiry.

§ 143. The will enthralled by the indulgence of the appetites.

With these general explanations before us on the nature of Mental Slavery, and in particular of the slavery of the will, we are the better prepared to contemplate the subject by going more into particulars. —We have instances of the prostration and enslavement of the Will, unhappily too often witnessed, in the undue indulgence of the Appetites. Look at the man who habitually indulges himself in the use of ardent spirits. Every time he carries the intoxicating potion to his lips, the sensation of taste, in accordance with the law of our nature that the various states of the mind become more prompt and vigorous in their exercise by repetition, acquires an increased degree of pleasantness. At the same time, the feeling of uneasiness, when the sensation is not indulged by drinking, is increased in a corresponding degree; and, of course, the *desire*, which is necessarily attendant upon the uneasy feeling, becomes in like manner more and more importunate and imperative. During all this time the internal harmony of the mind is interrupted. The other parts of the mind revolt, if we may so speak, against the usurpations of this unholy and destructive desire. The reason points out the evil consequences; the natural desire of esteem throws itself in front of the enemy; the conscience remonstrates and calls aloud; the will summons up its strength and makes a serious resistance. But the desire, growing daily stronger and stronger, gains the victory over one opponent after another; it tramples on the innate regard for the good opinion of others; it stops the hearing and puts out the eyes of conscience; it pays no regard to the admonitions of reason; like a strong man armed, it violently seizes the will, binds it hand and foot, and hurls it into the dust. What slavery can be more dreadful than this?

In connexion with this section, we wish to intro-

duce incidentally a single remark. Enslavement is generally gradual in its progress and various in degree, and we can oftentimes speak of one man as more free than another. And yet we do not ordinarily make this distinction, but are in the habit of speaking of a man as FREE whom we at the same time know to be under the enslavement of the undue influence of his appetites, so long as the degree of freedom is such as to allow of his own voluntary restoration. This mode of expression may not in all respects be philosophically accurate. But it is concise and convenient, and comes nearer the truth than any other formulary of expression, equally simple and equally well adapted to common use. We do not mean at such times to say that the person is free absolutely, and in the strict philosophical sense, but popularly and relatively to his accountability and a new course of conduct. (See § 96.)

§ 144. Enthralment of the will occasioned by predominant and overruling propensities.

We may apply these views to other active principles of a higher order than the appetites, such as the Propensities and Passions, or Affections. It is well understood that our propensities and passions, of whatever kind, as well as the appetites, grow stronger and stronger by repetition. And there are not unfrequently cases where they have become so intense, after years of such repetition, as to control, or, in other words, enthral the voluntary power almost entirely. And we accordingly proceed to remark, that one of the most common and lamentable forms in which mental slavery exists, is the aggravated or inordinate state of Acquisitiveness, or the Propensity to acquire.

We sometimes find men, for instance, so entirely absorbed in the pursuit of wealth as to annihilate them, as it were, to everything else. This pursuit so completely occupies every thought and feeling as to exclude all other objects, and to render them mentally debased and subjugated to the lowest degree. In-

dividuals are to be found, men too of great wealth, who are so entirely under the excessive influence of the acquisitive propensity that they cannot be persuaded to expend enough for the common comforts of life, and who will even gather up the cast-off clothes, and sticks and nails, that are found in the street, to add something, even the merest trifle, to their heaps of treasure.

The reader will find some account of the characteristics of the insane AURI FAMES, as he terms it, in the medical writings of Dr. Good, an acute and laborious observer of nature both in her material and immaterial forms.*

§ 145. The will enthralled by inordinate ambition.

The love of power, or ambition in any of its forms, if it gain an uncontrolled ascendency, will be found to cause such a degree of pressure upon the domains of the will as greatly to perplex and even enthral its action. It will not avail the individual, who is the subject of this inordinate ambition, that he is not wanting in energy of character; that he is, in ordinary cases, a man of great promptness and decision. There is no efficiency or energy of the Will so great, either originally or by culture, as not to be perplexed, weakened, and, in some of the circumstances of its action, entirely overthrown, by the inordinate increase of this passion. And we have reason to think that we can make this position good (saying nothing of the proofs which are almost daily and hourly presenting themselves to our notice) by a remarkable instance.

If any one will take the trouble to examine carefully and to estimate the life of the Emperor Napoleon, he will be satisfied that there is nothing more worthy of notice in the character of that remarkable man than his energy, his decision, his perfect control of all his powers. His control over himself was equalled only by his control over others. The movement

* Good's Study of Medicine, vol. iv., p. 132, Cooper's edition.

of his volition, like some electric element of nature, instantaneously penetrated in all directions, and all persons who were in communication with him instinctively felt their own minds tremble and quail before it. But it cannot be too often remembered and repeated, that the Will, like other mental capabilities, is a price put into our hands to be employed by us in accordance with its nature; and however great its natural or acquired energy, that encroachments cannot be made upon it from any other source without great danger. Unfortunately, the various situations in which the Emperor of the French was placed, all tended to foster the love of power and domination. The acquisition of supreme dominion over the nations was the burden of his meditations, the constant object of his desires. In the end, the lust of power became so predominant, that, in all matters where it was concerned, there no longer remained any authority, any effective power of the mind, that seemed to be capable of checking and controlling it. That strong and impetuous Will, which had subdued all others before it, was insidiously approached by this enemy from beneath, and, before the danger was fully perceived, was taken captive and bound with cords of iron. Napoleon himself was conscious of his situation; and feeling within him the demonstrations of this incontrollable impulse, usurping an authority to which nature never entitled it, and driving him hither and thither in a mad and measureless career, he began to talk about his "horoscope," his "star invisible to others," "unalterable fate," and "destiny." This is the common language of persons who have lost the true balance of the mind, and have permitted unauthorized passions to gain the ascendency.

§ 146. The will enslaved by the indulgence of the passions.

One of the most common instances of an enslaved will is that of persons who have long indulged in angry and violent passions. It is said of Frederic William of Prussia, the father of Frederic the Great, that

he was "of a temper so violent and ungovernable that his passions almost amounted to madness."* And happy would it be if such instances were found only here and there on the pages of history. But it is a melancholy fact, as every careful observer of human nature knows, that there is scarcely a neighbourhood without them. These passions, which are so ungovernable at last, are perhaps feeble in the beginning, and the unhappy subjects of them may not be fully aware, at first, of what will assuredly take place in the latter end. But for successive years they are repeated and indulged, and each returning year, and month, and day adds to their intensity. So that the man in this situation (to use an expression happily applied by a Latin writer to Alexander in one of his fits of rage) becomes, in respect to any control over them, *impotens animi.* He is a victim, sealed to destruction by his own hand. When the occasion of the passion occurs (and, in the case of the persons whom we now have in view, occasions are almost constantly occurring), the feeble will, unable to resist its pressure, trembles and bows before it.

§ 147. Inordinate intensity of the domestic affections.

It will throw some light upon the nature of the Enthralment or slavery of the Will if we consider the operations and results of some of the benevolent affections, when such affections exist in a high degree of intensity. It is proper to add, however, that we have not reference to temporary excitements, to sudden ebullitions and gusts of feeling, so much as to a fixed and permanent intensity. It might be naturally expected that a sudden overflowing of the affections would jar upon the harmony and interrupt the order of the mind's action, not only in respect to the Will, but generally. Such cases we have not now particularly in view, but others of greater permanency, though perhaps sometimes of less violence.

It is sometimes the case that the domestic affec-

* Lord Dover's Life of Frederic II., ch. i.

tions, the love of parents for their children, or of children for their parents, or that complexity of deep and sacred feeling which is embraced in the remembrance and the love of home, so pervades and fills the mind as greatly, in certain situations, to embarrass the action of the Will, and, in fact, to subject it to a greater or less degree of enthralment. If the individual, in whom the domestic affections exist in a very intense degree, is for some reason separated from the hills and woods of his childhood, from the hearth of his fathers, from the endearing company of those who sustain the most intimate relations, how greatly is his heart affected! What exquisite anguish fills his breast! Whatever plans he forms, whatever course of life he proposes to enter upon, he finds that the lovely and cherished image of the past constantly rises before him, and, by its contrast with the present, renders him wretched. He makes various efforts to free himself from the pressure of this mental thraldom; he calls up all the resources of his intellect; he reasons upon the perplexities and miseries of his situation, but all in vain. The fatal passion, so deeply rooted in his bosom, constantly besets him; it passes before and obscures the intellectual vision; it prostrates and scatters to the wind the determinations, even the most deliberate and sacred resolves, of the voluntary power.

If we may believe the statements of Rousseau and other writers, those inhabitants of the retired and solitary mountains and vales of Switzerland, who have been employed in foreign military service, have sometimes sickened and died under the influence of this strong and incontrollable love of country and home.

> "The intrepid Swiss, that guards a foreign shore,
> Condemned to climb his mountain cliffs no more,
> If chance he hears the song so sweetly wild,
> Which on those cliffs his infant hours beguiled,
> Melts at the long-lost scenes that round him rise,
> And sinks, a martyr to repentant sighs."

§ 148. Of the slavery of the will in connexion with moral accountability.

In concluding the remarks of this chapter, it is proper briefly to notice an interesting inquiry which naturally comes up here. The inquiry we refer to is, What bearing have these views on moral accountability?—And we may undoubtedly answer it by saying, in general terms, that our moral accountability remains, in a greater or less degree, so long as the due proportion or balance between the various powers of the mind is not *wholly* destroyed. If we permit the undue and unholy exercise of any appetite or passion, we are indeed ENSLAVED (in the sense in which slavery or enthralment is predicable of the mind) by such appetite or passion; but we are not, therefore, removed beyond the reach of accountability and guilt; but, on the contrary, are both accountable and highly criminal, *so long as there remain in our minds, either in the Will or anywhere else, any powers of right judgment and resistance.* When such powers of judgment and resistance no longer remain, then our actions, of whatever kind they may be, are neither criminal nor meritorious, although we may be criminal for bringing ourselves into this situation. Mental slavery, when it becomes so intense as actually to disorganize the mind and to pass over into the regions of insanity, destroys accountability, but not before. So long as it does not pass within the limits of mental alienation, and become merged in insanity, it is so far from rendering a person guiltless, that it might not be difficult to show that guilt or sin is identical with it. In other words, THAT THERE IS NO SIN WHERE THERE IS NO SLAVERY.

The Scriptures themselves seem to recognise some such view: "Jesus answered them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the *servant* of sin."—"But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into *captivity* to the law of sin."—"Because the creature itself also shall be delivered from *the bond-*

age of corruption into the glorious *liberty* of the children of God."—"For when ye were *servants* of sin, ye were free from righteousness."—"While they promise them liberty, they themselves are the *servants of corruption;* for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage."—John viii., 34. Rom. vi., 20; vii., 23; viii., 21. 2 Peter ii., 19.

It will be kept in mind, however, that we do not intend to apply these remarks to cases where the Will is brought into subjection by means extraneous to the person himself, and operating upon him without his concurrence or consent, as in the case just now referred to, of extreme suffering by torture. In all such cases, it is undeniable that moral accountability, on the part of the person who is subjected to such suffering, is either greatly diminished, or ceases to exist altogether. Under the pressure of a suffering so intense as wholly to prostrate the action of the volitional power, he is no more accountable for what he does, than he would be for what he is compelled to do by actual bodily constraint.

PART IV.

POWER OF THE WILL.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE OF MENTAL POWER.

§ 149. Of the distinction between liberty and power.

We now enter again upon a distinct series of subjects, which present the WILL to our notice in a new aspect. They are subsequent in the order of examination, but they are not wanting either in importance or interest. In this last Part of the discussion before us, we propose to examine the Power of the will and the various topics that are naturally connected with it.—But in making the POWER of the will a distinct subject of examination, it is proper to remark, that we deviate from the view of many writers, and some of them of no mean rank, who seem to have considered the Power of the will and its Liberty as one and the same thing. And this confusion of things which are entirely distinct has been one cause of that obscurity which has ever rested in too great a degree on the whole subject.

It is not altogether surprising, however, that an error should have been committed here, when we consider how apt we are to confound together objects, whatever grounds there may be for a distinction between them, which are often united together in our thoughts. The material world is so constituted, that in our perceptions of extension and colour, we find them necessarily always accompanying each other; so that, after a time, we find it very difficult to exclude from our notion of the sensation of colour the idea of extension. And it is undoubtedly much the same in all similar cases, and among others in that of FREEDOM and POWER, which also are found to be closely associated together. It is obvious that there is no freedom where there is no power; it seems to be undeniable that in the nature of things they go to-

gether; and they are, therefore, so closely connected in our thoughts, that we ultimately find it difficult to make the proper distinction between them.

§ 150. Proof of the distinction between liberty and power.

We presume to anticipate, that, after the reader has gone through with what we have to say on this general subject of voluntary power, especially if he will take the pains to compare it with what has already been said on the nature of liberty, he will not be disposed to take exceptions to the distinction which we assert to exist between LIBERTY and POWER. And yet, although it is unnecessary, in this stage of our remarks, to spend much time on this particular topic, there is a propriety in briefly introducing a few circumstances in support of the distinction before us.— And, accordingly, we remark, in the first place, that there are sometimes diversities or different degrees in the amount of power, even to a marked and decided extent, while the amount of freedom is essentially the same, which could not well be the case if liberty and power were identical. Take a single illustration. There is as much freedom, in any true and proper sense of the term freedom, in the mind of a child, whose intellect, just beginning to open, cannot expand itself beyond the limits of his native village, as in that of a philosopher whose thoughts embrace the world, and even systems of worlds. The sphere of the child's mind is indeed a very limited one in comparison with that of the philosopher, but the degree of freedom enjoyed by it is essentially the same. But while there is undeniably in these two cases an equal, or nearly equal degree of mental liberty within the respective spheres of the mind's operations, no one will undertake to say that there is the same, or nearly the same degree of mental power.

Again, if we take two persons equally advanced in years, we shall, in many cases, notice similar results. A truly virtuous man will always possess and exhibit a high degree of mental freedom. A vicious man

will suffer under some form of mental distortion unfavourable to freedom. But, although the latter possesses less mental freedom, it is possible that, in certain directions at least, he may possess much more mental power than the other.

§ 151. Distinction of power and liberty involved in the fact of our being able to form abstract ideas of power and liberty.

In the second place, our consciousness (that internal reflection, or rather recognition, which we are able to bestow upon what takes place in the mind itself, and which thus gives us new forms of knowledge) assures us that we are able to form the abstract idea of liberty, and also that we are able to form the abstract idea of power; and if our internal mental experience thus assures us of the existence of the two, it of course assures us of a distinction between them. Every simple idea, as it is a unit and is inseparable into parts, must necessarily have a character of its own, which is definite and immutable. And if we are capable, therefore, of forming these two distinct ideas of power and liberty (as the general consciousness on the subject seems clearly to testify), it will necessarily follow that they are entirely distinct in their nature; and although they may be, and undoubtedly are, closely connected together, so much so that we cannot conceive of the one without implying the existence of the other, it is still true that, in themselves considered, they are entirely separate, each having an entity and a character of its own. And if the ideas of liberty and power are thus distinct from each other, then we are under the necessity, inasmuch as there are no elementary ideas without things corresponding to them, of drawing the inference, that the things for which they stand, or, in other words, that power and liberty, in their state of actual realization, are different from each other.

§ 152. Distinction of power and liberty shown from language.

That there exists a distinction between mental power and mental liberty, and that this distinction is to

be fully recognised and received, seems to be evident, in the third place, from the structure of language. In the English language we have the two terms in question, which we constantly use, not as synonymous terms, but as truly expressive of things which are different from each other. And as we find it to be the same in other languages, we may well regard this as a circumstance which decisively indicates the general conviction and belief on this subject. The existence of a belief so general and so deeply founded does not appear to admit of any satisfactory explanation, except on the ground of the actual existence of the distinction to which the belief relates.

§ 153. Further shown from the possession of a moral nature.

Furthermore, the possession of mental power, as well as of mental liberty, is involved in the fact that man is a moral and accountable being. Argument in its ordinary form is not necessary here. Our Creator, in great kindness, has not left the questions of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, to be settled by the abstruse deductions of philosophers alone, but has written their solution in letters of light on the tablet of the common heart of mankind. All classes and descriptions of men, in the exercise of the powers that God has given them, are alike capable of understanding their essential import, and of rendering their interpretation. They all know, hardly less than they know their own identity, and far better than any human philosophy can teach them, that moral responsibleness implies the existence of power, and that the defect of power necessarily involves the negation of accountability.

"There is," says Dr. Reid, "a perfect correspondence betwen power on the one hand, and moral obligation and accountableness on the other. They not only correspond in general, as they respect voluntary actions only, but every limitation of the first produces a corresponding limitation of the two last. This indeed amounts to nothing more than that maxim of

common sense, confirmed by Divine authority, that to whom much is given, of him much will be required."*

§ 154. Origin of the idea of power in intuition or suggestion.

What has so far been said in this chapter, at least when taken in connexion with the illustrations of volitional power hereafter given, seems abundantly to show that there is a distinction between power and liberty, and that it is important not to confound them together. The subject of power, therefore, is a subject by itself, and requiring a separate and careful consideration.—And, in entering upon the examination of this subject, it seems to be a proper place here to say a few words in explanation of the origin of the idea of POWER. Power is obviously not anything which is directly addressed to the outward senses. It is not addressed to the sense of sight, as colours are; nor to the sense of hearing, as sounds are; nor to the taste; nor to any other of the outward senses. We cannot see it, nor hear it, nor touch it, nor taste it, although it is everywhere actually diffused; for it is a first truth and undeniably certain, that, wherever there is existence, there is power, either actually in the thing itself, or in some way connected with it.

If the idea of power is not to be ascribed in its origin to external perception in any of its forms, except so far as we may sometimes find in them the indirect *occasions* of its origin, we must look within for its rise. And in doing this, we find ourselves unable to assert anything more or otherwise than this, that it is the result (that is to say, it is made known to us by means of it) of that suggestional or intuitional faculty which has already been referred to as the true source of our idea of liberty. In other words, we are so constituted that, on certain occasions and under certain circumstances, the idea of power naturally and necessarily arises, or is suggested, or is intuitioned within us. It is thus suggested or intuitioned in all cases which come under our notice, of antecedence and

* Reid's Active Powers of the Human Mind, Essay iv.

sequence in the natural world; in all cases of the control of the Will over the muscular action; and also of the control of the Will over the other mental powers.

§ 155. The idea of power involves the reality of power.

Such is the origin of the idea of power — an idea which is both simple and undefinable. But we are not, therefore, to suppose that it represents nothing; in other words, that the power, which the idea is supposed to affirm and verify, is in itself a chimera and nonentity, a mere baseless fiction of the mind. This would be a great mistake. It is true that there may be complex ideas of things, as Mr. Locke has correctly maintained, which are chimerical; that is to say, which have nothing corresponding to them in outward objects, or in anything else, such as the ideas of a hypogriff, or of a dragon, or centaur, or of gold which is lighter than water, and the like. But this want of correspondence between the idea and the object to which it relates, or professes to relate, is never experienced in the case of simple ideas; and it is not at all surprising that we should find this difference in these two classes of our notions. Complex ideas, so far as the combination and arrangement of the subordinate elements is concerned, is the work of man; and it may sometimes happen, therefore, that they are expressive, or, rather, profess to be so, of what has no real existence. But simple ideas, on the other hand, which result necessarily from the action of the mind under given circumstances, may be regarded as truly the work of the great Author of our mental nature; and it would be inconsistent with our ideas of his perfections, particularly his truth, as well as with our own consciousness and experience, to suppose that they ever express anything other than an unchangeable reality.

§ 156. Things exist which are not made known by the senses.

Can it be necessary to say that there are existences, at least that there are *realities* (whether they are ex-

istences in themselves, or the mere attributes of things or relations), which have no outward and visible representation? We know that the contrary supposition would not be inconsistent with the philosophy of Condillac and Helvetius, and especially of Mr. Hume; but the result of later patient and thorough inquiries seems clearly to indicate that the philosophical systems of those writers cannot, in this particular at least, be sustained. It is undoubtedly true that we do not have a knowledge of Power by means of any direct action on the outward senses; that it has no form and outline, as if it were some material entity; that it is not the subject of any process of material admeasurement; that it is not an object of sight, hearing, or touch. But it is at last fully settled, I think, that there are not only outward or sensuous, but inward or super-sensuous sources of knowledge; and that things and the attributes of things, which are not susceptible of any material or outward representation, can nevertheless be made known as having an existence by means of internal or super-sensuous cognitions. And POWER, whether it be something in itself, or the attribute of something else, is one of this class of things.

§ 157. Of power as an attribute of the human mind.

Without saying anything further on the existence and nature of power in general, and of the way in which we have a knowledge of it, we now proceed to remark upon power as existing in, and as an attribute of, the human mind. There is power somewhere. Is it also in the mind of man? Does it reside there as something substantive and positive, or is it merely an appearance?

In proof of the position that power, in the strict sense of the term, is an attribute of the human mind, we may safely appeal, in the first place, to each one's consciousness. Every one is supposed to know what power is in realization, although, as has been said, the idea or intellectual representation of it is not susceptible of definition. In other words, every man is con-

scious that he possesses this power in himself; not perhaps in so high a degree as it actually exists in some others, but yet in some degree. He is not conscious that it exists in him in the form of a separate faculty, analogous to perception or memory, but that it exists as an attribute of the whole mind, and is diffused, in a greater or less degree, through all its faculties. That is to say, having from the earliest period formed a distinct idea of power, he feels, and from the nature of his being cannot help feeling and knowing, that he possesses in himself the reality corresponding to the idea, and that in every exercise or operation of the mind there is and must be power.

Furthermore, the existence of power as an attribute of the human mind is proved by our observation of others. When we carefully consider the wonderful efforts of the human intellect, with what rapidity and consummate skill it embraces and analyzes the most difficult subjects, have we not evidence of power? When we see men controlling their passions, sustaining themselves in meekness and fortitude amid the most cruel assaults, have we not additional evidence? When we read of the Republics of antiquity, of the eloquence that shook and swayed the fierce democracy of Athens, and controlled the proud hearts and intellects of Rome, and in later times has risen with no less ascendency in the stormy periods of the French and English Parliaments, can we believe that these astonishing effects are the results of minds constituted without any infusion of a living causative element? Without the recognition of the existence of power, as something consubstantial with and a part of the human mind, the philosophy of human nature, in the explanation of the facts which human history presents, will be found to be entirely inadequate.

§ 158. Further shown by a reference to the divine mind.

On this subject (the existence of power as truly an attribute of the human mind) it may not be improper, although it is to be done with suitable humility and

circumspection, to reason from the Supreme Being to the creatures he has made. Man, we are informed, was created in the image of his Maker; and accepting that as the true statement of the case, it cannot be doubted that the similitude was mental, and not bodily. It was the mind, the spiritual part, that was honoured with bearing the glorious impress of the divine lineaments.

It may indeed be said, by way of objection, that the alleged similitude between man and his Maker is limited to man's moral nature; but it should be recollected that it is impossible entirely to separate man's moral from his intellectual part. As the moral nature is based upon the intellectual (for there obviously can be no accountability where there are no powers of perceiving and judging), the existence of the former of course involves and implies the existence of the latter. If there be a reality in the distinction between right and wrong, there must be not only feeling and volition, but intelligence; and we cannot conceive of virtue or vice in connexion with the absence of either of them.—With these views of the connexion existing among all the parts of man's mental nature, the intellectual, sentimentive, and voluntary, we understand the statement of man's primitive creation in the image of God to mean that there was really a likeness in *kind*, however diverse in *degree;* and that this similitude extends to all parts of our mental nature, with the exception of what are purely instinctive, or are essentially connected with our bodily and material organization. Now no one will deny that power is an attribute of the Divine Mind; and hence, reasoning from the Maker to that which is made, reasoning from the original and self-existent Archetype to the derived and dependent similitude, we have good grounds to believe that power exists positively and substantively in man as well as the Being who formed him.

CHAPTER II.

POWER OF THE WILL.

§ 159. Proof of power in the will from the analogy of the mind.

But it is not enough to explain the nature of power, and to assert its existence as an attribute of the mind in general terms; we proceed now to consider its existence in that particular faculty or department of the mind which is denominated the WILL. Power is not only predicable of the mind in a general way, but it is predicable of its parts, and particularly and emphatically so of our volitional nature. The analogy running through our mental constitution furnishes some grounds and authority for this remark. Men universally speak (and they undoubtedly believe they have good reason so to do) of the power of sensation, of the power of perception, of the power of memory, and imagination, and reasoning; and, in fact, in all cases where there is a thing to be done, and a causative principle going before, which is prerequisite to its being done. The structure of all languages (for they appear to be all alike in this respect) proves what they think; and we may add, proves what they *know* on this subject. It is natural for the man who perceives to say that he has the power of perception; the man who remembers or reasons, asserts without hesitation that he has the *power* of remembering or reasoning; and it is impossible to convince these men either that these expressions are improperly applied, or that they are nugatory and convey no distinct meaning.—But if there is truly a foundation for such expressions, and if there is a propriety and truth in the use of them, is there not equal propriety in speaking of the POWER of the WILL? If every other mental action clearly and convincingly indicates to us the existence of an innate energy corresponding to such ac-

tion, it cannot be supposed that the act of willing alone, which is a pre-eminent and leading exercise of the mind, exists independently of any actual basis of voluntary energy. The analogy, therefore, of the mental constitution (for we are undoubtedly at liberty to reason from analogy in this case, as well as others) distinctly leads to the result that power is appropriate to, and is an attribute of, the Will.

§ 160. Proof of power in the will from internal experience.

That power is predicable of the will, as well as of any other faculty of the mind, or of the mind as a whole, is evinced not only by the analogy running through the mental structure, but by other considerations. Among other views to be taken of the subject now before us, may we not, in this inquiry as well as in others, make an appeal to our internal experience? In other words, have we not, beyond all doubt, a testimony within us, a direct and decisive internal evidence of power in the acts of the Will? Do we not feel and know it to be so?—Let us take a familiar instance as a test of these inquiries. When a person wills to go to a certain place, or wills to do a certain thing, does the volition appear to have been wrought within himself by an extraneous cause? Does it appear to have been created and placed there without any personal agency and effort? Or does it rather distinctly and satisfactorily indicate to him an energy of his own? Few persons, it is believed, will hesitate as to what answer to give.

Our consciousness, therefore, distinctly assures us that the action of the Will, within the limits constituting its appropriate sphere, truly originates in its own power. It wills, because it has the power to will. It acts, because it possesses that energy which is requisite to constitute the basis of action. In the language of one of the characters of the great English dramatist, when pressed for the reasons of a certain course of proceeding,

"The cause is in my *Will;* I *will* not come."

§ 161. Proved from the ability which we have to direct our attention to particular subjects.

In one particular at least, our internal experience seems to be clear and decisive, viz., that we are able to direct our attention to some subjects of inquiry in preference to others. It is admitted that we cannot call up a thought or a train of thought by a mere and direct act of volition, although we have an *indirect* power in this respect, which is not without its important results. But when various trains of thought are passing through the mind, we are enabled, as it is presumed every one must be conscious, to direct our attention and to fix it firmly upon one thought or one train of thought in preference to another. It is undoubtedly the tendency of association to remove the thought or the train of thought, whatever it is, from the mind; but the power of the Will, where it is decisively exerted, can counteract this tendency, and keep the mind in essentially the same position for a greater or less length of time. And it does not appear what explanation can possibly be given of the fact that we thus frequently delay upon subjects, and revolve them in our contemplation, except on the ground of a real and effective energy of the Will.

§ 162. Proof of power in the will from observation.

Furthermore, the phenomena of human nature, as they come within our constant observation, cannot be explained, except on the supposition that the Will is not the subject of any extraneous operation or power, in such a sense as entirely to exclude power or agency of its own. Do we not often see instances of persons, in whom vigour of the Will is a characteristic and predominant trait, and whose character and conduct cannot be explained except on the ground that they possess a voluntary energy of their own, and that, too, in a high degree? Men have often been placed in the most trying circumstances, called to endure the pains of imprisonment, and hunger and thirst, and torture, and exile, and death, and they have under-

gone it with a most astonishing fortitude and calmness, without shedding a tear or uttering a lamentation. Here is something difficult to be explained, unless we take into consideration that innate power which we assert to be an attribute of the Will.

Whatever may be said of the fervid sincerity of his religion or the natural benevolence of his heart, are we able satisfactorily to explain the character and deeds of the illustrious Howard, except by taking this view? "The energy of his determination," says a judicious and valuable writer, "was so great, that if, instead of being habitual, it had been shown only for a short time on particular occasions, it would have appeared a vehement impetuosity; but, by being unintermitted, it had an equability of manner which scarcely appeared to exceed the tone of a calm constancy, it was so totally the reverse of anything like turbulence or agitation. It was the calmness of an intensity, kept uniform by the nature of the human mind forbidding it to be more, and by the character of the individual forbidding it to be less."*

The case of Howard, marked and extraordinary as it is, does not stand alone. Every age of the world and every class of society have their men of this stamp. Extraordinary endowments of the will are as necessary to support society, and to meet the exigencies of our situation, as extraordinary endowments of intellect. But, unfortunately, though they are given in the discretion and wisdom of the great Dispenser of all mental gifts, they are not always wisely and righteously employed. A multitude of instances, of a character both good and evil, will occur to every one; among others, Alexander, Cæsar, Regulus, Charles XII., Hannibal, Columbus, the Apostle Paul, Cromwell, William Tell, Chatham, Nelson, Ledyard, Mungo Park, Napoleon, John Knox, Luther, Whitefield, Wesley, and numerous others, whose names are permanently enrolled in the religious and political history of men. The language of Ledyard will show the in-

* Foster's Essay on Decision of Character.

tensity of determination existing in such men. "My distresses have been greater than I have ever owned, or ever *will* own to any man. I have known hunger and nakedness to the utmost extremity of human suffering; I have known what it is to have food given me as charity to a madman; and I have at times been obliged to shelter myself under the miseries of that character to avoid a heavier calamity. Such evils are terrible to bear, but they never have yet had *power to turn me from my purpose.*"

§ 163. Of power of the will as exhibited in patience under suffering.

We invite the particular attention of the reader to the view of the subject which is now presented before him. If he will take the trouble to contemplate it steadily, we doubt not that it will have its due weight. We wish to be understood as distinctly and fully maintaining, on the ground of common observation, that the Will has an actual and substantive power, and that it is utterly impossible to explain the phenomena of human nature except by taking this view. Nor do we propose, in support of our positions, to introduce merely extraordinary instances of energy of the Will; but, on the contrary, should not hesitate to rest the issue of the inquiry on an appeal to cases which are of common occurrence. We have an evidence (an unobtrusive one, perhaps, but still worthy of our notice) of the power of the Will in that patience and submissiveness which we not unfrequently witness in the ordinary trials of life. Persons who have had their sensibilities wounded day after day, and hour after hour, have been seen at the same time to wear the smile of cheerfulness; and so far from uttering complaints and indulging a rebellious spirit, they have been uniformly kind to those who were the causes of their suffering. Others, who have suffered under the approaches of a wasting and insidious disease, have completely succeeded in quieting the emotions within them, and permitted no murmur to arise; they have even blessed these trying visitations of Providence,

and have shed a loveliness, glorious for themselves and cheering to the heart of the spectator, over the chamber of sickness and death. It is not enough to say that they may have possessed an enlightened understanding or a virtuous heart; nothing but the innate energy of the Will (however it may have been supported by correct views and virtuous principles) could have silenced and subdued the secret voice of anguish.

§ 164. Illustration of the subject from the command of temper.

The fact that men are not governed by a fatality impressed upon them from an exterior cause, but have an efficiency in themselves, may be further illustrated from the control which they are seen to exercise over their passions, in what is called *command of temper*. Few sayings are more celebrated than that of Socrates on a certain occasion to his servant, that he would beat him if he were not angry. Hume, who is entitled to the credit of being a careful observer of human nature, speaks expressly of the remarkable command of temper which was possessed by Henry IV. of England, and it is not uncommon to find this trait pointed out by historians and biographers as one worthy of particular notice. The biographer of our illustrious countryman, Mr. Jay, says that "he sought not the glory which cometh from man, and the only power of which he was covetous was the *command of himself*."* And this power, although he was obliged to contend with a natural irritability of temper, he exhibited in a very high degree.

In a recent interesting Work, entitled Recollections of the House of Lords, there is a sketch of the character and political labours of Earl Grey, a name familiar to those who are acquainted with the leading events of modern English history. The anonymous writer, who everywhere discovers his knowledge of the operations and tendencies of the human mind, speaks of him as follows: "He was not so insensitive

* Life of John Jay, vol. i., chap. xii.

to the attacks of his opponents as was generally supposed. Those who knew him intimately were well aware that his sensibilities in this respect were not blunted by the cares and anxieties of office. But he had great COMMAND OVER HIS TEMPER. His philosophy had taught him the great advantages to a man holding so important a situation as he did, of concealing any soreness he might feel from the conduct of an opponent. He knew that to betray a loss of temper at the attacks of the adverse party was precisely the way to invite a repetition of such attacks. He therefore resolved to subject his temper, in this respect, to a severe course of discipline. *He successfully carried his resolution into effect!*"

§ 165. Further illustrations of this subject.

It would not be difficult to specify other distinguished men, both of our own and other countries, who knew how to conciliate the actings of a sensitive and enkindled heart with the coolest circumspection and the most perfect self-command. But this is not necessary, since the trait in question is one daily coming within our notice. It is not uncommon, in almost every village and neighbourhood, to observe persons of naturally quick feelings, and whose passions are obviously violent, and are prone to foam and to toss about like the waves of the sea, who nevertheless have those passions under complete control, even in the most trying circumstances.

And is it not a duty to exercise this control over the passions? "He that ruleth his spirit," says Solomon, "is better than he that taketh a city." And again, "He that hath no rule over his own spirit is like a city that is broken down and without walls." "Be ye angry," says the Apostle, "and sin not; let not the sun go down upon your wrath." Here, then, is a great practical fact in the philosophy of the mind, and upon which important and solemn duties are based, viz., that the passions are under our control. But where is the power that controls them? It is not enough to

say that this power of regulation and control is deposited in the understanding. It is true that the understanding can suggest various and important reasons why this control should be exercised, but it cannot of itself render those reasons effective and available. The greatest light in the Understanding, and even if it were carried into the region of the Affections and the Conscience, could never bring this great result to pass without the co-operation of the effective energies of the Will.

§ 166. Proved from the concealment of the passions on sudden and trying occasions.

There are instances where the passions are repressed, or at least concealed, for the purpose of forwarding some ulterior end, which indicate the existence of power in the will. We might, perhaps, leave this statement just as it is, to be filled up by the private and personal recollections of the reader. But history, which furnishes so many valuable expositions of the passions and the will, is not without its striking instances here. It is mentioned by those writers who have given an account of Sylla, the Roman dictator, as a marked trait in his character, that he was capable of acting the dissembler to perfection. He was engaged in forming and executing gigantic plans for the extension of the Roman empire, at the same time that he had formed other plans of an entirely different character, and based upon the most dreadful passions, which he silently and calmly laid up to be executed at some distant day. One would have thought that his whole soul (such was his consummate ability in the management both of his present designs and of those passions which were afterward to be indulged) was exclusively taken up with his present business, and possessed no thought or feeling for anything else.

The conspirators against Julius Cæsar, after they had fully determined on his assassination, an event which involved either his death or their own, and perhaps both, were in the almost daily habit of meeting

and transacting business with him; and yet that wonderful man was utterly unable to detect in the language, manner, or looks of the conspirators any evidence or intimations of their atrocious design. Does not this indicate on the part of the conspirators power of Will? Cicero seems to have been excluded from the conspiracy chiefly because he was supposed to be wanting in that decision and fortitude of purpose which was requisite to the occasion.

§ 167. Further instances of concealment of the passions.

We may go further and say, that people may not only avail themselves of the power of the Will to subdue their passions or to conceal them, and that, in so doing, they prove the existence of power in the Will, but they not unfrequently subdue them to a certain point, letting them run in certain directions and not in others; or repressing them to a certain degree, and permitting them to rage below that degree.

An instance will help to illustrate what we mean. The author of the Recollections of Mirabeau gives an account of a quarrel which took place between Mirabeau and Claviere, two names which must be familiar to all who are acquainted with the events of the French Revolution.—"A singular circumstance, which struck me very forcibly, had called this quarrel to my recollection. Mirabeau and Claviere, although beside themselves with rage, maintained, with regard to each other's characters, a discretion which surprised me. I trembled every moment lest Claviere should utter some taunts regarding Mirabeau's private conduct, and tax him with meanness in pecuniary matters. But, although he had frequently mentioned such things to me, he was too much master of himself to utter them now; while Mirabeau, on the other hand, foaming with pride and anger, had still the address to mingle with his invectives testimonies of esteem and compliments upon Claviere's talents. Thus they scratched and caressed each other with the same hand."—The same writer makes another statement

in regard to Mirabeau which is applicable here: "In the tribune he was immoveable. They who have seen him well know that no agitation in the assembly had the least effect upon him, and that he remained master of his temper even under the severest personal attacks. I once recollect to have heard him make a report upon the city of Marseilles. Each sentence was interrupted from the *cote droit* with low abuse; the words calumniator, liar, assassin, and rascal, were very prodigally lavished upon him. On a sudden he stopped, and with a honeyed accent, as if what he had stated had been most favourably received, 'I am waiting, gentlemen,' said he, 'until the fine compliments you are paying me are exhausted.'"*

§ 168. Illustrated from the prosecution of some general plan.

We find further illustration and proof of that energy which is appropriate to the Will, in instances where individuals adopt and pursue, for a length of time, some general plan. Not unfrequently they fix upon an object which involves either their interest or their duty, and prosecute it with a perseverance and resolution which is truly astonishing. Nor is this state of things limited to those who have been elevated by rank, or have had the advantages of learning. It is often the case that we see this fixedness of purpose, this unalterable resolution, among those who have been greatly depressed by poverty, and who are ignorant as well as poor.

Not long since a poor Irish girl came to this country from her native land, for the purpose of making some provision, and obtaining a situation of greater comfort, for her depressed and suffering family. Alone and unprotected, and with a very small sum of money, she left the home of her father; travelled

* Note.—The reader will find an interesting statement, illustrative of this view of the subject, in Count Segur's History of the Expedition to Russia, book ix., ch. vi. It is an account of an interview between Napoleon and the German general Winzingerode. On the part of Napoleon the interview was violent and angry. But Segur very correctly remarks, "*there was calculation even in his wrath.*"

on foot many miles to the city of Dublin; succeeded in obtaining a passage on board a vessel bound for Quebec, and ultimately found her way into the United States. She there pursued her object through long-continued trial and suffering, until the smiles of a kind Providence rewarded her filial piety, and furnished the means which soon brought to her arms the beloved family she had left behind. Now here is a case in common life, without any artificial aids and excitement which can be supposed to have sustained it; and if we could open and expose to the view of the world the records of the suffering and virtuous poor, we should undoubtedly find many like it. "In the obscurity of retirement," says the author of Lacon, "amid the squalid poverty and revolting privations of a cottage, it has often been my lot to witness scenes of magnanimity and self-denial as much beyond the belief as the practice of the great; a heroism borrowing no support, either from the gaze of the many or the admiration of the few, yet flourishing amid ruins and on the confines of the grave; a spectacle as stupendous in the moral world as the Falls of Niagara in the natural." And can we explain this greatness of soul, this fixedness of purpose, this indomitable resolution, which is displayed in every condition of society, in humble as well as in elevated life, consistently with the supposition that the Will has no power?

But there are other facts of a higher character and a more general interest, as they involve the welfare, not only of individuals and families, but of whole classes of men. They are too numerous to be mentioned here; but they are recorded, and will long continue to be so, in the faithful register of grateful hearts. Are there not many individuals, who, like the benevolent Clarkson (whose history has already been referred to in a former chapter for another purpose), have fixed upon some plan of good-will to men, embracing a great variety and degree of effort, and have pursued it amid every form of trial and opposi-

tion for years and tens of years? The individual just referred to proposed the simple object of the Abolition of the Slave Trade. To this one object he consecrated his life and all his powers. He permitted no opposition to divert him from his purpose. But amid great apathy of the public mind, and great opposition on the part of those who were personally interested in his defeat; amid the most arduous labours, attended with a thousand discouragements, and protracted for many years; in rebuke, and sickness, and sorrow, this one object was the star that guided him on, the light that sustained him, and which he followed without giving way to his trials or relaxing in the least from his efforts until it was secured.

§ 169. Subject illustrated from the first settlers of New England.

The course of the first settlers of New England is an instance favourable for the illustration of the subject before us. Their simple object was to find a residence somewhere where they could live in the full and free exercise and enjoyment of their religion. And this was an object which, under the circumstances of the case, was not to be carried into effect without great firmness and perseverance. They left behind them, in their native country, a thousand objects which the world holds most dear. Despised and outcast, they came to these inhospitable shores in sorrow, and weakness, and poverty. They suffered from the want of provisions, from the prevalence of wasting sickness, from the storms and cold of winter, and from the watchful jealousy and hostility of the savage tribes. Though sincerely and ardently religious, it cannot be denied that they had their seasons of discouragement, and often feared and often doubted. But when all without was darkness, and when even the inward lights burned dimly, the high purpose which they had once deliberately and prayerfully formed remained unchanged. They held on by the anchor of a determined RESOLVE. So that it can be said with almost strict truth, that the Will sustained them when the Heart was broken.

§ 170. Illustrated by the fortitude exhibited by Savages.

We might go on multiplying illustrations of this subject almost without number; drawn, too, from every class of men, and from every condition of society, savage as well as civilized. We have often thought that the life of the savage warrior furnished an interesting philosophical problem. Let the reader go with us a moment to yonder dark and boundless forest. Behold beneath the light of the uncertain and shuddering moon, the fire kindled which is destined to consume the victim taken in war. View him fastened to the stake, his flesh slowly consumed, and, as it is burning, torn piecemeal from his blackened bones. What inexpressible suffering! And yet this dark son of the forest, this poor ignorant child of nature, betrays no weakness of purpose, sheds no tear, utters no exclamation of impatience. His enemies can take from him his distant wigwam, his wife and children, his burning body, his expiring life; but the sudden death-song, rising loudly and triumphantly, is a proof that they have not taken, nor are they able to take from him, the firm resolve, the unconquerable Will.

Here are the facts which are presented before us; not all, indeed, which can be brought forward, and perhaps they are not those which are best adapted to our purpose; but, such as they are, they are undeniable. They are inscribed on every page of the history of the human race. And we may challenge philosophy or anything else satisfactorily to explain them, except on the ground of the innate energy, not merely of the mind as a whole, but specifically and especially of the faculty of the Will.

§ 171. On the self-determining power of the will.

It may, perhaps, be asked here, What meaning we attach to a form of expression, which it may sometimes be convenient to employ, namely, the *self-determining power of the will?* In view of that analysis which we have felt it necessary to make of the human mind, including what has been said of the two

great classes of motives which are immediately antecedent to and furnish a basis to the will's action, and in view also of the distinction made between liberty and power, we can attach but one meaning. The self-determining power of the will, as we understand it, cannot be made to mean anything more or otherwise than this, that the will, possessing, in the fact of its own existence, and as an element of that existence, the attribute of power, does *of itself*, in view of the different and sometimes conflicting motives around it, arbitrate, determine, or decide among them. In other words, and philosophically more exact, developing itself in action at its appropriate time, and standing central in the midst of the motive forces around it, and by virtue of that which is in itself, and not extraneous to itself, it simply acts in the time of its action; it simply decides in the time of its decision; and in this simplicity of action, with motives before it, and with nothing behind it but the sustaining power of God, it fulfils the great unitive and executive function which God and nature have assigned it.

CHAPTER III.

DIFFERENCES OF VOLITIONAL POWER.

§ 172. Differences in volitional power seldom noticed.

THERE is one aspect in which this subject remains to be contemplated, which may tend to throw some light on what has already been stated under the general head of Power of the Will; we refer to DIFFERENCES OF VOLUNTARY POWER. This is a view of the human mind which has seldom, owing perhaps to erroneous or indistinct views on the whole subject of mental power, received that attention to which it appears to be entitled. It is no uncommon thing to hear remarks made upon differences of strength in the passions of men, or in their faculties of perception and reasoning, but it is exceedingly seldom that we notice anything said in explanation of differences in the ca-

pability of the Will. But if there is truly a power, an original and substantive efficiency, lodged in the Will, it is certainly a natural presumption that we should find degrees and diversities in this power, not less than in any other ability of the mind. And facts which are constantly presented to our notice show this to be the case.

§ 173. Remarks on constitutional weakness of the will.

If we will take the trouble to examine the characters of men, as we find them developed more or less in the pursuits of life, we shall not fail to find some who exhibit, not occasionally merely, but as a general thing and as a permanent trait of mind, a feebleness of resolution, a sort of vacillancy, a continual oscillation, if one may be allowed the expression, between one thing and another. No arguments, no motives, no considerations of interest, duty, or glory, are able permanently to countervail and prop up this inherent weakness. They may indeed sustain it for a time; the imbecility of purpose which marks the history of these persons may not always be discoverable in the ordinary circumstances of life, especially when the Will is supported by considerations suitable to give it strength; but in the onset of perilous circumstances, in the close pressure of portentous danger, in sudden and fearful emergencies of any kind whatever, instead of standing erect and immoveable, they are overwhelmed and driven away.

If this statement is correct, it certainly presents an important aspect in the developements of human nature. We do not gather grapes of thorns, nor figs of thistles; we do not expect the blind to see, the lame to walk erect, or the deaf to hear; we do not feel at liberty to require of a man, whose intellect is obviously incompetent to the task of combining more than half a dozen propositions, the production of a Spirit of Laws, a Principia, or Mecanique Celeste; and it would be almost as unreasonable, however useful they may be in other situations more adapted to their pe-

culiarities of mental organization, to expect from such persons a course of perseverance, fortitude, and daring. If no one is answerable for a greater number of talents than are given him, and if, in the case of particular individuals, the great Dispenser of mental gifts has seen fit to assign those talents to the Intellect rather than the Will, the requisition should be made, not only in conformity with the amount which has been given, but with reference also to the department of the mind where it exists. We may impose upon such persons a heavy burden of thought, but must be less exorbitant in our requisitions on their resolves and action in those difficult and pressing emergencies which obviously require the interposition of men of a different stamp.

§ 174. Of comparative or relative weakness of the will.

There is an apparent, and, to all practical purposes, an actual weakness of the will, which, when we fully consider its nature, may properly be termed COMPARATIVE OR RELATIVE. We may explain it thus. The individual is not wanting in volitional decision and energy, if the Will be considered *in itself* and disconnected from other parts of the mental constitution. So far from this, it may perhaps be said with truth, that voluntary energy is naturally a leading trait and characteristic of the persons now referred to. And yet the Will does not fully perform the office of a controlling power; it does not act up to the standard of its own capabilities; the individual is often vacillating in his conduct, even in those cases where he acts with vigour; so much so, that, even with great confidence in his good intentions, we do not place full reliance on his future conduct. And the cause is to be attributed not so much, as has been remarked, to any weakness in the will, *in itself considered*, as to the want of proportion between that and other parts of the mind. In other words, the passions have become predominant; an inflammatory violence has been infused into them by nature or by accidental circumstances; and

the Will, whatever may have been its original vigour, has become subordinate in its influence.—Have we not an illustration of these statements in the life of the Scottish poet Burns? It is undeniable, that he naturally possessed more vigour of purpose, more energy of resolve, than many other persons; but such was the inordinate intensity of his passions, that the power of his Will was *relatively* weak; it could not withstand and control those internal tempests to which he was subject.

§ 175. Instances of want of energy of the will.

Having made these general statements concerning weakness or inefficiency of the Will (both that which is original or natural, and that which is relative and depends upon the inordinate strength of some parts of our emotive or passional nature), we now proceed to give some further instances of that want of voluntary energy which has been spoken of. Do we not often discover a defect of this kind in men in public life? How many instances are recorded in history of men who have been thrown upon the stormy ocean of politics, fitted with every capability for such a situation, with the exception of volitional energy; but who, burdened with this single defect, have at last gone down and been overwhelmed in the billows! Was not the pre-eminent mind of Cicero, capable as it was of penetrating all the mazes of philosophy, and of embracing all the heights and depths of civil and public law, greatly wanting in decision, in energy, in the firm and unshaken resolve? Although unspeakably in the advance in other respects, would it not in this particular suffer in comparison with the energetic purpose of Brutus and the Cæsars?—There is a name of no small note in English history, which is naturally brought to recollection in connexion with these views, as an instance of versatility, founded not so much upon incapacity of the understanding as upon imbecility and changeableness of the will. We refer to the Duke of Buckingham, who figured so conspicuously in the

reign of Charles II., and who, in the language of Dryden,

> "Was everything by starts, and nothing long;
> But, in the course of one revolving moon,
> Was chymist, fiddler, statesman, and buffoon."

Some of the prominent leaders in the French Revolution, that remarkable period of political tempest, showed themselves unequal to the occasion, and were overwhelmed in the convulsions which they contributed to arouse, but were unable to control. Were not the ministers Necker and Roland, whose relations to that memorable event are too well known to require a recital, instances and proofs of this remark? Of Claviere also, one of the associates of Roland, it was remarked by Mirabeau, who was intimately acquainted with him, that "he was a man in head *and a child in heart;* that he always wanted a regulator; and that, left to himself, he never ceased to vary." Of De Graves, the successor of Narbonne, and who was required, in consequence of his situation and age, to furnish the list of the Roland ministry, it is said by a writer already repeatedly referred to, that "no man was less qualified to take a part *in a stormy administration.* He was an honest man, and his heart was good; he was a stranger to all party feeling, but was weak both in body and mind; he was not deficient in acquirements, and laboured hard; but he *wanted energy of character, and a firm will of his own.*"*— The mere possession of intellectual power is not enough to fit a person to take a leading part in the government of a nation, but it is necessary that he should add to distinguished powers of perception and reasoning a corresponding energy of the Will. How many, in consequence of not possessing powers of the Will commensurate with those of the Understanding, have become giddy on the pinnacle of their elevation, and have arisen only to fall!

* Dumont's Recollections of Mirabeau, chaps. xv., xix.

§ 176. Remarks on great strength of the will.

But there are instances of a different kind from those which have just been mentioned; instances, so far from weakness, that we clearly discover in them remarkable power of the will. It cannot be doubted that, among the various elements which constitute whatever is great and admirable in man, we find one here, viz., in marked decision and vigour of the will. If, in some cases, the will seems hardly to have an existence, in others it exhibits a transcendent degree of energy. There have been men who, in danger and suffering, have shown a vigour that was calculated to excite the strongest emotions; who have been inflexible, while others have been changed with every varying breeze; and have possessed themselves in stability and calmness, while many around them have been shaken in their resolutions and disquieted with fears. Of this marked decision and energy of the Will we now proceed, in addition to some cases already introduced for another purpose, to give some illustrations.

§ 177. Energy of the will under bodily suffering.

When occupied with the general subject of the power of the will, we had occasion to make the remark that the patience which was not unfrequently exhibited in circumstances of bodily suffering, indicated the existence of such power in a greater or less degree. We might with propriety appeal to instances of the same kind, in order to show with what varieties of intensity the volitional power is dispensed to different individuals. It is often said, however, when we refer to cases of this kind, that men will calmly endure almost anything when they cannot help it. But, in answer to this suggestion, it is enough to say, that there are cases where men suffer by their own act and their own choice; and not merely in a slight manner, but in the highest degree.—The story of the Roman soldier, Mutius Scævola, so familiar to the classical student, shows us what astonishing powers of will are possessed by some persons. When required

by Porsena to explain certain intimations of danger which he had obscurely thrown out, and being threatened with extreme suffering in case of a refusal, he calmly thrust his right hand into a fire which had been kindled for the purpose of a sacrifice, and steadily held it there burning in the flames, for the sole purpose of giving the Etrurian king, who was at that time at war with the Romans, to understand that he was not a person to be influenced by fear or intimidated by suffering.—Is not an act of this kind, either by this person or by others, to be regarded as a decisive and remarkable instance of volitional energy; showing most clearly that, while power is truly and emphatically appropriate to the Will, it does not exist in all persons in an equal degree, but is conferred more richly on some than on others?

There is a similar instance in the life of Archbishop Cranmer. In an unguarded and unhappy hour he had subscribed to doctrines which he did not believe; an act which he afterward deeply repented of, as the greatest miscarriage of his life. And when he was subsequently led to the stake, he stretched out the hand which had been the instrument in this false and discreditable subscription, and without betraying, either by his countenance or motions, the least sign of weakness or even of feeling (such are the very words of the historian), he held it in the flames till it was entirely consumed.

§ 178. Energy of the will as shown in imminent danger.

Diversities in the strength and energy of the will are clearly seen in all cases of imminent and sudden danger, particularly danger of death. The fear of death is as natural to man as the love of life; and but few men can be suddenly exposed to death, especially if it appear to be inevitable, without experiencing a shrinking back from it. We find some persons, however, who have such energy of purpose, such remarkable decision and firmness, that they meet it, not merely as it comes in the milder arrangements of

Providence, but in its most horrid and violent forms, with entire calmness, and even seek it as something desirable. The Roman Decii voluntarily devoted themselves to death for their country. Regulus, when he had been made a prisoner by the Carthaginians, of his own accord took a course, safe and honourable, as he supposed, for Rome, but which he clearly foresaw (and the result even more than realized his anticipations) would be attended with extreme cruelty and destruction to himself. In the dreadful wars of modern times, which have carried sorrow and desolation over Europe and America, how often have we heard of deeds and enterprises of valour, which have excited our admiration in view of the wonderful energy of purpose they have displayed, at the same time that we deeply lamented the occasions that called them forth. In the war of La Vendée, the celebrated Kleber called an officer to him for whom he had a particular esteem and friendship. "Take," said he to his military friend, "a company of grenadiers; stop the enemy before that ravine; you will be killed, but you will save your comrades." "I shall do it, general," replied the officer, with as much calmness as if he had been required to perform a simple military evolution. He fulfilled his word, and arrested the enemy's progress, but perished in the achievement.

But it is not the soldier alone who has exhibited this energy of purpose amid the imminent danger of death. Not unfrequently have the philanthropist and the Christian Missionary placed themselves in situations where extreme suffering, and even death itself, seemed to be inevitable. They have not only had the resolution to leave their country and home, but to plunge into dungeons, to walk on their errands of mercy amid pestilential atmospheres, to wander through pathless forests, and over burning sands and precipitous mountains. In the boundless forests of North and South America; on the shores of the Nile and the Ganges, and on the banks of solitary streams unknown to civilized man; in frozen Greenland and

amid the burning sands of Africa; wherever there is ignorance to be enlightened, or sorrow to be soothed, or souls to be saved, their labours and suffering, and oftentimes their triumphant deaths, have shown, not merely the sincerity of their belief, but the mighty strength of purpose which is lodged in the Will, and especially when it is harmonized with the will of God.

§ 179. Energy of the will as shown in martyrdoms.

Diversities in the power of the Will are quickly discovered, not only in the situations just referred to, of exposure to imminent danger, but in all extraordinary and trying situations whatever. Whenever we open a book of war, of famine, of pestilence, or of martyrdoms, and read in it the conduct of men under these terrible inflictions, we open and read a new and most interesting chapter in the philosophy of the human mind. It is impossible for a person to read the history of Martyrdoms, in particular, without entertaining a deep regard and admiration for the sufferers, founded not merely upon considerations connected with the cause of their sufferings and death, but also upon the moral sublimity of their fixed and immutable resolve. It may indeed be said, and said with truth, that they were supported by religious faith and hope. We may rest assured, nevertheless, that the cases of marked and decisive triumph over bodily suffering, such as we are now noticing, were, for the most part, those of persons who possessed an original and innate energy of the Will. It is true that they were enabled to endure a great increase of suffering with the aids of religion; but they were, for the most part, persons who could have firmly and triumphantly endured much suffering without it. It was this combination of original energy of character with the blessed aids of religion, that supported Jerome of Prague, who sung hymns as he went to the place of execution, embraced the stake with cheerfulness, and, when the executioner went behind him to set fire to the fagots, exclaimed, "Come here and kindle it be-

fore my eyes; for, had I been afraid of it, I had not come here, having had so many opportunities to escape."

It was this combination of communicated faith and natural energy which has characterized other historical instances.—Maccail, one of the Scotch Covenant preachers, was subjected in the year 1666 to the torture, which, in reference to the process gone through, is called in Scotland the boots. The torturers place a kind of iron boot close on the leg of the sufferer, and then drive wedges between this and the leg. Maccail, who had been a sincere and conscientious preacher of the doctrines of Christ as he understood them, was compelled to undergo this dreadful form of suffering; but, supported by a strong faith and an indomitable will, he remained true to his principles and his cause, although he expired under the process; a man who may be said to have been triumphant in the moment of his destruction. His last words, uttered in the very moments of death, and with a distinct and impressive voice, are very remarkable; perhaps, when we consider the peculiar circumstances of the case, a mind in glory and a body in ruins, they are as much so as any words in all history. "Farewell, sun, moon, and stars. Farewell, kindred and friends. Farewell, world and time. Farewell, weak and frail body. Welcome, eternity. Welcome, angels and saints. Welcome, the Saviour of the world. And welcome, God, the judge of all."*

§ 180. Subject illustrated from two classes of public speakers.

In this connexion we are naturally led to make the remark, that there are not only some situations, but some arts and callings in life, in which a high degree of decision and energy of the will is absolutely necessary to success. Among other arts (we do not propose to mention all of them where this trait seems to be especially requisite), a high degree of voluntary energy is exceedingly important to that of the orator.

* Bishop Burnet's History of his own Time, Reign of Charles II.

And we are here furnished with grounds of distinction and comparison between men of eloquence. There are some public speakers who greatly fail in efficiency of the Will. Possessed of intellectual powers that command the admiration of all, they are still acknowledged to have a weak point here. When they arise to speak in public, they have a clear perception of the subject of debate; and if there are any exciting elements in it, their passions are enkindled, and the texture of their argument is rendered heated and radiant with the flame. The strong workings of the sensibilities are seen in the agitated nerves, the violent gesticulation, and the contortions of the muscles. And we might expect great results, were it not that the presiding power of the will, upon which, under such circumstances, everything depends, is not equal to the occasion. The voluntary power staggers upon its throne. They lose the control of themselves; so that the mind, freighted as it is with thought and argument, is violently driven about, like a ship caught in a whirlwind.

But there are other public speakers, who combine a high degree of intellectual ability with a no less signal energy of the Will. On the occasions of public debate, however momentous, they arise with perfect calmness. The class of persons whom we now have in view are not without passion. On the contrary, the passions exist in a decided degree, and are capable of being aroused and of being impregnated with tremendous energy. But under no circumstances do they permit the passions to be so aroused as to reject and annul the supervision and control of the higher power of the will. They at times permit them to operate, so far as may be necessary to infuse vitality and vigour into the intellect; but always hold them, even in their highest exercises, amenable to the effective superintendence of volition. Accordingly, when they consider it as suiting their purpose, they let them loose, and at once their voice and all the other methods of oratorical communication become the indices

and expositors of the tempest that is raging within. If it suits their purpose better, they suddenly call to their aid the supremacy of the volitional power; all outward agitation ceases; a calm succeeds to the tempest; there is nothing perceptible but quiet dignity and unruffled self-possession; the passions, rebuked and quelled by a higher authority, retire into the secret recesses of the soul:

"Imperio premit, ac vinclis et carcere frænat."

§ 181. Power of the will requisite in the military and other arts.

There are other situations and callings in life, in which power of the will is an essential requisite to success. This is particularly true of military life. There never was a great commander who had not great energy of volition. It is not to be supposed, because a man stands unmoved and calm in the day of battle, even in its most terrible onsets, that he is naturally destitute either of fear or of the love of life. If this is sometimes the case, it is certainly not always so. And where such is undoubtedly the fact, it is not to be regarded as evidence of greatness, but rather of obtuseness and hebetude of character. That sort of courage which consists in mere dulness and immobility of feeling may answer well enough for a common soldier, but the trait of a great commander, in addition to great intellectual power, is energy of the Will, or what we more commonly express by the term *self-command*. He keeps not only his fears, but his hopes also, in subjection; and the imperturbable calmness he discovers is not to be regarded as a proof of the absence of fear, or hope, or joy, or sorrow, or anger, but merely as an indication that he keeps those emotions and passions under complete control.

Similar remarks will apply to those who are exposed to the dangers and perplexities of a seafaring life, particularly such as are sent out on voyages of exploration and discovery. If a high degree of energy of the Will is essential to the character of men who are required to fill leading military stations, it is

not less essential to those who, like Columbus, and De Gama, and Cooke, and La Perouse, are destined to discover and explore new worlds. And hence, when persons are to be selected for such expeditions, the inquiry with their employers always is, not merely is he a man of intellect and of education, but is he a man of decision and firmness? Can he stand unmoved and self-possessed in trying and unexpected situations? Is he able, with entire and manifest coolness, to meet danger, and pain, and even death itself?

§ 182. Energy of the will requisite in the men of revolutions.

A higher degree of voluntary power than is allotted to the great mass of mankind, seems to be requisite in those who are destined to take a leading part in those great moral, religious, and political revolutions which have from time to time agitated the face of the world. It is no easy task to change the opinions of men, to check and subdue vices which have become prevalent, or to give a new aspect and impulse to religion and liberty. The men who take a lead in these movements are, in general, men of decision and firmness; no others would answer the purpose. If the gentle spirit of Melancthon had been placed in the precise position occupied by Luther, would the great event of the Protestant Reformation have been urged forward with the same impetus and to the same issues?—When society becomes greatly unsettled, either in its religious or political aspects; when there is a heaving and tossing to and fro; a removal of the old landmarks, and a breaking up of the old foundations, then it is that men, not merely of intellect, but of decision and energy (sagacious, cool, decided, persevering, resolute), find their way upward to the summit of the conflicting elements, and subject them to their guidance. Such is the natural course of things; such men are needed, and no others are capable of taking their place; and they become, almost of necessity, the advisers and leaders in the nascent order of society. The prominent leaders, therefore, in every great re-

ligious or political revolution, will be found to illustrate the fact, that there are original and marked differences in the degree of power which is appropriate to the will.

Look, as an illustration of the subject, at the men who presided at the events of the great English Revolution of 1640, particularly the Puritans; men of the stamp of the Vanes, Hampdens, and Fleetwoods; who, in embarking in the convulsions of that stormy period, had a twofold object in view, the security of political liberty and the attainment of religious freedom! Were they weak men? Were they men wanting in fortitude? Were they uncertain and flexible, vacillating and double-minded? History gives an emphatic answer to these questions. It informs us that they entered into the contest for the great objects just now referred to with a resolution which nothing could shake; with an immutability of purpose resembling the decrees of unalterable destiny. It was in the strength of such determined resolution that they broke in pieces the throne of England; trampled under foot her ancient and powerful aristocracy; erected the standard of religious liberty; and by their wisdom and energy not only overthrew the enemies of freedom at home, but made the name of their country honoured and terrible throughout the earth.

§ 183. Practical application of these views.

The statements and reasonings of this and preceding chapters seem to us satisfactorily to show, that POWER, in the strict and real sense of the term, is an attribute of the mind as a whole; that it is truly an attribute of the Will also; and that, as an attribute of the Will, it exists in different degrees in different individuals. And it is proper to add here, that these views admit of a practical application, from which no person whatever ought to consider himself exempt. We are too apt to estimate and limit the degree of our accountability by the amount of our *intellectual* powers. But it cannot be doubted that this is a

ground of estimate too restricted. We are to inquire, also, whether our Maker has not seen fit to give us a large share of natural fortitude and decision? Whether he has not endued us with powers of the Will, which, under a suitable direction, might be available for our own good and that of others? And if we find it to be so, we may be assured that somewhere within the sphere of our location and action in life there are duties which require this precise kind of talents, for the performance of which they were undoubtedly given. Let us, then, carefully study ourselves, and learn, in view of the possession of our great and varied powers, what our adorable Maker would have us to do.

CHAPTER IV.

CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER.

§ 184. Connexion of the will with consistency of character.

THE philosophical analysis of the Will, which we have now in a great degree completed, may contribute to various practical results. Some of them we have already noticed, and, among other things, we may confidently assert, that we find in the nature and operations of the Will the basis of CONSISTENCY OF CHARACTER, which is certainly one of the most interesting as well as important mental traits. There is a well-written and popular Essay of Mr. Foster upon Decision of Character; a subject, although it is intimately connected with the doctrine of the will, on which we do not propose to touch except incidentally. We refer to that Essay, which exhausts in a great degree the subject of Decision of Character, merely for the purpose of saying, if indeed it can be necessary to suggest a caution of that kind, that it is important not to confound consistency with mere decision; for, although they approximate and resemble in some respects, they are obviously remote from each other and different in other respects. Decision is more limited; consistency embraces a wider range of opera-

tions. Decision relates to one thing, or, at least, may be shown clearly and distinctly in one thing; consistency relates to many. The appropriate sphere of decision of character is found in some perplexing but definite emergency, and, of course, it generally manifests itself in the performance of particular acts. Consistency, on the contrary, can never be shown from the course taken in a particular emergency, without taking into consideration the conduct of the person in other situations; but developes and proves itself from the tenor of his conduct in a long series of events. Decision implies a condensed and inspirited energy put forth in the crisis of a day or an hour; consistency implies a condensation, and, if we may be allowed the expression, a *tension* of purpose, kept firm and immoveable for years, and even a whole life.

There are some men who may not altogether be wanting in decision, but who exhibit a species of mental restlessness, an uncertainty of regard and affection, an inequality of temper, and an inconstancy of conduct, which seems to be inconsistent with the just claims of a percipient and moral nature. If we do not err in our estimate of the capabilities of human nature, it is in the power of all, who are in the full possession of their faculties, to check this inordinate restlessness, to regulate in a great degree this inequality, to establish and to render certain this inconstancy and uncertainty; and it is certainly unnecessary to urge the importance of doing it. The man of naturally small intellect renders himself ridiculous, as well as unhappy, by capriciousness and inconstancy; by such a course he hides or destroys the single talent that is given him; while the man who possesses originality and vigour of intellect, and who might make them of great account for the good of his fellow-men, loses for the same reason the confidence which would be otherwise reposed in him, and becomes comparatively useless.

§ 185. Illustrations of the inconsistent character.

We shall perhaps obtain a more full and precise idea of consistency of character if we look at the person who is without it. The inconsistent man projects a plan of operations to-day; to-morrow he makes preparations to carry it into effect; and the next day he abandons it. He proclaims his friendship for this or that individual; eulogizes their merits, without much discrimination, on every opportunity, suitable or unsuitable; but suddenly he becomes suspicious, recalls his eulogiums, and ends in hatred. He adopts the principles of some literary, political, or religious sect, defends them with great zeal for a short time, and then rejects them with contempt. And it is impossible, from any assertions he may make or any course he may pursue at the present moment, to divine what doctrines he will maintain or what course he will take hereafter. In the language of Bruyère, "a man unequal in his temper is several men in one; he multiplies himself as often as he changes his taste and manners; he is not this minute what he was the last, and will not be the next what he is now; he is his own successor; ask not of what complexion he is, but what are his complexions; nor of what humour, but how many sorts of humour has he. Are you not deceived? Is it *Eutichrates* whom you meet? How cold he is to-day! Yesterday he sought you, and caressed you, and made his friends jealous of you. Does he remember you? Tell him your name."

§ 186. Illustrations of the consistent character.

The consistent man is directly the reverse. He may be less prompt and rapid in his movements, but he ordinarily exhibits more discretion. And when he has once come to a conclusion as to what course is best to be pursued, he goes forward to the accomplishment of his object with perseverance and success. He may be somewhat cautious in forming friendships, but he is equally so in breaking them up and terminating them. He endeavours to perform what he

considers to be his duty after a full examination of a subject, and is not discouraged, and angry, and turbulent if he happens to meet with disappointments. He looks calmly on the changes of life, neither much elated by prosperity, nor depressed by adversity. He does not make his principles bend to his circumstances, but conscientiously and firmly maintains them under all changes of fortune. If he is poor in outward wealth, he is rich in inward consolation; if he is sometimes filled with sorrow, he is not harassed with the tenfold wretchedness of remorse; and if he is destitute and unhonoured, he is never contemptible. —Such is the consistent man when guided by the sentiments of virtue. Such, among other illustrious names abounding both in profane and sacred history, was Socrates. It was his consistency of character which shed such a lustre over the name and life of that wisest of the sons of Athens.

Other men may have possessed equal talents and have been equally conspicuous; but they had not the same consistency; a consistency the more remarkable, as it was sustained not only against outward pressures, but against no small share of inward evils. It is this trait in particular which has rendered the ethical teacher of the ancients so pre-eminently entitled to the rank which he holds. In almost every possible situation that could test his principles or try his patience, he was unaltered. He retained the same high principles of virtue, the same meekness, and kindness, and cheerfulness, the same unfeigned disposition to promote the good of his country and of all mankind, amid great poverty, amid ingratitude, and rebuke, and calumny, in prison, and in death itself. Had he decidedly failed in a single position, had he subjected his principles to some temporary convenience even for one short hour, it would have tarnished forever the glory of his good name.

§ 187. Of individuals remarkable for consistency of character.

And if we come down to our own times and our

own country, is it not the same? What is it that imparts its deathless splendour to the name of Washington? It is the same consistency of character. In that well-balanced and noble mind, each desire and passion was compelled to keep its place. He never allowed them to usurp an undue dominion, and to drag his Will hither and thither against the dictates of his Conscience. He had but one rule of conduct, that of an enlightened moral sense. Hence his life was not, at different periods, at variance with, and dissevered from, itself, but was one throughout, constituting from beginning to end (at least as compared with that of the great mass of mankind) a resplendent and unchangeable unity of excellence.

We have often thought that the life of Lafayette, the friend and associate of Washington, was an interesting illustration of this subject. Having seen in his youth the miseries of a government which is not based on just fundamental laws, he naturally felt a sympathy for those, wherever they might be, who were struggling for liberty. It was not, however, the licentiousness of a mob which had any charms for him; but freedom controlled by law, the union of liberty and order. The promotion of these was always the great object of his life, steadily and openly pursued in almost every possible variety of trying situation. At one time the idol of the populace, at another doomed by them to the scaffold; at one time the prominent and leading man of his nation, and soon after a detested fugitive and exile; to-day the admired inmate of palaces, to-morrow the resident of a dungeon; in poverty and in wealth, in joy and in sorrow, in honour and in degradation, under the old monarchy, the republic, the empire, and the constitutional monarchy, in the Old World and the New, in the field of battle and amid the debates of the senate, when everything around him had changed and everything in his own personal situation, he still steadily and cheerfully pursued the same noble object, uniting with delightful harmony the end with the beginning, and identified,

more than anything else, by THE UNCHANGEABLE IDENTITY OF HIS PRINCIPLES.

§ 188. Of the value of consistency in the religious character.

If consistency gives nearly its whole beauty to the character of men in the political sphere and also in the ordinary transactions of life, it is certainly not less fitted to adorn and to honour in the discharge of the various duties of religion. Probably no directions in the Holy Scriptures (not always given in express terms, but often indirectly and by implication) are more frequent than those which require us to possess and exhibit consistency of religious character. This requisition is implied more or less in all those passages which exhort us to labour and not to faint, to bear with patience, not to be soon shaken in mind, and to persevere unto the end. When we lack wisdom, we are directed by an Apostle to "ask in faith, nothing wavering; for he that *wavereth* is like a wave of the sea, driven by the wind and tossed. For let not that man think that he shall receive anything of the Lord. *A double-minded man is unstable in all his ways.*" Again and again, Christians are commanded to watch, to stand fast, to continue grounded and settled in the faith, not to be moved away from the hope of the Gospel, and to hold fast their profession without wavering.

It is melancholy to see how much the conduct of those who would not be thought to be wanting in true Christian feeling varies with circumstances. The performance of the most plain and obvious duty (for instance, that of prayer) is unwisely and wickedly made to depend upon a thousand contingencies, as some transient doubt or fear, to which all men are subject, some trifling worldly disappointment, some slight affection of the nervous system, a keen and uncomfortable atmosphere, the wind blowing in a particular direction, a bright and beaming sun, or a sky overcast with clouds. Many religious persons decline doing what it is obviously their duty to do, because, as they

allege, they are not in the right *frame;* in other words, because their hearts are not sufficiently quickened and enlivened; not considering that the laws of God and the requisitions of duty are as much binding upon the will and the moral powers as upon the desires and affections. When the desires, including the affections, are asleep, or are tending the wrong way, we may still find within us abundant elements of action in the will and the conscience. And just so long as the faculty of the will remains to us, and, at the same time, the moral nature, by pointing out a certain course to be pursued, furnishes a basis or occasion for the will's action, no excuse of dulness and worldliness of the affections can possibly avail. Men may always be morally bound to do up to the limit of what they *can* do; and if their feelings (we speak not of the moral feelings, but merely of the desires and affections in themselves considered) do not come up to the standard of their actions, that may be their *sin*, as it undoubtedly is, but not their excuse. Not that we mean to approve, by any means, a cold and heartless performance of religious duties; but merely to assert, that there are elements in our nature which are sufficient to keep the conduct steady, and which ought to keep it steady, to the pursuit of the great objects of a religious life, amid the fluctuations of feeling to which men are so exposed. A depressed and suffering condition of the physical system may for a time infuse a gloom and darkness into our religious affections; but so long as our perceptions of truth remain clear, and our moral sensibilities are awake, and the faculty of the will is continued to us, we remain under an obligation, as binding and as urgent as ever, to hold on our way, to trust in God, to press forward towards the mark, to fulfil faithfully every obvious duty, "cast down but not destroyed, faint yet pursuing."

§ 189. Of the foundation or basis of consistency and inconsistency of character.

The statements of this chapter thus far go to show

what consistency of character is, of what importance it is, and what beauty and interest it throws over the whole life. Now if consistency of character is at once so full of beauty and utility, while the opposite trait of character is in an equal degree remote from both, being as deformed in its aspect as it is detrimental in its results, it is important to inquire into the cause both of the one and the other. And we think it must be obvious, on a very limited reflection, that they are both based upon one and the same mental power, viz., the Will. And it is in consequence of this that we introduce this subject in connexion with the examination of the will.—If the will be decisive and energetic, the conduct will be essentially consistent; if the will be vacillating and weak, we may naturally expect that the vacillation of the mind will infuse itself into the outward life, and stamp it with inconsistency.

"When I look at the *mind* of Lord Bacon," says Cecil, "it seems vast, original, penetrating, analogical, beyond all competition. When I look at his *character* [by which this writer appears to mean his outward life], it is wavering, shuffling, mean."* That the character, or outward and practical life of Lord Bacon, was essentially what it is here represented to be, is generally thought to be true; but the cause of this meanness, and wavering, and shuffling, so far as it really existed, is not to be sought for in his intellectual powers, for in that respect he was undoubtedly vast and original, as Cecil represents him, and penetrating and analogical, beyond all competition. The secret is to be detected, not in the structure of his intellect, or the mere percipient part of his nature, but in the natural weakness of his will, as compared with the intensity of his desires and passions. And so of other cases of marked inconsistency of life. There is probably not one, with the exception to be mentioned in the next section, which does not involve the fact of a constitutional or a relative weakness of the will.

* Remains of Rev. Richard Cecil.—Remarks on Authors.

§ 190. Of inconsistency of belief in connexion with inconsistency of conduct and character.

We are aware there is some ground for the remark here, that inconsistency of conduct is not to be ascribed wholly to a defect in the power or the regulation of the will, but is owing, in part at least, to inconsistencies in the power of *belief*. There are some men who are constantly undergoing changes in their speculative views; whose minds, in the strong language of Foster, "are a CARAVANSERA of opinions, entertained a while, and then sent on pilgrimage." These frequent changes will of course be attended with correspondent changes and inconsistencies of conduct. So that undue versatility of conduct is not always to be ascribed to a defect in the regulation of the will, but often to an inordinate facility and changeableness of belief. In connexion with this aspect of human nature, which is undoubtedly one of no small interest, a few remarks are to be made.

In the first place, we admit it to be true and undeniable that there are some men who have this strange facility of belief, which in its results attaches them successively to opinions and systems diametrically opposite in their import. And, furthermore, we may well suppose that, in some of these cases, the cause of this peculiarity of mind is a constitutional and natural one. They labour under the difficulty of a constitutional weakness or defect of mind in this particular. Without checking their belief by the suggestions of the most ordinary degree of caution, without taking any note of dates, characters, and circumstances, they eagerly receive and digest the most glaring and ridiculous improbabilities. In respect to these persons, we may admit that their inconsistency of conduct is not be *ultimately* ascribed to a defect in the exercises of the will.

But, in the second place, we shall find in many, and perhaps a majority of cases of great vacillancy and changes in the belief, that the ground or cause of such multiplied changes is not a constitutional imbecility

of the belief itself, but is to be sought for in the *will*, and in that very trait or characteristic of the will which is the basis of such inconsistencies in other respects. That is to say, the change in the position of the mind, which is undergone, commences in the will, and the belief is afterward brought to correspond to the new direction which has been taken by the voluntary power. A man, for instance, who is wanting in firmness of purpose, is urgently addressed by another person of a different party or creed. Placed in this situation, he feels the little voluntary strength which he possesses beginning to break up or give way; and very soon, as if he were a helpless victim wholly in the power of another, he is carried over to the new party or creed, and deserts both his old doctrines and his old friends. He is not convinced nor satisfied; on the contrary, he feels himself greatly dishonoured; but as he soon finds he cannot retreat, but must remain in his new position, whether he is pleased with it or not, he sets about searching for arguments to justify him in the course he has taken. A thousand influences are now at work which were dormant before; his reputation, his interests, his pride, all throw their weight in favour of certain decisions of the understanding at variance with its former conclusions; and by this rapid and powerful process, so evidently unfavourable to a true view of a subject, his intellect is soon brought up into a line with the new position of his will, and he stands justified in his own estimation as a consistent person, though it may be in nobody's else. So that it still remains good, as a general statement, that the basis of consistency or the opposite is to be sought for in the character and discipline of the will.

§ 191. Self-possession an element of consistency of character.

But it will be seen more distinctly and fully that consistency of character has its basis chiefly in the condition and discipline of the will, when we consider some of those things which are more or less implied or embraced in such consistency. It is beyond

all question that one and a marked element in consistency of character is *self-possession or self-government.* A consistent person has, of course, some fixed principles by which his conduct is regulated, and some great objects before him (or, at least, what he considers such) towards which his efforts tend. His consistency is chiefly exhibited by his acting upon these principles and steadily pursuing these objects. But not unfrequently there are circumstances occurring which come unexpectedly, and which, coming in this unexpected manner, greatly try the strength of his resolutions. If he has not an entire *self-possession;* if he cannot wholly control himself in such seasons of sudden temptation and trial, he is, of course, liable to be driven off from the ground of his principles, as well as diverted from the great object of his pursuit, and thus to forfeit his character for consistency. It is highly important, therefore, if we would possess the rich reward and the high honour of a consistent course through life, that the business, and events, and trials of our present state, instead of driving us hither and thither, and exercising an arbitrary sway over us, should be made subject to ourselves; that our own minds should have the mastery, the pre-eminence, the control over events. But this ability of remaining firm and self-possessed in all such emergencies implies more or less of power and discipline of the will. And if consistency of character is a truly valuable trait, which gives beauty while it increases the worth of all other traits and attainments, we have a reason here, and a powerful one too, why we should endeavour to understand the nature of the will, and the means of strengthening and regulating it.

§ 192. Perseverance under changes of circumstances a second element.

As consistency of character involves the fact of a series of actions, extending over a greater or less length of time, there is necessarily implied, as another element in such a character, a disposition to *persevere* in the course which has been once adopted, un-

der all those various changes of circumstances which are found always to attend the progress of human affairs. But there is a great difference in this respect. When the truly consistent man has once placed before him some object as decidedly worthy of his pursuit, he presses towards it with an inflexible and ever-advancing step; he is not frightened at every lion that stands, or is supposed to stand, in his path; if difficulties suddenly come in his way, perhaps many in number, and rising one above another in magnitude, his courage and resolution swell upward in proportion, and pass easily over their summit.—But it is altogether different with the man who does not possess this character for consistency. He does indeed place before him some object to be obtained, and he enters upon the pursuit of it with ardour; but from the beginning he pursues a zigzag and irregular course; alternately advancing and retreating; the obstacles he meets with, whether from within or from without, perplex his resolutions, and finally turn him wholly from his purpose.

But what is necessary to that perseverance, without which there can be no consistency of character? Obviously strength of will; either a natural strength, or a vigour infused into it by a course of discipline. So that we see in this respect, as well as in others, how closely the important subject of consistency of character is connected with the doctrine of the will.

§ 193. Consistency implies a control over the passions.

Among other things which are implied in consistency of character is a *control of the passions.* Although this ability may, with some reason, appear to be involved in self-possession or self-government, yet it is worthy of a distinct notice by itself. Frequent and violent ebullitions of passion will necessarily mar and destroy the order and harmony of one's life. It is obviously ordered in Providence that we are placed in a world where trials constantly beset us; where griefs, and joys, and tears, and smiles come

mingled together, not merely to render us either sad or happy, but to try, to purify, and to discipline the soul. How beautiful, and even sublime, it is to bear in patience the evils which are our allotment, while we learn in quietude and thankfulness the salutary lessons they impart! It cannot be doubted that a patient spirit, in the circumstances in which we are placed, is absolutely necessary to that propriety and evenness of deportment which is implied in consistency of character. No one can pursue the regular and even tenor of his way, on a path so beset with inequalities as that of human life, who is not able to guide and to subdue the storms, whether of anger or impatience, which at times arise in every one's bosom. When, in the providence of God, we are made the subjects of various sorrows, it is our duty to bear them without murmuring. When we are injured by our enemies and are angry with them, it is still our duty to forgive and to bless them. But how can we possibly do this? In what way can we quell our impatience and subdue our anger, if there be not, distinct from the passions and altogether above them, another and authoritative power, to which they can be compelled to render obedience?

It may perhaps be said, in all these cases, that we are not obliged to throw ourselves on the volitional power, because we have the power of the conscience, the ability implanted within us, to judge of the right and wrong. But it should be kept in mind that the act of conscience is merely advisory or consultative; that it merely pronounces a thing to be just or unjust, merely approves or disapproves; and that, without some other power to carry its decisions to their appropriate results, it would be wholly without effect. The whole topic, therefore, of consistency of character (one of the most practical and interesting that can be presented to our notice) is closely, and even inseparably, connected with the doctrine of the nature, powers, and laws of the Will. This, however, is only one instance of the applications of this great subject, which will be

found to weave itself into every variety and aspect of the philosophy of human conduct. So that we may say, in a single word, that it is impossible for us to have a correct understanding of the elements, and operations, and diversities of human nature, in its various aspects, both of feeling and action, without an acquaintance, and a *thorough* acquaintance too, with the nature of the Will.

CHAPTER V.

DISCIPLINE OF THE WILL.

§ 194. Importance of a due discipline of the will.

In all the various treatises having relation to mental discipline that have from time to time issued from the press, while much has been said of the discipline of the memory, the reasoning power, the imagination, and other intellectual powers, but little has been said of the discipline of the affections, and still less of that of the Will. It seems even to have been imagined that the volitional power, in consequence perhaps of its acknowledged pre-eminence and control over the other powers, is placed in a sphere so entirely distinct and remote as not to be approached in the way of discipline. And when we consider what ignorance and misconception of this part of our nature has prevailed, it is not surprising, on the whole, that such a notion, erroneous and prejudicial as it is, should have obtained currency. But if the views hitherto given in the preceding chapters be correct, we shall see that the discipline of the will is not an unmeaning proposition, and that it is as important as it is practicable. Of the importance of this discipline it will not be necessary to say much, after what has just been remarked on the subject of consistency of character. If a man would sustain himself with any sort of credit amid the storms which blow from every point of the compass; if he would covet the reputation of possessing any fixedness of belief or of acting on any fixed-

ness of plan, it is certain that he must have within himself a regulative power. And this regulative power, in order to meet and sustain the requisitions that are made upon it, must be strengthened in every possible way.

In these views of the importance of the discipline and culture of the Will, we are happy to find ourselves sustained by the authority of an eminent writer, whose opinions would be entitled to great weight on a matter far less obvious.—"The faculty of the Will requires not only to be directed aright in infant life, but to be fortified and strengthened by a course of exercise and discipline, as much as any faculty whatever. This we may say as physiologists; but as moralists we may speak a bolder language, and maintain that it demands the spur and trammel of education even more than all the other faculties put together, since it is designed by nature to be the governing power, and to exercise an absolute sway over the rest, even over the desire itself, by which, however, it is moved on all ordinary occasions."*

§ 195. A due balance of all the powers the most favourable state of things to the just exercise of the will.

In this connexion, and as preparatory to what we have further to say in this chapter, we are led to make the remark, that the most favourable occasion for the action of any mental power is to be found in the exact adjustment and harmony of the mental powers generally. When they are all in their natural place, when they are all properly and precisely adjusted in reference to each other, without any of that interference and jarring which always result from a transgression of their natural limits, they may all be expected to act vigorously, because there is nothing in the way of their thus acting; all obstructions, at least all *extrinsic* obstructions, are removed; and we may reasonably anticipate, that whatever ability they possess will be put forth to the full extent of its exist-

* Good's Medicine, NEUROTICA, ORD. I., Gen. vi.

ence, and in the most available and best manner. And, accordingly, we may lay it down as a general principle, that wherever there is perfect harmony in the mind, everything will be right in its action; every exercise of the mind will be in accordance with the truth of things; that is to say, it will be just such as it ought to be.

But every careful observer of human nature (saying nothing of the testimony from Biblical sources) assuredly knows that this is a state of things which, as a general statement at least, does not exist among men. The parts of the human mind, however wonderfully they may have been arranged in the first instance, and whatever realizations of harmony they are capable of attaining to in the future, exhibit at the present time but too mournful evidence of a dislocated and jarring movement; one part of the mind contending against another; the appetites and passions attempting to enforce their claims against the requisitions and authority of conscience; the love of the world, in its various forms of enticement and attraction, earnestly and fiercely contesting against the love of God and of heavenly things. And now it should be kept in mind, that all these forms of violent contest bear directly upon the Will; and it is too often the case, that this higher and controlling power, this great arbiter of the internal conflict, gives its decision in favour of the appetites and against the moral sentiments, in favour of the world and against Him who is the world's creator and ruler. But this is a state of things which ought not to be. And it is truly a great practical question, in what way the energies of the will can be strengthened, and directed to their appropriate and rightful issues. It is admitted that we know the right. And the question is, How shall we obtain strength to do it? How shall we redeem ourselves from our voluntary thraldom, and walk forth in the light of our own conscience and in the smiles of an approving God, regenerated and free? The answer to these questions might be greatly expanded,

but the limits of our plan require us to dismiss the subject, practical and interesting as it is, with some general views given in as few words as possible.

§ 196. Of the culture of the appetites, propensities, and passions, as auxiliary to the discipline of the will.

Keeping in view the general statement, that an entire harmony of the mental powers is a condition of things the most favourable for the perfect exercise of the Will, we are the more fully prepared to enter into the examination of particulars. We proceed, therefore, to remark, that it is highly important, in the discipline of the will, to keep the appetites, propensities, and passions in due subjection. While it is true that the volitions are capable of operating upon these various desires, and that they can check and subdue them both by a direct and indirect action, and particularly by a combination of both, it is likewise not the less true that these appetitive, propensive, and affectional parts of our nature are also capable in their turn of operating on the volitions, and that they do thus operate, although it is not necessary at the present time to enter into any explanation of the precise nature of this reciprocal influence. In other words, there is in the economy of the mind a fixed relation between the two classes of mental states; between the voluntary power or will on the one hand, and the desires, including the propensive and affectional principles, on the other. Each of them has its place; each, in a perfect state of the mind, has its appropriate limits; each has its nature, its object, and its relations. Hence, in order to illustrate the alleged importance of keeping the desires, in their various forms, under suitable control, as a prerequisite to the proper exercise of the will, it seems to be necessary to present but one view. It is a fact, susceptible of as clear demonstration as subjects of this nature generally admit of, that any appetite or propensity whatever, whether it be the desire of mere sensual pleasure, or of knowledge, wealth, or power, which is indulged for

a long time without any restraint (and the same may be said of any one of the passions or affections), ultimately acquires the ascendency, and entirely prostrates, not only the Will, but the whole mind, at its feet. If, therefore, we duly estimate the great object of securing to the will a free, unperplexed, and vigorous action, we shall seriously endeavour, by the use of all those means which have a relation to a result so desirable, to restrain every appetite, propensity, and passion within its due bounds. Whenever they exhibit a disposition to pass the limits which a duly sensitive conscience has prescribed to them, let them be subjected to a rigid supervision and repression. If we permit them to take even one step beyond the sphere which nature has assigned them, we give them a sort of claim on another step and another; and, what is worse, we give them renewed power to enforce it. It is in their very nature, when they have once transgressed, to insist on repeated and continued transgression; and it is impossible effectually to evade their clamorous and unjust demands but by expelling them at once from their position, and bringing them back to the place where they belong.

It remains only to be added, that in the culture of the various forms of desire is to be included not only the repression of those which are evil, but the bringing out and strengthening of those which are good. The amiable and honourable propensities and passions, together with those of a purely religious kind, are entitled to a position in our sentient constitution of the first and highest rank; but how frequently does it happen that they are expelled from their appropriate place, and are compressed into some obscure nook, by the spreading and strengthening of those of a different character? But it is certainly incumbent on every one, who is desirous of securing the great object of freeness, vigour, and rectitude in the mental operations, to make them the subject of special and long-continued attention, to allure them forth into the light, and in every suitable way to accelerate their expansion and enhance their beauty.

§ 197. Some instances and proofs of the foregoing statements.

The subject of the inconsistency of the perfect exercise of the Will, with an undue and unnatural predominance of the appetites and passions, has been particularly introduced to the reader's notice in the chapter on the Slavery of the Will. In that chapter various illustrations and facts were brought forward, and, of course, it is not so necessary at the present time to enter into further illustrations and proofs at much length. A few additional remarks will suffice.

Every one must have observed how destructive to every good resolve and noble effort is the inordinate indulgence of the bodily appetites. When they obtain the ascendency, as they not unfrequently do, they make the unhappy subject of them an entire slave; obscuring his intellect, blunting his conscience, perplexing and overthrowing all his serious and wise determinations, and debasing him to a level but little short of that of the brutes. The unhappy results of such indulgences are so frequently witnessed, that we feel at liberty to pass them by with this mere reference.—But the evil does not rest with the undue indulgence of the appetites alone. Those active principles which, under the name of the propensities and affections, rank decidedly higher in the scale of our sentimentive nature, are hardly less hurtful, when indulged to excess, than excessive bodily appetites. This remark may perhaps be illustrated by a brief reference to the operations of a passion, which is obviously implanted for wise and beneficial purposes, and whose perversions are both less numerous and less injurious than those of some others; we refer to the passion of Fear. If all the various facts which go to make up the history of this passion could be presented before the reader, he would at once see what an immense obstacle an undue intensity of the passions presents to the unencumbered and vigorous exercise of the Will, when such exercise is put forth or is proposed to be put forth in any direction at variance with the precise line of the passion itself. If

it be otherwise, how can it have happened that many persons of clear perception, and of undoubted powers of intellect in every respect, have nevertheless been the complete slaves of the irresistible sway of the passion now referred to!

There is one individual, whose mournful history is so familiar that a mere suggestion of it will answer our purpose; we refer to the English poet Cowper. The passion of fear in this amiable and interesting writer (operating undoubtedly on a constitution easily excited and nervous) was so undue in its influence, that the will was often entirely overcome and prostrated, and he was often unable to perform what other persons, greatly his inferiors in the length and breadth of intellectual perception, would have conceived a very easy thing to be done. While in some respects (all those which go to constitute a man of literature and a poet) but very few men could justly claim a superiority over him, he sunk in others to the grade of infantile weakness; and so conscious was he of this, that his vivid imagination represented himself as the subject of ridicule and sport among those he met with in the streets.

We recollect to have seen it represented in a German writer of deserved celebrity, that the key to the character of the Apostle Peter, whose active and benevolent life was often strangely anomalous and inconsistent with itself, is to be found in the undue operation of the passion of fear. And there seems to be much truth in the remark. If one will carefully recall the incidents in the life of that devout and faithful follower of our Saviour, he will readily recognise how applicable the remark is. When the disciple, with an undue confidence which is not unfrequently found associated with an undue susceptibility to fear, assured the Saviour he would not forsake him though all others should, he undoubtedly uttered what he felt, and what he felt, too, when he made the asseveration, most deeply and sincerely. But when the Saviour's prospects were clouded, when the hour of

the prince and of the powers of darkness came, when the shepherd was smitten and the smiters seemed to have all might in their hands, then it was that those intense misgivings and fears, to which this devoted follower of Christ had probably been always subject, came rushing in, billow upon billow, till they overwhelmed all the landmarks of love and of duty, and bore him away captive into the camp of the enemy.

We repeat it, therefore, that we should carefully study the nature of the appetites, propensities, and affections; we must make them the objects of a patient and assiduous culture; we must, in particular, subject them to a strict supervision and control; otherwise, in some unexpected hour, they will arise in their might, and, in defiance of the clamours of conscience and the struggles of the volitional power, will bring the whole man under their dominion.—True as it undoubtedly is that the will has a real and substantive power in itself, it is still true that this power has its limits, and cannot withstand everything; it is still true that every inordinate exercise of the appetites and passions trenches upon the sphere of the volitional faculty, and diminishes something from the freeness and vigour of its action.

§ 198. Importance of repressing the outward signs of the passions.

But is it a fact that the propensities and passions are actually under our control in any degree? It cannot be doubted. Instances have already been given which show it. There is a very striking remark of Mr. Locke on this subject, in his interesting chapter on Power. "Let not any one say he cannot govern his passions, nor hinder them from breaking out and carrying him into action; *for what he can do before a prince or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.*"—But, granting the general fact, the inquiry still remains, What course shall be taken, what particular method shall be adopted, in order to control them and keep them in their place? Our limits will not permit us to undertake an answer

to this question at length, and we shall accordingly leave the whole subject to the reflections and good judgment of the reader, with a few remarks upon a single topic, which is the more interesting as it has seldom attracted notice; certainly not that degree of notice to which it is justly entitled.—There is a tendency in every emotion and passion to express itself outwardly by means of natural signs, such as the motions of the eye, the changes of colour in the countenance, the movements of the muscles, and the tones of the voice. As the tendency is a natural one, it may be difficult to control it entirely; but it is highly important to attempt to do so. And the reason is (and a singular fact it is in the economy of the mind), that the outward expression reacts upon the inward principle, and gives increased intensity to the internal feeling. "As every emotion of the mind," says Mr. Stewart, "produces a sensible effect on the bodily appearance, so, upon the other hand, when we assume any strongly expressive look, and accompany it with appropriate gestures, some degree of the correspondent emotion is apt to arise within us. Mr. Burke informs us that he has often been conscious of the passion of anger rising in his breast, in consequence of counterfeiting its external signs; and I have little doubt that, with most individuals, the result of a similar experiment will be the same. Campanella, too, the celebrated philosopher and physiognomist (as Mr. Burke further observes), when he wished to form a judgment of what was passing in the mind of another, is said to have mimicked, as accurately as possible, his appearance at the moment, and then to have directed his attention to the state of his own feelings."*

Furthermore, as the tendency of the emotions and passions is to express themselves outwardly, every suppression of the outward signs operates as a direct rebuke and curtailment of the passions themselves. The passions, when they are excited, are of such a violent

* Stewart's Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. iii., ch. ii., § ii.

nature, that they require an open field, a free, unencumbered circuit; and they cannot well exist in their higher degrees of intensity without this opportunity of expansion and of unencumbered action. Shut them up, therefore, in the bosom; enclose them amid the dim shades and the walls of the penetralia of the soul, and they will necessarily wither and die. When they are thus enclosed, they will not be more likely to live and flourish than the tree will that is shut out from the light of the sun and from the genial airs of heaven.

This is a principle of great practical consequence in the government of the passions, and, of course, in the discipline of the will. Never give to the passions (of course, it will be understood that we have no reference to the mild and benevolent passions, but to the evil, and malignant, and angry passions) an outward expression, either verbal or physiognomical, with the exception of those cases where the actual state of things does undoubtedly require it. We may suppose a case, where we may not only be angry with a person, but where also it is desirable that he should know it; but in a vast majority of cases, it is exceedingly better that they should be known only to the bosom where they originate. In one of the well-known Resolutions of President Edwards, which are worthy of the attention of the mere philosopher as well as of the Christian, after resolving against uneasiness and fretfulness in a certain case, he resolves further, never to suffer the effects of such uneasiness or fretfuness, "so much as in the least alteration of speech or motion of my eye." A strong intimation, to say the least, how unbecoming he considered the outward expression of the unamiable passions, and how injurious, in ordinary cases, he deemed such an expression to the subject of them.

§ 199. Of enlightening the intellect in connexion with the discipline of the will.

But, in order to give the will a suitable opportunity of action by removing the obstructions in its way, and

especially in order to furnish an adequate and ample basis for its operations, we must go further back than the Sensibilities, which are in immediate proximity with it, and consider it in its connexion with the Intellect. This is a prominent and leading view of the whole subject of the discipline of the will. It cannot be doubted that, among the most available and decisive methods of aiding and regulating the action of the will, we must include the illumination of the intellect. As a general thing, the voluntary power will act the more decisively in reference to any given object, in proportion as such object is the more fully understood. We do not mean to say that the perceptions of the intellect alone, and without anything further, will furnish a basis for the action of the will. The Intellect and the Will are not entirely separated from each other; but they have only an indirect connexion. The intellect reaches and operates, and, we may say, *powerfully* operates, upon the will through the medium of the sensibilities. For instance, we are required to pursue a certain course, but it certainly cannot be expected that we should have any feeling in the case, or that we should put forth any action in respect to it, until we understand what it is. Why is it that men are so inactive, so supine on subjects of the greatest moment to the welfare of the whole human race? It is, because, wholly taken up with their own private affairs, they do not give their attention to them; they do not investigate and understand them; of course, they do not feel, and, being destitute of feeling, they do not act. Hundreds of millions of the human race are living and dying without any of those aids and consolations which a knowledge of the religion of Jesus Christ is calculated to impart. And yet it is universally admitted, both in consideration of the reasonableness of the thing and of the commands of Scripture, that it is a duty incumbent on Christian nations to see that blessed Gospel sent to them without delay. But why is it that so few feel in heart what they acknowledge speculatively, and that almost

none are found to offer themselves as personal labourers in this great and glorious work? It is because (at least this is one great and prominent reason, if it be not the only one) their inquiries have been too limited; they have been satisfied with generalities and abstract truisms, without carefully and seriously estimating, even in a single instance, the extent of that degradation and suffering which are incidental to the state of heathenism.

We would illustrate the prominent idea of this section by another topic. One of the greatest evils which has ever afflicted the human race is that of war. But still only a very few individuals appear to be fully awake to its dreadful atrocity, and are seriously, and with an earnestness proportioned to the importance of these movements, arraying their efforts and their influence against its continuance. The great mass of mankind are indifferent and inert. And how can we account for it? In the same way we account for their indifference to the spread of the Gospel. It is owing (we do not say wholly, but in a great degree certainly) to inattention to the subject, and consequent ignorance of it. They dwell upon a few general and often erroneous conceptions of skill and heroism, as they are detailed in the pages of a government Gazette, but they do not bring distinctly and fixedly before their eyes the burnings, and the devastations, and the famine which overspread the country; they do not behold the wounds, and the protracted suffering, and the horrid forms of the battle-field; they do not listen to the mourning and the lamentation of the bereaved father and mother, whose gray hairs go down with sorrow to the grave. If they would but once consider the subject in all its facts and in all its bearings, they could not fail both to feel and to act; they would at once lift up a note of remonstrance which should reach their rulers, and compel them to stop in their ministrations of blood.

§ 200. Further remarks on the same subject.

A multitude of similar illustrations might be brought forward. In almost any case whatever, if we can induce a person to examine a subject with a view to action, the work is half done. And what is true of others is true of ourselves. If we propose to act, we must think seriously upon that, whatever it is, to which the proposed action relates. The proper, and, we may add, the *indispensable* preliminary to action, is investigation. We are so constituted that it is impossible for us to put forth a volition without a motive, without some antecedent feeling, without some appetite, some desire, some moral feeling already existing in the mind. But it is equally impossible, as has already appeared in the chapter on the Relation of the Intellect to the Will, that the various emotions and desires should exist, without some specific object perceived by the understanding, to which such emotions and desires relate. It is a fundamental law of our nature that there can be no action of the will without feeling, and that there can be no fecling without intellection. There is, therefore, an indirect, but a very intimate and important connexion between the intellect and the will. If we would will, we must feel; and if we would feel, we must understand. As a general thing (it will be noticed that we do not lay down the proposition as one admitting of no exception whatever), the will corresponds to the intellect; the action of the will is in a line with the action of the intellect; and changes in the intellect will almost necessarily induce corresponding changes in the sentient and volitional parts of the mental constitution. And hence it happens, that what is desired at one time, will soon cease to be desired when presented to the mind in some new light. What is warmly approved at one time will suddenly become, on further examination and knowledge of all the circumstances, an object of disapprobation. And, on the other hand, objects of disapprobation and aversion may soon become, on further inquiry, objects of approbation and desire. In

this way, by exerting our powers of inquiry and reasoning, and by presenting new facts to the mind, we are continually presenting new motives, and are indirectly, but very effectively, operating changes in the action of the volitional faculty; and (what is an important circumstance in this connexion) these inquiries are made, and these changes are brought about, under the direction of the will itself. And thus, in the wonderful constitution of the human mind, there are wheels within wheels; effective springs of action operating upon each other; motives regulating the will, and the will taking a different direction and regulating the motives; a reciprocal action and influence of each part without detriment to its appropriate nature.

§ 201. Of aiding the will by a reference to the regard of others.

We may sometimes give strength to the action of the will, in those numerous cases where we find ourselves vacillating, and uncertain what to do, by various aids external to ourselves. As our Creator never designed that men should live isolated from each other and alone, so he has admirably fitted them up with those mental capacities and tendencies which are precisely adapted to a state of society. While he has implanted within them a strong desire for each other's company, which brings them together in communities, he has, at the same time, so constituted them, that they naturally exercise a regard and esteem for whatever is kind, honourable, and upright. And it is altogether suitable and just that they should avail themselves of this arrangement of things in whatever way it can be made subordinate to the discharge of their personal duties, and to the general perfection of their character. In a single word, they are at liberty to sustain themselves in any proposed course of action by taking into view, and by receiving, as an encouragement to them, the favourable estimates of public opinion.

We would not, however, be understood to say that

a regard to the good opinion of others should be the sole and paramount rule of conduct, since our constitution developes a higher rule, that of the moral sense, to which every other one is not only subordinate, but responsible. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true, that a suitable regard, as has been remarked, may safely and justly be paid to the favourable opinions of our fellow-men. The regard and approbation which they not unfrequently bestow on those whose conduct they are called upon to witness is one of those natural rewards which the Creator has appointed as an attendant upon virtue. When, therefore, we are strongly tempted, by the influence of prejudice, passion, or self-interest, to pursue an erroneous though pleasing and favourite course, it is important to aid the will by presenting before it, as a counteracting motive, the judgment of enlightened public sentiment; remembering that there is something in the heart of man which is instinctively responsive to the just and true in human conduct, not only to condemn or approve such conduct as right or wrong, but to despise or to honour it as ennobling or as degrading. He whose fixed and immoveable volition is always coincident with the requisitions of immutable rectitude, is cheered by the hearty and consentient voice of the wise and good; while he who yields himself to an evil course, or even weakly vacillates between the right and the wrong, can expect nothing but their aversion and their frowns.

§ 202. Of aiding the will by a reference to the conscience.

But particularly in those conflicts of life where we find the will halting between two opinions, we should refer, as has already been intimated, to the consolations and guidance of that higher power within us, the Moral Sense. It is undoubtedly true that we may derive strength from an enlightened public sentiment; but it cannot be denied that public opinion is always changeable and sometimes wrong. We may perhaps admit that, in a large majority of cases, it is just in its decisions; but still it is obviously so imperfect as a

rule of action, that we greatly need some other; not, perhaps, of a more amiable aspect, but certainly more lofty in its bearing and more inflexible in its requisitions. He who constantly subjects himself to the influence of the general rule that conscience is never to be violated, who strictly observes it in small things as well as in great, is a tower of strength to himself. Beginning to feel as if he were in some degree acting up to the dignity of his nature, he finds within himself a fountain of joy springing up with spontaneous and everlasting freshness. While he builds, as it were, a mighty wall around the will to prevent its erring into forbidden paths, he at the same time gives it direct and positive strength to pursue its onward and allotted course. In all cases whatever, however we may explain the fact, *rectitude is strength.* If it is true that knowledge is power, it is still more so that moral uprightness is power. It will always be found that he who faithfully walks within the magical circle of virtue, experiences an invisible protection; but when the limit is once passed over, he is left to himself, and rushes headlong. There is profound wisdom in the terse and emphatic expressions of a Roman writer, that a single departure from rectitude prepares the way for a greater downfall: "UBI SEMEL RECTO DEERRATUM EST, IN PRÆCEPS PERVENITUR."

§ 203. Of the aids furnished by the principle of imitation.

We here take the liberty of recalling to the reader's notice a remark already made, to the effect that the power of the will is a definite thing; that, although it may not be precisely the same in every individual, it has nevertheless, in every case, its fixed limits of capability and action; and that we cannot reasonably expect from it what is obviously beyond its ability. And hence the propriety of always keeping in mind its true nature; of carefully considering what it *can* do, and what it *cannot* do, in order to aid it in cases of doubt and trial in every possible way.

Among other directions important to be kept in

mind, we may make the further remark, that the operations of the will may be greatly aided by availing ourselves of the principle of Imitation. Of the nature of this principle we propose to say nothing further than to remark, in a word, that it is an original one, and is very extensive and powerful in its influence; perhaps there is none more so. Hence in common life, and particularly on extraordinary occasions, we find constant appeals to it. When soldiers are on the eve of a battle, the commander instigates them to the great and decisive effort, not only by the consideration of what is due to their country, but by setting before them the example of others who fell in the renowned fields of war. In the numerous and sanguinary battles of Napoleon, he rarely permitted his soldiers to advance into the conflict without reminding them of the great days and heroes of victory, and endeavouring to inflame their courage and to increase their energy by proposing for their imitation the soldiers of Lodi and Marengo, of Jena and Austerlitz.

It will be naturally understood that we introduce this instance merely as an example of the power of the principle, and of the use which has been made of it. It would be much to be lamented if there were no other examples than those of a military kind to sustain in trial, and to encourage to endurance and effort in trying emergencies. In the ordinary trials of life; in those perplexities which assail us from every side; in those afflictions, both bodily and mental, which poor and corrupted humanity is heir to, we often feel our best resolutions breaking up and giving way, and we should wholly fall into despair did we not draw encouragement and support from the faith and fortitude of those who have been in similar situations. Discouraged and fainting, we rest our weary heads on the bosoms of those who have gone before us, and find ourselves refreshed. The Scriptures themselves fully recognise the propriety of this resource, and furnish us with some striking examples of an appeal to it. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, in particu-

lar, seems to have availed himself of this principle of our nature. After mentioning Abel, and Enoch, and Abraham, and Moses, and a multitude of others, that great host of olden time, who subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, had trials of mockings, scourgings, and imprisonment, and of whom, in a word, the world was not worthy, he adds, as if he would instigate those whom he addressed to follow an example so glorious, "Wherefore, seeing we also are encompassed about by so great a cloud of witnesses, let *us* lay aside every weight, and the sin which doth so easily beset us, and let us run with patience the race that is set before us." The sacred writers everywhere encourage and exhort us to follow in the path of our blessed Redeemer; "*who suffered for us, leaving us an example that we should follow his steps.*" And how many, in all ages of the world, have turned their weeping eyes to the Captain of their salvation; and beholding him firm and unmoved in temptation, constant and persevering in his labours, patient in suffering, benevolent and forgiving to his enemies, having but the one great object of doing his Father's will, have been transformed into the likeness of his glorious image, and, like him, have been made perfect through tribulation?

§ 204. Of aiding the will by placing ourselves in circumstances which do not admit of a retreat.

We may sometimes aid the action of the will by placing ourselves in a position from which there is no retreat. We sometimes express it by saying that we have taken, or are about to take, a decisive step; meaning a step which is more or less an irretrievable one; a step which fully and completely pledges us to a certain course. We may suppose, with some reason, that Julius Cæsar, when he approached the banks of the Rubicon, felt some hesitation and vacillancy of purpose; he scarcely knew himself what he was going to do; his will stood balancing on a pivot; and it was

uncertain in which direction it would throw itself; but when he had once passed the small stream that constituted the boundary of his province; when, by a single movement onward, he had changed his position in relation to the government of his country, then all was done; there was no possibility of retreat; his purpose at once became fixed, irrevocable, unchangeable.

In many cases in common life, when the will is vacillating between various objects, we may establish it firmly and for ever by a step onward, by placing ourselves in a new position, by appealing to a Higher Power for the uprightness of our intentions, and making an irretrievable movement. And we have here an effective principle of action; one, upon the application of which the most important issues have sometimes depended. The true course of action, in all cases where the path of duty is unquestionably plain, and when, at the same time, the world and its allurements interpose to hinder us from entering into that path, is, not to sit down sluggishly and hold an inglorious parley with the suggestions of indolence and vice, but to move forward, to commit ourselves at once, to take a decided step, to throw ourselves into the breach, and let the consequences take care of themselves.

§ 205. The effects of habit in giving strength to the will.

In illustrating that course which is to be taken in order to give strength to the will, it is proper and important to bring into account the great principle or law of habit. Of the nature and tendencies of this law, it is enough to say in this connexion, that no other law of our mental constitution is capable of so entirely modifying the mental action as this. We often see its results in the case of the vicious man, whose unholy propensities go on strengthening and strengthening under its influence, till they assume the stubbornness and inflexibility of iron. But the principle in question is as powerful for good as for evil; and we do not fully understand the secret of our own strength

till we have learned its power, and how to apply it. When we set out upon a course of virtue, our resolution may be feeble; not unfrequently we shall find ourselves faltering in our purpose; and it seems to be with great difficulty that the volitional power is fully brought up into a line with that course which we deem it important to pursue. But it is the result of the principle of habit, that every act of the Will in this right direction gives vivacity and strength to the succeeding act. So that, if a man once enters upon a virtuous course, if he once sets his foot into the strait and narrow way, then every step which he takes will greatly increase the elasticity and the ease, the rapidity and firmness of his movement.

§ 206. Of strengthening the will by religious considerations.

Finally, we may give great strength and energy to the action of the Will by means of religious considerations. Let it ever be our serious desire and determination, in the numerous perplexities and temptations of life, to look constantly to that beneficent Power who presides over the destiny of men and of worlds, and without whom (whatever human pride may assert to the contrary) there is no race to the swift and no battle to the strong. Everything of a religious nature, the goodness of God, the condescension and love of Christ, the completeness and mercy of the methods of salvation, the shortness and rapidity of time, the solemnities of death, the fact that all our deeds are to be brought into judgment, a limitless eternity, the joys of heaven, and the wretchedness of a rejection from God's favour; all these things may operate upon the mind, either singly or with various forms and degrees of combination; and as they cluster around the great principles of action, they will be found infusing into them an element of vitality, and imparting a strength which can be derived from no other source. The world is full of instances. In all periods of the history of the human race, men have witnessed the power of religious considerations in imparting patience,

endurance, and vigor of purpose. They have seen it in the chamber of sickness, in the solitary dungeon, on the iron bed of torture, in the flaming furnace, in the voluntary exile among barbarous tribes, in hunger, and cold, and nakedness, in dens and caves of the earth, in desert islands and wildernesses. Other considerations may undoubtedly give strength, but those of religion give *more;* mere worldly motives may impart a considerable degree of vigour, but the ennobling incentives, drawn from the character and government of God, inspire an energy far more intense, as well as more elevated and pure.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

We thus bring these discussions to a close. Beginning with the Intellect in its External or Sensational form of action, we have seen under what circumstances the mind begins to acquire knowledge, and what mental powers are first developed. Proceeding to the form of intellectual action, which may be discriminated as the Internal or Super-sensational, we notice the developement of other and higher powers, through which we have a knowledge of those things which are not cognizable by powers operating directly through the senses. The action of the Intellect lays the foundation for the developement of the second great department of the mind—the Sensibilities. In correspondence with the fact that man, the created and finite mind, sustains relations to the uncreated and Infinite Mind, the Sensibilities divide themselves into the Natural or Pathematic, which has reference to the natural good of things, and the Moral, which, in recognising all possible facts and relations, establishes the rectitude or moral good of things. And it is thus that a foundation is laid for the developement of the third great department of the mind—the Will. The Will, added to the Sensibilities and the Intellect, discloses a relative adjustment and completeness of man's nature which is full of interest. He stands before us, in view of the examination of the mind which has been gone through in its successive departments, complete in all that is essential to knowledge, emotion, and action; not only great in himself, but great also in the multiplied and important relations he sustains; not only a perceptive and æsthetic, but a moral, responsible, and religious being.

THE END.

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